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The section that follows attempts to summarise the major themes and issues raised during the General Debate and cluster discussions, including the three special sessions devoted to the FMCT, Middle East and Security Assurances. Thirty-three statements were made in the General Debate, which was open. The cluster debates were closed to observers and NGOs (1). In each section, the relevant references in the Treaty or the 1995 decisions are summarised. This is followed by the relevant parts of the NAM's working paper, presented by Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia during the General Debate. Few NAM members spoke during the debates, arguably because they were satisfied with the general representation of their views in the collective working paper, which had been developed over the previous months among delegations in New York, co-ordinated by Indonesia. Although the EU and associated States also made collective presentations to many of the sessions, a number of European delegations also made quite detailed statements, which are treated individually.
Fewer than 30 delegations contributed, with the rest remaining silent or even absent from the meetings. It was to be expected that the General Debate would consist of statements of national positions. To the disappointment of many of the participants, however, the cluster debates took exactly the same form. Some useful information and ideas were put forward, but there was very little debate or discussion. After the NWS gave their individual and, in some cases, quite detailed accounts of steps they had taken towards implementing the Treaty, there seemed to be neither the structure nor inclination for questions, responses or analysis. It was rare for anyone even to pick up on points made by previous speakers, although a few used the opportunity to support others' proposals. Not all the time allocated was taken up, even for the most contentious issues, nuclear disarmament and the Middle East; the sessions on safeguards and non-military uses of nuclear energy petered out quite quickly, after a handful of (mostly Western) States had presented their positions. Among advocates of the review process there was considerable frustration that most of the time was taken up in sterile exchanges of national positions, rather than in debate and problem-solving.
Nuclear Disarmament
The majority of States which spoke during the General Debate devoted significant time to nuclear disarmament. Three sessions of the cluster debate were also allocated to the issues arising from the articles and preambular paragraphs relating to nuclear disarmament.
The primary article laying out the nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT is Article VI, as follows: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Articles I and II also cover nuclear arms control, if not (strictly speaking) disarmament, with obligations not to "transfer nuclear weapons other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly" or encourage or assist in such transfers.
The 1995 P&O prioritised nuclear disarmament (after universality and non-proliferation). Paragraph 3 related to the context, arguing that nuclear disarmament was facilitated by easing of international tension and reaffirming the commitment by the NWS to Article VI. Paragraph 4 contained a programme of action calling for the CTBT to be completed by 1996, for the CD immediately to begin negotiating the proposed FMCT, in accordance with the Shannon report; and for "the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control."
The NAM devoted 8 paragraphs to Article VI. They argued that nuclear weapons "pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization", noting that the provisions of the NPT in this regard had not been fulfilled, and that that the NWS with the biggest arsenals bear particular responsibility. With an eye on discussions about the CD's agenda, the NAM regretted the lack of progress and reaffirmed that priority in disarmament negotiations should be nuclear weapons "in accordance with the Final Document" of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (UNSSOD IV, 1978). The NAM working paper called for the CD to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, taking into account all proposals for G-21 members (2) and also to: "commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination." One paragraph renewed the call for a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons, as discussed in the section on the fissile materials treaty.
The NAM working paper reaffirmed the importance of "the fullest implementation" of Article I and II, calling on the NWS and NNWS to "refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons States [and NWS], and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements." This was widely taken to be a pointed reference both to Israel and to NATO and other nuclear umbrella alliances.
Nuclear-Weapon States
The five NWS each provided a more-or-less detailed account of their intentions, achievements and progress on cutting or limiting their nuclear weapons, but the format of the cluster debate seemed to preclude questions or any real discussion or exchange of views about these issues (3).
In both the General Debate and cluster 1, Norman Wulf provided a comprehensive overview of the "numerous practical steps" taken by the United States in support of its NPT obligations, devoting considerable time to Article VI. Referring to the bilateral START process and multilateral CTBT, as "classic disarmament" approaches, Wulf also outlined arms control measures such as the unilateral reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, detargeting, cessation of fissile materials production and attempts to increase fissile material transparency. He stressed that the US wanted its NPT partners "to recognise and understand the relationship between this range of 'non-classic' arms control measures and the nuclear disarmament process." As far as Washington was concerned, the NNWS did not have a role in nuclear weapon reduction negotiations, but in helping to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament to make progress, for example, in supporting strengthened safeguards, compliance with other global arms control measures, reductions in "destabilising concentrations of conventional forces", and greater transparency and confidence-building measures, regional as well as global.
Grigori Berdennikov enumerated Russian arms reductions under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and START I. He noted Russia's "unilateral disarmament initiatives" in reducing tactical nuclear weapons and spoke of Russia's efforts to withdraw plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from military programmes. Taking aim at NATO's continuing nuclear policies, Berdennikov reiterated Russia's call for nuclear weapons not to be placed outside the territory of the nuclear States. Referring unmistakably to US plans for modernisation and missile defence, Berdennikov warned that continued progress in nuclear weapon reductions would only be possible "if appropriate guaranties are provided against reproducing the nuclear arms race of the past". Russia welcomed initiatives to make Central and East Europe and Central Asia into areas free of nuclear weapons. While arguing that it would be "untimely and, consequently, counterproductive" for the CD to start talks on a time-table for nuclear disarmament, Berdennikov instead issued a challenge to Britain, China and France, saying that Russia "would like to see the other nuclear powers joining the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons".
In his statement for China, Sha Zukang noted that "nuclear disarmament, which has direct bearings on every State's security, attracts most attention from the international community" and commented that "we still have a long way to go". Sha said that "China was forced to develop a very limited nuclear force due to historical reasons". He accused "some countries" of clinging to a "Cold War mentality" by expanding military blocs and developing "sophisticated hi-tech weapons" and argued that the NWS should abandon nuclear deterrence policies and conclude legally binding no-use and no-first-use agreements. He argued that warheads removed from dismantled nuclear warheads should be destroyed rather than merely stored for future recycling. China's concerns about US plans to develop strategic missile defence systems were underlined several times, as Sha noted that such plans "violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, jeopardise regional and global strategic security and stability, hamper further progress in nuclear disarmament, and may even trigger a new round of the arms race." China appealed once again that "a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons be concluded at an early date like the conventions banning chemical and biological weapons."
Joëlle Bourgois, speaking for France, said that "the distance travelled in the space of a few years by... France is vast". In addition to supporting multilateral efforts on nuclear disarmament, France had removed all its ground based and tactical nuclear weapons. It had detargeted its remaining weapons and "air and submarine force alert levels have been drawn down in accordance with the new world strategic context." Paris was in the final stage of closing down and dismantling the Moruroa and Fangataufa test sites and planned to begin in 1998 the "final shut-down operations" of the facilities for producing plutonium and HEU at Marcoule and Pierrelatte. Bourgois pointed out that "it is all very well to sign treaties, and even better to ratify them; but ... best of all is to implement them." Noting that France has signed the CTBT, Bourgois called on all others to do likewise and said that there should be ratification by the largest possible number of signatory States, in order to prepare for the conference provided for under Article XIV of the test ban treaty.
