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Check Against Delivery 29 April 1998
The Global Elimination Of Nuclear Weapons
Introduction
1. The global elimination of nuclear weapons. Mr Chairman, distinguished delegates, that simple phrase sums up the United Kingdom's goal in the nuclear sphere. It could hardly be more plainly stated. And it is a goal all NPT parties share. But how best to set about achieving it? That is the fundamental question which lies behind so many of the current debates on this crucial subject, both here and in the Conference on Disarmament. It is the question to which I intend today to outline the United Kingdom's answer.
A Question Of Approach
2. Mr Chairman, if we look beneath the surface of our debates I believe we can discern two major currents of thought about the best way to proceed towards our shared goal. On the one hand there are those who believe that the key point is to know the destination we are aiming at, and to concentrate on taking the next manageable steps towards it, knowing that as we move forward the subsequent steps, will become clear. On the other hand, there are those who, before going any further, want to have a much clearer map for the entire journey, preferably along with a firm indication of how long it will take.
3. In our view the basic difficulty with the latter approach is that it does not do justice to the complexity and variety of the problems we face in moving towards elimination. To assume that all these can be foreseen at this stage, let alone solved and then neatly encapsulated in a rigid time-frame or single Convention, seems to us to smack of unrealistic idealism. It also threatens to make the job seem almost impossibly difficult. Far better in our view to start the job by pursuing tasks that are clearly achievable, working to achieve them with vigour and urgency but also with flexibility as to timing and means.
4. That great teacher, experience, also suggests that this is the way to make progress. Think of all those far-reaching plans for disarmament that were drawn up from the late forties to the early sixties. Where are they now? They are gathering dust on unvisited shelves in library basements. It was only when the international community forsook this approach for the pursuit of more limited measures that real progress began to be made, starting with the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Since then, the international community has come a very long way indeed by taking one incremental step after another.
5. In the sphere of testing alone, for example by means of this unexciting, painstaking but effective method we have now achieved, via the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I know there are those who, having once fought so hard for this Treaty, now like to belittle its significance and impact. But I know of no-one involved in the business of nuclear weapons who does not believe this Treaty will severely constrain their activities
6. The incremental approach has also proved its value as a means of controlling, and now of reducing, nuclear forces. People are apt to forget now that until 1972 there were no agreements at all regulating the nuclear forces of any nuclear weapon state. Even then the agreement reached by the United States and the Soviet Union on their strategic offensive arms did not deal at all with strategic bombers, made no effort to limit numbers of warheads, and contained no provisions for on-site inspections. It takes up a mere six pages of the most recent US compendium of arms control agreements. By contrast the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which entered into force in 1994 is so comprehensive and detailed that it runs to 280 pages and requires a volume in its own right.
7. I mention these examples simply to demonstrate that the incremental approach has produced results. Why? Because it deals with issues in manageable clusters, and because it is flexible enough to be responsive to varying political conditions. There is every reason to suppose that if it could produce results in the harsh atmosphere of the Cold War it can produce even better ones in the future. In these circumstances to re-focus now on rigid time-frames or single instruments would be to jettison a tried and tested method for moving towards our goal in order to repeat the errors of past. If we are to make real progress we do not need endless debate about general plans; we need detailed negotiations for specific agreements.
8. I hear it said that the BWC and CWC give the lie to the case I am making. It is said that if we can eliminate biological and chemical weapons by means of these Conventions we can eliminate nuclear weapons by means of a similar convention. And it is pointed out that the CWC does contain a time-frame for the elimination of existing chemical weapons. That is true. But it is also irrelevant. The fact is that nuclear weapons have played a much more prominent part in the military thinking and planning of their possessors than chemical or biological weapons ever did. So the reality is that the approach that worked for the latter will not work for the former.
