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A monthly digest of news and documents edited by Sean Howard. Credits
The third issue of Disarmament Diplomacy features three opinion pieces on the future tasks and agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
Two of the opinion pieces deal with conventional arms control. Romania's Ambassador to the CD, Romulus Neagu, and his Deputy, Cristian Istrate, argue for the Conference to negotiate a code of conduct for arms transfers. The authors express some exasperation that the CD has yet to turn its attention to the arms trade: "notwithstanding how legitimate the preoccupations over nuclear issues may be, it is hardly understandable that this unique multilateral disarmament negotiating body continues to fail to address conventional weapons."
Dan Smith, Director of the Oslo Peace Research Institute (PRIO), urges the CD to tackle the issue of light weapons, and sets out detailed suggestions as to how this might be managed, arguing "it is, of course, essential to be realistic about the scale and the complexity of the problem... But the uncontrolled proliferation of light weapons is doing great harm to very large numbers of people... It is not realistic to preclude efforts to identify solutions."
The third opinion piece is by Roland Timerbaev, former senior Soviet arms control negotiator, closely involved with the evolution of the CD and its predecessor conferences. He concludes with substantive and procedural proposals for enhancing its future performance. Specifically, he urges the Conference to agree to not establish more than two ad hoc committees for any Session. He also suggests formalising of the role of the five declared nuclear- weapon States: "the group of five might even be institutionalised in some way as an informal negotiating component of the CD for dealing with nuclear weapons issues".
In Geneva Update, Rebecca Johnson assesses the sometimes tortuous, sometimes dramatic progress of the CD towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty during the first part of its 1996 Session.
Documents and Sources features material from the signing of the Rarotonga Treaty Protocols, key statements from the CD, an International Atomic Energy Agency statement on its inspection of the French test site, and Congressional testimony on the US nuclear stockpile and ballistic missile defence plans and threats.
News Review includes coverage of China's alleged sales of nuclear- weapons related technology to Pakistan, the latest Iraq-UNSCOM stand-offs, and the debate in and between Russia and the US on the START II and ABM Treaties.
I am pleased to announce that the next issue will feature an opinion piece by former US Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara.
The agenda, in place since 1978, has ten items, known collectively as The Decalogue.
For the 1994 Session of the Conference, Sweden's Ambassador, Lars Norberg, was appointed Special Co-ordinator on Review of the Agenda. No Special Co-ordinator was appointed for the 1995 Session. Algeria's Ambassador, Hocine Meghlaoui, has now been appointed as Special Co-ordinator on the Agenda, though his deliberations are principally concerned with the agenda for the 1996 Session.
The fullest account of the review so far came on 1 September 1994 with Ambassador Norberg's report to the Conference. His statement referred to "divergent views" on the issue of "the appropriate balance" between nuclear and non-nuclear issues:
"...consultations have revealed conflicting views among delegations as to the appropriate balance between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons on the agenda. Divergent views have also been expressed with regard to the question of a possible widening of the CD's scope of activities to include the negotiation of politically binding agreements covering, for example, global confidence building measures or regional questions."
Specifically, Ambassador Norberg said that four of the Decalogue items in particular were inspiring controversy: items 2 (Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament), 3 (Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Measures), 7 (Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament) and 8 (Transparency in Armaments).
Along with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, the large scale spread and use of conventional armaments constitutes one of the principal threats to international peace and security. Since World War II, all the conflicts to have erupted on the Earth were exclusively fuelled by conventional armaments, claiming a tremendous death toll all over the globe. Structural changes in international relations have brought the end of the Cold War and eliminated the danger of a military East-West confrontation and artificial barriers in the way of developing normal relations between nations. At the same time, new conflicts and tensions, risks and uncertainties have arisen. While the real threat of a nuclear war has clearly receded, the number of local conflicts fought by conventional weapons has dramatically increased.
In this emerging, fragile political climate conventional armaments are being more frequently used in hot points of our planet and they often represent a main destabilising factor. Moreover, the balance of forces established in time or by international agreements in various sensitive regions can be undermined through preferential, discriminatory conventional arms transfer policies (1).
A source of growing concern is the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms, in particular of small arms. The availability of massive quantities of such devices, and especially their illicit transfer, is widely considered as a most disturbing and dangerous phenomenon, affecting the internal situation of many States, hampering their development and the respect of human rights (2). Furthermore, the illicit arms trade, as indicated by the UN Secretary General in his message to the Conference on Disarmament at the opening of its 1996 session, is a serious threat to national and international security.
The large-scale transfer, production and use of anti-personnel landmines is another facet of the issue and one of the most serious present consequences of the scourge of conventional armaments. Landmines cause enormous casualties, slow down or prevent the return of refugees and affect UN humanitarian and peace-keeping operations. The economic, social and ethnic disruptions generated by their use both in internal and international conflicts have a profound negative impact for normal life (3).
If these developments remain unchecked, the risk that political crises will degenerate into armed conflict is bound to grow. This has already happened in the ex-Yugoslav area and in some republics born from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Hence, effective internationally agreed and verifiable measures are much needed in order to render arms transfers transparent and responsible. Of course, such measures should take fully into account the inalienable right of States to self defence, which is universally recognized and finds a precise formulation in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
The adoption more than four years ago by the United Nations of Resolution 46/36 L represents a landmark in the process for greater transparency in armaments, as well as a major dividend of the post-Cold War era. With this resolution, for the first time, the United Nations embarked upon an action-oriented endeavour by establishing a multilateral mechanism for review and expansion of transparency in armaments, namely the Register of Conventional Arms (4). The Register requires all UN Member States to report on an annual basis the number of conventional weapons exported or imported during the previous calendar year, according to seven categories of weapons: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. It also requires contributing States to give the names of countries of origin or of destination of such transactions.
The Register's function is three-fold: to build confidence among participating States, promote transparency in international arms transfers and, as a result, contribute to restraint in military production and the transfer of arms. It thus addresses mainly the concern of preventing the excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms which might pose a threat to international peace and security.
The assessment of three years of effective operation leads to the conclusion that the Register is only the beginning of the process, which should be further improved and expanded, so as to create a really meaningful, more advanced and more widely accepted system. First and foremost, it has to be recognized that since the Register in itself is not an arms control measure. Without any proactive role assigned to it the Register cannot contribute significantly to arms control. One way to remedy this may be to introduce a consultative mechanism under which States participating in the Register could seek clarification and elaboration of data submitted by others (5).
By the same token, the relatively new concept of regional and subregional variants of the Register, as well as the proposals that already-participating States should encourage and assist others to adhere, through a kind of "partnership approach", are most commendable in order to attain the universality of the Register and improve its effectiveness.
Many countries have spoken in favour of inclusion of new weapons in addition to the seven existing categories, such as landmines and small weapons in general, as well as domestic production and holdings (6). If accepted, such additions could render the Register more suitable to ever-changing reality. On the contrary, recent proposals for inclusion into the Register of reporting on weapons of mass destruction, as well as on transfers of high technology with military applications, cannot but weaken the system, divert its goals and encompass the risk of its irremediable failure.
The transparency regime as provided by the UN Register does not directly regulate or prevent arms transfers that undermine international security. Besides transparency, there is an increasing need to exert greater control, through politically binding guidelines, in the field of international arms transfers.
Responding to the ever-growing conventional arms flow which began to mark the post-Cold War era, the London Economic Summit of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations (G7) adopted in July 1991 a 'Declaration on Arms Transfers and Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation', which stressed the need for transparency, consultation and action in order to ensure that countries could never again acquire massive arsenals that went far beyond the needs of self defence.
In the Declaration issued after their meeting on October 1991, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council adopted common guidelines for the transfer of conventional weapons and agreed to continue discussing the possibilities for lowering tension and arms levels, including the development of further measures of restraint concerning arms transfers (7).
Also in 1991, but at a regional level, the participating States in the then-CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna examined a proposal on 'Principles governing conventional arms transfers', agreeing that effective national control of weapons and equipment had acquired the greatest importance. Consequently, they decided to include the question of the establishment of a responsible approach to arms transfers as a matter of priority in the work programme of the post-Helsinki arms control process.
At a still narrower level, the 'Common criteria for a EEC [European Economic Community] member State policy on arms exports to third countries' closely reflected the spirit of the aforesaid CSCE text, indicating that before exporting arms outside the Community its members should take into account inter alia the respect of human rights in the country of final destination, the internal situation in that country, the preservation of international peace and security, and the compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that States should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.
The question of regulating arms transfers is a rather complex and sensitive one because it relates directly to the security of States in a troubled, uncertain period, in which various regions of the world are threatened by suspicion, instability and mistrust. However, the common awareness of risks and challenges should not preclude but, on the contrary, constitute an important stimulus for cooperation towards elaborating commonly acceptable solutions.
In his address to the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on 16 June 1993, the President of Romania, Mr Ion Iliescu, envisaged that "in the future, the overall, aspects regarding transparency in armaments could be regulated in an international treaty of universal vocation, which would set standards and procedures, as well as appropriate implementation mechanisms. He further proposed that "in order to break the ground for such a comprehensive and complex work, a first stage could be aimed at agreed guidelines to serve as an international code of conduct. The experience in this field of the five permanent members of the Security Council could represent a starting point and a useful contribution for the future efforts of the Geneva Conference, as well as those of the United Nations, the CSCE and various regional bodies." (8)
From this perspective, Romania has introduced before the CD the proposal for a 'Code of conduct for the international transfers of conventional arms', intended to lead to the establishment of a universal and non-discriminatory set of principles and criteria to be followed by subscribing States in considering arms transfers (9).
Essentially, the Romanian proposal is intended to bring about restraint and responsibility in conventional arms transfers, while envisaging the endurance of equal and undiminished security of States at the lowest levels of armaments. The code would consist of three sections, one dealing with basic principles of conduct, the second devoted to the criteria to be followed in considering arms transfers or for avoiding transfers and third providing for a 'mechanism' of data sharing and periodic consultations at an appropriate level (10).
As for the basic principles of conduct, the Romanian draft Code enumerates inter alia the commitment to be undertaken by the recipient State that arms transfers are made in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the prevention of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of armaments. As far as criteria are concerned, they include a broad range of conditions to be fulfilled in the process of arms transfers, from the need to enable the recipient country to exercise its right of self-defence, to avoiding arms transferred being used for the purposes of repression or terrorism. It is worth mentioning that the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms constitutes a common feature for both categories, as an important criterion to be taken into account in the process of arms transfers.
The Code's relation with the UN Register is clearly stated inasmuch as the subscribing States will be asked to provide data and information according to the requirements of the Register, which in fact would become an integral part of the international Code of Conduct.
