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By Jenni Rissanen
Regrets and Uncertainty Over Protocol at First Committee
Almost all statements delivered during the annual general debate of the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security have tackled the topic of biological weapons (BW), with many of them expressing concern over their possible use by terrorists following the September 11 attacks. A number of states argued that the attacks further underscored the need to strengthen the international ban on BW. Over thirty statements addressed the stalled negotiations on a verification Protocol to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC). With the exception of the United States - which rejected the draft Protocol on July 25 and told the Committee that recent events had only reinforced its stance (see BWC Protocol Bulletin, October 8, 2001) - varying degrees of regret were expressed at the failure of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) in Geneva to conclude a Protocol in time for the Convention's Fifth Review Conference, scheduled for November 19-December 7 this year.
Many statements also expressed the hope that the Review Conference would provide guidance to the states parties on how to proceed with strengthening the BWC. However, the fact that the annual BWC resolution has been effectively downgraded to a strictly procedural decision making no mention of the Protocol indicates that there is virtually no agreement yet among delegations about how the process should continue. The Chair of the AHG, Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary, circulated a draft based on last year's resolution, but with updated references to the Protocol negotiations, expectedly drawing from the AHG's draft procedural report of its unhappy 24th session (July 23-August 17). The new sections stated that the AHG had not been able to fulfil its mandate but that the mandate remained in force and would determine the Group's future work. Further, the resolution would have invited the Review Conference to consider the Group's work and the question of how it could best fulfil the mandate. Reportedly, however, this language did not satisfy a number of parties, some of whom would have liked to modify the text in different ways that would have opened up the same controversial issue that had prevented the AHG from agreeing a report on its last session - namely, how to explain the AHG's failure to fulfil its mandate (see BWC Protocol Bulletin, August 20, 2001). There was also a feeling that it was premature to address these thorny issues in advance of the Review Conference. Indeed, there are signs that preparations on the Review Conference are only beginning now.
With these realities prevailing, Hungary opted to table a straightforward, procedural draft decision. The draft, entitled Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (A/C.1/56/L.11), aimed at ensuring continued UN assistance, reads as follows:
The General Assembly,
The following compilation summarises statements on the Protocol and the Review Conference from the UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, the Chair of the First Committee, and Committee delegations:
UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, Jayantha Dhanapala, and the Chair of the First Committee, Ambassador André Erdös of Hungary, addressed the Protocol negotiations in their opening day statements (October 8). Starting from the premise that "treaties that constitute the global legal regime for disarmament are seriously incomplete", Dhanapala noted that negotiations to strengthen the BWC - "this key treaty" - had "ended abruptly". He believed that the forthcoming Fifth BWC Review Conference provided "an opportunity to revisit this issue", stressing that the opportunity "must not be missed". Erdös said the AHG had "sadly enough" not been able to conclude the Protocol, believing such a breakthrough would have been "of paramount importance" and " a significant contribution" to strengthening the Convention and enhancing its effectiveness. Erdös hoped that the Review Conference would "identify ways and means to continue this urgent task".
The European Union (EU), The Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and The Rio Group addressed the issue in their general statements. The EU (October 8) said it "gave priority" to the Convention's reinforcement. Regretting that the AHG had been unable to conclude its task or "even" to adopt a procedural report at its final scheduled session in July-August, the EU reiterated, "in light of this failure", the "fundamental importance it attaches to the preservation and reinforcement of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and compliance with the [AHG's] terms of reference". "Convinced" that the BW threat demanded "an appropriate multilateral response", the EU would "retain and build on the experience it has acquired over many years of negotiations, including the [Chair's] composite text". Finally, the EU called the Review Conference "a focal date" for the process of strengthening the Convention. On October 9, ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) likewise regretted that the AHG had failed not only to conclude the Protocol but also to adopt "a final report of its work". It emphasized "the validity of the mandate" and underlined "that the only sustainable method of strengthening the Convention is through multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory legally-binding agreement". On October 8, The Rio Group (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela and Guyana) also regretted the lack of progress and hoped that the Group's mandate could be "renewed" at the Review Conference so that "negotiations can continue with a view to finalizing the elaboration of that international [judicial] instrument".
Australia (October 11) was disappointed and said it had "strongly supported the Chairman's text as a valuable, if imperfect, means of strengthening the BWC" that would have provided security benefits for all. It was vital that the momentum be renewed, beginning at the Review Conference. Australia urged all states to enhance their efforts to strengthen the Convention "with practical and effective international measures".
Brazil (October 9), which played an important role in developing the cooperation sections of the draft Protocol, was "deeply disappointed" at the lack of consensus on the composite text proposed by the Chair. In Brazil's estimation, its provisions would without doubt contribute to strengthening international security in this field. The draft Protocol should not be totally "squandered". Action against biological weapons had to be universal: there was "no alternative to multilateralism". Brazil believed the international community could "no longer continue to ignore" threats posed by BW but must instead "work together to reinforce the BWC regime". Brazil hoped the Review Conference would "succeed in identifying the necessary tools to prevent proliferation and ensure biological disarmament".
