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Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

BWC Protocol Bulletin, August 3, 2001

By Jenni Rissanen

Deep Disappointment But Restrained Reactions to US Decision

A number of countries have now commented on the US rejection of efforts to conclude a Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. Canada, Cuba, Japan and South Africa were the quickest to comment (please see 'United States Rejects Protocol', BWC Protocol Bulletin, July 25). Unsurprisingly, Cuba and Iran have so far expressed the harshest criticism of the US decision. In addition, the European Union (EU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as well as Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Libya and Russia, have all expressed various degrees of disappointment. However, a number of key players, such as China and India, whilst joining the NAM statement, have refrained from making their own individual public comment.

On June 26, Belgium spoke on behalf EU and the associated states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey). Norway later associated itself with the EU statement. Belgium reiterated the 26 countries' "fundamental commitment to the maintenance and strengthening of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes", considering these to be "essential elements of security and confidence". Belgium said the EU had "listened attentively" and "noted with concern that the United States was of the view that the costs related to the Protocol would outweigh the benefit thereof". It did not share this conclusion. Nor did it share the US view that "nothing could make the Composite Text" - proposed by the Chair of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG), Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary, on March 30 this year - "acceptable". The EU regretted that the United States had adopted this position after six years of joint work. For its part, the EU wanted to preserve the fruits of that long effort. Despite its disappointment, the EU noted that the US had made clear it was not withdrawing its support from multilateral regimes, and that it continued to share the common objective of strengthening the BWC.

In a hint about how the EU wanted to proceed, Belgium said the Union hoped "a multilateral negotiating forum would be maintained in the context of this Convention". The EU looked forward "with interest" to the promised "presentation of concrete proposals" by the US "that would be such as to take us out of this stalemate in good time before the Fifth Review Conference" scheduled for November 19-December 7 this year. In private, a number of diplomats have expressed scepticism about the US promise to come up with alternatives to the Protocol, believing the pledge was merely a poorly-disguised attempt to soften the blow and to appear more constructive - a similar tactic to that deployed by Washington in the wake of its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. So far - even when asked by one delegation in an informal meeting - the United States has not elaborated on its ideas. Some predict that such elaboration cannot be expected, as the US would be reluctant to submit whatever ideas it may have to AHG scrutiny. Concluding its statement, the EU stressed its desire to "maintain the chances of arriving at a multilateral agreement…involving all concerned states". The EU conceded that the AHG could no longer, after the US statement, "do business as usual". The Union was, therefore, considering "all possible options".

South Africa delivered the NAM's reaction on July 26. The Movement found it "appropriate" to recall its position as set out at its 13th Ministerial Meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, on April 8-9, 2000, where Ministers reaffirmed the decision of the Fourth BWC Review Conference and called on the AHG to complete its work "at the earliest possible date". The NAM "regretted" the fact that the US had come to a conclusion that the AHG's efforts "had not yielded an outcome that would be acceptable and that even further drafting and modification would not yield an acceptable result". The NAM assured the Chair of its "full and continued cooperation" and called on all states parties and "the major negotiating partner in particular" to continue to work in order to achieve the Group's objectives.

The NAM statement appeared very 'minimalistic' and restrained in its criticism. Some NAM countries, however, took a harder line. On July 26, Iran expressed regret that its political analysis of a few days earlier (July 23) had been proven correct: that the United States had "openly questioned the decisions made by consensus years ago, ignoring all rules of the game in international negotiations". The AHG was now faced with "a totally unjustifiable statement" from the US that questioned even the concept of a Protocol, a blow delivered "at the peak of satisfaction of a new cooperative atmosphere and momentum". Iran argued that the US move had interrupted the emergence of a consensus on two issues in the AHG "for first time in history": that this session would be the AHG's final meeting, and that the composite text - which Iran and others have been having a hard time accepting as the basis of the negotiations - "could be thoroughly discussed" with the hope of reaching consensus on a final text. Indeed, some fifty countries - nearly all of the AHG participants - had endorsed the composite text as the basis of the negotiations just prior to the US announcement. Some have suggested, however, that a small number if states only made such an endorsement to 'score cheap points' ahead of Washington's widely-anticipated announcement.

Iran scrutinized the United States' reasoning further, taking issue with the claim that US concerns had been ignored in the AHG. Noting that the US now openly "questioned the very concept and the necessity of the Protocol", Iran argued that, had this position been known years ago, the AHG would have been spared a huge waste of time and energy. Iran further identified several contradictory views in the US statement. The United States had argued that the Protocol was about disarmament and not trade. Yet, it criticized Iran for requesting the deletion of references to commercial propriety information (CPI) from the text. Iran also criticized the United States for appearing to give equal status to both multilaterally negotiated treaties, such as the NPT, CWC, BWC, and informal group export-control arrangements such as the Australia Group. Finally, Iran said it was ready to enter into serious businesslike negotiations on the composite text so as to conclude the AHG's work on time. However, any Protocol would need active participation and adherence from all countries with advanced bio-technology capacity to be effective.