An agreed mechanism is considered a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the Code and it could take the shape of institutionalized, periodic consultations at the political and, if necessary, military levels on whatever issue is deemed relevant for the application of the Code. Also, the subscribing States undertake to cooperate in order to establish efficient export control mechanisms and to prevent illicit transfers of conventional armaments.
When it was introduced, during the 1994 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Romanian draft Code of Conduct was positively and encouragingly received. Unfortunately, last year the topic evaded the Conference due to procedural inconveniences and the total priority given to nuclear aspects of disarmament and arms control. The same goes for this year. Notwithstanding how legitimate the preoccupations over nuclear issues may be, it is hardly understandable that this unique multilateral disarmament negotiating body continues to fail to address conventional weapons, despite many calls from the UN General Assembly, including its most recent resolution 50/70, through which the CD is invited to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments.
In the interest of all countries, big or small, and especially in the interest of smaller, developing ones, the CD should take up with no further delay the complex, sensitive and highly topical issue of promoting transparency in armaments and regulating international arms transfers through a Code of Conduct and related measures. A gradual, progressive approach, starting with conceptual aspects, identifying areas of convergence and advancing step-by-step towards more action-oriented measures appears to be best suited to such a challenging endeavour.
References
Ambassador Neagu is the Permanent Representative of Romania to the European Office of the United Nations and International Organizations in Geneva. Cristian Istrate is his Deputy.
Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) indicate that since 1985:-
* the number of regular military personnel has decreased by approximately 15 per cent;
* the dollar value of world military spending has declined by 30 per cent;
* the dollar value of the trade in major conventional weapons has fallen by almost 50 per cent; and
* the number of nuclear warheads has been reduced by about 55 per cent.
Even if the data are unreliable in detail, the trend is clear. By contrast, from what little is known, the international trade in light weapons appears to be growing uncontrollably.
The point of these contrasts is not to support an argument for doing nothing further about nuclear weapons or major conventional arms. There are also counter-trends running against the positive grain - unresolved proliferation problems in both nuclear and major conventional weapons. But even though some of these arms reductions came not by agreement but because governments had previously over-spent and over-purchased, part of the improvement is because serious attention has been paid to serious problems. They should continue to receive serious attention. But, in addition, it is time to bring the same sort of concentration to the trade in light weapons.
The conceptual apparatus used in arms control hitherto will not suit this problem. There are several salient differences. Most notably, while there are some non-governmental purchasers of major weapons and some suppliers that operate without government sponsorship, they are the exception. By contrast, non-governmental suppliers and purchasers abound in the light weapons trade.
In some regions, the dissemination of light weapons is extraordinary. Among them is southern Africa, where the end of wars in Mozambique and perhaps in Angola is making available rifles that can be bought for ten or twelve dollars in the former war zones and sold at a 4,000 per cent profit in Johannesburg and some other South African cities. There is, sadly, a dark side to the outbreak of peace.
The vicinity of Afghanistan is also awash with light weapons. According to some estimates, American supplies to the Mujahedeen in the 1980s included over one million Kalashnikovs - and the US was not the only supplier. Together with rocket grenades, mortars, light missiles and the like, they came in through a weapons supply channel that was leaky in the extreme and spread round the region at modest prices. Along with them went weapons captured, stolen and bought from the Soviet army in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.
Intense proliferation of light weapons also characterises the southern belt of the former USSR from the western shores of the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and into Central Asia. Though light weapons have reportedly been imported into Chechnya via Turkey, the main source of supply was the Soviet army just before its break-up and the Russian army since 1991. The arms market in Chechnya from 1991 to 1994 was the most notorious node in the dissemination of the weapons, but by no means the only one. The problem is perhaps most graphically illustrated by the recent case of a group of Russian soldiers selling a tank and an armoured fighting vehicle to a group of Chechen rebels for about US $6,000. This is an extreme example, but Russian soldiers who sell their weapons are by no means rare. Indeed, the disarmament process agreed between Dzhokar Dudaev's Chechen forces and the Russian government in July 1995 broke down because it was agreed to compensate the Chechens for every weapon they turned in. Many Chechen fighters used that money to buy weapons from Russian soldiers only a few metres from the collection points, and were generally able to buy back two for the price of one.
These three examples indicate part of the problem encountered in trying to generate feasible policy options to control the proliferation of light weapons. In Southern Africa, the problem is peace. In Pakistan and northwest India, the problem is a continuing war. In the former USSR, it is an underpaid and demotivated army.
This is one reason why some observers despair of achieving any restraint in regions where proliferation has taken hold. It might be possible to get agreement between governments, but how can one consider treaties with purchasers like the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, let alone suppliers like Russian soldiers who will trade a tank for less than the price of a Lada?
Other aspects of the problem are if anything more daunting. These are the weapons with which most of the killing is done in current armed conflicts. It was after having been equipped with new light weapons that Rwandan army officers boasted in early 1994 about their ability to kill at the rate of 1,000 people every 20 minutes. While it is precisely this that makes it so urgent to find a way to deal with the problem of light weapons proliferation, it may also induce a certain diffidence.
There is, perhaps, an unstated and even unrecognised reluctance to propose policies whose prospects of being accepted and implemented probably decline in proportion to their likely effectiveness. There may be an inherent feeling of improbability about proposals for controlling a trade whose lethality is so concrete, so observable, so direct.
Proposals for control on the light weapons trade are, after all, getting right to the heart of current warfare in a way that is not true of most other arms control. The current campaign against landmines confronts a problem no less concrete, observable and direct. But most current armed conflicts could be fought out without the use of anti-personnel landmines, which is perhaps what makes the use of such weapons so unnecessary and so vicious, and the consequences of their use so tragic. By contrast, nuclear arms control - despite the evident environmental damage caused by making and deploying nuclear weapons - has largely been concerned with an abstract and distant threat. The same is arguably true of East-West conventional arms control. Governments that are or might soon be involved in warfare are far less likely to consider restrictions on the supply of their basic military equipment. In this view of things, peace precedes disarmament, not vice versa. Worse, with light weapons, as the case of southern Africa indicates, peace may precede rearmament somewhere else.
It is, of course, essential to be realistic about the scale and the complexity of the problem of the light weapons trade. But the uncontrolled proliferation of light weapons is doing great harm to very large numbers of people - killing, injuring, terrorising, forcing millions into flight and homelessness, and causing widespread grief and misery. It is not realistic to preclude efforts to identify solutions.
The experience of how the nuclear weapons debate shifted over the years indicates one way this might happen. The foundation was a cogent moral and human case, pressed, sometimes quietly and sometimes noisily, for years on end. This provided the basis for insisting that the boundaries of what some called realism represents only the narrowness of conventional wisdom. Alongside this there was a restless search for possible policies. Some of them did not make much sense, but some that were speedily dismissed by hard-headed, technically adept analysts - ideas such as deep cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals, a freeze on new nuclear developments, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, conventional forces shaped predominantly for defence, no tactical nuclear weapons - were later absorbed into practical policies.
It is in the search for policies that a change in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament could play a highly valuable role. To begin with, it would be important even to include this issue in the debate on the new agenda. The establishment of a working group with a relatively limited mandate of exploring the problem would, in the current state of things, represent a major step forward.
There are at first glance four areas in which policy options could and should be developed. These four agenda items are united by a single principle, which is that, to begin with at least, the best approach is to treat light weapons proliferation as a problem of lawlessness. This is quite different from the approach taken in, for example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or even the Missile Technology Control Regime. In these cases, the working, if implicit, assumption is that those whose behaviour is to be controlled will ultimately accept control voluntarily. Inducements may be required, either within or outside the formal treaty framework; pressure may be exerted; but when the parties sign up, it is as formally sovereign equals. Defining the problem in terms of lawlessness throws that assumption out and replaces it with the understanding that among those whose behaviour is to be controlled will be some, perhaps many, who will submit to control, if at all, only unwillingly.
This has two effects on the search for policy options. Firstly, it indicates that, in principle, policies based on coercion could be acceptable since those who agree to such policies will not themselves be subjected to them. What we seek is akin to a policing and judicial system. Secondly, as is the case with national criminal laws, they do not have to be 100 per cent effective in order to be viable and valuable.
Against this background, the first step is to chart the true dimensions of the problem. This will not be achieved, even partially, by relying on formal reporting by governments. The UN Arms Trade Register is not an appropriate model. What is required is a major research enterprise. How to carry it out and what responsibilities should be laid on national governments to support it are the first items on the agenda.
The second step derives from the first: any such research effort will initially produce sketchy results and, at best, will essentially construct broad estimates; the second task therefore is to consider the capacity required in given national or regional circumstances to locate and monitor the traffic in light weapons, and the basis for undertaking operations to end it. This task combines fairly standard intelligence and policing functions and would require some technological capacity. Mapping the relationship and scale of those requirements is the second item on the agenda.
The third step drives from the second: in the absence of inside information and tip-offs, light weapons are hard to locate and some kinds are more or less impossible. While this means that intelligence work will concentrate on cultivating informants, technological means of monitoring would obviously be more effective if those weapons that can be easily hidden from electronic surveillance were banned. This suggests that it would be worth looking at international manufacturing standards. This would not affect the supply of second-hand weapons, which are so numerous that the most efficient restrictions on new weapons would be of little practical effect for a long while. But however serious the problem, it can always get worse. Finding a way to prevent this aspect of the problem from deteriorating is a reasonable third agenda point.
All three of these points feed directly into the fourth: the establishment of an international legal framework and, within it, of an operational arm. The relationship between it and national policing will be one sensitive problem to explore. The relationship between international and domestic gun control will be another.
Establishing a legal framework and an international control regime will be long and arduous tasks that will certainly involve far more elements than those mentioned here. But one way or another, the first steps have to be taken. The CD could be an appropriate forum in which to begin.
Dan Smith is Director of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)
It is with great pleasure and a sense of responsibility that I undertake the task of expressing my views on how best to structure the activities of the Conference on Disarmament in order to contribute more effectively to its overarching goal of negotiating international agreements promoting disarmament, both nuclear and conventional.
I have been associated in different capacities with the work of the CD and its predecessors ever since 1960 when it was first formed by the decision of the great powers, and I hope that my experience might be of some help in contributing to discussions leading to agreeing on a realistic agenda for the CD. My paper offers some ideas as to how it can be achieved.
It must be, first of all, emphasised that the entire post World War II history offers a stark proof to the validity and credibility of the argument entertained by a vast majority of political analysts and arms control professionals that any meaningful result in disarmament is a function of the political realities prevailing at any given period of time. It is highly important, though, to be able to foresee in advance a trend leading to a more favourable climate that might produce a desired result.
