ACRONYM Reports

Fissban

Para 4 (b) called for the "immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein".

The 'Shannon Mandate', named after the Canadian Special Coordinator in 1995, had been adopted by the CD just before the 1995 NPT Conference. Since then the CD has failed to start the negotiations, apart from a brief period of a few weeks in August 1998, when it agreed to establish the ad hoc committee on fissban. Despite that agreement, which took three years, the CD did not re-establish the fissban committee in 1999. At time of writing the CD is once again attempting to gain consensus on a work programme which would enable it to get the negotiations underway.

The problems are of two kinds: substantive, in relation to the fissban itself; and political, relating to national interests and priorities. The major substantive problem is disagreement over the scope of the proposed treaty. The narrow mandate refers only to negotiating "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons". Recognising that a number of states, notably Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and Algeria, had pushed for retention of the non-aligned position that the fissban should address the stockpiling as well as production of nuclear weapon materials, Shannon's report therefore stated that the agreed mandate "does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad hoc Committee" issues of past as well as future production. At times, some delegations - particularly Pakistan - have appeared to want this question of the inclusion or exclusion of stocks to be determined before the ad hoc Committee is established, while others call for negotiations to commence so that such questions can be addressed in context. Some of the Arab states want to prevent Israel hanging onto its past production of nuclear weapon material, while Pakistan is concerned that halting production without dealing with stockpiles would freeze India's military advantage of larger stocks.

In addition to the disagreements over stocks and the contribution to be made by a fissban to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, there are political difficulties in the CD which have prevented the fissban negotiations from getting started. There was some delay in 1998 before Israel agreed to let the fissban committee be established, and some arm-twisting was required to get Pakistan on board after India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. Four of the five NWS have declared moratoria on the production of fissile materials (and France has even begun to dismantle its production facilities at Marcoule and Pierrelatte). China has not declared a moratorium but is believed to have halted production some years ago. India, Pakistan and Israel all have active production programmes for plutonium and/or HEU, and are believed to be trying to produce as much as possible before a fissban can be put in place. Delays in getting fissban negotiations underway therefore adds to the proliferation threat posed by these countries.

The CD adopts its work programme every year by consensus. This is a requirement that encourages all kinds of linkages and hostage-taking. Sometimes the linkages are relevant, but the knowledge that the United States or another NWS will reject substantive work on an issue such as nuclear disarmament or outer space means that linkages can also be a convenient way of delaying substantive work. In the past a number of CD members argued for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to be established along with the fissban committee. Most recently the linkage has been asserted with missile defence: China, having proposed an ad hoc committee on the 'prevention of an arms race in outer space' (PAROS) in 1999, now argues that the CD programme of work must have a balance between the three issues of fissban, PAROS and nuclear disarmament.

Clearly NPT parties have not met the objectives of para 4 (b) of the P&O, although the fault lies also with some non-NPT parties in the CD. There needs to be more focussed discussion of how to get the negotiations underway, either in the CD or in an alternative forum if the CD proves incapable of getting down to work in the very near future. There also needs to be further consideration of proposals for dealing in parallel with fissile material stocks, such as put forward by Norway and others.

'Shannon Report' to the CD

CD/1299, 24 March 1995

Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

At the beginning of last year's session, I was tasked with seeking the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

As you know I held numerous consultations, both bilaterally and with groups and reported formally to this plenary on five occasions in 1994. Mid-way through the last session, consensus was reached that the CD was the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty on this issue. At the end of the session in September, while there was no agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee, there was agreement in principle, that an Ad Hoc Committee be established on this issue as soon as a mandate had been agreed. At that time, the CD asked me to continue consultations on an appropriate mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee in order to enable the convening of this Ad Hoc Committee as soon as possible.

At the beginning of this year's session, the Conference decided to continue consultations on a mandate.

I have since held numerous consultations, and am pleased to report that delegations have agreed that the mandate for such a Committee should be based on Resolution 48/75L of the UN General Assembly, and reads as follows:

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a "Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session.

During the course of my consultation, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile materials (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.

Mr President, it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.

Delegations with strong views were able to join consensus so we could all move forward on this issue. This means that an Ad Hoc Committee on Cut-Off can be established and negotiations can begin on this important topic. This has for some time been the common objective of all delegations of this Conference.