Since its Strategic Defence Review had yet to be published (4), Britain's contribution was short on specifics, but contained musings on the international condition. Ian Soutar began by emphasising that Britain's goal was the "global elimination of nuclear weapons". The fundamental question, however, was "how best to set about achieving it". He analysed the differences between the timebound 'map' approach, which "seems to us to smack of unrealistic idealism" and the 'incremental approach', which seeks the next manageable steps. The latter, by dealing with issues in manageable clusters, "is flexible enough to be responsive to varying political conditions". Soutar argued that "in these circumstances, to re-focus now on rigid time-frames or single instruments would be to jettison a tried and tested method for moving towards our goal in order to repeat the errors of [the] past." Soutar opposed comparisons between eliminating nuclear weapons and the elimination of biological and chemical weapons through the BWC and CWC respectively, the latter of which included a time-frame. He said that this approach would not work because "nuclear weapons have played a much more prominent part in the military thinking and planning of their possessors than chemical or biological weapons ever did". An "enormous burden" was on the US and Russia, as the largest weapon states; as for the smaller nuclear powers, their role was "first of all, not to become large nuclear weapon states", which Britain was "more than fulfilling", and secondly, "to accept that in due course they will need to join the larger nuclear weapon states in negotiations about their nuclear weapons." For Britain, due course was when it was "satisfied with progress towards its goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons". Also important would be universal adherence to the BWC and CWC, strengthened collective security, and controlling conventional arms, as well as the actions "taken, or not taken" by India, Israel and Pakistan.
Main Themes
During the General debate and the thirty or so interventions during the closed cluster 1 debates on nuclear disarmament, certain themes recurred frequently. These included:
New Zealand summed up the general mood, noting that while there had been "positive developments" since 1995, "overall our feeling is one of disappointment that more substantive movement has not been possible".
CTBT
Many States wanted the NPT Review process to urge all States to accede to the CTBT. Masabumi Sato, Director of Legal and External Relations for the CTBTO Preparatory Commission gave a brief overview of its work, covering accessions, budget, and establishment of the global verification regime. Noting that of the 44 States required for entry into force, only six (including France and Britain) had ratified, Sato concluded by inviting all States to sign the Treaty and "move forward in their ratification process" so that the CTBT could take effect.
The NAM working paper backed the Treaty and called on the NWS to refrain from "conducting all types of tests" and to "comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT". Sri Lanka underlined its support for a "true CTBT" but warned that "if testing continues under whatever pretext, technical or other, each test would be a blow to the CTBT regime". A number of statements criticised sub-critical testing programmes. Iran said they undermined the provisions of the CTBT and "would certainly open the door to similar undertakings by other nuclear powers".
While Switzerland underlined the CTBT's role in limiting the development of new or qualitatively improved nuclear weapons, others were even more explicit. Sweden, for example, urged the NWS to exercise the "utmost restraint regarding any activity that could undermine the fundamental objectives of the CTBT, including so-called sub-critical experiments." Canada proposed that the NPT PrepCom endorse calls for the political conference to facilitate the CTBT's entry into force (as per Article XIV of the Treaty) to be convened in 1999, before the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Canada's proposal is supported by many States, although there have been reports that Russia and possibly others are pushing for the Conference to take place after 2000. There appears still to be lingering confusion over the exact meaning of the phrase "three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature" in Article XIV. Canada, the originator of the language, and Jaap Ramaker, Chair of the negotiations at the time, stated in August 1996 and have since reconfirmed that the article meant three years, but this has not satisfied all. First the British and, once they dropped their objections, the Russians have argued (not without reason) that the ordinary language interpretation would be four years. International lawyers can justify either interpretation, so in the end, the issue is likely to be resolved according to political expedience.
Furthering START
A large number of delegations stressed the importance of furthering the START process and hoped that Russia would ratify START II soon. While some appeared reasonably satisfied with current progress, others, notably the NAM states, expressed concern that such "limited agreements" did not go far enough. Indonesia castigated the NWS' "self laudatory" references which "cannot conceal that there are still an estimated 36,000 nuclear weapons with their inherent dangers". A number of NAM States and China criticised deterrence doctrine and nuclear policies characterised as belonging to the Cold War era. Iran, for example, argued that to the NWS, the end of the Cold War was merely a phenomenon which dictated changes in strategic and tactical postures, including developing new nuclear weapon systems "to meet the geopolitical requirements of the new international system".
A number of States, including Russia, Sweden, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, Japan, and several NAM delegations have alluded to the importance of involving China, Britain and France more in the future and to encouraging five-power talks on nuclear disarmament issues. Germany, for example, argued that a "START III agreement would be a major step towards creating the conditions for negotiations among all nuclear weapon states..." Those who scrutinise 'diplo-speak' carefully drew a minute measure of hope from the tantalising final paragraph of the otherwise-bland joint 'P-5' statement: "In recognition of the value of the NPT to global security and conscious of our obligations under the Treaty, we will continue to work together for the success of the preparatory process and the 2000 Review Conference and on related issues."[emphasis added] It is more likely that this refers to informal bilateral and occasional plurilateral exchanges, rather than the re-instating of five-power talks on a regular basis in Geneva.
Arguing that NPT Parties should be able to take a direct role, as well as evolving text for future review documents, Canada proposed a 'Draft Statement on Current START Standstill', intended to be issued either by the PrepCom or as a Chair's statement at the end of the PrepCom. The statement built on the 1997 UN General Assembly resolution co-sponsored by the US and Russia (among others), and was intended to encourage START II ratification and further progress on START III. Although Canada's proposal has attracted interest from a number of delegations, Russia and the United States seemed united in the view that it would not further its objective in Russia. Both also expressed opposition to the concept of issuing statements on contemporary issues from the PrepCom.
CD Nuclear Disarmament Committee
In addition to the NAM working paper, many individual non-aligned statements called for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to be established in the CD. Myanmar wanted specific recommendations to the 2000 NPT Review Conference to bring about CD negotiations, first on a legally-binding multilateral instrument committing all States to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and then on nuclear disarmament. Egypt expressed scepticism regarding the CD's decision to hold consultations on nuclear disarmament under the Presidential 'troika', instead calling for an ad hoc committee which could conduct simultaneous negotiations on a fissban and a phased programme for nuclear disarmament.
Several Western States also now back CD work on nuclear disarmament, ranging from support for South Africa's non-negotiating mandate or Canada's proposal for "substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally" to Belgium's very mild proposal for an "ad hoc group for reflection and study". Belgium called for a "regular, open and public exchange of views on nuclear disarmament, its achievements, difficulties and perspectives". Japan called for information exchange and discussion of practical issues in various fora, including the CD and the NPT review process,. Japan hoped that a session of the UN Disarmament Conference in November in Nagasaki would be devoted to practical aspects of nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear Sharing and Tactical Nuclear Weapons
After a few States in 1995 and 1997 had raised the question of nuclear sharing, the NAM working paper this year unmistakably addressed this issue, calling on NPT Parties to refrain from "nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements". The phrasing was intended to cover not only NATO and other nuclear-based alliances, but also the alleged sharing of nuclear technology with non-NPT States, especially Israel. Russia spoke against the deployment of nuclear weapons beyond the territory of the NWS. Having "assessed positively" the NATO declaration regarding not deploying tactical nuclear weapons in the countries scheduled to become new members of the Alliance, Ukraine regarded it of "urgent necessity" to make this pledge mandatory. China's references to NATO expansion were critical but oblique. By contrast, Bangladesh called the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of NNWS a "violation of the spirit of the NPT".
Dr Mahmoud Karem, for Egypt, addressed the justifications of those who cited 'understandings' and the negotiating record from the 1960s. Bearing in mind "certain interpretations of the NPT which would have the Treaty apply only in times of peace", he said, Egypt proposed that "the PrepCom recommend that the 2000 Review Conference state in clear and unambiguous terms that Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allow for no exceptions and that the NPT is binding on States Parties at all times." Somewhat confirming the essence of the criticism, Turkey informed the PrepCom delegates that "apart from the nuclear umbrella of the NATO alliance" Turkey did not possess nuclear weapons and had no intention of doing so.
