Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

BWC Review Conference Bulletin, November 23, 2001

NGO'S share their Hopes, Fears and Proposals with Conference

By Jenni Rissanen

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) conveyed their ideas and proposals on the Review Conference to delegates on Wednesday, November 21. They presented a variety of views, all stressing the need for a multilateral legally-binding instrument to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The recent anthrax letters, which had violated the norm against the use of biological weapons, had only compounded the need for joint action. The rapid scientific and technological development posed further challenges. Prominent among the issues that the NGOs raised were verification, the failed verification Protocol talks, the 'alternative' US proposals, non-compliance, non-lethal biological weapons, synergies between national and international biosafety agreements, reservations to the Geneva Protocol, and American public opinion on biological weapons (BW) issues. Many called for more frequent meetings of the states parties as well as an interim supportive organization for the Convention.

The Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES) addressed the implications of the recent revolution in biotechnology which, it noted, had "not yet reached its peak". The possible misuse of knowledge for the development and production of biological weapons could "no longer be ignored". Citing the example of the inadvertent creation of the "killer mouse pox virus", INES believed that, with research on pathogenic micro-organisms being conducted every day, a stronger awareness of "this inherent threat" was required, along with every possible effort to counter it. In this context, INES endorsed the proposal by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) for an educational programme for scientists designed to highlight the BWC and the BW issue more generally. There was also a need to monitor and analyse new developments currently at the research level; scientists could themselves provide such oversight and reporting and so increase transparency. These were just some examples of the kind of action required: "more far-reaching, concerted measures" were still "desperately needed". A truly multilateral instrument, backed by an implementing organisation equipped with "world-wide capabilities and powers for spot-checks, intrusive inspections and sanctions can act most effectively as a deterrent". The Institute of Biology (the professional body for biologists in Britain) echoed INES' concern that, if no effective steps are taken, the misuse of biological agents was likely to continue "with the fruits of the current genomics revolution being suborned for a host of malign purposes". The recent breaking of the taboo against using biological agents for hostile purposes, a reference to the anthrax mailings in the United States and elsewhere, was "an extremely serious event", making it all the more important that the Conference make a start in remedying some of the Convention's deficiencies and recovering from the failure of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to negotiate a compliance Protocol. Moreover, the Institute stressed that, given the current rapid pace of scientific and technological development, Article I of the Convention had to be reviewed in a more frequent and systematic way.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) referred to the recent anthrax cases in the United States, arguing that "the most effective response to the use of biological weapons is a multilateral one": it was "extremely important" to put into place a verification protocol as well as technical assistance for the BWC. The Convention also badly needed a Secretariat. Multilateral efforts did not negate the need for national legislation, and every state party needed to do its part in reducing the likelihood of BW proliferation or use.

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) argued that there was now an even greater need for a legally-binding verification regime: without it, "the norm against biological weapons could be severely damaged", accusations would continue to linger and there would be no opportunity to verify claims independently. If the Review Conference failed to take decisions that enabled the AHG to fulfil its mandate, "this might be interpreted as a signal that the international community has capitulated and abandoned the goal of preventing the spread of BW". In discussing future measures to strengthen the Convention, VERTIC suggested that three points be kept in mind: first, the Conference should agree on a date for the next meeting of the AHG in 2002 so that multilateral discussions on a legally-binding mechanism to verify the Convention could continue. To avoid the issue from preventing agreement on a Final Declaration, the format and goals of continued talks could be discussed at the next meeting of the Group. Second, the talks should aim at a strong and legally-binding verification mechanism, building on the measures contained in the composite text as well as reflecting new proposals, including those made by the United States. There was a unique opportunity to "to produce a stronger Protocol". VERTIC said the US proposals were "no substitute for a verification mechanism", as only an international organisation could monitor and verify compliance "in an effective and consistent manner and provide for unbiased and competent mechanism to investigate alleged violations". Without verification, other efforts to prevent BW proliferation remained "patchy and insufficient". Thirdly, it was important to not to make a verification system dependent on consensus. The Ottawa Convention had saved thousands of lives despite opposition from the United States and other key states. VERTIC concluded by hoping that states parties would be able to find a compromise that enabled talks to continue so that more than ten years of talks would not be wasted.

Researchers from Bradford University urged the Conference to address four issues. First and foremost, it was "vitally important" that it reaffirmed the basic prohibition "that biological weapons are totally prohibited and that the undertaking...in Article 1 applies to all relevant scientific and technological developments...as the past five years have seen immense progress in microbiology, biotechnology, genomics and proteomics". Second, the steps taken in 1996 to the prevent non-state actors acquiring or using BW "needed to be strengthened in respect to Article III [non-transfers of agents, toxins, weapons or delivery vehicles] and Article IV [investigations launched by UN Security Council] of the Convention", and countries should adopt legislation to this effect. Third, the Conference should establish an interim supportive organisation for the Convention because "the regime to prevent biological weapons is too important to be nurtured and developed at the five year intervals". Finally, states parties should "rise over the setbacks of July/August", when the AHG's work ground to a halt, and "welcome the recent identification by the United States of measures to strengthen the Convention" and explore and elaborate these "in order to develop a package of legally-binding measures that attracts the support of all parties". In light of these priorities, the Final Declaration should thus aim to reaffirm the prohibition norm against BW, and agree to set up an interim supportive organisation to operate between the Fifth and the Sixth Review Conferences to act as a forum carrying forward work on strengthening the Convention, building on both the AHG's work and the US proposals.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) spelled out the recent developments confirming the Convention's "greatest limitation", the "absence of meaningful verification and transparency-enhancing measures", arguing that international cooperation should "form the heart of the global efforts to meet" the challenges dramatically highlighted by the events of and following September 11. SIPRI expected the Conference to (a) reaffirm and expand the understanding of the core prohibitions of the Convention; (b) reaffirm states parties' obligations and rights; (c) reaffirm the importance of confidence- and transparency-building mechanisms and effective compliance concern procedures; (d) consider common measures to increase awareness of national obligations under the BWC and to deal with threats on the sub-state level; (e) consider establishing an interim institutional to help states fulfil their undertakings; and (f) reaffirm the AHG's mandate.