9. Mr Chairman, for all these reasons the United Kingdom is not persuaded that it would be productive to embark now on negotiations for a time-bound framework for nuclear elimination or on negotiations for an all-encompassing Nuclear Weapons Convention. The United Kingdom respects the motives of those who favour these approaches, but we think there are more sensible ways forward at this stage. All that said, Mr Chairman, we do not think it is impossible to identify in broad outline some of the key elements in the task ahead of us. And I would now like to mention some of these.
Elements In The Task Ahead
10. As we see it, a variety of actions will be needed on a number of fronts, both within the nuclear sphere itself and in other spheres.
11. Within the nuclear sphere all five of the nuclear weapon states party to the NPT clearly have a key role to play in movement towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. But, equally clearly, there is, for the time being, a big distinction between the two largest nuclear weapon states, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and the three smaller nuclear weapon states, China, France and my own country, the United Kingdom. What are their respective responsibilities in the march towards elimination?
12. Clearly an enormous responsibility lies upon the shoulders of the two largest nuclear weapon states. Fortunately it is a responsibility they have not shirked. Over the last ten years, they have concluded agreements and taken unilateral actions which have vastly reduced the number of their deployed nuclear weapons - and they have begun dismantling their non-deployed weapons. But this welcome momentum needs to be sustained - initially by ratification both of the START II Treaty and its Protocol and of the recent ABMT-related agreements, and then by the subsequent opening and early conclusion of negotiations on the START III Treaty to which both sides are committed.
13. In emphasising the heavy responsibilities on the larger nuclear weapon states, I do not mean in any way to diminish the burden of responsibility that also falls on the smaller nuclear weapon states. Clearly their role on the path to elimination is, first of all, not to become large nuclear weapon states, and, secondly,. to accept that in due course they will need to join the larger nuclear weapon states in negotiations about their nuclear weapons. I will say more in a moment about the specific contributions the United Kingdom is making in accordance with these precepts.
14. But if we are to achieve our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons it is not only the nuclear weapon states who need to play their part. Also of great significance will be the actions taken, or not taken, by the three states not party to the NPT which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities - India, Israel and Pakistan. Of course, ideally, we would like them to become non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT tomorrow. But we are not naive. We recognise the reality that these states have spent thirty years refusing to adhere to the Treaty because, as things stand, they do not believe that renouncing the nuclear option would be in their interests.
15. Before they change their minds there will have to be changes in perceptions of their security environment With our EU partners, the United States and others, we are working hard to bring about a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, which we hope would have a positive effect on the views of Israel. As for the Sub-Continent of Asia, we note the strengthened political contacts between India and China in recent years and the resumption last year of high-level contacts between India and Pakistan. The further favourable development of these contacts is clearly of major importance for the achievement of our goal.
16. Another group of states with a vital contribution to make to the global elimination of nuclear weapons is comprised of the 181 states which have undertaken obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons by becoming non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. We recognise and acknowledge that this is an enormous contribution by these states towards facilitating the world's journey along the road to global elimination. It follows that their continued commitment to this Treaty will remain vitally important. Fortunately, in the vast majority of cases, the commitment of these states is not in any doubt - and in many cases it has been reinforced by additional commitments to treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones, treaties we have been happy to support.
17. But we are all aware that there have been some very regrettable exceptions to the general rule. I need only recall the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme exposed by inspections since the Gulf War and the continuing uncertainties about the past activities of North Korea. We are fortunate that the inspection activities in Iraq under various security Council Resolutions and in North Korea under the Agreed Framework offer a way of restoring confidence in these states' intentions - if they are ready to let this happen. We must hope and pray that they are - and that no others are tempted into activities calculated to raise doubts about their intentions.
18. There is also a contribution which all states can make to the global elimination of nuclear weapons - regardless or their size or status. It is to support the two measures that can put a universal end to nuclear explosions and to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. You will not be surprised to learn, Mr Chairman, that in my United Kingdom capacity I fully endorse everything I said about the importance of the CTBT and FMCT in my EU capacity.
