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Statement by John R. Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, November 19, 2001.
"We are here to review the functioning of the Biological Weapons Convention under circumstances none of us would have wished and none of us foresaw. Suddenly, all of us are engaged in a war - a war that ignores national boundaries and threatens the very fibre of our societies. President Bush warned in his recent address to the UN General Assembly that: 'the world faces the horrifying prospect of terrorists searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons the moment they are capable of doing so.' This conference is therefore unfortunately timely.
We, the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, must demonstrate an unwavering commitment to fighting this undeniable threat. We must overcome years of talking past each other, and address the real issues. Will we be courageous, unflinching, and timely in our actions to develop effective tools to deal with the threat as it exists today, or will we merely defer to slow-moving multilateral mechanisms that are oblivious to what is happening in the real world?
The United States has repeatedly made clear why the arms control approaches of the past will not resolve our current problems. This is why we rejected the flawed mechanisms of the draft Protocol previously under consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. Countries that joined the BWC and then ignore their commitments and certain non-state actors would never have been hampered by the Protocol. They would not have declared their current covert offensive programs or the locations of their illegal work - nor would the draft Protocol have required them to do so. By giving proliferators the BWC stamp of approval, the Protocol would have provided them with a 'safe harbor' while lulling us into a false sense of security. Although the United States has been criticized publicly - both in the media and by foreign governments - for rejecting the draft Protocol, many of those same governments have told us privately that they shared America's reservations, describing the draft as 'flawed' or 'better than nothing.' Do we really believe that a Protocol that would allow violators to conduct an offensive biological weapons program while publicly announcing their compliance with the agreement is 'better than nothing?' We think not. We can - and must - do better.
Before we consider new ways to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, however, we must first confront the failure of many states to abide by that very document. Too many states are parties to the BWC but have not lived up to their commitments. Any nation ready to violate one agreement is perfectly capable of violating another, denying its actual behavior all the while. The United States will simply not enter into agreements that allow rogue states or others to develop and deploy biological weapons. We will continue to reject flawed texts like the draft BWC Protocol, recommended to us simply because they are the product of lengthy negotiations or arbitrary deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the United States and many other countries represented here today.
Straight Talk About BWC Compliance
The most important reason we gather here is to assess compliance with the BWC provisions outlawing the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, or retention of biological weapons and their delivery systems. While the vast majority of the BWC's parties have conscientiously met their commitments, the United States is extremely concerned that some states are engaged in biological weapons activities that violate the Convention. We also are concerned about potential use of biological weapons by terrorist groups, and states that support them. So I plan to name names. Prior to September 11, some would have avoided this approach. The world has changed, however, and so must our business-as-usual approach.
First, we are concerned by the stated intention of Usama bin Ladin and his al Qaeda terrorist organization to use biological weapons against the United States. While we do not yet know the source of the recent anthrax attacks against us, we do know that some of the September 11 terrorists made inquiries into renting crop dusters, almost certainly to attack our cities. We also know that Usama bin Ladin considers obtaining weapons of mass destruction to be a sacred duty, that he has claimed to possess such weapons, and that he has threatened to use them against us. We are concerned that he could have been trying to acquire a rudimentary biological weapons capability, possibly with support from a state. While the United States is not prepared, at this time, to comment on whether rogue states may have assisted a possible al Qaeda biological weapons program, rest assured that the United States will not rely alone on treaties or international organizations to deal with such terrorist groups or the states that support them. Neither the Biological Weapons Convention nor the former draft BWC Protocol would stop biological terrorism by groups like al Qaeda or restrain their rogue-state patrons.
Beyond al Qaeda, the most serious concern is Iraq. Iraq's biological weapons program remains a serious threat to international security. After signing the BWC in 1972, Iraq developed, produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents and weapons, and continued this activity even after ratifying the BWC in 1991. Despite the obligation to fully disclose and destroy its BW program, which the UN Security Council required to conclude the Gulf War, Iraq denied having a BW program and pursued a policy of obstruction, denial and evasion to conceal its program. Only under increased pressure from UNSCOM and the looming defection of one of Iraq's weapons directors did Baghdad admit the existence of its offensive BW program. Baghdad unilaterally ended UNSCOM weapons inspections and monitoring in Iraq in December 1998. Even with unprecedented intrusiveness, UNSCOM, when faced with a nation dedicated to deception and concealment, unfortunately could not fully dismantle Iraq's BW program. Its successor, UNMOVIC, is prepared to resume on-site activities in Iraq, but Saddam Hussein's continued belligerence prevents it from so doing. The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken advantage of three years of no UN inspections to improve all phases of its offensive BW program. The existence of Iraq's program is beyond dispute, in complete contravention of the BWC. The BWC Protocol would have neither hindered nor stopped it.