From a different perspective, Switzerland called for tactical and short range nuclear weapons to be subject to the same levels of transparency and confidence-building as strategic weapons. Finland welcomed the US-Russian (declared) intention of exploring, as part of the START III process, transparency relating to tactical nuclear weapons. In the longer term, however, Finland wanted to "bring tactical nuclear weapons under a regime of contractual nuclear disarmament obligations" with the objective of having short range nuclear weapons withdrawn from operational use and dismantled.
Implementing the P&O Programme
Many of the statements outlined national positions with regard to nuclear disarmament and some proposed language to be included in a 'rolling text' of recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. Several delegations made direct or oblique reference to item 4c of the P&O, "to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons", and to the importance of the steps identified by the Canberra Commission which should be undertaken by the five NWS without delay, such as: taking nuclear weapons off alert; transparency measures for nuclear weapons and military stockpiles of fissile materials; restrictions on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons; opening the ABM Treaty to accession by Britain, China and France; commitments not to modernise or increase the size of nuclear arsenals, and so on. As discussed in Part I, South Africa's pragmatic proposal to give the P&O programme concrete content became a main focus of NWS opposition.
The NAM states, including Mexico, have welcomed these proposals as a positive step forwards. Although Western countries such as New Zealand, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium have expressed interest in this practical approach to addressing nuclear disarmament issues in the review process, others have seemed reluctant, either because they argue that nuclear disarmament gets sufficient attention in the cluster debates, or on the grounds that such focused action by NPT Parties could detract from the work of the CD or the bilateral START process underway. South Africa, however, had emphasised the continued importance of the bilateral reductions (and also future negotiations involving all the NWS). Pretoria's recent role at the forefront of efforts to enable the CD to address nuclear disarmament more effectively also clearly demonstrated its commitment to addressing nuclear disarmament issues in both fora, as is appropriate.
In many ways, the South African proposal to provide a structured mechanism for information exchange between the NWS and NNWS regarding practical steps towards nuclear disarmament is also consistent with growing calls for greater transparency coming from many sides, including the NAM, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, Finland and Belgium.
Fissile Material Treaty
A ban on the production of fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons purposes has been an objective of nuclear disarmament advocates since the 1950s. The 1995 Principles and Objectives in paragraph 4 (b) called for "the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the special co-ordinator of the Conference on disarmament and the mandate contained therein." The statement in question, often called the 'Shannon report' after Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, who crafted it, was agreed by the CD just prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995. A number of CD members, including Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and Algeria had pushed hard for the measure to encompass existing military stockpiles; the NWS, India and Israel, however, remain opposed to negotiations going beyond a 'cut-off' of future production. Shannon achieved consensus on the basis of a carefully crafted fudge. His report contained a core negotiating mandate for the CD covering a basic FMCT prohibiting future production. His report, however, left open the possibility of raising related issues, including stocks, for the negotiations themselves to determine whether such issues would be addressed in the context of the treaty, in parallel, later or not at all.
One session of the cluster debate was devoted to special consideration of issues relating to what most referred to as a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Many delegations also addressed this issue in their statements in the general debate and cluster 1. The majority called on the CD immediately to commence negotiations on an FMCT, in accordance with the Shannon mandate and P&O paragraph 4 (b). Several underlined the importance of the measure because it would place the unsafeguarded facilities of the NWS under IAEA safeguards, thereby rectifying one of the discriminatory aspects of the NPT. They hoped it would promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by capping
'Shannon Report' to the CD
CD/1299, 24 March 1995
Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
At the beginning of last year's session, I was tasked with seeking the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
As you know I held numerous consultations, both bilaterally and with groups and reported formally to this plenary on five occasions in 1994. Mid-way through the last session, consensus was reached that the CD was the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty on this issue. At the end of the session in September, while there was no agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee, there was agreement in principle, that an Ad Hoc Committee be established on this issue as soon as a mandate had been agreed. At that time, the CD asked me to continue consultations on an appropriate mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee in order to enable the convening of this Ad Hoc Committee as soon as possible.
At the beginning of this year's session, the Conference decided to continue consultations on a mandate.
I have since held numerous consultations, and am pleased to report that delegations have agreed that the mandate for such a Committee should be based on Resolution 48/75L of the UN General Assembly, and reads as follows:
1.The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a "Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".
2.The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
3.The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session.
During the course of my consultation, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile materials (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.
Mr President, it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.
Delegations with strong views were able to join consensus so we could all move forward on this issue. This means that an Ad Hoc Committee on Cut-Off can be established and negotiations can begin on this important topic. This has for some time been the common objective of all delegations of this Conference.
I have appreciated the productive contribution and support of all delegations in arriving at this result.
production of plutonium and HEU by the NWS and the so-called threshold States, on which no restraints are presently imposed. Some, like Australia, also argued that the FMCT could "play an important security and confidence-building role in regions of tensions" particularly South Asia and the Middle East.
Japan spoke for many when it condemned three "wasted" years of deadlock in the CD and called on the NPT PrepCom to express "as a whole, its firm determination to commence FMCT negotiations" on the basis of the Shannon Report. Canada proposed language for a P&O rolling text supporting the FMCT commitment and urging the NWS to increase transparency with regard to military stocks of fissile materials and "increase the amount of fissile material declared excess", putting this under permanent safeguards. Morocco said it was essential for the CD to give utmost priority to a fissile materials ban and castigated that body for "wasting time" on less important issues that were already being dealt with in other fora. Indonesia, however, condemned the NWS who, "while willing to end their production are unwilling to give up existing stockpiles". Indonesia wanted a "ban on existing material which also bans future production of weapon-usable fissile material."
Although the NAM working paper called for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD, it de-linked the FMCT from the demand for concurrent negotiations on time-bound nuclear disarmament, as pushed by India since 1996 and contained in the 'Programme of Action' put forward by 28 CD members of the G-21 group of Non-Aligned States in August 1996. The NAM working paper called for "the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as non proliferation of nuclear weapons" taking into account the Shannon report and the "views relating to the scope of the treaty". The treaty should be "non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable."
While supporting Austria's February proposal for the CD to start negotiations on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate, a number of Western delegations have made constructive suggestions for how to address the thorny question of asymmetric stockpiles in conjunction with a cut-off treaty. States such as Japan and South Korea considered that existing stocks could not be included in the FMCT "for various practical reasons", i.e. the reluctance of the declared NWS and some of the de facto NWS to contemplate negotiations on stockpiles. Japan proposed increased transparency and parallel initiatives which could be undertaken among the NWS, and also suggested setting up an expert group under CD auspices to discuss the technical aspects of an FMCT. Canada reiterated its CD proposal for a Presidential statement to redefine the context of the core Shannon mandate, especially with respect to scope negotiations and entry into force. Germany spoke for many in being prepared to "reaffirm or make more explicit" the Shannon report's essential flexibility: "The very carefully crafted Shannon report is balanced and contains all necessary flexibility to address all concerns of the states involved, It was explicitly agreed that the mandate contained in the Shannon report does not preclude any delegation from raising certain issues... the outcome of negotiations... should not be prejudged." Norway affirmed the four points in its 1997 proposal for voluntary transparency measures, including co-operative international measures to clarify and confirm the voluntary declarations, with encouragement for the NWS to permit inspections of their holdings and agreed monitored reductions of the stockpiles. Several delegations supported moves to put fissile material designated as "excess" by the NWS under safeguards. Some, including Switzerland, wanted to go further, arguing that all plutonium and HEU from weapons dismantled under disarmament agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards.