It is also true that an important factor in bona fide efforts to establish a helpful environment and set up an effective forum, whether bilateral or multilateral, and formulate an objective, or objectives and priorities (i.e. agenda), is the role and contribution of subsidiary bodies and their relationships with the main forum and other international mechanisms such as the UN.
In retrospect, we can see that agreements have been negotiated when parties concerned were ready to strike a deal and at the same time were able to find an effective mechanism to conclude an agreement.
It is worthwhile to recall that the United Nations Organisation was created during World War II and before the advent of the atomic age. Disarmament was not listed among the UN's purposes (Article I of the Charter) and was mentioned only among the functions of the General Assembly ("disarmament and the regulation of armaments" - Article 11) and those of the Security Council ("establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments" - Article 26).
The UN Charter does not establish a special organ, either principal or subsidiary, to negotiate disarmament, and solely places on the Security Council, among its many important functions, including the Council's "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 24), a responsibility "for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee..., plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments" (Article 26, referred to above). So, what was provided for was only the submission of plans to UN members, without authority to negotiate disarmament agreements.
Thus, when an idea to establish an international control of nuclear energy was proposed by a group of prominent scientists led by the 'Great Dane' - Danish Nobel Physics Laureate Niels Bohr - with a goal to prevent a nuclear arms race, a debate took place within the US administration about how to deal with this proposal. In a memorandum to President Truman of 11 September, 1945, Secretary of War Stimson, who shared the view of scientists, urged to undertake a "direct" approach to the Soviets after discussion with the British:
"I emphasise perhaps beyond all other considerations the importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the United States - backed by Great Britain, but particularly the proposal of the United States. Action of any international group of nations, including many small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war would not, in my opinion, by taken seriously by the Soviets." (1)
The Truman administration, however, decided to take the nuclear problem for consideration by the newly formed United Nations. After some initial hesitation, this decision was supported by British Prime Minister Attlee. The reason? Leaving for a meeting in Washington with Truman and Canada's Prime Minister King in November 1945, Attlee wrote:
I should tell the President that we are naturally interested in the development of atomic energy, both as a means of self-defence, and a source of industrial power." (2)
It was agreed by Truman, Attlee and King in Washington to propose to the Soviet Union to co-sponsor a resolution to establish a UN Atomic Energy Commission. At a meeting in Moscow in December, Molotov, to the surprise of US Secretary of State Byrnes, quickly agreed to become a co-sponsor, requesting only one substantial change - to reflect in the UN resolution that the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission in matters affecting security (3). The reason? By this time the Soviet Union's 'Manhatten Project' was in full swing. Thus, the new UN Commission was doomed to failure even before it met in June 1946.
The next attempt at arms control in the UN was made in 1954-57 when a subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission (a successor to the UN Atomic Energy Commission), consisting of the USSR, US, UK, France and Canada, met in London. It was not accidental that the subcommittee was deliberating outside UN Headquarters. This was, perhaps, the first serious post-war effort to negotiate some sort of a more or less comprehensive disarmament package, and a new forum was needed, which became known as the London Subcommittee. The politico-strategic climate was then quite helpful: the Soviet Union and later Britain joined the US in creating a three-power "nuclear club," thus establishing the first semblance of mutual deterrence; Khruschev was eagerly promoting "peaceful co-existence" between capitalism and communism. The first summit was held in Geneva in 1955, at which Eisenhower proposed his 'Open Skies' plan.
However, this effort also turned out to be ill-fated: the world was simply not quite ready for arms control, particularly of a comprehensive nature. In 1958, the US, USSR and UK launched a three-power negotiation in Geneva on a nuclear test ban. This forum was totally outside the UN. Being unable to conclude a comprehensive agreement, the three powers, in 1963, ended up by negotiating in Moscow, in a matter of less than two weeks, a partial test ban treaty which was later welcomed by the United Nations.
As to a more comprehensive programme of disarmament, the great powers agreed, in 1960, to establish the Ten-Nation Committee of Disarmament (TNDC), consisting of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, which met in Geneva. Next year, the 'superpowers' were forced to expand this committee by adding eight non-aligned and neutral States and, thus, establishing the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), which also deliberated in Geneva, between 1962- 68, and then the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 1969-78. Finally, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was formed in 1979 as the single multilateral negotiating body of the international community after agreement was reached among States during the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
The CD and its predecessors have worked out a special relationship with the United Nations: unlike UN organs, it adopts its own rules of procedure, based, inter alia, on a principle of consensus, and its own agenda, taking into account UN recommendations and proposals presented by its members. It reports to the UN General Assembly, meets on UN premises and is serviced by UN personnel.
In its 35 years of existence, the CD and its predecessors have negotiated and concluded a number of important multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements: the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, the Seabed Treaty in 1971, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972, the Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) in 1977, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992. There is a good chance that this year the CD will conclude the negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In my view, it is not a bad record for a multilateral negotiating body, especially if we take into account all the vicissitudes of international developments over this complicated period. Bilateral or regional arms control and disarmament agreements (US-Soviet/Russian treaties on strategic and intermediate nuclear arms, treaties on establishing Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zones (NWFZs) or reducing conventional armaments on a regional level, etc) and the so-called Inhumane Weapons Convention, negotiated outside the CD, in no way diminish the results achieved by the Conference on Disarmament. All these agreements complement each other. The CD was capable of focusing its attention on a limited number of important disarmament issues which it could approach in a more productive way.
The present format of the CD and its mode of work do not need any substantive changes, except for some reasonable expansion of its membership. What is needed, however, are some improvements in prioritising its agenda items and restructuring its method of activities.
The experience accumulated by the CD over the years has clearly demonstrated that this multilateral body is capable of negotiating no more than one, or at most two, arms control agreements at a time. Therefore, its agenda should be prioritised in such a way that the Conference select from its agenda one or two items of top priority and, accordingly, set up no more than two Ad Hoc committees to deal with the selected issues.
The agenda items not selected for actual negotiation should be considered at CD plenaries with the aim of exchanging views among members and observers and preparing such items for subsequent negotiation.
In my judgment, the CD, taking into account the overwhelming opinion of the UN General Assembly and views of CD members, could consider limiting its priority issues, which would become the subject of negotiation as soon as a CTBT is concluded, to the following: a) Fissban, b) reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and c) reduction of conventional armaments starting with the limitation of their transfers.
All other items should be considered at the plenary meetings of the CD, while some of them could be taken up by other international mechanisms. For instance, item 5 (security assurances) could be considered by the Security Council, which has already adopted two resolutions on this issue - 255 (1968) and 984 (1995). The Council might adopt, in anticipation of the next NPT Review Conference, yet another, and much stronger, resolution than the previous ones. The decision by the CD to request the Council to consider this issue should be without prejudice to any further action by the Conference with a view to adopting a legally binding international instrument on security assurances.
As to making more efficient the method of the CD's work, it would be useful to explore the possibility of more active involvement of the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), as a group, in negotiating reductions in, and the elimination of, nuclear weapons. The present informal consultations among the five on a CTBT have proved to be quite a helpful way of dealing with some intricate aspects of a CTBT. The group of five might even be institutionalised in some way as an informal negotiating component of the CD for dealing with nuclear weapons issues, though certainly without any prejudice to the negotiating role of the appropriate Ad Hoc committee.
The group of five could take as its first matters of business the role of nuclear weapons in the present world, the nuclear postures of the NWS, nuclear deterrence, and the non-use of nuclear weapons.
References
Roland Timerbaev is President of the Center for Policy Studies in Moscow. For over 40 years he enjoyed a distinguished diplomatic career, acting as the Soviet Union's Ambassador to numerous arms control negotiations, including those for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The contributors and Editor encourage readers to submit responses, to be considered for publication, to the arguments put forward above.
With most countries continuing to set 30 June as the target date for completing a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), the Conference on Disarmament concluded the first part of its 1996 session with a working paper from the Chair of the Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) Committee, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands. Under pressure from China, India and Pakistan not to do anything which might 'pre-empt' the rolling text, Ramaker made clear that his 'Outline of a draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty' was intended to provide 'delegations and their capitals with a structured and manageable product of these negotiations so far, and highlight the major outstanding issues on which political decisionmaking is required.' The rolling text, on which the NTB Committee has continued to focus, remains 'imprisoned in the celebrated 1200 brackets', as memorably described by Ireland.
Ramaker's working paper is structured as a draft treaty, with a preamble and 17 articles, from scope and verification to the standard treaty articles on ratification and authentic texts. Attached to this is a three part protocol covering the international monitoring system (IMS), on-site inspections (OSI) and associated confidence-building/transparency measures, plus various annexes listing States and detailing the stations earmarked for inclusion in the IMS. Four unnumbered articles appear at the end in brackets. These cover China's text proposals on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), security assurances for State parties, and the relation to other international agreements. None of these articles commands significant support among other CD participants; in some cases, they disagree with the idea, i.e. PNE, in others they consider that the concept, though intrinsically worthwhile, is not appropriate in this treaty. Their inclusion in this way meets China's objections that its decision on these issues cannot be overtaken by another State just dropping the text, while indicating the general view that there is no place in the treaty for these articles. There are still brackets, but far fewer. In the working paper, rolling text often appears next to an indication of a clean text formulation that either attracts wide support or has emerged from consultations by the various Friends of the Chair.
Ramaker highlights six 'outstanding issues [that] seem to need attention': the preamble; scope, the composition of the executive council; some of the functions of the international data centre (IDC) and what level of data and analysis it should provide to States parties; on-site inspections; and entry into force. The majority of States agree that these are the major hurdles. Moreover, certain countries are now referring to deadlocks on particular issues as 'treaty breakers'. The US says that it could not get the CTBT ratified if national sources of intelligence were excluded from the verification regime. China, India and Pakistan currently rule this out, arguing for verification, including OSI requests, to be based solely on IMS data. They say that any incorporation of national technical means (NTM) would be 'discriminatory', although they concede that the issue is about legitimacy and its acceptance as evidence, since those which have it will continue to employ it.
The Russians are now saying that if their recent proposal for monitoring stations to be placed at the test sites is not accepted, the Duma would reject the treaty, since Novaya Zemlya would be unfairly monitored to a higher degree than Nevada and Lop Nor. China on the other hand has rejected any further enhancement of the detection level as 'excessive and unacceptable'. The principle of non-discrimination is being used with cliched frequency, meaning different things to different States at different times. China, for example, argues that Lop Nor is monitored to an intensity higher than the global average, avoiding the obvious point that China has a higher than average capability (and motivation) for conducting a clandestine explosion. In seeking to come up with an entry into force (EIF) formula that binds in the P-5 nuclear weapon States and the three threshold States, India, Israel and Pakistan, without actually identifying them in a way which might be construed as discriminatory, many States have come to support a list based on nuclear capability, as defined by the IAEA - some 68 countries.