I have appreciated the productive contribution and support of all delegations in arriving at this result. Practical Measures

The third part of the P&O programme of action on nuclear disarmament was "the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all states of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." This paragraph aimed to make the nuclear disarmament obligation more concrete than the Article VI obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith. In July 1996, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) firmed up the NPT parties disarmament obligation further. The ICJ opinion on the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons was viewed as ground-breaking because it gave authoritative interpretation to the Article VI provision, in the context of other relevant legal understandings. It delinked the nuclear disarmament obligation from the more remotely attainable general and complete disarmament, and unanimously concluded that there existed an obligation to pursue and "bring to conclusion" negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament.

It is likely that many states will want the 2000 Review Conference to reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to this obligation, as interpreted by the World Court. The New Agenda Coalition already signalled this intent with its most recent UN General Assembly resolution (UNGA 54/54G), adopted on December 1, 1999, by 111 votes to 13 (and 39 abstentions). The first operative paragraph of this resolution called on the NWS "to make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations, thus achieving nuclear disarmament, to which they are committed under Article VI of the NPT."

One of the most concrete proposals for how the NPT review process could be used to address nuclear disarmament was made at the Second NPT PrepCom in 1998 by South Africa. Noting that the Article VI obligations are binding on 'each Party to the Treaty', South Africa took as its starting point paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 P&O, and argued for establishment of the "practice within the strengthened review process for the States Parties to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons". In its statement to the 1998 PrepCom and a subsequent working paper, South Africa proposed that the 2000 Review Conference should establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee I and ensure that all future meetings under the enhanced review process would allocate specific time for the practical deliberation of qualitative and quantitative measures that would contribute towards fulfillment of Article VI.(10)

In making the proposal for a subsidiary body and specific time to be devoted to the practical consideration of nuclear disarmament issues, South Africa was seeking to go beyond the delivery of national statements or adversarial exchange of ideologies that tends to characterise Main Committee I debates. Instead, South Africa envisaged a role for the NNWS in agenda-setting, facilitating information exchange between NWS and NNWS, and in supporting or assisting initiatives that are undertaken or agreements, as they are achieved, both politically and materially. In this way, the NNWS could have a role in furthering accountability for the Treaty and the implementation of Article VI.(11)

South Africa did not on that occasion identify the practical issues that could be addressed in such a subsidiary body. The kinds of issues and approaches were subsequently raised in the Dublin Declaration, which launched the New Agenda Coalition in June 1998, and in further resolutions to the UN General Assembly in 1998 and 1999.(12) Following on from South Africa's proposals to the Second PrepCom, the New Agenda states followed up with a working paper to the Third NPT PrepCom in 1999 which noted that nuclear disarmament should have been facilitated by the easing of international tension after the Cold War. The NAC working paper analysed attitudes and developments and concluded that the pace of efforts to implement the NPT was "faltering". It cited "the lack of evidence that the nuclear weapon states consider their treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons consistent with the Article VI obligations and the 1995 Principles and Objectives". The New Agenda Coalition and its allies noted a re-rationalisation of the possession of nuclear weapons and the reaffirmation of nuclear doctrine and observed baldly that "the indefinite extension of the NPT does not sanction the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons". The working paper hammered this point home, underlining that in a treaty based on mutually agreed obligations, one group of states cannot expect to retain its privileges indefinitely, nor to determine independently the pace of progress towards implementation. In terms familiar from the Dublin Declaration, the NAC paper called for a progressive mix of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral efforts, "which should be mutually reinforcing and which should be pursued in concert". It specifically identified four interim measures which would reduce the nuclear threat and de-emphasise the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies: de-alerting nuclear weapons and de-mating warheads from delivery systems; reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons; legally binding negative security assurances; and greater transparency about nuclear arsenals and fissile material stocks.

The NAM working paper at the 1999 PrepCom included 10 paragraphs on Article VI, quoting the ICJ opinion and, echoing South Africa's proposal, also called for the 2000 Review Conference to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to "deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons". The CD was called upon to negotiate a fissban "banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material" for nuclear weapons - going further than the Shannon mandate - and to prioritise nuclear disarmament negotiations. The NAM also reiterated its call for a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and a "nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons.."