One of the more innovative proposals came from Australia, building on the statement of the Foreign Minister to the CD in February. Recognising that if approaches to a FMCT are to succeed, they must take account of the security situations of the NWS and non-NPT states and their regions, Australia put forward the view of a cut-off treaty not as a stand alone, one-off negotiation, but rather as "a framework instrument which evolves into a comprehensive regime governing the production, stockpiling and disposition of fissile material". Accordingly, Australia proposed that the conclusion of a first treaty codifying a basic FMCT should be followed by a second agreement, "providing for greater transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually bringing fissile material stocks under strict and effective international control". Verification would require "an innovative, multifaceted approach involving a balance of bilateral, plurilateral and appropriate international - and possibly regional - arrangements..."
NAM countries, including Egypt, Indonesia and South Africa, emphasised the importance of any fissban covering not only future but also past production as well as the management of weapon-usable fissile materials. Indonesia posed five questions to be addressed in fissban negotiations: How can past and future production best be addressed? Should stocks of materials be declared and limits placed on their uses? Should continued production be permitted for non-weapons purposes? What would be the best verification mechanism for a cut-off agreement? Would the IAEA be given a role or should another verification mechanism be devised? Indonesia called for plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads to be placed in internationally-monitored storage "in order to assure that they will not be re-used for weapons".
The EU, France, Britain and the United States laid out their reasons for getting FMCT negotiations underway, relating the measure both to nuclear disarmament objectives and to non-proliferation. By contrast with earlier assertions by British and French representatives, they stressed that the Shannon mandate permitted discussion of stocks and the "appropriate scope" of the FMCT. The UK representative said that Britain had not altered its view with regard to leaving stocks out of the scope, but "we recognise that that Shannon statement and mandate allow others to raise the issue in the negotiations. So let us get the negotiations started and debate the issues where they should be debated - in negotiations and not in pre-negotiations." Britain castigated the delaying tactics of some CD members and called on all NPT parties who are also CD members to go to the next session of the CD with "a united determination" to see a FMCT committee established. Saying that Israel, which was not a CD member in 1995, had not indicated an unwillingness to enter into negotiations, and that India and Pakistan, two non NPT States in the CD which have raised different kinds of objections to the proposed FMCT, had accepted the Shannon report in 1995, Britain considered "that it is as much in their interests to do so again now as it was to do it then - if not more so." France said that a world-wide halt to the production of nuclear explosive materials and the associated verification were necessary for regional and world security. Having itself taken the decision not only to halt the production of plutonium and HEU for weapons, but of "decommissioning its production facilities, how could France accept the fact that the others... should preserve an option that it has ruled out for itself and shirk the commitment which it has, for its part, honoured in advance?"
The P-5 statement, however, called for immediate negotiations on a "non-discriminatory, universal and internationally verifiable" FMCT [emphasis added]. Canada drew particular attention to the replacement of the Shannon language of 'universally applicable' with the more stringent 'universal' requirement. Canada was concerned that if the NWS were going to reinterpret the mandate as requiring universality as a condition of agreement rather than as a desirable goal, it could "complicate or retard" getting the FMCT.
Safeguards
Article III of the NPT mandates all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to undertake safeguards agreements (bilaterally or collectively with other States) with the IAEA "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Article III also commits each State party not to provide source or special fissionable material, equipment and so on to any NNWS without the required safeguards. Article III also specifies that the safeguards should be implemented "to avoid hampering the economic or technical development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities..."
The 1995 P&O reiterate the Article III obligations and enshrine the IAEA as the "competent authority responsible to verify and assure" compliance with its safeguards agreements. Paragraph 11 supports the regular assessment and, where appropriate, strengthening of the safeguards regime by measures such as the 93+2 programme and the additional Protocol adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors. Paragraph 12 specifies that new supply arrangements must be accompanied by acceptance of the IAEA's full scope safeguards "and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". In effect, this would prohibit the supply of nuclear-related materiel, equipment and technology to countries which have neither joined the NPT nor a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement, i.e. India, Israel and Pakistan. Paragraph 13 recommends that fissile materials transferred by the NWS from military use should be placed under safeguards and that "safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved".
The NAM working paper contained five paragraphs on Article III. Rejecting attempts by those NAM members opposed to export controls to identify the IAEA as the sole competent authority for verifying compliance with the NPT, the statement reiterated support for the IAEA as the competent authority, "an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III undertakings". With implied criticism of countries, such as the United States, which tend to rely on their own intelligence resources and to act unilaterally or through the UN Security Council, the NAM working paper wanted any concerns about non-compliance to be directed to the IAEA, for the IAEA to decide on an appropriate response. The NAM supported the principles regarding new supply arrangements and fullscope safeguards and called for excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and fissile materials removed from nuclear weapons to be placed under IAEA safeguards. They underlined the necessity for protecting the Article IV "inalienable right" to nuclear energy, asserting that "no state party [be] limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA". Like the EU interventions and others, the NAM argued for the IAEA to have the financial and human resources to discharge its functions regarding technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. South Africa and Japan especially underlined the need for greater efficiency so that the enhanced safeguards would be more "cost-effective".
Of the few national statements in the cluster debate, there was generally expressed support for the IAEA Model Protocol adopted on 15 May 1997, which gave greater powers to the IAEA to check declarations and inspect undeclared sites. The EU considered that the Model Protocol, once implemented, would substantially strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system, providing a more complete picture of nuclear activities and giving the IAEA increased ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. The UK and France congratulated themselves on going beyond the narrow requirements applicable to them as NWS, viewing the adoption of the additional protocols by the entire EU as "an example and a symbol". South Africa argued that "together with the nuclear export controls system", safeguards provided the context in which the promotion of non-military uses of nuclear energy could take place. Arguing that the system of safeguards offered a parallel mechanism for confidence building and nuclear arms reductions, South Africa urged the NWS to apply "as many of the provisions of the Model Protocol as possible" and also urged the non-NPT parties to consider applying some of the provisions to their own situations.
The EU and several others backed the Trilateral Initiative of Russia, the United States and the IAEA regarding the transfer of fissile materials from military to civilian use, under safeguards. Canada joined calls for greater transparency concerning nuclear weapon-usable fissile materials "as well as significant reductions in existing stockpiles of such material, with the objective of their elimination." Canada called on all the NWS to "make arrangements to place permanently under IAEA safeguards agreements nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities." The EU welcomed the French-German-Russian project to convert excess weapons plutonium from Russia into MOX fuel. Britain argued that some provisions in the UK's additional Protocol went beyond its commitments to the IAEA Board; for example, by providing information not required of the NWS on nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities involving nuclear material.
Many delegations called for greater transparency regarding military nuclear stockpiles and fissile materials obtained from dismantled weapons. Arguing for measures that would enhance the "irreversibility of nuclear disarmament", Japan said fissile materials from dismantled weapons should be "managed and disposed of in such a way that they cannot be reused for military purposes", starting with "surplus" stocks. The United States suggested the NWS should make arrangements with the IAEA "as soon as practicable" to ensure that fissile materials no longer required for defence purposes (as determined by each NWS for itself) are "never again used for nuclear weapons". In supporting the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium agreed by nine countries in December 1997, the EU noted that the NWS had "reiterated their intention" to take steps towards putting plutonium transferred from military to civil activities under IAEA safeguards "on a voluntary basis".