Also on June 26, Russia expressed disappointment and anxiety over the US move, describing it as a "full rejection of the results of six year of work". Russia's position on the Protocol would, however, remain unchanged. The Russian delegation would "inform Moscow about the situation…and this [would] be taken into account". Russia called on the Group's work not to be "broken off and six year of efforts… laid to waste". The AHG should not "miss the chance to solve a problem which has needed to be resolved for a long time".

Brazil spoke after Russia expressed its regret. Believing that the Protocol provisions would have contributed to international security without a doubt, Brazil responded to US criticism of the composite text by arguing that no treaty could be "absolutely fool-proof". However, "true political will" in disarmament non- proliferation had to "be embodied in multilateral agreements if they are to have international legitimacy and become politically viable". In addition, to be effective, a verification regime needed to be universal, especially in the biological field, and a balance between verification and cooperation had to be struck. Brazil "firmly" rejected the idea that multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties could be based "solely on verification". The AHG had "a mandate to fulfil and its task should be accomplished".

Australia referred to an earlier statement by its foreign minister and expressed the view that if the negotiations now failed, the world would lose a valuable opportunity step up its fight against biological weapons. Speaking on July 26, Australia welcomed US Ambassador Mahley's assurance that there was no basis for claims the United States did not support multilateral weapons-of-mass-destruction and missile instruments. However, a failure to conclude the Protocol would be "a set back for multilateral arms control and send the wrong message to potential proliferators". An "acceptable result" was within reach after seven years of hard work.

Like Brazil, Australia argued that there no "absolute verification" was available. However, the Protocol could bring "real security benefits raising the bar on biological weapons proliferation and making it more difficult for countries to cheat" on the BWC commitments. Australia said it did not share the US conclusion that the Protocol would put national security and confidential business information at risk - there were measures to protect against this in the envisaged text. Australia said it looked forward to "learning more from the United States about its progress in developing other ideas and different approaches". Finally, perhaps wanting to inject a sense of realism into a fraught situation, Australia pointed out that the "fortunes of these negotiations rest on much more than this latest development in the US position", referring both to significant differences of views among delegations and to countries that "never really projected a sense of urgency about the Protocol", or who favoured weaker compliance provisions or the abolition of export control mechanisms.

Argentina reflected on the new situation over the weekend and commented the US decision on Monday, July 30. The country regretted the US position, saying it would now analyse the "various innovative ways" to proceed "which could legitimately be used to strengthen the verification regime for the Convention". It stressed the importance of universal participation in such a regime. As for next steps, Argentina suggested that the AHG start drafting its report for the Review Conference. A freeze on its work "would send a negative signal to the international community and its failure would add one further factor for concern to the somewhat discouraging situation in recent years".

Speaking on Friday, August 3, Mexico said it had arrived at the 24th and final AHG session (July 23-August 17) "with a will to negotiate, convinced that all the efforts and resources invested by the international community, from more than six years of intense work, should be concretised". The overwhelming majority of the AHG had expressed support for concluding the negotiations on the basis of the composite text. Mexico believed this was "a clear signal of the general will to conclude the Protocol". Thus, Mexico "deeply" regretted the US announcement. It was through multilateral negotiations, "and not through unilateral or partial regimes", that the ban on biological weapons would be preserved and strengthened. Mexico recalled that the negotiations had begun "in a moment of crisis", and that not concluding the Protocol was "the worst possible scenario". Mexico was ready to explore every possibility to reach agreement to fulfil the AHG's mandate. However, like many others, it felt that this required the commitment and support of all negotiation participants.

Libya added its voice on the same day, saying that it was "very disappointed like many others". However, it believed that the US decision should not discourage the AHG from continuing its work.

Overall, the reactions to the US announcement were relatively moderate. This was probably due to a combination of factors. Because a number of press reports that had given strong indication of what was to come, the news did not come as a big surprise to anyone in the AHG. Nevertheless, the fact that the US rejected not only the composite text but also further negotiating efforts created some shockwaves and required some additional assessment. With the United States not prepared to negotiate on the text, and others not willing to proceed with finalizing the text without US participation, many delegations quickly turned their attention to the question of how best to salvage the Protocol and the process. The restraint of the reactions might also be explained by the desire of some countries to have the AHG's report single out the United States and blame it for the Group's failure to fulfil its mandate. With such a blame-game possibly in the offing, the AHG is likely to face a difficult time drafting its report in the coming days.

Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's analyst monitoring the BWC AHG Protocol negotiations in Geneva.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.