Brazil - whose recent accession to the NPT was enthusiastically welcomed at the 1999 PrepCom - outlined a comprehensive and practical programme, recognising that "after the CTBT and the FMT, there is a logical step at the multilateral level, that is, a Nuclear Weapon Convention..." Brazil urged NPT Parties to begin at least considering this objective, while at the same time calling for interim steps that would complement and reinforce the bilateral reductions underway, including: the de-alerting of nuclear weapons; the removal of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; an agreement on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons; an agreement not to increase or modernise nuclear arsenals; the removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites; and greater transparency of fissile materials stocks. Peru specifically supported the de-alerting and de-activation of nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of non-strategic weapons. China reiterated its long-standing demand for a legally binding instrument among the NWS on no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Canada called for a new programme of action for 2000 to include the following additional elements: acceleration and full implementation of the START process, with the direct engagement of the other three NWS (Britain, China and France) "in the near future"; plus measures such as de-alerting, transparency and confidence-building, and negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. Warning that unless the tasks of nuclear disarmament were "thoroughly addressed, the NPT could lose its credibility", with grave consequences, Japan emphasised the importance of the START process, CTBT and fissban, but also called for "further efforts" by all five NWS "to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and through their negotiations". Together with a growing number of states, Japan also underscored the importance of practical measures such as de-alerting and de-targeting, as well as assistance in dismantling nuclear weapons, and managing and disposing of the resultant fissile materials.

As is clear from their many interventions in the committees and cluster debates on nuclear disarmament, the NNWS endorse and encourage the bilateral negotiations (the START process); but they do not regard these as the only steps or approaches for nuclear disarmament. If the NWS resist calls for a subsidiary body to address practical disarmament measures and if they persist in rejecting interim steps proposed by the NNWS to reduce nuclear dangers, such as de-alerting, transparency, ending the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, and halting further modernisation of nuclear weapon systems, they may find themselves facing calls for an amendment conference to convert Article VI into a framework nuclear weapon convention.(13) As noted by the Chilean Chair of the UN First Committee in November 1999, the frustration-level of the NNWS is rising.(14) The failure of the NWS to seize post Cold War opportunities is causing NNWS to question whether the NWS ever actually regarded Article VI as an obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament in real terms. Was Article VI merely a sop to get the NNWS on board? In Washington at least, and possibly in other NWS capitals it is becoming increasingly obvious that the NWS did not think they needed to take the implementation of Article VI seriously in their own defence and security policies. Perhaps the NWS thought that the NNWS understood that; and during the Cold War it is possible that the NNWS also believed that nuclear disarmament was an impossible dream. With the end of the Cold War, however, the majority of NNWS wanted to see some genuine changes in doctrines, policy and approaches. Faced with the dangers of proliferation, made inescapably clear this past decade by the actions of some of the NWS, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iraq and North Korea, the NNWS are having to evaluate whether their own national security needs are met by the NPT. Most would prefer to continue to abjure nuclear weapons, as the NPT obliges them to; but there is a growing fear that as long as the NWS reaffirm the value of nuclear weapons for their own security, the non-proliferation norm will be under threat. Unless the NWS show themselves to be genuinely willing to move towards zero, the NPT will be unable to sustain the nuclear apartheid of the past 50 years. In a situation of collapsing confidence in nuclear non-proliferation, more States will hedge their bets, which would in turn, accelerate the disintegration of the Treaty and its all-important norm.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Since 1995 there has been good progress in general on establishing NWFZ. The Pelindaba Treaty, setting up a NWFZ in Africa, and the Bangkok Treaty, covering South East Asia, have both been concluded and signed by States in their respective regions. Progress is also being made on a Central Asian NWFZ encompassing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, although that has recently run into some problems. After the end of nuclear testing, the NWS have finally now all signed the relevant protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty, covering the South Pacific. Nevertheless, some problems remain with Pelindaba, Bangkok and Central Asia. Most importantly, the repeated calls for development of NWFZ in regions of tension, such as the Middle East or South Asia, have been dismissed or ignored by the nuclear possessors in those regions, and look further away than ever. Such calls, especially with respect to the Middle East, will undoubtedly be made again, but with little hope of seeing progress in the near future.