Several statements raised concern about non-compliance with their safeguards agreements by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iraq, which France, in devoting most of its statement to these derelictions, referred to as "a major challenge". The EU called on Iraq to comply fully with the 23 February Memorandum of Understanding (1998) and relevant resolutions of the Security Council and reminded Baghdad that full compliance would permit the lifting of sanctions, whereas further violations would have "severest consequences". Japan commended the IAEA for its efforts in monitoring facilities in DPRK but regretted that "there continues to be non-compliance in important aspects of the Safeguards Agreement between North Korea and the IAEA." Like the EU and others, Japan and South Korea stressed the importance of the full implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States. In the debate on the Middle East, Iraq said that it supported the strengthening of IAEA safeguards: "This has always been Iraq's position since it joined the Agency more than thirty years ago. Iraq is now renewing this support, since we are now at an extremely critical and dangerous stage which will not allow further procrastination and illegitimate aspirations based on weapons and other forms of force." Iraq argued that it had fully co-operated with UNSCOM and the IAEA and complied with what was required, but was still being "subjected to political pressure".
Several delegations raised concerns about illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, nuclear safety and physical protection. Canada called on all States to adopt the IAEA's recommendations on physical protection in INFCIRC 225 rev.3 and argued for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials to be reviewed as soon as possible "with the goal of determining the adequacy of the current regime and extending the Convention if required."
Universality and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Universality became of increasing importance as more States joined the NPT, and as certain States deliberately remained outside, keeping their nuclear options open. Concerns about the nuclear programmes of India, Israel and Pakistan, in particular, may be discussed under the rubric of universality or in terms of the desirability of establishing NWFZ in those regions. Following pressure from Egypt in 1997, special time was allocated to the Middle East issue, which is therefore considered separately, below.
The 1995 P&O devoted its first operative paragraph to universality as an objective of the review process: "Universal adherence to the Treaty... is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States to achieve this objective."
Article VII of the NPT enshrines the right of groups of states "to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories". The 1995 P&O reaffirmed that "internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned" enhance peace and security. Where some states advocated strong language calling on the NWS to respect such zones, opposition from some of the NWS ensured that the P&O could only state the obvious that "the cooperation of all the NWS and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols".
Four NWFZ have now been concluded: The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, covering Latin America and the Caribbean; the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, covering the South Pacific; the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, covering Africa; and the 1997 Treaty of Bangkok, covering South East Asia. Following Cuba's signature (though not as yet ratification), the NWFZ established by the Tlatelolco Treaty is now whole, and must be counted a major success for non-proliferation, especially in view of the earlier nuclear ambitions of some of its members. After many years of continued nuclear testing by France finally ended, the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga were finally signed by Britain, France and the United States in March 1996, with Washington yet to ratify. After delays due to conflict over the status of Diego Garcia, claimed by Mauritius but ceded by Britain (as colonial master) to the United States for a large strategic nuclear and military base, the Treaty of Pelindaba was concluded in 1996. By July 1998, however, only 2 of the 53 African signatories have ratified. All the NWS have now signed the relevant protocols, though only France has so far ratified. The Treaty of Bangkok has run into political problems with all the NWS over the proposed protocols, requiring negotiations and causing annoyance on both sides. For China, the main problem concerns sovereignty of the South China Seas. The other NWS dislike the security assurances they are expected to provide, which cover the whole zone instead of just the territories of the States parties. Negotiations are proceeding, with the NWS attempting to bring the Bangkok security assurances into line with those of other NWFZs.
The cluster debate was short, with statements reinforcing the support expressed in the general debate for the various NWFZ now in existence. The NAM working paper supported all NWFZ, with particular mention of the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia, and to "consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas". The NWS were urged to respect the provisions of the four NWFZ agreements and to sign and ratify relevant protocols where that had not yet been done. Indonesia was particularly critical, however, arguing that "despite all the support given by States parties to the establishment of the zones, the fate of each nuclear-weapon-free zone continues to depend on the strategic interests of nuclear weapons states." Indonesia complained that the Treaty of Bangkok was now being "fine-tuned" to accommodate the interest of "external powers", which were "felt to be paramount over the collective interests of the regional States concerned." China said that it supported the South East Asian initiative and hoped to resolve the pending issues "through friendly consultations with those countries concerned". China also argued that NWFZ should be "in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and established principles of international law." In an oblique reference to military alliances, China stressed that the status of NWFZ should not be subordinated to other security mechanisms, and reiterated its policy that the NWS should "undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons" against such zones.
There has been significant progress on the initiative by five countries to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Calling for international and United Nations support for this initiative, Uzbekistan said that a Central Asian NWFZ would contribute towards international cooperation and universal nuclear disarmament. Moreover the process of multilateral diplomacy in building such a zone was also important: to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, to work out effective measures for environmental rehabilitation and to develop and reinforce regional security measures. Kyrgyzstan also pledged its support for a Central Asian NWFZ and hoped that the PrepCom would take a positive attitude towards the initiative's progress. Kyrgyzstan expressed its serious concern about the legacy of environmental damage from nuclear weapons production still being borne by countries such as theirs, long after the end of the Cold War, and called for assistance from governments and international organisations, especially the IAEA, in cleaning up the region and disposing of the radioactive contaminants. Uzbekistan updated NPT Parties on the current stage reached in negotiations and announced that further consultations would be held among these five countries, the P-5 and representatives of the IAEA and United Nations, with the intention of working out the elements of a Treaty.
Reminding delegates of the devastation from the Chernobyl accident and noting that its voluntary decision to give up its Soviet weapons and become a NNWS had caused "controversial debates" in its Parliament, Ukraine said that nuclear safety, NPT and CTBT compliance and NWFZs were issues of public and political concern. The statement recalled a speech by Leonid Kuchma, President of Ukraine in April 1996, which noted that "establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe could substantially enhance the development of European progress in all its dimensions". This was interpreted by US delegates as moving away from its earlier commitment for the NWFZ, as proposed jointly with Belarus, and by others as a reaffirmation of support.
South Africa not only endorsed the objective of a NWFZ in the Middle East, but made specific reference to South Asia as well. Noting that the possession of nuclear weapons "provides only the illusion of security", South Africa argued that after destroying its own nuclear capability, it now realised that "security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation" - a lesson relevant for the declared NWS as well as the 'threshold' States.
The Middle East
Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities were raised by a number of delegations in the general debate and the various clusters. In accordance with the intentions of the 1997 PrepCom, however, time was specifically allocated to discussion of the Resolution on the Middle East.
The only reference in the 1995 P&O was in paragraph 6, which encouraged the development of NWFZ and zones free of all weapons of mass destruction "especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East", specifying the need to take into account "the specific characteristics of the region." The primary instrument referred to by those seeking to have the NPT regime address the Middle East question was the Resolution on the Middle East, proposed by the depository States (Britain, Russia and the United States) and adopted without a vote at the same time as the three decisions on extending the Treaty and strengthening the review process.
The NAM working paper devoted five paragraphs to this issue, noting that since 1995 all States in the region except Israel have joined the NPT. The NAM stressed the "special responsibility of the depository states" as co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution and called for the resolution to be fully implemented and for Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under fullscope IAEA safeguards. The United States was reportedly particularly incensed by paragraph 35, which sought an undertaking from the NWS "not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons..." This could be construed as implying that assistance, technology or other encouragement had been provided to Israel in the past, in contravention of Article I.
Resolution on the Middle East, adopted 11 May, 1995
Resolution on the Middle East
(Proposed by the Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.)