19. As you know, the United Kingdom, with its ally and partner France, has recently ratified the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We hope others will now do the same and thus enable this important Treaty to enter into force. As for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the United Kingdom has been willing to enter into negotiations for this Treaty since the relevant UN resolution was passed in 1993. We very much hope that another five years do not pass before there is once again agreement to go forward with this Treaty on the basis of that consensus resolution and the agreed mandate which flowed from it. We recognise that by placing all reprocessing and enrichment facilities under safeguards an FMCT would put in place a crucial building block in our approach to global elimination.
20. So much for some of the key developments that will be necessary within the nuclear sphere over the next few years it we are to move towards our goal. But, Mr Chairman, it would be idle to pretend that the global elimination of nuclear weapons will be achieved solely by action in the nuclear sphere. I have already mentioned some of the parallel developments that will be necessary in the wider political sphere in relation to non-parties to the NPT. We are also conscious that much more needs to be done to alter ingrained habits of thought in the nuclear weapon states. For almost fifty years we have operated in a world where the dominant concepts have been nuclear deterrence against each other and conventional defence against each other. Moving towards a new world of mutual cooperation with one another and joint partnership with one another is not easy. But continuing movement in this direction is the necessary political complement to continued progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.
21. That is why the United Kingdom lays great emphasis on the importance of exploiting to the full the opportunities for cooperation and partnership in Europe offered by the recently established NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Partnership for Peace, as well as by the further development of longer established bodies like the Organisation for Security and cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. For the same reason we also see great value in the sort of consultations among all five of the nuclear weapon states that have taken place from time to time. Such consultations build trust and confidence, and so facilitate mutual steps towards our shared goal.
22. It is also apparent that progress to nuclear elimination will be facilitated not only by improving political relationships between key states, but also by parallel progress in other areas. I am thinking, for example, of the need to ensure the elimination of both chemical and biological weapons through universal adherence to the relevant Conventions and effective implementation of them. I am thinking also of the need for careful consideration in due course of the arrangements for controlling conventional arms and strengthening collective security as we progress towards our goal - and of the verification and compliance issues that will no doubt arise.
The UK Contribution
23. Mr Chairman, I trust I have said enough to demonstrate that the United Kingdom has a clear view of the broad directions in which the international community needs to move if we are to advance towards our goal. I want to devote the remainder of my remarks to the specific contribution the United Kingdom is already making to this overall process.
24. I said earlier on that one of the responsibilities of a smaller nuclear weapon state is not to become a large nuclear weapon state. The United Kingdom is more than fulfilling this requirement. A decade ago, in addition to operating our force of Polaris submarines, we were involved in operating land-based nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery, we had a maritime tactical nuclear weapon capability, and we had a significant number of free-fall nuclear bombs in service with our air force. Since then, far from becoming a larger nuclear weapon state, we have been becoming a steadily smaller nuclear weapon state.
25. Some years ago now we withdrew from any involvement with land-based nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery systems. subsequently we decided that we no longer needed to retain a maritime tactical nuclear weapon capability. And last month we withdrew from service the last of our free-fall nuclear bombs. These developments mean we now have only one nuclear system in operation. Furthermore, the number of warheads this system will carry in future is currently being considered as part of the new British Government's wider strategic Defence Review.
26. I also said earlier on that it is a responsibility of smaller nuclear weapon states to accept that in due course they will have to join the United States and Russian Federation in negotiations on their nuclear weapons. The British Government has already made it quite clear that, when satisfied with progress towards its goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, it will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included in multilateral negotiations. Meanwhile, we have ratified the comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to demonstrate beyond doubt our commitment to that Treaty, and all the world knows that in April 1995 we made clear that we had ceased to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
27. Mr Chairman, distinguished delegates, the United Kingdom has a clear view of its goal - the global elimination of nuclear weapons. We have a clear view of the approach most likely to achieve this goal - relentless incremental progress. We have a clear view of the next steps that particular groups of states and the international community as a whole can take to further this progress. And, above all, we have demonstrated by our deeds that we mean what we say - that our goal truly is the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Thank you very much.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.