Also extremely disturbing is North Korea's BW program. The United States believes North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability and that it has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the Convention. North Korea likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to do so. While we are hopeful that Pyongyang will come into compliance with the BWC and end its program, the fact remains that the BWC has been ineffective in restraining North Korea. The draft BWC Protocol would have done no better.
We are also quite concerned about Iran, which the United States believes probably has produced and weaponized BW agents in violation of the Convention. The United States believes that Libya has an offensive BW program in the research and development stage, and it may be capable of producing small quantities of agent. We believe that Syria (which has not ratified the BWC) has an offensive BW program in the research and development stage, and it may be capable of producing small quantities of agent.
Finally, we are concerned about the growing interest of Sudan (a non-BWC party) in developing a BW program. The BWC has not succeeded in dissuading these states from pursuing BW programs and we believe the draft BWC Protocol would have likewise failed to do so.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but to demonstrate real challenges left unaddressed by the Biological Weapons Convention. There are other states I could have named which the United States will be contacting privately concerning our belief that they are pursuing an offensive BW program. The United States calls upon all BWC parties and signatories that have not done so to immediately terminate their offensive biological weapons programs and comply fully with their obligations.
New Approaches to the BW Threat
In light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, widespread violations of the BWC, and the weaknesses of the draft BWC Protocol, which rendered it incapable of effectively addressing these serious threats, the United States has crafted alternative proposals. Just as we can no longer rely solely on traditional means to fight a war against terrorism, we need to look beyond traditional arms control measures to deal with the complex and dangerous threats posed by biological weapons. Countering these threats will require a full range of measures - tightened export controls, an intensified non-proliferation dialogue, increased domestic preparedness and controls, enhanced biodefense and counter-bioterrorism capabilities, and innovative measures against disease outbreaks. Strict compliance by all parties with the BWC is also critical.
The United States has a dedicated bio-defense program to ensure that Americans and our friends and allies are protected against bioweapons attacks. In light of the recent anthrax attacks, our efforts will increase. Robust biodefense efforts are necessary to combat known threats, and to ensure that we have the means to defeat those specific threats. US bio-defense programs are a means to an end, to protect Americans and our friends and allies. An essential element in our strategy is to find agreement in this body on measures that countries can undertake immediately to strengthen the BWC. We strongly believe that the key is to broaden our understanding of the biological weapons threat and the types of measures that are potentially valuable in countering it.
US Proposals for Strengthening the BWC
National Implementation (Article IV). Let me begin with measures to strengthen National Implementation. The United States proposes that parties agree to enact national criminal legislation to enhance their bilateral extradition agreements with respect to BW offenses and to make it a criminal offense for any person to engage in activities prohibited by the BWC. While Article IV permits the adoption of such legislation, it does not explicitly require it. This body must make clear that doing so is essential.
Further, parties should have strict standards for the security of pathogenic microorganisms and: (a) adopt and implement strict regulations for access to particularly dangerous micro-organisms, including regulations governing domestic and international transfers; and (b) report internationally any releases or adverse events that could affect other countries. Sensitizing scientists to the risks of genetic engineering, and exploring national oversight of high-risk experiments, is critical and timely, as is a professional code of conduct for scientists working with pathogenic micro-organisms.
Such measures, if adopted and implemented, will contribute significantly to doing what none of the measures in the draft BWC Protocol would do: control access to dangerous pathogens, deter their misuse, punish those who misuse them, and alert states to their risks. Individually and collectively, they would establish powerful new tools to strengthen the BWC by enhancing our ability to prevent the development, production or acquisition of dangerous pathogens for illegal purposes. These benefits can be achieved quickly, since implementation does not depend on lengthy international negotiation.