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,
Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,
Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 adopted of 15 December 1994,
Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC (XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,
Bearing in mind Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and particularly paragraph 14 thereof,
Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,
Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,
1.Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;
2.Notes with satisfaction that, in its report (NPT/ CONF. 1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the conference recommended that the Conference "call on those remaining States not Parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities";
3.Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
4.Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
5.Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;
6.Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
Bahrain, on behalf of fourteen Arab States, issued a paper calling for full implementation of the Resolution and accession by Israel to the NPT. This argued that it was imperative that the PrepCom address the issue, presenting the adoption in 1995 of a resolution co-sponsored by the depository States as a "clear expression by the States parties of their concern over the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East resulting from the existence of ... unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities in the region and ambiguous nuclear policies endangering regional and international peace and security." Identifying the role of the depository States as "crucial", the working paper requested Britain, Russia and the United States to "indicate at every Preparatory Committee and the 2000 Review Conference what measures they have taken to ensure the full implementation of the resolution and the realisation of its objectives." The Arab States again reiterated their support for establishing a Middle East NWFZ as a step towards realising a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Many individual Arab statements gave support to and underlined this statement. Iran expressed frustration at the long delay in implementing a NWFZ in the Middle East, first proposed in 1974, and accused Israel of undermining the credibility of the NPT and of developing long and medium range ballistic missile systems "to develop and use nuclear weapons against regional countries." Iraq criticised double standards, saying: "Some of those who are defending the safeguards, the Treaty and the Agency should cease their nuclear cooperation with Israel, which runs contrary to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty."
Egypt followed up with a working paper which recommended ways in which the Middle East resolution could be addressed. Egypt proposed an agenda for discussion in seminars and conferences, including a study into the nuclear status of the region, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, plus consideration of arms control, disarmament and lowest levels of armaments. Egypt stressed the "important role" which the NWS should play. In relation to the "practical steps" called for in the Resolution, Egypt proposed early conclusion of the text of a NWFZ treaty as a step towards establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and suggested that the UN could dispatch a special envoy to the Middle East to assist States to reach the objective of a NWFZ there.
Britain said that the EU supported calls for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East "provided that all States in the region are involved". Believing that progress would be "greatly facilitated by a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East", the EU supported the attempts to renew the momentum in the negotiations on the Middle East peace process. France went further, calling on States in the region to commence discussions "without delay" so as to jump-start negotiations on a NWFZ in the Middle East. Various Western countries attempted to tread the tightrope between criticising Israel and supporting universality of the NPT. Australia, for example, said it shared the concerns about unsafeguarded nuclear facilities but also noted that the issue was linked to broader regional security issues: "however we are firmly convinced that addressing these concerns with a view to enhancing security in the Middle East should involve not the maintenance of ambiguity or covert programmes in the area of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction but transparency and strengthening... of international norms against these weapons."
Security Assurances
Special time was accorded at the Second PrepCom to discuss the issue of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with majority acceptance of South Africa's proposal in 1997. Although many negotiators had wanted an article on security assurances in the NPT, they had to settle instead for a UN Security Council resolution, which was adopted in 1968 (5). This resolution, UNSC 255 (1968), acknowledged that the NNWS, in denying themselves the nuclear option by acceding to the NPT, had the right to be safeguarded from nuclear threat or attack. It accordingly condemned aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a NNWS and expressed the intention of "certain States" to provide or support immediate assistance, including vague references to the UN Security Council and the P-5 who "would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations..." UNSC 255 has long been deemed inadequate.
In April 1995, under pressure in the run-up to the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the P-5 provided an updated collective 'positive' assurance, enshrined in UN Security Resolution 984. This recognised the "legitimate interest" of NNWS party to the NPT to receive assurances that "the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, will act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in the event that such States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used" (6). Among the assistance proffered, "technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian" were specified. Military measures were not. The right to self defence was reaffirmed: "the inherent right, recognised under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defences if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". UNSC 984 also noted the individual assurances provided by each of the NWS on 6 April 1995. The NWS had been unsuccessful in harmonising a collective 'negative assurance', principally because Britain, France, Russia and the United States insisted on exempting certain categories of States from their guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, while China refused to abandon its broader non-use assurance and commitment to no first use. Each of the NWS therefore issued its own statement on negative assurances, with China reiterating its comprehensive assurance and the other four utilising almost identical language, as represented in the US declaration: "The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carries out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State." (7)
These 'voluntary' assurances have long been regarded inadequate by many NPT States parties and for years Nigeria has co-ordinated NAM proposals for a legally binding treaty on non-use and security assurances. The 1995 P&O contained one paragraph, noting UNSC 984 and the individual declarations and saying that "further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument."
The NAM working paper contained a paragraph which reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only genuine guarantee for NNWS: "pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded." While noting the ad hoc committee on security assurances convened by the CD in 1998, the NAM called on the States Parties to negotiate such a legal instrument in the PrepComs for the 2000 Review Conference.
Advocating that security assurances be addressed as part of the NPT regime, South Africa presented a working paper to the Second PrepCom and argued that "the negotiation of legally binding security assurances within the NPT umbrella, as opposed to some other forum, would provide a significant benefit to the Treaty parties and would be seen as an incentive to those who remain outside the NPT [to join it]." Security assurances were therefore the right of those States which had forsworn nuclear weapons "as opposed to those who are still keeping their options open". Australia agreed that "pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons consistent with Article VI... negative security assurances are a central reinforcing element underpinning the basic non-proliferation bargain which the NPT represents." Australia attached the report of the Friend of the Chair on Security Assurances appointed during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Ambassador Richard Starr. Starr's report summarised the various proposals made to the 1995 Conference and urged NPT parties to consider them more fully. Because the 1995 Conference was unable to adopt a final document, this 12-paragraph report has no formal status, even though its content had been agreed by consensus.
In its working paper, South Africa proposed that an internationally legally binding instrument on security assurances could be either in the format of a separate agreement or as a protocol to the NPT. It would need to address the following elements: identification of the States providing the assurances (in South Africa's view, the NPT nuclear weapon States); identification of the States which would be beneficiaries; any qualifications (for example, whether to distinguish NNWS in military-nuclear alliances from those which are not); provisions of the assistance to be provided and the mandatory actions to be undertaken in the event of a threat or use of nuclear weapons.
Having succeeded in ensuring a special allocation of time to address security assurances in the second PrepCom, South Africa appeared to be flexible about how the issue should be negotiated and did not push for special time for addressing security assurances in 1999 or require the establishment of a negotiating mechanism either intersessionally or at the 2000 Review Conference. Since the CD in March 1998 managed to establish an ad hoc committee on security assurances, several delegations proposed parallel approaches, pursuing the issue in both the CD and NPT contexts. Myanmar, which had tabled a draft protocol to the NPT on security assurances in 1997, proposed allocating special time to this issue at the third and future PrepComs. Myanmar argued that a legally binding instrument was achievable in time for the 2000 Review Conference "if the nuclear weapon states show a greater measure of political will." The draft protocol proposes an undertaking by the NWS "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons" against NNWS parties to the NPT and would commit all NPT States parties "to refrain in [their] international relations from the threat or use of force against another State party, its territorial integrity and its political independence".
Rather than negotiating a separate treaty, although they were not prepared publicly to rule out the possibility, the Western NWS and some of their allies argued that a regional approach involving nuclear-weapon-free zones would be the best way to expand and develop security assurances. France urged States to implement such treaties "and thus bring into effect those security assurances." The United States pointed out that by signing the protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba, it had provided legally binding negative security assurances to 99 NNWS, which could be increased to 109 if its difficulties over the protocols to the Bangkok Treaty could be resolved. The United States said it respected the concerns of NPT states seeking a treaty on security assurances, but preferred discussions to be conducted under CD auspices rather than the NPT, although it did not consider a global negative security assurances treaty to be achievable "at this time". China reiterated its unilateral declaration that "at no time and under no circumstances" will it be the first to use nuclear weapons and advocated that "a legally binding international instrument be concluded at an early date on no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States." China argued that there was "no reason to impose various obligations" on the NNWS and stressed that negative security assurances should also include the commitment by the NWS to no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other. In China's view, "nuclear deterrence, based on the first use of nuclear weapons, runs counter to the trend of the times, and is detrimental to international peace, security and stability." China called on the other NWS to abandon their deterrence postures based on potential first use.