The P&O contained three paragraphs on NWFZ, noting that they must be on the basis of "arrangements freely arrived at among the states in the region concerned". Apart from the positive progress in establishing further NWFZ, nothing very new has been added on this subject during the PrepCom process. Some attention will be paid to the difficulties encountered in concluding the Central Asian NWFZ, and if Belarus again tries to put forward its initiative on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free 'space' in Central and Eastern Europe, the new NATO and NATO-wannabe states from the region are likely to object.

Security Assurances

The NWS concluded a new Security Council resolution on security assurances just before the NPT Conference in 1995 (UNSC 984). This was noted in the P&O, with the rider that further steps should be considered which "could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument". The NAM paper of 1999 called for negotiations on a legal instrument on security assurances to be negotiated during the preparatory process and adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT. South Africa issued a working paper containing draft text for a five-article protocol to the NPT on "the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties" to the NPT. Among proponents of security assurances, there remain divisions over whether security assurances should be negotiated in the NPT context, and offered as a benefit to NPT parties, or whether they should be more universal, and therefore negotiated by the CD or some specially established multilateral forum. There may be calls to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee I for the purpose of negotiating a legally binding agreement on security assurances, but this is unlikely to be an issue that states parties go to the mat over.

Safeguards

The P&O called on all the NNWS parties to sign and bring into force comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements and urged the NWS parties to place under safeguards any fissile material transferred from military to non-military uses. At time of writing, 52 NPT parties have not concluded and/or brought into force safeguards agreements, although these parties do not have any declared nuclear facilities. There was a strong injunction on NPT parties to make fullscope safeguards agreements a condition of supply of nuclear materials, technology and assistance. The P&O backed efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards regime, including widening the capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, which at that time were being developed as part of Programme 93+2. After negotiations based around the 93+2 programme, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a 'model Additional Protocol' (INFCIRC/540) to augment the safeguards agreements which States had concluded with the IAEA as part of their Article III obligations (INFCIRC/153, or in the case of the European members of EURATOM, INFCIRC/193).

The NWS, which do not carry safeguards obligations under Article III, have only voluntary safeguards agreements, but have also been urged to bring into force the relevant Additional Protocol. Britain and France are striving to do so before the 2000 Review Conference. In September 1996, US Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov, and IAEA Director General Hans Blix announced, as part of a drive to ensure the "transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions", a Trilateral Initiative "to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to weapon-origin fissile materials" to provide confidence that they were not being recycled, or kept in reserve for new weapons. The broad remit of the Initiative, which is reviewed annually at the IAEA General Conference, is to address "the scope and purpose of IAEA verification" and "the locations, types, and amounts of weapons-origin fissile material potentially subject to IAEA verification", to explore "technologies that might be capable of performing verification and monitoring objectives without disclosing sensitive information", and to consider "options for funding and providing a legal framework for IAEA verification measures". During the PrepComs support for the Trilateral Initiative was widely expressed by other States Parties.(15)

The model protocol is the basis for the various Additional Protocols which states have been urged to sign and ratify. They are intended to give the IAEA better tools to detect undeclared activities and to carry out inspections. The impetus for strengthening the IAEA safeguards came from the lessons learned from the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon programme, North Korea's failure to comply with its safeguards agreements, and the experience of verifying the dismantlement of South Africa's nuclear weapon programme in the early 1990s. Speaking to the UN General Assembly in November 1999, the IAEA Director General, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, described the Additional Protocols as "designed to provide the Agency with greater access to information and sites so it can verify that no declared nuclear material has been diverted to non-peaceful uses and also provide assurances that there is no undeclared material or activities."(16)

Despite widespread support at the PrepComs, however, NPT parties have been abysmally slow to sign, ratify and bring into force the Additional Protocols relevant to them. By the end of January 2000, only 46 NPT parties had concluded negotiations on an Additional Protocol, with only eight having brought their agreements into force. It is therefore to be expected that there will be calls for speedier implementation of the Additional Protocol.

Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols

The following States have signed or ratified Additional Protocols to their IAEA Safeguards Agreements for the Agency's application of strengthened safeguards.