Consultation and Cooperation (Article V). The United States seeks to establish a mechanism for international investigations of suspicious disease outbreaks and/or alleged BW incidents. It would require parties to accept international inspectors upon determination by the UN Secretary General that an inspection should take place. This would make investigations of such events more certain and timely. It would also allow us to acquire internationally what is likely to be the first hard evidence of either accidental or deliberate use of biological warfare agents and help insure that any such event did not get covered up by the responsible parties. We are also supportive of setting up a voluntary cooperative mechanism for clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by mutual consent, to include exchanges of information, voluntary visits, or other procedures to clarify and resolve doubts about compliance.
Assistance to Victims (Article VII) and Technical and Scientific Cooperation (Article X). Enhanced cooperation with the World Health Organization would be in everyone's interests. As we are aware, biosafety standards vary widely throughout the world. The United States strongly believes every country would benefit from adopting rigorous procedures, and therefore proposes that parties adopt and implement strict biosafety procedures, based on WHO or equivalent national guidelines. Furthermore, we should enhance support of WHO's global disease surveillance and response capabilities. Parties could agree to provide rapid emergency medical and investigative assistance, if requested, in the event of a serious outbreak of infectious disease, and to indicate in advance what types of assistance they would be prepared to provide.
Restricting access and enhancing safety procedures for use of dangerous pathogens, strengthening international tools to detect serious illness and/or potential illegal use of biology and providing assurance of help in the event of a serious disease outbreak - these measures all enhance collective security and collective well-being - which is, after all, our ultimate objective. With the exception of the final measure, none of these measures was contemplated in the draft BWC Protocol.
The United States believes these proposals provide sound and effective ways to strengthen the Convention and the overall effort against biological weapons. These are measures state parties can adopt now to make the world safer and proliferation more difficult. The choice is ours.
Review Conference Objectives
To preserve international unity in our efforts to fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation, we need to work together, and avoid procedural or tactical divisiveness during the Review Conference that may hinder reaching our mutual goal of combating the BW threat. We welcome all reactions to these ideas, and additional new ways to strengthen the BWC.
The time for 'better than nothing' protocols is over. It is time for us to consider serious measures to address the BW threat. It is time to set aside years of diplomatic inertia. We will not be protected by a 'Maginot treaty' approach to the BW threat. The United States asks the states assembled here to join us in forging a new and effective approach to combat the scourge of biological weapons. I have laid out serious proposals that the United States hopes will form the basis of this new approach. I ask that these proposals be endorsed in the Final Declaration.
By working together during this Review Conference, by exchanging ideas and proposals that will help us meet this critical challenge, I am confident this Convention can succeed in advancing the worldwide effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate the biological weapons threat."
Source: Text - Bolton Says Iraq, North Korea Violate Biological Weapons Pact, US State Department (Washington File), November 19.
Press briefing by Under Secretary of State John Bolton, November 19.
'Mr. Bolton: 'I...think it is important to underline two points. The first is that the central problem in our view with biological weapons is the fact that an unfortunate number of the states party to the Biological Weapons Convention are flatly violating the terms of the Convention with the conduct of an operational biological weapons program. That is the reason that we named some of those countries in the plenary statement to make it clear that we know what they are doing, and we know that it is in violation of the Convention. Second, also as I said in the speech, [we have] to recognize that simply piling one convention on top of another is not going to solve the problem if the rogue states that we are talking about are prepared to violate the underlined prohibitions in the BWC, or indeed going back to the Geneva Convention of 1925. That's why I said that neither the United States nor anyone else, would be protected by a Maginot treaty approach to the BW threat. ...'
Question: 'What are you proposing then - to disregard the protocol, to disregard the Convention and work on something else?'
Mr. Bolton: '... What we have said is that we strongly support the Convention. It was after all the United States that unilaterally announced in 1969 that we were forswearing the use of biological weapons and that we would unilaterally destroy all of our biological weapons stocks, and that led really to the negotiations that created the 1972 Convention. The United States for 30 plus years has been in the forefront of the opposition to biological weapons and we think that the proposals that we have made today continue in that tradition.'
Question: 'Two questions related to your alternatives package... Number one is, do you plan to make your alternatives package a global one as well as a legally binding one or would you be willing to start off the program on incremental approach like with say 20 countries, 30 countries willing to go aboard... Second part of the question is, aren't many of the elements included in this alternative package compatible, not mutually exclusive, with the composite draft protocol that you have just rejected?'