Canada (October 10) had hoped the Protocol would be adopted this year. Instead, the AHG had "unfortunately…failed to report". Canada saw a clear link between BW proliferation and terrorism and thought that governments were facing "a growing public concern". Canada would "examine with great interest any and all proposals to serve our common, primary goal to reinforce the Convention and prevent the possession and use of biological weapons".
China (October 9), which criticised the United States heavily in August over its rejection of the draft, was indirect in its reference to the US rejection this time. Nevertheless, its expression of "deep" regret over the fact that, after nearly seven years of negotiations, "the very basic approach of the protocol to the [BWC] has been negated, leading to the suspension of the negotiations", made it clear it was still blaming Washington for the failure. This 'negation', China argued, was "only detrimental" to efforts to achieve the "forging of international consensus in non-proliferation". China made no mention of the forthcoming Review Conference.
The Czech Republic (October 10) said it had been supportive of the Chair's text, but accepted the failure of the AHG negotiations as a "political reality". In considering further options, "we should not lose what has been achieved": the mandate remained in force and many of the Protocol's elements could be "used in our further work". The Czech Republic hoped that the forthcoming Review Conference would "give rise to new prospects for the credible verification" of the Convention. It believed that bio-terrorism dangers would "have to receive a priority".
India (October 16) was "disappointed" and "particularly sad that an endeavour that had come so close to a successful outcome was abandoned so abruptly, when threats of bio-terrorism are becoming more likely". It sincerely hoped the forthcoming Review Conference would "succeed in maintaining the mandate for strengthening the implementation" of the BWC "within the framework of the Convention".
Iran (October 9), which in August had wanted the AHG to explicitly blame the United States for the failure to conclude the Protocol, was the only country to name the US in its statement to the Committee. Iran believed that international efforts against BW should focus on the Convention's universality and its effective implementation. However, the US rejection of the draft Protocol had "caused international concerns". Iran hoped both that this would "not give [an] improper signal to wrong circles at these circumstances" and that "the new situation would encourage the United States to review its position and open the way for stimulating a momentum to revive" the negotiations with "the aim of concluding the BWC Protocol". Iran argued that today it was more essential than ever to encourage and promote peaceful international cooperation between the developed and developing countries in order to combat infectious diseases. Like China, another strong critic of the US stance in Geneva, Iran made no mention of the forthcoming Review Conference.
Jamaica (October 12) shared the concerns about the AHG's inability to advance its work and hoped the Review Conference would contribute towards strengthening the regime.
Japan (October 10) listed the failure to conclude the Protocol as number two on its list of negative trends in disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan held that efforts to strengthen the BWC should not be diminished. Although the AHG had not been able to conclude the Protocol by its "target date", Japan thought states parties should "continue to seek ways to enhance confidence in and compliance with the Convention". The Review Conference was "an important occasion for the states parties to demonstrate their collective will to strengthen the Convention". Japan touched also upon the sensitive issue of export controls, linking them with bio-terrorism. It said that all states should "tighten their national legislation and export controls on sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to [BW]".
Lithuania (October 16) warned that confidence in the BWC would not last "unless a renewed world-wide political commitment" to the regime was "extended without delay". It called the BWC "the weakest link in the system of [WMD] prohibition regimes". Developments in defence, preparedness, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism had "not removed the raison d'être for a verification regime that can play a useful and cost-effective role, particularly in the light of mounting concerns of a possible use of bio-weapons in terrorism".
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, October 16) said the terrorist attacks had pointed to the urgency of reinforcing the BWC, the "first test" of international resolve being the Review Conference. FYROM pointed out that international efforts would only be effective if they were "coupled with the same determination on the national level, by increased preparedness and by adjustment of national legislature to that end".
Malaysia (October 12) noted that the negotiations on a Protocol had come to an abrupt end "due to the decision by a major negotiating partner, which opposes the draft composite text". Malaysia also regretted the Group's inability to produce "a final report of its work". However, Malaysia hoped the Review Conference would "provide another opportunity to revisit this issue". Malaysia argued that negotiations on a verification regime needed to be accelerated as advances in biotechnology were increasing the threat posed by BW. The Convention remained "more significant than ever".
Mexico (October 8) regretted that it had not been possible to fulfil the Group's mandate. Believing that the internationally community shared the common objective of strengthening the BWC, Mexico called on the Review Conference "to provide an opportunity to reaffirm the validity and force of the mandate" and "to identify and determine the future course of action".
Mongolia (October 9) regretted that the talks had failed and hoped that the Review Conference would take up further work.
Myanmar (Burma, October 12) listed the failure as one of the setbacks received by the international non-proliferation regime during the last 12 months.