Attempting to cut through the tangle created by concerns that other States on the list (not necessarily test-capable) could hold the treaty to ransom, the UK floated an EIF formula which targeted only the eight. While strongly invoking the non-discrimination principle in its objections to NTM, Pakistan has adopted the UK formula (which the UK now says it does not support) with great gusto, seeing in it the leverage on India that it seeks. By contrast, China, India and Israel are unhappy that this formula discriminates against them, while South Africa and others object that it sets an unhealthy principle by appearing to confer special status on the threshold States. It is important to many States that the composition of the executive council be non- discriminatory, providing regional balance without excluding any state. At the same time, some of the major players, including the P-5, threshold States and those which may find themselves footing a large part of the verification bills want to ensure seats for themselves.
Perhaps most centrally, concern that the safety and reliability requirements claimed by the nuclear-weapon States would give them a continuing advantage in nuclear weapon development are fuelling proposals to relate the CTBT more explicitly to nuclear disarmament. At the sharp end are India's proposals for a wider scope and explicit linkage with a time-bound framework for negotiating the elimination of nuclear weapons. Pakistan wants an additional article on purposes and objectives, in order to tie down reassurances given by John Holum, US Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), at the 23 January 1996 plenary, that a CTBT would constrain qualitative development. Towards the middle ground are proposals, originated by India but gathering wider support, to put language in the preamble that would inform the understanding of zero yield scope, including references to new and qualitative nuclear weapon development and the CTBT as part of a programme of action to achieve nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapon States have made clear that they will reject explicit mention of a time-bound framework, but while the US, UK and France are generally resistant to any mention of nuclear disarmament in the treaty, there is growing pressure on them to accept preambular language to reassure States who are accepting in good faith the Australian scope formulation with the zero yield understanding.
The prevailing feeling is that these political questions can be resolved if the States have the political will and are prepared to make compromises. While anxiety remains regarding India's intentions, many of its substantive concerns are being addressed in the negotiations, and though it would not be possible to satisfy all of them in the context of the treaty, further progress is expected. If part of India's purpose was to prepare the ground for refusing to sign, compromise by others would make little difference, except to weaken India's arguments. With Indian elections in late April and early May, it is hoped that India's position will be resolved - or at least clarified - soon thereafter. There is a growing view that China intends to sign, and would hope to sign together with the rest at the end of the year. This would allow time to finish its current testing programme if all goes as planned. Although it is not expected that China would renounce its position that it will stop testing when the treaty enters into force, there are signs that China would nevertheless cease testing after signature.
The brief flurry of concern following US news reports that a possible Russian test had been detected last month seems to have died down. The US has accepted Russia's denial. Russia appears annoyed but not unduly put out by the allegation. Much more worrying is the effect on Russia of the US debate on scrapping or modifying the ABM Treaty and the proposed NATO expansion, especially if the option of deploying NATO nuclear weapons to its borders is not explicitly rejected.
Combined with leaked intelligence reports of test preparations by India and then Pakistan, as well periodic foot-in-mouth publicity from the US laboratories, the Russian test scare has if anything weakened US credibility. A number of delegations have expressed some worry that the US is not fully on the ball. The possibility of sabotage against the treaty negotiations (and Clinton's policy on a CTBT) being waged from within sectors of the US nuclear establishment has also been raised.
The fever chart assessment of the negotiations continues to fluctuate. Those engaged in the painstaking and frustrating negotiations over brackets and words of text tend to be despairing; Ambassadors dealing less with detail and more with the political debates and trade-offs in capitals as well as Geneva tend to express greater optimism. Early assessment of Ramaker's working paper has been positive. However, he has so far trod softly among the political issues. With the tight schedule necessary to achieve a CTBT in 1996 and midst talk of 'treaty breaking' issues by one or other of the key States, a crisis is inevitable. As with any serious fever, the timing and type of crisis will determine whether the patient dies or emerges alive - and probably a good deal slimmer!
The 728th plenary of the CD, chaired by Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, honoured International Women's Day with the annual statement from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and other non-governmental organisations (NGO). As ritual demanded, the representatives of the three groups and China responded. Sirous Nasseri of Iran used the occasion to call on the CD to increase participation by NGOs in the CD's work. Russia and Cuba made substantive statements on the international security situation and CTBT negotiations. Brazil announced its ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 27 February 1996, while the new Ambassador of Kenya, Esther Tolle, spoke of her support for the CD's work.
Concentrating primarily on conversion, as 'an essential, practical component for effective disarmament', the NGO statement pointed out that just one quarter of the annual military expenditure in the world (estimated around US$ 1 trillion) could 'provide clean water for all, cancel the debt of developing nations, provide shelter for all, provide health care for all, prevent global warming, stabilise the world's population, stop ozone depletion, eliminate starvation and malnutrition, [and] eliminate illiteracy...' Arguing that the work of NGOs on issues such as landmines and nuclear testing complimented the work of the CD on disarmament, the statement called for an enlarged role for NGOs. Eumelio Caballero of Cuba picked up these themes, reminding the CD that 'every day in Africa, Asia and Latin America large numbers of children are dying for lack of medicines and basic foodstuffs that could be provided using a minute part of what is currently being spent on military equipment by some countries.' In particular, however, Cuba concentrated on the CTBT negotiations, calling for a balanced text: the scope should prohibit qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; verification should be cost effective and based only on the IMS - introducing NTM could 'jeopardize the universal character of the treaty' and open the door to legitimising national intelligence; there should be no permanent seats on the Executive Council, which should not exclude any state party. In relation to verification and scope, Caballero argued that it would be 'excessive pragmatism' to limit the scope of the treaty to what can be fully verified, since the CTBT is intended as a 'political instrument...[with] moral obligations' even if the ideal verification system is impossible.
Grigori Berdennikov gave what many regarded as a very 'hard-line' statement for this stage of negotiations. While noting that for the first time this century, 'there is no real military threat for Russia', he warned that 'the plans for expanding NATO are poisoning the whole international climate' and that denunciation of the ABM Treaty, as advocated by some voices in the US, 'would have extremely negative consequences for the disarmament process.' Prior to rumours from unnamed US intelligence sources that Russia may have conducted a low yield explosion at Novaya Zemlya, Berdennikov had affirmed that 'since the proclamation of its independence, Russia has not conducted a single nuclear explosion, and has firmly adhered to the moratorium it proclaimed.' Focusing on the CTBT, Berdennikov reiterated Russia's support for scope language based on the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and its recent demand for 'identical transparency' for the four operational test sites 'by improving the seismological and radionuclide subsystems of the IMS.' For OSI requests, data from NTM could be utilised, 'in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law' - a phrase denoting the inadmissibility of certain kinds of spying. However, Russia backs the green light procedure for OSI, opposing any 'automaticity in triggering an inspection'. Expressing satisfaction that there is growing support for Russia's proposal of countries on the IAEA list as a basis for entry into force, Berdennikov opposed any kind of waiver mechanism, arguing that if the 'hostage' problem exists, it will have to be resolved by 'political methods'.
Concerned that the continuing impasse over enlarging CD membership is 'prejudicial to the authority of the Conference in its capacity as a multilateral negotiating forum', Berdennikov appealed to the US 'to weigh up all the pros and cons of the special position which [the US] delegation has adopted.and finally move towards the positions of all the other countries...'
The 729 plenary of the CD, chaired by Ramaker, was addressed by the Republic of Korea, Ireland and Poland. On behalf of the G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States, Algeria once again proposed that the CD establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. In concluding his term as President, Ramaker regretted that no further progress had been made on expanding CD membership, and recommended that Ambassador Meghlaoui be retained as Special Coordinator on the agenda, to continue his consultations. He said that a possible role for the CD in nuclear disarmament in addition to the CTBT and fissile materials ban, 'does not seem to be excluded for the future', while acknowledging that in the immediate future there was no agreement.
Meghlaoui's statement, in his role as G-21 coordinator, presented the following decision, which was, however, opposed by members of the other groups:
"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time. The Conference decides to appoint [unnamed] as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during its 1996 session. The Group of 21 further proposes that this decision be adopted by the Conference on Disarmament during the first part of its 1996 session. The negotiations in the framework of this Ad Hoc Committee should commence immediately after the conclusion of the CTBT negotiations in 1996."
Addressing the CTBT, Ambassador Sun Joun Yung of the Republic of Korea, said that the CD's credibility would be 'very much diminished' if it failed to conclude a CTBT, and proposed that the groups should play a more substantial role: 'Only the spirit of cooperation through checks and balances among the groups can bring this potentially endless game to a satisfactory conclusion in time.' Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski, who had been chair of the NTB Committee in 1995, referred to the 1200 brackets as 'symptoms, not the disease', and suggested that time was being wasted on detailed technicalities of IDC, IMS and OSI which could be dealt with later, by the Preparatory Commission: 'What we now need is to concentrate our undivided attention on resolving the outstanding issues': scope, including PNEs; balanced verification; the 'place and standing' of the nuclear weapon and threshold States with regard to the organisation and entry into force; and 'the intrinsic nuclear disarmament value of the CTBT' which, he said, did not require formal linkage.
Ambassador Anne Anderson warned that the window of opportunity for a CTBT would not remain open indefinitely 'nor indeed for much longer'. She said that Ireland wanted a CTBT with a true zero yield, with no exemptions for any kind of nuclear explosion, with an IMS as agreed, but able also to use 'all of the available sources of information'. The verification system should be able to respond quickly, while entry into force should balance the need for rapid implementation with adherence by States of 'particular relevance'. Emphasising that a nuclear weapon free world was and would remain the goal of Irish policy, Anderson condemned attempts to link this directly in a CTBT. Referring to India's earlier mention of trick mirrors, she said that 'mirrors will of course reflect the perspective of the people looking into them.'
In particular, Ireland's speech focused on the expansion question. Referring to the 'twilight zone' between full membership and non- member status to which the 23 States on the O'Sullivan list had been condemned, Anderson put in a plea for the 13 States, including Ireland, which have applied for membership without even being admitted to this twilight zone. Noting that the CD rules of procedure state that membership should be reviewed at 'regular intervals' she commented that this ought to be 3 years and not 17. Prior to the 1993 review undertaken by Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, the CD was last enlarged in 1978. The Republic of Korea, among the 23, also condemned the delay in implementing the membership decision in CD/1356.