The latest status report, as of 17 January 2000, includes: Strengthened Safeguards System: Additional Protocols (46 approvals, 45 Signatories, 8 Contracting States)

¹ All 15 EU States have concluded Additional Protocols with EURATOM and the Agency.

Nuclear Energy

Article IV seems to be treated in NPT Conferences as the least problematic of the Treaty's provisions. The main arguments revolve around the export control regime developed through the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group, which some NAM countries view as impediments to the assistance in developing nuclear energy that they consider their 'inalienable right' under Article IV. Support is expressed for the various conventions and agreements governing nuclear safety, transshipments, and waste, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which held its first review meeting in April 1999.

Yet the generally cosy discussions on Article IV mask a fact that is growing more obvious with each passing year. Despite the huge sums of money spent on research and public relations, nuclear energy did not turn out to be the wonder-technology it was advertised to be in the 1950s and '60s. It has not fulfilled the promise of being a cheap, safe, clean and relatively unlimited source of energy for developing countries. This is in contrast to some of the medical and other uses, which are a relatively small fraction of the non-military uses of nuclear energy, but which have proved to be important and useful. Nuclear energy for electrical power is on the wane, amid the industry's continuing inability to find a safe solution for nuclear waste, the problems of which will become dramatically more apparent as aging reactors come off line and have to be dismantled.

The period since the 1995 Conference has seen virtually no growth in the number of civil nuclear reactors in the world - according to IAEA figures, by the end of 1995 there were 437 nuclear power plants in 30 countries plus Taiwan; by the beginning of 1999, there were 434 plants in the same countries - and continuing controversies and doubts about the safety, viability and even integrity of the nuclear industry. Speaking in Russia in June 1996, then IAEA Director General Hans Blix observed soberly: "What is the current status of nuclear power deployment in the world? There was a rapid expansion of nuclear power through the 1970s. With the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the less-than-expected increase in demand of electricity in the 1980s, and the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the expansion rate of nuclear power has slowed markedly" He then noted that "While nuclear power construction has been stagnating in the Western industrialized world, the growth of nuclear power in East and South Asia has continued." Blix noted that nuclear power had become more expensive due to many new safety features, but acknowledged that the "most important factors are safety in reactor operation and waste disposal"(17).

Western diplomats contort themselves into hoops trying to explain why they are so critical of Iran's 'peaceful' nuclear programme and its endless evocations of Article IV rights and access. The real reason for Western scepticism was succinctly stated off the record by a senior Western official, who admitted that the economics no longer added up: "No developing country in its right mind would go for nuclear power these days... unless they also wanted a nuclear weapons option."(18) Many diplomats and non-proliferation and arms control specialists privately agree. Yet few NPT states other than Austria have ever publicly questioned the relevance and rightness of Article IV. Instead, Western nuclear industries from Canada to Britain, France and Germany, are desperately trying to shore up their failing balance sheets by selling to developing states, with offers of sweeteners and incentives to get them hooked.

Furthermore, since Blix's comments, the nuclear tests in South Asia have shown the proliferation-related weakness of the industry's enthusiasm for the growth in nuclear power in that volatile region, while confidence in reactor safety has been further dented by a number of incidents, by far the most serious of which were a fatal accident in September 1999 at the Tokaimura reactor in Japan and a fire and explosion at a plutonium reprocessing plant in Japan in April 1997. Widespread international concern has also been generated by Japan's plan to import plutonium-based mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel from Britain and France for use in its reactors. Strong objections have been voiced on the grounds that using plutonium fuel increases proliferation dangers, and that the transport of such material is irresponsible and hazardous. In July 1999, the Caricom nations of the Caribbean, through whose waters the shipments are routed, issued an unusually strongly-worded communiqué stating they were "particularly outraged at the callous and contemptuous disregard of their appeals by the governments of France, the United Kingdom and Japan to desist from this dangerous misuse of the Caribbean sea."(19)

Despite reassurances from Britain, France and Japan, the maritime transport of radioactive materials has been an issue of growing concern in NPT discussions. At the Third PrepCom in 1999, for example, South Pacific Forum members, Peru, Chile and Argentina raised the question, and New Zealand reiterated its request for states to adopt "at least prior notification and ideally prior informed consent procedures" for the transshipment of radioactive materials. France, Britain and Japan, for their part, insisted there was no problem and that there must be no impediment to the "rights and freedoms of navigation". Ironically, shipments of British plutonium from Sellafield were postponed in December 1999 not by protests, but by Japan's Ministry of Industry (MITI) after British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) admitted that they had falsified quality report data on MOX fuel stocks, including - though this was only admitted after a legal challenge - supplies earmarked for shipment to the Takahama-4 reactor in Japan. MITI insisted that Britain take back the most recent shipment, transported to Japan only in October.