Nepal (October 10) said strengthening the BWC was a goal that needed to be pursued "vigorously".
New Zealand (October 11) argued that evidence of non-compliance with the Convention in the past, and current difficulties in the defining the Convention's exact parameters, should not lead to the conclusion that a compliance Protocol would be of limited value. Instead, New Zealand argued, the focus should be on the "real need" for effective compliance machinery making it harder for "proliferators to cheat, or terrorists to go undetected and unchecked". Unilateral and plurilateral measures such as bio-defense were "essential and consistent" with the Convention. However, the bio-threat also required a collective response: it was important to show leadership in strengthening the Convention's prohibitions. Warning that "squabbling fruitlessly over the past" at the Review Conference would "not take us forward", New Zealand urged "thinking outside the box" to address non-compliance concerns effectively. New Zealand continued to believe that measures to strengthen the Convention "are possible" and that the AHG's mandate remained "a valid basis for doing this".
Norway (October 10) said it accorded "high priority" to efforts to achieve an effective Protocol. It called for a multilateral and legally binding instrument. While regretting the lack of progress, Norway nevertheless believed "we still have a vehicle that could bring the process forward" because the AHG's mandate "remains in force". Thus, states parties should "make use" of the Review Conference and "reconfirm" their commitment "to the aims set out in the mandate".
For Pakistan (October 17), it was "regrettable" that the Protocol could not be finalized this year. Pakistan said it was "ready for the resumption of negotiations" and that it would "work towards this end" at the Review Conference. However, it warned that it would not "endorse proposals which are likely to sabotage the multilateral approach or seek solutions which cannot be effective nor command universal support".
Russia (October 11) made brief mention of the Protocol, saying that it was "in favour of creating an efficient mechanism" for the BWC, "in the form of a legally binding document". Russia believed that "negotiations on the subject should be continued on a multilateral basis".
South Africa (October 11) said it was an "underestimate" to say that it was "disappointed by the outcome" of the AHG's deliberations. The threat of deliberate disease as a weapon of war and terror continued be a major concern for South Africa. Recent events only underscored the danger. It was necessary that "the international community - as a whole - take action and commit themselves to strengthening the norm against" BW. South Africa continued to see the Convention as " a core element of the international security architecture" and remained "convinced that this objective" of enhancing its effectiveness "would be possible". South Africa believed that "the concerns that were expressed [by the United States] at the July/August meeting…can still be addressed in a satisfactory manner".
South Korea (October 10) thought it was "unfortunate" that the Protocol talks had failed to meet their mandate and "look[ed] forward to a constructive outcome" for future work at the Review Conference.
Sri Lanka (October 12) regretted that negotiations had "ended…without final agreement". The credibility of WMD regimes such as the BWC depended "to a great extent on the effectiveness of its verification regime". Such a regime could only be provided for through "open and transparent" multilateral negotiations. It was thus disturbing that the BWC was "likely to remain…the only treaty dealing with a weapon of mass destruction that has no verification mechanism". The implications of this glaring deficiency "would certainly have adverse effects on the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly at a time when the international community is preparing to deal with the menace of terrorism". Sri Lanka argued that the growing treat of bioterrorism "should not be overlooked or under-estimated".
For Tanzania (October 11), the failure was "regrettable and disappointing particularly after more than six years of negotiations". Tanzania hoped that the Review Conference would "salvage the draft protocol".
Thailand (October 12) hoped "the impasse could be resolved at the near future", saying it was "in this spirit" it was looking forward to the Fifth Review Conference.
For the Vatican (Holy See, October 12), the failure was "another setback for international cooperation that is so necessary to prevent terrorism." The Vatican believed that in order to combat bio-terrorism, the international institutions of arms control needed to be "more credible" than at present.
Vietnam (October 11) regretted developments, insisting that measures to strengthen the BWC were needed "as urgently as ever". It hoped that differences could be resolved and multilateral negotiations resumed as soon as possible.
In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, October 17) addressed the First Committee on the issue. The ICRC said the Review Conference should "strongly reaffirm the long-standing public abhorrence of the use of any form of biological weapon by any party to a conflict for any purpose whatsoever". It urged the states parties to "spare no effort to strengthen the BWC" at the Conference.
The general debate of the First Committee opened on Monday, October 8 and concluded on Wednesday, October 17. The Committee has now entered the next phase of its work: thematic discussions, including the introduction of resolutions and decisions. Action (adoption) on the draft resolutions and decisions begins on Wednesday, October 31. For reports on further developments on the BWC draft decision, please check http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc. First Committee statements and related material can be viewed at the website of the Women's International League for Peace and freedom (WILPF) at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's analyst monitoring the BWC AHG Protocol negotiations in Geneva. She is in New York from October 22 to November 9 to follow the deliberations of the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.
© 2001 The Acronym Institute.