A special plenary was held on 19 March, chaired by Ambassador Ejoh Abuah of Nigeria, to enable the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali to address the Conference. Emphasising the importance of concluding a CTBT by June 1996, Boutros-Ghali called on the delegations to 'go beyond certain differences of opinion, however great they may be', drawing particular attention to scope, and the need to provide for 'a truly "comprehensive" ban on nuclear tests.' In a comment which struck a contrary note with some of the States kept out of the CD by the impasse over its expansion, he said that 'the political and geographical balance of its membership, and the special arrangements which have been made to allow more than 50 non-member States to participate in it, make the Conference a forum for negotiation that is unique of its kind and guarantees that all viewpoints will be heard.' He concluded with a ringing exhortation: 'Your success will represent a triumph for future generations, and for all humanity. You must succeed!'
The 731st plenary, chaired by Abuah, heard substantive speeches on the CTBT and nuclear disarmament from the Foreign Ministers of India and the Ukraine, and from the Deputy Foreign Secretary of Mexico. Italy, currently holders of the European Union (EU) presidency, emphasised EU commitment to a treaty by June 1996 and said that any compromise on PNEs was 'unacceptable' and 'would practically nullify the spirit and the purpose of the treaty.' Dr Ola Dahlman gave a brief report on the continuing work of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) and their testing of a prototype seismic network, GSETT-3. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea reiterated its concerns about security and repeated its call for North-East Asia or at least the Korean Peninsula to be made nuclear free. This prompted a brief exchange between Han Chang On and the representative of the Republic of Korea, Yong Shik Hwang, over who was to blame. The CD President noted that there was 'great enthusiasm and broad support' for early conclusion of a CTBT, which should be translated into concrete action to eliminate the many remaining brackets.
The Foreign Secretary of India, Salman Haidar, said that India had followed a 'consistent policy on the CTBT: We believed then and are even more convinced today that a CTBT should bring about a halt to the qualitative development, upgrading and improvement of nuclear weapons and should also mark the first irreversible step on the road towards genuine nuclear disarmament within a time- bound framework.' Referring to 'disturbing developments that appeared to indicate an intention that nuclear weapons should be here to stay', Haidar said that India had put forward its proposals 'to ensure that the CTBT is indeed an integral step in a time-bound process of global nuclear disarmament.' He said that India believed that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was not essential for national security and that the very existence of nuclear weapons diminished international security. Thus, he underscored, 'shorn of the disarmament context, [the CTBT] will be only an arms control treaty designed to perpetuate the reliance on nuclear weapons by those countries who have concluded extensive testing programmes.'
The Ukrainian Foreign Secretary, Hennadiy Udovenko, began by condemning the over 2050 nuclear explosions already conducted and reminded delegations of the terrible consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, and Ukraine's continuing need for assistance in that regard. Welcoming France's decision to cease testing, he called on China to follow suit. Although Ukraine considered a CTBT 'an extremely important element of the process of terminating [the] nuclear arms race' and supported a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD, it opposed explicit linkage in the treaty, for 'however attractive this interrelation is...it might lead to the failure of the CTBT negotiations.' Ukraine wanted a truly comprehensive treaty, regarding any provision for PNEs to be 'inadmissible'. Ukraine supported the verification structure and IMS as developed and offered its own stations for inclusion. Expressing deep disappointment in the CD's failure to enlarge its membership and calling for a precise admission date now to be fixed, Udovenko said that 'when States that made concrete contributions to the global reduction of armaments, including their deadliest types, remain outside the CD [it] is not only incomprehensible but also unfair...'
The Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, told the conference that the nature of a CTBT is 'to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons' and that a CTBT seeks 'to prevent the development of new nuclear weapons' as an 'indispensable first step in a process of nuclear disarmament.' He identified key problems as: relationship of the treaty with nuclear disarmament, PNEs and entry into force. While it was 'not easy to understand an absolute refusal to accept a reference to the need of a nuclear disarmament programme, he questioned the demand for a legally binding link, as that would unreasonably 'deny the prohibition of nuclear tests a value in itself.' Acknowledging China's argument that some future scenario might make States wish to reopen the prohibition on PNEs, he pointed out that it would always be possible to use the amendment process: 'the absence of any mention of peaceful nuclear explosions in the Treaty does not mean banning them forever.' On EIF, Mexico opposed special conditions and argued that political will should be sufficient to ensure that States of particular concern have joined.
The 732nd plenary, chaired by Abuah, welcomed the announcement from France, on behalf also of the United States and the UK, that they had signed the additional three protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga on 25 March. It also heard from the Foreign Minister of Finland and from Norway.
The communique from France, the US and UK put their decision to sign the Rarotonga protocols in the context of the indefinite extension of the NPT and its support for nuclear weapon free zones,. This decision commits them to respect all the provisions of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, established in 1985. France said that the decision underlined their desire to ensure the complete cessation of nuclear testing worldwide, and emphasised again the need to conclude in the first half of 1996. Australia, New Zealand and Belgium expressed their satisfaction regarding the decision, also welcoming France's decision to close its testing facilities at Moruroa and Fangataufa, apart from those required for environmental monitoring.
Tarja Halonen, the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs strongly supported conclusion of the CTBT by the end of June, and said that this was not the time for micro-management: 'a distinction should be drawn between what belongs to the Treaty and what belongs to the work of the Preparatory Commission following signature of the Treaty.' Finland supported: zero explosions and no PNE provision; a simple number for EIF; a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) based in Vienna; two-phase OSI, with red light automaticity for the early phase. Emphasising the CD's role as a negotiating body, Halonen called for more action towards conventional disarmament and criticised the delay that kept her country excluded from membership.
Echoing many of Finland's positions, Bjorn Skogmo of Norway said that 'a UN funded body dealing with issues affecting national interests...of global significance, must be open to all States willing and able to participate' and warned that, resourced as it is through the UN, the CD should not be able to escape its ongoing reform. While Norway believed that the aim should be a nuclear weapon free world, it opposed direct linkage, fearing this could 'derail the process' and 'make the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament not closer, but more distant.' Reminding delegations that nuclear tests are not only a threat to non-proliferation and disarmament, but also present environmental and health risks, Skogmo said that the ban should be truly comprehensive: PNEs 'cannot be permitted within any credible and verifiable test ban treaty.'
The 733rd plenary, chaired by Abuah, heard statements on the CTBT from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and from China, Austria, Mongolia and Brazil. Slovenia focused on the implications of the financial crisis in the UN system for the proposed CTBTO, advocating that the IAEA should provide the CTBTO with all necessary services, similar to the ways in which the UN Center for Human Rights services various human rights monitoring bodies. The statement from the Czech Republic covered a wide variety of disarmament issues, including Czech positions on the CTBT.
Foreign Minister Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali reiterated with little change the positions made familiar in previous plenary speeches by Pakistan. Referring to Pakistan's 'historical experience of undue harassment', he rejected the use of NTM and insisted on a green light (positive decision) by the Executive Council before any inspection could go ahead; 'We should not countenance any mechanism which bypasses the political and technical role of the CTBT Organization.' While Pakistan does not endorse India's proposal making a CTBT conditional on nuclear disarmament in a specific time frame, it supports the demands of the G-21 for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and argues that the CD should identify and propose the next steps towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Addressing CTBT scope, Pakistan ackowledged the convergence of support around the Australian working paper 222, but raised doubts about its meaning: 'to move towards a genuine consensus, it will be necessary to elaborate in some way that the treaty will ban all nuclear testing at any threshold. To this end, the concept of a 'zero yield' ban needs to be more clearly explained, understood and accepted by all States.' Expressing concern that 'some nuclear weapon States do not appear to be committed to the objective of halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons', Pakistan stressed that 'the prime attraction of the CTBT has been that it will stop vertical proliferation - in other words, the qualitative development of new nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems.'
Reiterating his desire to conclude 'no later than 1996, a good CTBT' and warning that 'no country can impose its will on China under any circumstances', Sha Zukang confirmed China's acceptance of the zero yield concept and signalled a review of its position on satellites and EMP monitoring. While calling for flexibility, however, he reiterated the pressure for PNEs, arguing for a 'strict application and approval procedure and an effective international on-site monitoring mechanism for the whole process of PNEs'. Rejecting any incorporation of NTM in the international verification regime, Sha said that 'it is necessary to prevent certain countries from taking advantage of their superior NTMs to frequently harass and discredit the developing countries with dubious information, and even infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the latter.' To avoid abuse, China would require a 'green light' vote of two-thirds of the Executive Council before each phase of an OSI.
Reminding delegations that 'it is inappropriate to prejudge the inspected State as 'violator' before the inspection result is endorsed by the EC', Sha also underlined the necessity for a State to be able to protect its 'legitimate security interests'. Addressing the Russian proposal for seismic and radionuclide monitoring stations at the four operational test sites, Sha argued that at present 'China's nuclear test site is subjected to a monitoring intensity higher than the global average' and that 'further enhancing the detection level for China's test site is excessive and unacceptable.' He also opposed noble gas monitoring as part of the IMS. Stressing that China 'understands and sympathizes with the demand of a large number of non-nuclear- weapon States for nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework', Sha argued that 'the specific time-frame for nuclear disarmament should be settled within the framework of negotiations on a convention banning nuclear weapons' rejecting linkage by means of the CTBT text itself.
With the prospect of hosting the CTBTO in Vienna, Austria addressed the outstanding issues in detail. Supporting the Australian scope text, Harald Kreid reminded delegations who wanted a 'watertight' text that 'they should not underestimate the normative faculties of the Treaty.' Not only would other States parties object, but 'public opinion, which in this context must be regarded as a strong and growing influence, especially in the form of NGO activities, will certainly react with great sensitivity to activities which might not be formally banned under the Treaty, but could be considered to be incompatible with its spirit.'
Referring to the environmental and health consequences, as well as the verification complications, he said Austria opposed PNEs 'for reasons of principle'. He reiterated Austria's proposal for a mechanism of 'provisional application' on EIF, contained in WP.242, although its preference was for a simple number, such as forty. Supporting the IMS, Austria supported monitoring noble gases. While acknowledging the reservations about NTM, Kreid argued that they 'should not a priori be disavowed as they can be very valid in detecting a suspicious event', supporting the French proposal. Severe sanctions should be imposed for abusive requests. Finally, Austria took exception to Boutros-Ghali's apparent endorsement of the CD's 'political and geographical balance' the previous week, saying that 'it is not sufficient to be heard...a decision on expansion is overdue.'
Shirchinjavyn Yumjav said that Mongolia endorsed the Australian scope text, opposing thresholds and PNEs. Stressing that the OSI regime should provide a 'balance between deterrence and protection of legitimate national interests', he said that only a State party should have the right to make the request and that 'information from the IMS would be sufficient to trigger a request.' Mongolia also backed the G-21 statement on a nuclear disarmament committee.