Non-Military Uses of Nuclear Energy
Article IV of the NPT refers to "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II..." Article IV commits States parties to facilitate this treaty provision and enshrines a "right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." Paragraphs 14 to 20 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives reconfirm the importance of nuclear cooperation and promise preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon parties, especially developing countries. The P&O call for transparency in nuclear-related export controls and high standards of nuclear safety, including waste management and transhipment. With the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in mind, a carefully worded paragraph raises concerns about the potential illegality and dangers posed by attacks or threats on nuclear facilities "devoted to peaceful purposes", although the P&O stop short of condemning such attacks outright as illegal. The P&O also affirm the importance of ensuring the IAEA has sufficient financial and human resources devoted to technical assistance, as well as safeguards and nuclear safety.
The cluster III debate on the non-military uses of nuclear energy was predictably short, since there is comparatively little overt disagreement among NPT parties about the aims of this commitment, although some question the effectiveness of implementation. The NAM had made their position clear in their working paper, reaffirming the "inalienable right" and arguing against the export control regimes currently in place, holding that "beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed." They called for nuclear supplier states to promote "the legitimate needs of nuclear energy" and give preferential treatment to developing states, somewhat paradoxically referring also to "pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities". A major criticism from NGOs of the NPT's 1968 'bargain' is that nuclear energy is not appropriate to sustainable development or the energy needs of developing countries. Only 33 countries have a nuclear generating capacity, among which barely a handful could be described as 'developing' nations. The NAM statement contained a lengthy paragraph on the "highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications" of attacks on nuclear facilities and calls for measures to regulate the international transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel.
Most statements supported the Article IV provision on nuclear energy and called for wider financial contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. Saying that France had "resolutely opted for nuclear energy", Joëlle Bourgois argued that "nuclear energy contributes to the well-being of a large part of humanity", not only in the generation of electricity, but in food ionisation, medicine and industry. South Africa concurred but criticised the lack of adequate resources for developing countries. In Pretoria's view, the optional aspect of the Technical Cooperation Fund should be made mandatory by incorporating the Fund into the regular budget of the IAEA.
Referring to the recent Kyoto Conference on Climate Change, Bourgois argued that nuclear power could meet the world's energy requirements without causing emissions of carbon dioxide. Austria, one of the few countries to refuse to back nuclear power, argued against the view that enhanced nuclear energy use is the solution to the problems of fossil fuels, global warming and climate change. Several delegations raised concerns about the environmental and health risks from nuclear operations and the transhipment of radioactive waste and plutonium. Many called for wider adherence to the various conventions on nuclear safety, and the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste, civil liability etc (8). France, involved in controversial shipments of nuclear waste by sea and by rail to and from its reprocessing plant at La Hague, said it attached great importance to the management of non-defence-related fissile material stockpiles and to the carriage of radioactive materials "taking place under optimal security and safety conditions, in conformity with the most stringent international standards." Many statements welcomed the IAEA's recently published Plutonium Management Guidelines. France backed solutions involving immobilisation or burning excess military plutonium in mixed oxide fuel (MOX) in civil reactors, and gave information on French cooperation with Russia and Germany on projects to use up some of the plutonium from dismantled ex-Soviet nuclear weapons.
Five Central Asian countries wanted the PrepCom to recommend language to the 2000 Review Conference about the "exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons". Their aim was to emphasise the need for international expertise and assistance in cleaning up and disposing of radioactive contaminants, such as those which blight large areas of Kazakhstan around the former Soviet nuclear 'Polygon' at Semipalatinsk.
Both China and Iran objected to measures that went beyond the IAEA safeguards, saying that 'peaceful uses' were still being impeded. Repeating its concerns about export controls, arguing that "these unilaterally restrictive measures had negative consequences" on the development of countries, Iran proposed that "effective transfer guidelines" be multilaterally negotiated among all supplier and recipient states. With Israel and possibly Pakistan in mind, Iran also proposed that the Chair's text should note the concerns "about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons" and called for the complete prohibition of such transfers.
The EU states and others reiterated the importance of the export control regime to enable supplier states to comply with their Treaty obligations under Articles I and II. South Africa said that most recipient countries understood this and did not regard the controls as a blocking mechanism: "the very small number of export denial decisions bears this out." Like South Africa, Canada held that "properly structured and applied", export controls were essential both to non-proliferation and to nuclear trade and cooperation. Many countries advocated greater transparency in the conduct of the international nuclear export regime. Britain, as current Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, reported on the first steps being undertaken by the NSG to provide greater transparency and drew attention to the September 1997 background paper on the NSG Guidelines, which aimed to ensure that "nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, without hindering international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field." (9)
In response to a request made by Kyrgyzstan in the General Debate, the IAEA briefly reported on various radiological assessment studies of areas affected by nuclear production, testing, dumping or accidents, including Chernobyl, Tomsk, Moruroa and Fangataufa, Bikini Atoll, Semipalatinsk and the Arctic around the Kara and Barents Seas (10).
NGOs Address the PrepCom
Non-governmental organisations made 13 statements to delegations at an 'informal session' of the second PrepCom, chaired by Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner. The statements were the result of a collective process undertaken during the past months to ensure the participation of many NGOs with diverse views, whether or not they would be able to be in Geneva during the PrepCom. In keeping with this spirit, ACRONYM 12 does not highlight the individual names or affiliations of the speakers, but aims to give a brief flavour of the arguments put forward.
Spiritual, Ethical and Humanitarian appeal
The opening statement noted "the terrible suffering caused by nuclear weapons, their potential for total destruction, and their perversion of the fundamental nature of matter". The NWS and their allies were urged to free themselves of their "self-imposed and self-destructive addiction" with the help of "tough love" from the non-nuclear-weapon states, to help them "embark on a course of action that moves toward nuclear abolition." With regard to Article VI, and the ICJ unanimous ruling in July 1996, it was stressed that "good faith" meant "basic honesty ...abiding by one's commitment".
Nuclear Colonialism and Environmental Racism
A representative of Indigenous peoples of the Pacific spoke of how "modern technology has been used to perpetuate the historical devastation of Indigenous lands", and made specific reference to "the superpower nuclearisation of the region, nuclear testing, toxic dumping..." He demanded the "final cessation of these genocidal acts of nuclear colonialism" and called for NPT parties to support and respect nuclear weapon free zone treaties and contribute to the environmental cleanup of the radioactive waste and contamination, emphasising the importance of ending the transhipment, storage and dumping of nuclear waste in the Pacific and the necessity for ongoing monitoring of contaminated areas and support for test site workers affected by nuclear testing. A number of subsequent statements reinforced this message with documented evidence of the terrible destruction wreaked on Indigenous Peoples and lands during the nuclear age.
NATO Nuclear Weapons Sharing
Concerns were raised about the continued siting of around 150-200 nuclear weapons in seven European countries as part of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements involving: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In view of US plans to transfer control over nuclear weapons to Allied countries and the involvement by additional States in nuclear planning, such arrangements contradicted "the intent and possibly the letter of Articles I and II of the NPT". NPT Parties were thus recommended to "explicitly and clearly state that the Treaty remains in force in time of war," building on the results of the 1985 Review Conference. In addition, to exclude any possible future development of European nuclear forces through integration of French and British nuclear weapons, EU members should declare that in the event of full political union, the EU would become a non-nuclear member to the NPT.