Mr. Bolton: 'In response to your first question we think that it's in fact more effective to rely on the adoption of national criminal legislation rather than slug through seven more years of negotiation as we just finished with the draft protocol that resulted in something that we found both ineffective and unacceptable for other reasons. ... There are actually, of the elements that we suggested in our package, really very few that were in any way addressed in the protocol. And that's one of the reasons why we wanted to get away from both the protocol and the Ad Hoc group to break through that old thinking, if I may characterize it that way, and look at other ways to strengthen the BWC.' ...
Question: 'You mentioned that there are other countries that you did not want to name but that you would be speaking to privately that are doing this. Is this because they are friendly countries or countries that for other reasons you wouldn't want to embarrass?'
Mr. Bolton: 'In the kind of complex diplomacy that the United States engages in where there are many factors that affect not just preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, there are a lot of things we take into account. Having made the decision not to name certain names in the prepared statement, I am obviously not going to get them in now. But as the statement says, we will be contacting them privately because, as the statement also says, strict compliance with the BWC is something we think is important for all countries to engage in, and that standard is the one that we are really holding countries to. There are practical limits to the efficacy of what you say publicly and what you say privately. It's a complex balance that we have to make in a wide range of cases. The balance we made in this instance was demonstrated in the statement.'
Question: '... [Are you] saying that going through the Secretary-General of the UN rather than having a regime of mandatory challenge or routine inspections, would make investigations of such events of alleged breaches more certain and timely? My question would be on which kind of experience are you basing this assessment given the fact with the CW treaty for the last 8 years we have had all good and satisfactory experience.'
Mr. Bolton: 'In response to your second question...[you have to consider] the difference between the nature of chemical weapons and the nature of biological weapons. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention is essentially an 'intent' treaty. And it's one of the things that differentiates it from other kinds of arms control and why we think this alternative proposal is more likely to work. But make no mistake about it. We have not contended that this proposal is perfect. What we do think...is that states that undertake to comply with the biological weapons convention should comply with it. And absent the use of compelling force the most important thing we can do, whether through public means or private means, is to convince them to comply with it. We are not concerned with the violation of Article 1 of the BWC by countries in Western Europe because we know they are complying with it. We want the other countries to comply with it too. Because their failure to comply with it undercuts the legitimacy and utility of our all arms control arrangements and that's why we thought it important to name names today to put the spotlight internationally on those countries that are lying about their compliance.'
Question: 'Excuse me if I may follow up then because my question was whether or not you will enter the procedures that are being provided for in the convention to clarify the kind of allegations you have been making here...'
Mr. Bolton: 'I don't feel the need to clarify them because our information we believe is sufficient to justify the statements that I made here publicly and many others that we've made in classified fashion to Congress and to other friends and Allies.'
Question: 'OK. And the other question was... why do you think that going through the Secretary-General might be more certain and more timely to investigate certain allegations?'
Mr. Bolton: 'Because it's our hope based on experience based under the Chemical Weapons Conventions but also the work that we undertook in looking at various of the measures being debated in connection with the draft BW protocol, that we thought would have been ineffective, that this will provide a better alternative. ...'
Question: 'The proposal in your speech using the Secretary-General's office to get inspectors in countries, is this avenue preferred because it could also be easier to impose sanctions on states that would not comply? It's an easier mechanism to have sanctions for the UN structure?'
Mr. Bolton: 'Well, it's possible, but I think it is important to have that mechanism play out. First it's important to get it adopted, which hasn't happened yet because it is still a proposal, but it is also important to see what happens when we try to implement it. Our preference, let me say it again, is that states should comply with their obligations under the biological weapons convention because they have solemnly undertaken to engage in that kind of behaviour, and all of the proposals we are talking about are really second best solutions from the ideal, which is to have the governments that sign on to the Biological Weapons Convention, do what they commit to do.'
Question: 'The call for national criminal legislation on this issue, would it be a call for a kind of law of the jungle? What will be the coordinating strategy for that? Don't you feel that every country that takes up your call will legislate according to its particular interests?'