Reiterating its support for the Australian scope text, Brazil's Ambassador Celso Lafer said that the aspiration of the elimination of nuclear weapons 'should form part of the treaty itself.' Brazil expressed interest in EIF based on the combination of 'a certain number of States with a waiver provision'; and expressed interest in some of the ideas contained in the 'non-paper' from the Friend of the Chair on the CTBTO, Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco. However, he objected to any reduction of seats to the Latin-American region. Supporting the target date in UNGA resolution 50/65, Lafer referred to the end-game phase in May/June, when 'needed trade- offs would have to take place'. Supporting the G-21 demand for a nuclear disarmament committee, he argued that this would go some way to reassuring non NPT States that nuclear disarmament would be pursued multilaterally in fora such as the CD as well as through the NPT enhanced review process. He said there was no lack of material for a nuclear disarmament committee to discuss, suggesting a ban on the future production of nuclear weapons, as proposed last year by New Zealand.
Negotiations on a CTBT opened in the CD in January 1994, chaired by Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico, who bequeathed an initial rolling text of 93 pages. Ludwik Dembinski of Poland took over the chair in January 1995, in a year which saw substantial progress on verification but little movement on the central political issues until August, when the US and France dramatically pledged themselves to zero yield. When Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands took over in January 1996, he inherited a revised rolling text, with more than 1200 brackets around disputed text or options.
In February, Iran and Australia submitted draft or 'model' treaty texts, which were widely welcomed as providing genuine attempts to find middle ground, demonstrating areas of agreement and showing how the mass of brackets could be pared away. While differing in the detail of their solutions, the Iranian and Australian texts were remarkably similar in their conceptual approach to many of the outstanding problems. The drafts from Iran and Australia were working papers providing examples, but unless a particular State specifically proposes text or articles contained in either of the drafts, they are not included in the rolling text. While many countries had endorsed the sense of urgency conveyed by the two drafts, China, Pakistan, India and Russia had expressed strong objections to any attempt to circumvent the rolling text. Their warnings were understood to be aimed at the NTB Committee Chair as well as the Iranian and Australian texts.
To reassure and allay this hostility, while attempting to move the negotiations through the maze of brackets, Ramaker made clear that his working paper CD/NTB/WP.321 was intended to 'assist States participating in the negotiations in preparing for the final stage...' He asked them to consider their options in time for resuming work in May. The Chair's working paper makes use of the rolling text and negotiations conducted under the auspices of the Chairs of the two working groups: Grigori Berdennikov of Russia, Chair of WG1 on Verification and Mounir Zahran of Egypt, Chair of WG2 on Legal and Institutional Issues. Where appropriate, the outcome of consultations by Friends of the Chairs on key issues has also been included in text form. The current Friend of the Chair are expected to continue for the time being. These include: Ralph Alewine of the US on the International Data Center (IDC); Yukiya Amano of Japan on Funding; Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco on the executive council; Marshall Brown of the US on the preamble; Patrick Cole of Australia on the IMS; Richard Ekwall of Sweden on associated measures; Antonio de Icaza of Mexico on EIF; Mark Moher of Canada on OSI.
Scope is the fundamental article of the treaty, outlining what is to be banned. Rather than appoint a Friend of the Chair, Ramaker decided to retain this crucial issue in his own hands. Much of the debate has continued among the P-5, with varying degrees of effectiveness and a high level of frustration.
With China withdrawing its text covering 'release of nuclear energy' there are now in effect four scope texts on the table: from Australia, which now has majority support; China, wanting PNEs to be exempt; Russia, based on the 1963 PTBT formulation; and India, which seeks to define a nuclear explosion. Indonesia recently withdrew its scope proposal which covered all nuclear weapon tests, whether explosive or not. Although Iran's draft text revived this, and there were some rumours that Pakistan might seek ownership, this has not happened, and the 'Indonesian formulation' covering all testing activities, including laboratory and simulation, is now considered dead. A reportedly desultory scope debate was held on 25 March, with little movement other than an amendment of one word - 'rapid' - proposed by the Indians to modify their own text to get round the objection that the definition covered civilian nuclear activities. The major stumbling blocks are now perceived to be PNEs and the extent to which India and perhaps Pakistan will push for explicit scope language defining or detailing the meaning of the zero yield concept.
Australia's text, proposed in March 1995 as WP.222 reads:
"1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."
Although in a definite minority, Russia has so far refused to let go of its scope text, based on the PTBT listing of prohibited environments. However, the question is no longer whether Russia will withdraw this, but when (and with what other trade-offs). Although dropping its phrase on 'release of nuclear energy', intended to exclude any threshold, and adopting the zero yield concept, China objects to the phrase 'any other nuclear explosion' in the Australian and Russian texts, as this covers PNEs.
In June 1995, India proposed WP.244, which it modified on 25 March so that it would not appear to ban civil nuclear operations.
"1. Each State Party undertakes to prohibit and to prevent, and not to carry out, any nuclear weapon explosion, or any other nuclear test explosion, or any release of nuclear energy caused by the (rapid) assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical explosive or other means, at any place under or beyond its jurisdiction or control.
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."
This text seems designed to ban all use of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear explosive testing, and even with addition of the word 'rapid' retains some ambiguity, according to its detractors. According to Arundhati Ghose, India's Ambassador, it should leave 'no loophole for activity, either explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued development and refinement of nuclear weapons'.
Raising doubts whether the Australian formulation 'will be truly comprehensive and that it will serve the objective of halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons', Pakistan said it would be 'necessary to elaborate in some way that the treaty will ban all nuclear testing at any threshold. To this end, Pakistan has been considering an additional article on the treaty's purposes and objectives.
Other States are seeking ways to place the Australian text in a context that will meet India's stated concerns, using the preamble rather than further definitions in the scope. There is therefore growing support for some preambular reference to the treaty's aspiration to prevent new and qualitative developments of nuclear weapons, based on text originally proposed by India and included in the Iranian draft preamble.
The majority of States endorse the view that all nuclear explosions should be banned in this treaty. Some, such as Austria, oppose PNEs on principle because of their health, environmental and verification consequences; Canada said it was 'allergic' to PNEs; the non-aligned have repeatedly argued that they would undermine the treaty. However, despite expectations that it would have let go of PNEs by now, China has clung to the concept, disregarding the overwhelming opposition of non-aligned and non- nuclear weapon States.
In its 28 March statement, the Chinese delegation maintained 'that as an important principle, any disarmament or arms control treaty should not hinder the development and application of science and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore it would be incorrect if [the] CTBT should ban PNEs... As a populous and developing country with insufficient per capita energy and mineral resources, China cannot abandon forever any promising and potentially useful technology that may be suited to its economic needs. China fully shares the concern over the possible misuse of PNEs. However, we think that the issue can be solved by establishing a strict application and approval procedure and an effective international on-site monitoring mechanism for the whole process of PNEs.'
This was precisely what the Iranian draft treaty sought to do. While appearing to prohibit PNEs in its scope, Iran gave the Conference of States Parties responsibility for considering 'in exceptional circumstances and in the case that the real benefit of nuclear explosion for the sole purpose of purely peaceful scientific research and civilian applications are demonstrated. a specific request for conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion.' A PNE would only go ahead if four fifths of the Conference agreed, and with verification intended to ensure that no military benefit would be gained. Initially a number of States seemed to think that this face-saving formula could be accepted, since they doubted that any request would get the agreement of a four-fifths majority. However, to focus on whether a PNE would ever be allowed may be to ignore a real and insidious effect of this provision: the legitimisation of nuclear weapon research under PNE guise. It appears that any approval procedure presently envisaged by China would carry this risk of perpetuating the power of nuclear laboratories.
Acknowledging that China's stated concerns have to do with not foreclosing a future option that may be perceived as desirable when conditions have drastically changed (e.g., after nuclear weapons have been eliminated from the face of the earth, as China has suggested) Mexico sought to redirect attention from a specific provision permitting PNEs to the availability of the amendment procedure. Since this treaty will contain provisions for amendments, 'the absence of any mention of peaceful nuclear explosions in the treaty does not mean banning them forever.'
So far, however, despite the concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States that a PNE provision could undermine the purpose of the CTBT, China shows little sign of giving the option up.
Much progress has been made on the technical aspects of verification, with a few key political questions unresolved. These include the siting of monitoring stations on the territory of the four operational test sites; whether the IMS should monitor noble gases such as xenon and krypton, the radioactive isotopes of which are indicative of a fission explosion, and may be vented within days despite the best efforts at camouflage; the role of satellite and EMP data; whether and under what conditions information from national technical means might be used as evidence; what kind of information the IDC should provide to States parties - i.e. how much analysis and preliminary assessment it should contain.
There is broad agreement that the verification regime should include an international monitoring system (IMS) of four technologies, transparency, consultations and clarification and on- site inspections. With a few details still to be worked out, the IMS is expected to comprise: 50 primary and 100-150 auxiliary seismic stations; a hydroacoustic network; around 75-100 radionuclide monitors and up to 70 infrasound detectors. China and Pakistan had for many months been advocating additional networks of satellite and EMP sensors, but in its 28 March statement China for the first time signalled its intention to review its position in this regard. At the same time China concluded that it would not be cost-effective to include noble gas monitoring. The other nuclear weapon States and many delegations argue that (in Austria's words) noble gases might be 'the only information carrier leaving the scene of a clandestine nuclear test'.
In January Russia proposed that four primary seismic stations plus radionuclide monitors be located at each of the test sites at Nevada, Lop Nor, Moruroa and Novaya Zemlya. The late proposal, coming after most delegations thought the IMS networks had been agreed, is believed to be related to the decision by the other nuclear weapon States (which Russia has not yet explicitly endorsed) that the treaty would encompass a 'true zero yield', with no thresholds.
In his 7 March address, Berdennikov indicated that 'ensuring equal terms for monitoring existing nuclear test sites [and] their equal transparency for the IMS' was an issue on which it could not compromise. While Russia expresses most overt concern over the advantage it believes the proposed IMS confers on Nevada, and with the US and other countries willing to seek an accommodation, China has threatened to reopen all agreement on the IMS if Russia has its way on this. Such a prospect is deeply chilling to the experts and negotiators who have painstakingly obtained consensus on the number and location of stations in the IMS.
Arguing that the IMS as currently designed 'gives concrete expression to the principle of equality among all States parties, nuclear weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States alike', on 28 March Sha said that in fact the Lop Nor test site was 'subjected to a monitoring intensity higher than the global average.' Therefore, he averred, any further enhancement of detection - a clear reference to the Russian proposal - was 'excessive and unacceptable'. With China adamant against revision and Russia arguing that its Duma would not ratify a treaty where other P-5 test sites were monitored less rigorously than Novaya Zemlya, others have begun referring to this issue as a 'treaty breaker'.