Although it is likely that such issues will receive a hearing at the 2000 Review Conference, it is not to be expected that Article IV will be seriously questioned, except by non-governmental organisations and environmentalists. Recognising that a reliable and affordable source of energy is essential for development, the NGOs have long argued for a protocol to the NPT establishing an International Energy Agency to offer research, assistance and equipment for developing a range of (preferably renewable and sustainable) energy producing technologies. Such an Energy Agency would be far more suitable to the real energy and economic needs of developing countries, and would also enable the IAEA to separate its dual and contradictory roles, so that its sole responsibility under the NPT would be of managing safeguards to prevent diversion and proliferation. If the IAEA were to retain a function of promoting nuclear energy, it would make sense for that to be outside the framework of the NPT.

Notes:

(1) Abraham Rabinovic, 'Israel comes clean on nuclear capabilities', New Zealand Herald, July 17, 1998.

(2) Statement by Issam Makhoul MK to the Israeli Knesset, February 2, 2000.

(3) Letter dated 27 April 1999 from the Chairman of the Working Group on Disarmament of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/1

(4) Rabinovic, op. cit.

(5) For a fascinating account of India's acquisition of nuclear weapons, see George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, University of California Press, 1999.

(6) Working paper submitted by Malaysia, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/26

(7) [New Agenda Coalition] Working paper submitted by Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Malaysia, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/26

(8) See Nicola Butler, 'NATO in 1999: A Concept in Search of a Strategy' in Disarmament Diplomacy 35, March 1999, pp 4-10; Nicola Butler 'NATO at 50: Papering over the Cracks' Disarmament Diplomacy 38, June 1999, pp 2-8; and Nicola Butler, 'NATO Ministers Fudge the Essentials', Disarmament Diplomacy 42, December 1999.

(9) Daryl Kimball, 'What Went Wrong: Repairing the Damage to the CTBT', Arms Control Today, December 1999. See also Special Features on the CTBT in Disarmament Diplomacy 40, September/October 1999 and in The Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, January/February 2000

(10) Statement by the Republic of South Africa, Cluster I, Second Preparatory Committee of the 2000 Review Conference, April 29, 1998. Working Paper on Cluster One Issues: Article VI of the NPT, submitted by South Africa, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/12

(11) See also Rebecca Johnson, 'Using the Review Process to Address Nuclear Disarmament', in UNIDIR 37, op. cit and 'Ensuring accountability and progress in implementing Article VI' in Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparing for the Future, ACRONYM 11, April 1998, pp 32-36.

(12) The Canberra Commission, the Stimson Center, the US National Academy of Sciences and several Acronym Institute publications had identified a number of qualitative measures relating to nuclear-use doctrines and deployment postures that needed to be worked on in parallel with bilateral nuclear reductions. The Dublin Declaration is published in full (among other places) in Disarmament Diplomacy 27, June 1998, pp 27 - 32.

(13) Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana, 'Diplomatic Judo: Using the NPT to make the Nuclear Weapon States negotiate the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament Diplomacy 36, April 1999, pp 7-12.

(14) Ambassador Raimundo González of Chile, quoted in Rebecca Johnson, First Committee Report, Disarmament Diplomacy 41, November 1999.

(15) Press Statement on the Trilateral Initiative, IAEA Press Release PR 97/26, September 30, 1997; http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/pressrelease/prn2697.html

(16) Mohamed ElBaradei, statement to the 54th Session of the UN General Assembly, November 4, 1999.

(17) Hans Blix, 1997, taken from the IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom.

(18) Conversation with the author, December 1999.

(19) 'Stormy waters for nuclear shipments', BBC News Online, July 19, 1999

© 2000 The Acronym Institute.