Fissile Materials
Two broadly different perspectives were identified: those who favoured getting a cut-off agreement underway as soon as possible, on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate; and those who considered that "without specific disarmament steps" by the NWS, a cut-off agreement would "simply reinforce existing disparities." Both approaches advocated additional steps, such as greater transparency and accurate accounting, as well as designating more plutonium and HEU as "excess", to be put under IAEA safeguards and irreversibly removed from future military re-use. The first sought ways to address stocks in parallel with the FMCT, whereas the second argued for specific disarmament steps to be undertaken together with a fissile materials ban, including the dismantlement of all military fissile materials production facilities and a ban on the production of nuclear pits and tritium. The proliferation risks associated with the commercial use of fissile materials and various options for dealing with plutonium and HEU stocks to minimise the risks of proliferation and environmental contamination were also highlighted.
Health and Environmental Effects
Detailing the "extensive health and environmental damage" resulting from nuclear weapons production and testing, including human experiments conducted without informed consent, the statement emphasised that the effects were not confined to the NWS, but have had harmful effects worldwide. A "Global Truth Commission on the Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Production and Testing" was proposed, either as a commission of the UN General Assembly, or under the joint auspices of the WHO and the UN Environmental Programme, with the task of documenting and evaluating the health and environmental effects and developing ways to assist the affected populations. Since "the mothers of the world are...often its first epidemiologists", the Commission should also invite the participation of citizens from around the world.
Nuclear Power and Sustainable Energy
In addressing the current status of nuclear power, the sixth statement identified trends and issues to enable NPT delegates and decision-makers to place nuclear power in the overall perspective of energy needs. In particular, the speaker noted that the "nuclear industry is in a period of stagnation worldwide and in actual decline in many countries" due to several factors including: its cost, diminishing political support, a failure to address safety, environmental and proliferation issues, and significant public opposition to nuclear technology in many countries. To meet the growing world-wide demand for energy, it was proposed that a "contemporary Article IV" should be taken up, to "promote research, technology transfer and assistance in developing sustainable energy development, including energy efficiency...encourage strengthened forms of cooperation...[and] allow the energy aspirations of the developing world ... to be met in a sustainable manner."
Immediate Steps on CTBT and START
The seventh statement focused on bringing the CTBT into force, implementing START II and achieving deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals. The fundamental importance of the CTBT as both a nuclear disarmament and a non-proliferation measure was stressed, all States were urged to sign and ratify the Treaty, and the NWS were reminded that "the CTBT does not give them a blank cheque to pursue the development and qualitative improvement of new types of nuclear weapons or modifications of existing weapons types..." In addition, it was proposed that NPT Parties urge Russia to ratify START II without further delay and encourage the United States and Russia to initiate negotiations on START III, with the aim of signing and ratifying it by the year 2000.
Anti-Disarmament Policies and Programmes
The eighth statement raised concern about new weapons and facilities being developed by some of the NWS under the rubric of 'Stockpile Stewardship' and provided details on laboratory testing programmes and capabilities, with particular emphasis on the United States. The statement called for: full disclosure and public debate on national policies regarding the threat and use of nuclear weapons; the renunciation of polices of threatened first use or massive retaliation; elimination of laboratory testing capabilities; national policies to prohibit the design, development or production of new warheads or modifications for new military capabilities; and negotiations leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons.
Next Steps
Emphasising the importance of uniting the non-NNWS in order to "be a powerful irrefutable voice to which the NWS will be compelled to listen", this statement proposed the de-alerting of the current nuclear forces, by removing warheads from operational missiles and long-range warheads, reducing the number of warheads on submarines or cutting the nuclear submarines' patrols. Such measures could be accomplished in the near term, thereby contributing practically to the growing acceptance of the case for abolishing nuclear weapons. The statement further proposed that the final stage before complete nuclear disarmament should be one involving the immobilisation of the remaining (few) nuclear weapons of the declared and undeclared NWS. According to this, warheads and delivery systems would be separately stored under international monitoring. Such a measure would "protect the security interests of the NWS while eliminating all possibility of surprise attack or threats to use nuclear weapons".
Nuclear Weapons Convention
A model nuclear weapons convention, developed by international scientists, lawyers and disarmament experts, was first introduced at an NGO meeting during the first PrepCom in 1997 and subsequently published as UN document A/C.1/52/7. Presenting this to NPT parties and describing the reasons for and basic provisions of the model nuclear weapons convention, it was proposed that NPT Parties should establish an intersessional working group on implementing Article VI, to consider how to bring about negotiations. It was stressed that now was the time to begin devising a plan for complete nuclear disarmament - including verification mechanisms - "to be ready when the political climate is favourable".
Regional Initiatives
Existing nuclear weapon free zone arrangements were strongly supported. Noting that these were primarily in the South, further NWFZs were advocated in the Northern Hemisphere, in areas such as Central Asia, Central Europe, the Balkans and the Adriatic, and especially in zones where nuclear weapons are currently deployed. International seas and oceans should be free from nuclear weapons. Zones free from all weapons of mass destruction were important, especially in the Middle East, and countries wishing to declare themselves nuclear free should be encouraged.
Security Beyond Nuclear Deterrence
Noting that "the security challenges we face now arise from threats to the earth's life-support systems", ranging from economic disparity and misuse of scarce resources to environmental degradation, overpopulation and climate change, it was clear that nuclear weapons were "a security problem, not a solution" and that we need "to shift the image of nuclear weapons from political virility symbol to the stigmatised status of chemical or biological weapons". Arguing that effective solutions will require "cooperation, imagination and vision", the statement concluded: "Cold War alliances have had their day; we must all be allies now if we are to avoid disaster."
A Call to Action
The final statement summarised the main arguments and recommendations and urged fuller NGO participation in the Review Process. Supporting the 1997 Marshall Islands proposal for an inter-sessional working group to start work on preparing the ground for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, the NGOs stressed the importance also of immediate, intermediate measures such as taking nuclear weapons off alert and halting sub-critical nuclear tests and the modernisation of nuclear weapons. The statement concluded: "It is time to put away these deadly instruments of war, clean up the toxic legacy of the nuclear age, and use our precious resources to provide for the genuine needs of our human family on planet Earth."
Notes
1. Many but not all delegations provided their substantive
remarks in written form. I have tried to use their own words or
translations where possible, but all quotations should be regarded
as informal. Where statements were not available and the meetings
were closed, I attempted to glean the gist from the speakers or
other participants. As it is inevitable that some important or
useful points will have been missed, this account should be treated
as a guide to the issues raised, rather than an exact record. For
this reason, references for quotations are not detailed in
footnotes.
2. Recent proposals from G-21 members to be taken into account
would include, among others: the proposed programme of action from
28 members of the G-21 in August 1996; Egypt's proposal for a
nuclear disarmament committee with two working groups, one to
negotiate a fissban and the other to negotiate a time-table for
nuclear disarmament; and South Africa's proposal for a nuclear
disarmament committee to "to deliberate upon practical steps for
systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as
well as to identify if and when one or more such steps should be
the subject of negotiations in the Conference".
3. These statements are reproduced in Part III.
4. See footnote 11 in Part I
5. UN document S/Res/255 (1968)
6. UN document S/Res/984 (1995)
7. Sha Zukang (China) and Stephen Ledogar (United States) to the
Conference on Disarmament, 6 April 1995, CD/PV.705. All five
declarations were provided to the UN Security Council: S/1995/261;
S/1995/262; S/1995/263; S/1995/264; S/1995/265.
8. The Convention on Nuclear Safety; the 1997 Joint Convention of
the Safety of Spent Fuel and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management; the 1997 Protocols to the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; and the Supplementary Funding
Convention.
9. IAEA INFCIRC 539, 15 September 1997.
10. The IAEA statement is reproduced in Part III.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.