Although some experts support the Russian contention, and others suggest that the verification regime could benefit from noble gas monitoring and seismic stations capable of picking up aftershocks in the event of cheating at or near the test sites, still others argue that the technical benefit of the proposed four changes would be marginal. For the Russians, however, this is turning into an issue of principle.
The International Data Centre, attached to the Technical Secretariat, would be responsible for processing the mass of raw data from the IMS stations. Early in the negotiations the US argued that the IDC should leave the analysis to States parties. Many non-aligned countries objected that this would effectively exclude them from decision-making, since they lacked the technical resources to analyse an unfiltered event bulletin. A significant number of western States also argued for more user-friendly bulletins, with some preliminary identification of an event, while accepting that the actual decision to name a violation was political and should be taken by States parties. The G-21 argued that the CTBTO 'should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing all data.'
In February, Dr Ralph Alewine of the US, Friend of the Chair on the IDC, submitted a paper identifying three options, ranging from 1, where the IDC sends out just the raw data to 3, where it is responsible for all analysis. Most countries would probably find themselves between these two extremes, but there are concerns that a broader set of choices should be available between what is offered by options 2 and 3.
Like NTM, this issue has both practical and political implications, with most non-aligned States and significant western delegations critical of the extreme US position because they consider that it smacks of an attitude akin to 'I'm all right Jack'. The US probably already has sufficient technology to verify this treaty and may well resent paying a big share of the international costs as well, but if the CTBT is to be successful as a political instrument, which was the intention in entering into multilateral negotiations, then the verification regime must be multilaterally effective, which means accessible.
However, China's 28 March statement fed directly into US fears, taking the position that not only must an OSI request be based solely on IMS data, but that they should 'be directed at ambiguous events detected by the IMS and located by the IDC'. The US position is that giving the IDC an analysis role could be used in the future to reject evidence from a test conducted with sufficient guile that its signature was not initially identified in the IDC bulletin. This concern is backed up by verification experts. However, the solution may lie not in inundating States parties with data they lack the resources to use effectively, but in the common understanding that the event bulletin is indicative only, with any State retaining the right to receive the raw data and if necessary to request the Technical Secretariat to re- examine a suspect event, making use of data from additional stations and/or supplementary means, if necessary. This would, however, mean persuading China and some of the non-aligned States to accept broader OSI provisions.
Regarded as the article least developed in political and text terms (now being cleaned up and rationalised by the Canadian Friend of the Chair), OSI lays bare States' concerns about national security, equality, deterrence and access to timely evidence. The dominant view is that OSI should be rarely invoked, with penalties for abuse, but that the provisions in the treaty should be sufficient to deter any would-be violator.
The principal areas of disagreement concern the decision-making procedure following an OSI request and whether States can use evidence derived from their own national sources in addition to IMS data. While many States take up positions along a continuum somewhere in the middle, the US/UK represent one pole, arguing that there should be a presumption of access (a red light) and that any corroborating evidence should be permissible. At the other pole, China, Pakistan and India argue against any use of NTM and want to ensure that an inspection would only go ahead after consideration and decision by the Executive Council (green light). The US in particular has said that if NTM data were excluded from the verification regime a significant component of deterrence would be sacrificed, and the US Government would not be able to get the treaty ratified by Congress. In order to reconcile the polarised positions it is likely that a solution will have to offer something to both sides.
While the G-21's official position rejects NTM, many of them share the concern of Western and Eastern European countries that the deterrence function of the verification regime would be severely weakened if only IMS data were admissible. France early on proposed that in considering an OSI request, the Technical Secretariat should accord the evidence different weight, depending on whether the evidence was based on IMS or NTM data. An OSI request based on NTM would have to be evaluated and voted on (green light) by the Executive Council, but could go forward automatically (red light) if backed up by IMS data.
South Africa followed with a proposal to bridge the gap between 'international' and 'national' information: a State could use any kind of information to justify an OSI request providing that the 'unprocessed data' is submitted to the Technical Secretariat for independent analysis on behalf of the CTBTO and States parties. Neither the Australian nor Iranian texts entirely excluded NTM. Iran, which maintained that an OSI request could only be based on IMS data, with 'red light' procedure for the initial stage, allowed 'supplementary information' to be provided to the Technical Secretariat. Australia put forward a solution based on the French/South African approach, with 'access by all States parties to other technical information and data relevant to the verification of the basic obligations of the treaty.'
Having signalled that it will reconsider its position on satellites and EMP, China may now also need to consider alternative ways for such important information - from commercial as well as national sources - to supplement the IMS. The majority of countries which opposed China and Pakistan's demand for an enlarged IMS to include satellites and EMP did so for reasons of cost effectiveness, not because such data was not valued. While there is considerable sympathy for the concerns of those who feel that certain countries have abused their national intelligence capability, the debate has now moved towards looking at modalities and providing conditions for utilising NTM that will enhance the verification regime but protect individual State parties from abuse. The South African proposal may well provide the directions allowing for States parties themselves to make the decision whether their NTM is appropriate for the Technical Secretariat to analyse or too confidential, in which case it probably would not meet the criteria for internationally valid evidence.
In keeping with this emerging desire to find responsible mechanisms to enable non-aligned countries and China to accept NTM data, the red light process for allowing OSI to go ahead looks less viable. More States are arguing that the incorporation of NTM requires a positive decision by the Executive Council (green light). If this decision is taken, it makes the two phase concept, originally proposed by the US, less attractive. China, which embraced the concept last year, wants each phase to be subject to a green light decision, with the initial phase strictly limited in duration and intrusiveness. India and Pakistan have long joined China and Russia in requiring a positive majority of two-thirds or three-fourths of the Executive Council. However, some of those who advocated the red light procedure because they wanted a presumption of access in order to capture time-critical evidence, are considering that a simple majority decision should be sufficient security against abuse if the green light process is adopted.
Although identified as a treaty-breaker, there are some emerging signs of possible compromise. However, this is still an issue to watch carefully.
Implementation of the treaty will be overseen by a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), likely to comprise a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council of between 41 and 65 members, and a Technical Secretariat. There is now virtual agreement that the CTBTO will be in Vienna, co-located with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), from which it will be structurally independent but with some sharing of facilities and resources. The major political issue concerns the composition of the Technical Secretariat, with key players (including the nuclear weapon States) wanting assured seats, and others rejecting the concept of permanent seats and requiring regional balance, with no State excluded.
Iran's draft followed the IAEA structure, with a council of 65 members elected from the conference according to their region. Although all States would have the right to be on the council, there is no specific structural mechanism preventing the exclusion of a particular State if its region persistently fails to elect it. Australia looked to the CWC precedent, suggesting a smaller executive council of 41, regionally designated, but with at least two members per region per session designated by alphabetical rotation, thereby guarding against any permanent exclusion of any particular State party. Australia sought to balance interests and accountability by specifying that particular priority should be accorded to those States parties having a) the highest number of IMS stations; b) sizeable nuclear infrastructure; and c) ratified before the treaty enters into force.
Benjelloun-Touimi, as Friend of the Chair, came up with an option somewhere between the IAEA and UN regional models. As it appears in the Chair's working paper, the EC would consist of 45 members: 8 from Latin America; 6 from Eastern Europe; 9 from North America and Western Europe; 9 from Africa; 6 from the Middle East and South Asia; 7 from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. He then defined the selection process to be followed by each geographical region: at least one third to be filled according to the following priorities, as determined by the region itself: nuclear capabilities, number of IMS stations, expertise and experience in monitoring technology, and financial contribution to the CTBTO; one seat to be filled according to alphabetical rotation; the remaining seats by either rotation or elections.
Already Norway and Mongolia have expressed interest in this ingenious compromise, but it is understood that the African States were particularly disappointed in their under-representation. A slightly modified revision of Benjelloun Touimi's paper was brought out on 29 March, but already Brazil had given notice that robbing Latin America of a seat to give to Africa would be unacceptable. While some objections remain, it is thought that the final treaty will contain an executive council formula very close to the concept proposed by the Friend of the Chair.
Long regarded an issue for the endgame, entry into force conditions are a balancing act between the competing requirements of universality (or at least adherence by the relevant testing- capable States) and a relatively practical procedure to allow timely inauguration of the implementation regime. The options cover a wide range from a simple number to a list of specific States, including various mechanisms for avoiding the exercise of a veto by one or a few States. The Australian model proposed combining the list of CD members plus observers (some 75 States) with a waiver conference two years after signature, at which the States which have ratified could decide whether to permit the treaty to enter into force for them. Iran suggested basing entry into force on the IAEA list of 68 States which either have or have had nuclear technology or capability, but specified that the treaty can enter into force if 65 out of the 68 join.
The inevitable objection to this is what would happen if the remaining three were nuclear weapon or threshold States. In its 28 March statement Austria again drew attention to its proposal on provisional application contained in WP.242 (June 1995). This would allow a simple majority of States parties to decide to apply the treaty provisionally, allowing them to decide among themselves about verification and financial arrangements in the event of incomplete accession. Although this permits any future State to join thereafter, the position of those States which ratify but vote against provisional application seems unclear.
Seeking to cut through the euphemistic role of lists such as the IAEA or the expanded CD, the underlying purpose of which is to ensure that the nuclear weapon and nuclear capable States are on board, the UK floated a proposal aimed at these eight (the IAEA list qualified by reference to States 'not under a legally binding treaty obligation not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons). Though this was never formally put by the UK, it was adopted into the rolling text by Pakistan (and, reportedly, Brazil). It would provide a means by which Pakistan could sign and ratify the treaty but be certain that it would not take effect without India's accession as well. However, India, China and Israel have objected on grounds that this singles them out, while South Africa has argued that it would have to seriously consider whether it could accept a treaty that offered special status to the threshold States in this way.
In recent statements two trends are emerging: EIF by simple number, relying on political means to ensure ratification by the key States; or the IAEA list, originally proposed by Russia and now backed by China, France and the UK. Although there seems to be a loss of interest in the waiver concept, combining it in some form with the IAEA list could still provide a way out of the veto trap. Antonio de Icaza of Mexico was recently appointed by Zahran as Friend of the Chair to try to weave his way through this maze.
Initial assessment of the Chair's working paper indicates support for the framework as outlined. While not deleting the paragraphs on peaceful uses, PNEs, security assurances and other treaties, Ramaker found no place for them in the draft outline. This reflects the weight of opinion, that such provisions are inappropriate for this treaty.