Mr. Bolton: 'We expect that every country will legislate consistent with the obligations that they have undertaken pursuant to the Biological Weapons Convention itself. The United States has legislation, I am sure that other countries will have other ideas, but it is not necessarily the case that one size fits all. Other countries may come up with legislation actually that has ideas that we could incorporate. ...' ...
Question: 'Did I understand you correctly that you have no plans to trigger any of the provisions in the Convention against the offending countries that you have named? You are not going to go through the Convention to do that?'
Mr. Bolton: 'Well, the purpose of this statement here today was not to indicate one way or another what subsequent actions we might take which might cover a broad variety of things, but to say to the international community that these states, we believe, are currently in violation of the convention. As I said before, the ideal way to handle this is for the states that have undertaken the obligations that they do in the Biological Weapons Convention to adhere to it. That is the best way, and that is the behavior that we would like to see.' ...
Question: 'You've presented alternative proposals, but a lot of countries are concerned that we don't have what they consider to be an international legally binding protocol. Is there any way that you could accept for countries to go along with your proposals on the understanding that negotiations would continue on a wider protocol?'
Mr. Bolton: 'The draft protocol that was under negotiation for the past seven years is dead in our view. Dead, and is not going to be resurrected. It has proven to be a blind alley. We have lost a lot of time in the course of the negotiations and we think that the proposals we have made, and there may well be other thoughts and proposals out there that would be productive as well, ought to be pursued and ought to be pursued in the immediate short term so that they can be implemented. I think that that is why the statement says in a couple of occasions, we think the traditional arms control approaches in this area have not been successful, and we are trying to think...outside the box and why we encourage other governments to do the same.'
Question: 'Why the emphasis on bilateral extradition agreements? If you have national legislation, doesn't that imply then that you don't trust the other nations to enforce this legislation and you would like to be able to collect these people and bring them to the United States for trial?'
Mr. Bolton: 'Well, I think the proposal on extradition is not dissimilar from other bilateral extradition ideas that countries have on a whole variety of offenses that where there is the possibility of extraditing in some cases you want the person brought back to the United States, or another country may want it brought back to its national jurisdiction, and you want that possibility to be there, absolutely.'
Question: '... To what extent, sir, is your speech today triggered by September 11, and to what extent is it the outcome of long-term analysis of the defects of the ad hoc committee's proposals?'
Mr. Bolton: 'Well, I think it is a combination of both. I think the terrorist attacks of September 11 demonstrate that the risks to the American homeland are real, that we are dealing with something that is not hypothetical. And certainly the release of anthrax, whatever its source turns out to be, underlines that. But our effort has been to see if there aren't ways of truly strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention and the prohibition against the use of BW. Our complaint about the draft protocol was that it would not do what its supporters claimed it would do. ... The defects in the protocol that we saw were such that on an interagency basis there was no disagreement during the course of the US government's internal review. There was no disagreement that the protocol should be rejected. Why did we reject it now? Because the negotiators in the course of their discussions had set this Conference in effect as the deadline. The United States even during the prior administration had argued against setting this Conference as the deadline, but we were, dare I say it, alone. And so the overwhelming weight of the seven-year-long ad hoc process came together and we had to make a decision. It was not a case where the Bush administration came in and said let's make a decision on this. It was presented to us that we were going to be here in November and the subject of the ad hoc group's protocol was going to come up, where did we stand on it? So we evaluated it and told the truth.'
Question: 'Technically speaking what are you aiming at? Are you aiming at amending the Convention, which of course would be a time consuming process, and why could you not strengthen the Protocol...?'
Mr. Bolton: 'The proposals that we made...do not require amending the Biological Weapons Convention. We think that's one of the advantages of it. In terms of why we are not proposing to change the protocol as an alternative, the protocol we found to be hopelessly defective in three major respects. First, we felt that the protocol as drafted would endanger the viability of Biological Warfare defense programs because the inspection provisions would open up to countries that had a desire to have an offensive BW program the possibility of finding out what our defenses were. ... The second major defect of the protocol was that it would have endangered and we believe hopelessly compromised the export control programs that the United States and many other Western countries have restricting and limiting very severely the export of dual use items that could be used to help develop an offensive biological weapons capability. ... And the third fatal defect in the protocol was the risk to proprietary information that would have been occasioned by the inspection provisions from entirely legitimate pharmaceutical concerns in the United States and elsewhere. So the draft protocol as it stood in the summer of this year we felt was hopelessly inadequate already and that is why we rejected it, and the timing of the rejection as I said a moment ago was occasioned by the impending arrival of November 19 and this Review Conference. There is no doubt however that had the protocol remained open for amendment whether by us or others there are many states that would have wanted to make the protocol even worse from our point of view. And our judgment was that after seven years of negotiation, the process was in a ditch, and we couldn't see how to get it out, and that is why, because of the press of circumstances, we came to the decision that we did and presented it at the last meeting of the ad hoc group during the summer.'