The Sunshine Project addressed three topics in its address: the US proposals, the need for new BWC organizational and administrative mechanisms and threats to Article I. Sunshine argued that the US proposals undermined existing multilateral and national biosafety efforts, specifically the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol and the African Model Law on Biosafety. The proposal to have the Conference endorse national biosafety regulations based on World Health Organisation (WHO) or equivalent national guidelines was inconsistent with the Cartagena Protocol, the purpose of which was to facilitate the implementation of biosafety law globally. States parties should, of course, call for the implementation of national law, but only under the Cartagena Protocol. Echoing earlier NGO calls, Sunshine wanted states parties to meet frequently than every five years. Annual meetings, and a BWC Secretariat, should track other multilateral work and develop synergies with other instruments. The Project advocated the creation of a participation fund for developing countries and the establishment of subsidiary bodies on technological change and confidence building. The issue that needed to be addressed with the greatest urgency, however, was the question of non-lethal weapons threatening to erode Article 1. Proposals to create new non-lethal weapons were "toxic" to the Convention's total prohibition on biological warfare. Examples cited were "biological control" agents used to eradicate narcotic crops, genetically-engineered microbes designed to attack a wide variety of resources, and anti-personnel biochemical weapons and their delivery systems. Sunshine asked states parties to "reject these frightening weapons" and called on them to "show their conviction that all forms of agricultural biological warfare are prohibited".

Researchers from the University of Michigan set out three proposals. Since some states had conducted projects that "pushed the envelope" with regard to Convention compliance, states parties should unequivocally declare that developing weapons, equipment and means of delivery for hostile purposes or in armed conflict was prohibited. The development "of the greatest concern" was the interest in several major industrialised countries in modifying pathogens and other microbes for military purposes not related to the development of vaccines against naturally occurring pathogens. Some states had "either developed or are planning to develop genetically modified pathogens that could overcome the protection provided by pathogens", or had plans for projects that would develop organisms capable of digesting materials such as plastics or lubricants (non-lethal weapons). Negotiations should be pursued on a ban on all genetic modification of biological agents for defensive and offensive purposes. Thirdly, "in light of the urgent need for a new international instrument for addressing charges of non-compliance", negotiations should be resumed on such an instrument for the BWC.

The Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva wanted the Conference to "demonstrate full compliance", offering examples as to how this might be accomplished. The Conference should also request a renewed and collective effort to universalise the Convention and encourage the 18 signatories to the Treaty which had not yet ratified to do so as a matter of urgency. To persuade countries to withdraw the few remaining reservations to the Geneva Protocol, the Office wanted the Conference to authorise systematic demarches on those countries. It also supported the call for interim supportive institutions.

Two US-based NGOs, the Federation of American Scientists and 20/20 Vision, spoke critically of the American position on the Protocol. FAS said the recent anthrax attacks had demonstrated the "incredible potency of weaponized disease" and believed that the anthrax "derived, almost certainly, from a US defense laboratory". However, the anthrax letters were only "a small taste of what is possible". The Federation believed the most probable BW threat came from covert state programmes prepared to utilise a terrorist mechanism for delivery. US proposals to strengthen the Convention, while "commendable" and potentially helpful in preventing domestic bio-terrorism, did not address the most serious threats. FAS added that if the US officials believed that some countries were operating clandestine BW programmes, they should also realise "voluntary measures won't work at the international level, and that a legally-binding mechanism is the only way to influence the behaviour of countries of concern. Only an international legal agreement can increase the available information about biological activities in the world, or bring the international community together to respond, if a violation of the Convention should be suspected". Referring to allegations in early September questioning the compatibility of US biodefence programmes with Convention provisions, FAS believed that "perhaps the best way to... prevent a more serious BW attack against civilians is not through secret, ultra-sophisticated threat assessment projects, involving biological bombs and weaponized agents and large aerosol facilities", which hardly set a good example for others: transparency "would be a better policy, and monitoring compliance would be more valuable than secrecy". In the Federation's view, the Conference would be a failure unless states parties agreed to "continue talking as long and as often as may be necessary in order to pursue every possible means for preventing bioterrorist attacks everywhere". 20/20 Vision argued that the position held by the US delegation on the Protocol was "by no means the view held by all of the US population". The organisation had commissioned a poll demonstrating that the American population understood the difference between "strong words and strong actions". 20/20 Vision drew attention to "how drastically and suddenly the US position had shifted", arguing that the volte face ran contrary to the wishes of a public that wants to see "prompt action and a strong verification procedure even if our own delegation apparently does not." The preliminary results of the poll found that 81% of respondents believed inspections of public and private facilities should be mandatory, with 72% of the view that it was more important to ensure facilities were not producing biological weapons than to protect trade secrets. In addition, 71% supported the creation of an international agency to monitor compliance with the BWC. 20/20 Vision thus believed that the US government would pay a heavy political price if it continued to "insist on its position...on the Protocol that was so ably being developed by the Ad Hoc Group".

Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's analyst monitoring the BWC AHG Protocol negotiations in Geneva. She is attending the BWC Review Conference.