Question: 'So you want your proposals to be part of the Final Declaration?'
Mr. Bolton: 'Of this Review Conference, that is correct.'
Question: 'Can you indicate what measure of support you think you are going to get from other participants in the conference, given that many of them, including the Western Group, or many in the Western Group, are still angry about the US pullout in the summer...?'
Mr. Bolton: '...I can say that we have consulted extensively around the world on these proposals and that I think there is a fair amount of support for them. Whether that will be enough to ensure that they are adopted in the Final Declaration, or whether the Conference is unable to reach agreement on the Declaration because of other issues, I can't really say at this point. I will tell you what I told a meeting of the Western Group just a few moments ago, was that I am certainly prepared to come back here in the third week of this conference if my counterparts, at least in the Western Group, are also prepared to come back here. ...'
Question: 'Could you elaborate more on your information on North Korea's biological weapons program? And one more question, will your naming in public of the North Korean program would have some effect on the ongoing US North Korean dialogue or are you going to put the prerequisite of this problem for the improvement of bilateral relations between the two countries?'
Mr. Bolton: '... [W]ith respect to the potential impact on President Bush's offer to have further conversations with the DPRK, I did say in the statement we are hopeful that Pyongyang will come into compliance with the BWC, and that's our policy, just as we are hopeful that they will cease their proliferation of other technologies involved with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems.' ...
Question: 'I just want to understand. You've proposed the Secretary General invoke inspections which as I understand it give would presumably give the Security Council a chance to veto such inspections, so that would presumably protect the Perm 5 inspections, the other major omission from the protocol in your proposals is, as I understand it, the lack of the sharing of technology, or am I wrong or could you set me straight?' ...
Mr. Bolton: '... In terms of the Security Council, you know, look, it is in the nature of the veto power, and it's why the veto power exists at all, that those countries have the ability to exercise it. I think that's a fact of life and that's not going to change.' ...
Question: 'In your statements you said that after al Qaeda your most serious concern is Iraq and their biological weapons program. If I remember correctly, though, when the UN was going after Iraq after the war, the United States was accused of having sold Iraq the elements that it used in making its biological weapons and that the US Department of Commerce was issuing export licenses for the elements right up until the January 15, 1991, and that the US impounded the UNSCOM documents and has kept them impounded ever since because they prove this. At least this is what people in the UN have told me who have worked on it. Doesn't this put you in a very awkward position then in pointing the finger at Iraq considering you've equipped Iraq and this was after Iraq had already gassed its own people and shown what it was capable of doing?'
Mr. Bolton: '...I can tell you that as a matter of historical record, having been in the State Department at the time of the Persian Gulf Crisis and having helped write the resolution that created UNSCOM, that there were lots of participants, lots of sales to Iraq, lots of equipment, by lots of other countries before hand. I would be the last person to say the United States has been perfect in the implementation of its export control system. It has been and that system has undergone very substantial revision in the years since the Persian Gulf crisis, and to the extent which Iraq was able to develop an offensive BW capability before the program the Persian Gulf War, and the extent it's been able to develop one since the Persian Gulf War and particularly since the end of UN inspections should be a lesson to us all as to how easy it is for governments to practice denial and deception techniques to conceal BW programs even from the most intrusive arms control inspection regime in the history of arms control - UNSCOM. And that's why the idea that the draft protocol that was rejected would have resolved the problem of Iraq was inaccurate. I think all of us in the government are ready to accept recommendations for strengthening the export controls system and it doesn't bother me at all to say that while ours [is] imperfect, others are a lot more porous. ...'"
Source: Transcript - Bolton Briefing on Biological Weapons Pact, November 19, Washington File, November 20.
© 2001 The Acronym Institute.