Preambular discussions are becoming an interesting site for negotiating the meaning, context and spirit of the treaty. As more and more countries take the pragmatic decision to back the general scope prohibition contained in the Australian text they want to ensure that those with advanced technology do not just carry on business as usual. Much as the UK, France and others claim that the purpose of the treaty is simply to ban the bangs, other States have been lining up in plenary to state their understanding of what this means and why. Evoking the history of attempts to achieve a CTBT, the most widely held view (and not only among the non-aligned States) is that to fulfil the disarmament as well as non-proliferation role assigned in the treaty mandate, the CTBT should 'put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons' and 'prevent the development of new nuclear weapons'. The growing demand for preambular language to this effect reflects a desire to strengthen the treaty and a way of reaching out towards India's concerns.
At the beginning of 1996, India had put down additional preambular paragraphs, mostly linking the treaty to nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework. Many G-21 countries continue to push for this, but at least three of the nuclear weapon States (US, France and the UK) are adamant in their rejection. Australia proposed identifying a CTBT as 'a meaningful step towards the realisation of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament'. While welcoming the intention most non-aligned countries consider this does not go far enough. If target dates and time-bound frameworks for nuclear disarmament are unacceptable to the P-3, it is likely that the non-aligned will push for a reference to programme of action, which they had succeeded in including in the NPT Principles and Objectives.
The impasse in the CD over the G-21's request for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament is also impinging on the nuclear disarmament discussions in the CTBT context. Some consider that if the US, France and UK could withdraw their objections to such a committee, it would help to resolve the difficulties over time- bound nuclear disarmament in the treaty context. As pointed out by Brazil on 28 March, 'a concrete role by the CD on nuclear disarmament would...go a long way in reassuring all States that the step represented by the CTBT does not fall exclusively within the purview of principles and objectives of treaties to which not all are States parties, but rather that such a step is firmly embedded in a systematic and determined pursuit to rid the world of nuclear weapons undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament.'
Whatever the outcome, it is likely that the meaning and nuances of preambular language will be hard fought to the very end. As States concede positions elsewhere in the text the preamble becomes the territory for determining the treaty spirit and aspirations.
The first part of the 1996 session ran from 22 January to 29 March. The second part will open on 13 May until 28 June, and the final part from 29 July to 13 September. The NTB Committee decided to hold intersessional negotiations during the periods 1-4 April and 6-10 May.
Note: The latest Red Report, ACRONYM No 9, giving a fuller summary of CTBT negotiations so far will be available at the end of April from Disarmament Intelligence Review.
On 22 March, France, the UK and US announced they would be signing the Protocols to the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (SPNWFZ), or Rarotonga, Treaty, with the signing ceremony to take place in Fiji on 25 March (see next News Review). The move follows the 20 October 1995 announcement by the three States that they were withdrawing their opposition to the Protocols (already signed by China and Russia) which, among other stipulations, prohibit the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in the region. France had refused to be bound by these terms due to the South Pacific location of its test site. The UK and US had refused to be bound partly out of solidarity with France, partly out of a Cold War antipathy to nuclear-weapon-free zones, and partly out of disagreements with the anti-nuclear policies of a number of States in the region, particularly New Zealand.
Full text
"The governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America will sign on Monday, March 25, 1996 the three additional protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga.
Last year's NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed that internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhance international peace and security. The Conference also agreed that the cooperation of all the nuclear weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such zones and the relevant protocols.
Our decision to sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga demonstrates our clear support for a nuclear weapon free zone in the South Pacific.
It is also an important further milestone in demonstrating our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.
It underlines our wish to see a permanent end to nuclear testing throughout the world. It will give a further boost to the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, which we believe should be completed in the first half of 1996."
Full text
"The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, establishes a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific. The Treaty prohibits the testing, manufacture, acquisition and stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea.
The Treaty also requires all parties to apply full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. A comprehensive control system has been established to verify compliance with the Treaty and there are mechanisms, including provision for mandatory on-site inspection, to ensure compliance.
The Treaty affirms the right of each party to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields. It also explicitly upholds the freedom of navigation on the high seas and passage through territorial waters guaranteed by international law.
The Treaty has three Protocols. Under Protocol 1, the United States, France and the United Kingdom are required to apply the basic provisions of the Treaty to their respective territories in the zone established by the Treaty. The Treaty will therefore apply to American Samoa and Jarvis Island. Under Protocol 2, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and China agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty or to each others territories located within the zone. Under Protocol 3, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and China agree not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone established by the Treaty.
The Treaty was opened for signature on 6 August 1985 in Rarotonga, the largest island in the Cook Islands. All members of the South Pacific Forum are eligible to accede to the Treaty. The Treaty entered into force 11 December 1986. The Protocols were opened for signature on 8 August 1986 in Suva, Fiji.
The following States and freely associated governments have acceded to the Treaty: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. China and Russia are party to Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty but did not accede to Protocol 1 since neither has territories within the zone."
See Geneva Update for in-depth coverage.
China's 28 March statement, by Head of Delegation Sha Zhukang, included a defence of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) - a defence no other State feels persuaded to mount.
The short, powerful 21 March statement of India's Foreign Minister, Salman Haidar, was devoted to the issue of desirable and feasible linkage between a test ban and nuclear disarmament.
The 28 March statement of Haidar's counterpart in Pakistan, Aseff Ahmad Ali, also dwelt on this issue, arguing on the one hand that India had gone too far, and on the other that the nuclear-weapon States have gone not nearly far enough.
Russia's statement, by Ambassador Berdennikov on 7 March, was remarkable for its outspoken criticism of planned NATO expansion - plans which, according to Ambassador Berdennikov, "poison the entire international community, and...arms control is no exception" - and of moves by the Republican Congress to abrogate the 1972 US-Russia Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Ambassador Berdennikov used his statement to repeat Russia's call - first made by President Yeltsin in September 1994 - for a treaty on nuclear security and stability to be signed by the five nuclear- weapon States. He also repeated Russia's view that the CD should establish an ad hoc committee to discuss post-CTBT nuclear disarmament measures, aimed at complete nuclear disarmament.
Extracts
"The Chinese delegation hopes to conclude, no later than 1996, a good CTBT...
The reality we are faced with is that we have already settled a large number of issues, but there are still quite a few other issues that have yet to be resolved. ...we stand for settling the issues with a realistic and serious attitude, and object to wrapping them up in a simplistic, hasty manner out of considerations of political expediency. If some people misinterpret this position as being not positive to the negotiations, it is either out of ignorance or ulterior political motives. ... China is willing to make compromises on some issues, but that cannot be done on a unilateral basis. No country can impose its will on China under any circumstances."
"China is committed to concluding a CTBT which prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place and in any environment. Proceeding from this guiding principle, the Chinese delegation proposed at the outset of the negotiations its scope text prohibiting any nuclear weapon test which releases nuclear energy. ... The Chinese delegation has always held that the scope of the CTBT should exclude any threshold.
...most countries have reached a common understanding on the phrase 'any nuclear weapon test explosion' in the scope article, that is to say, the CTBT will, without any threshold, prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion. In view of this understanding and for the purpose of accelerating the pace of our negotiations, China now decides to withdraw the phrase 'release of nuclear energy' from its proposed text. ..."
"The Chinese delegation maintains that as an important principle, any disarmament or arms control treaty should not hinder the development and application of science and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, it would be incorrect if CTBT should ban PNEs. ... As a populous developing country with insufficient per capita energy and mineral resources, China cannot abandon forever any promising and potentially useful technology that may be suited to its economic needs. China fully shares the concern over the possible misuse of PNEs. However, we think that this issue can be solved by establishing a strict application and approval procedure and an effective international on-site monitoring mechanism for the whole process of PNEs."
"...we support the formula that CTBT shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by all nuclear-capable States, as specified in the relevant International Atomic Energy Agency list. ... I wish to stress that although the ratification of the treaty by the five nuclear-weapon States may be a prerequisite for the entry into force of the treaty, we definitely cannot agree to confining the conditions for the entry into force of the treaty only to...ratification by the five. ..."
"The Chinese delegation maintains that the International Monitoring System (IMS)...is relatively objective and just. In comparison, national technical means (NTM) are controlled and used by individual or small groups of States Parties. If NTMs are incorporated into the international verification or used for triggering OSI, that would inevitably put most of the States Parties...into an extremely unequal position... This is obviously unreasonable and unjustifiable. ...
...a request for OSI [should] only be based on the monitoring data of the IMS. ...
The Executive Council (EC)...should exercise supervision over OSI throughout the process. As the first step, the EC should consider, and approve the request for an OSI with two-thirds majority of all its members, namely by 'green light'. This procedure should apply to both the first and second phase of OSI. ...triggering OSI through an automatic or simplified procedure will make OSIs vulnerable to possible abuse, which is the reason why China, together with many other countries, opposes...this idea."
Extracts
"...we note with concern that large gaps remain in areas which we believe are central to the purpose of this Treaty. To our regret, the opportunity has not been taken during this part of the session...to adequately address these key issues...
...from the start India has followed a consistent policy on the CTBT. We believed then and are even more convinced today that a CTBT should bring about a halt to the qualitative development, upgradation and improvement of nuclear weapons and should also mark the first irreversible step on the road towards genuine nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework.
... It would surely be unacceptable if, after almost four decades of effort, we achieved a Treaty which left open a route to improve or upgrade nuclear weapons and refine designs for new weapons. We believe that the CTBT should be truly comprehensive and that technical limitations of the present verification technologies should not be allowed to constrain our efforts towards this objective.
...even while the current negotiations were in progress we witnessed disturbing developments that appeared to indicate an intention that nuclear weapons should be here to stay. New justifications for the retention of these weapons were put forward and new roles envisaged for them. We voiced our concern...and, after careful consideration, put forward proposals which are designed to ensure that the CTBT is indeed an integral step in a time-bound process of global nuclear disarmament. These are concrete and substantive proposals. They will need to be addressed as they are essential in defining the nature of the Treaty and its effectiveness as an instrument of disarmament. ...
...last week, India, along with other members of the Group of 21, put forward a formal proposal calling for the establishment of an Ad-hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time. This proposal was tabled after two months of Presidential consultations had unfortunately failed to achieve consensus on the subject. ...nuclear disarmament is not the concern of one group of countries but is of universal relevance. We realise that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated overnight. But surely...conditions exist to begin negotiations on this primary disarmament objective. Unwillingness to move in this direction, coupled with a reluctance to focus on the disarmament aspects of the CTBT text, would raise doubt about the level of commitment to the disarmament agenda. A CTBT, shorn of its disarmament context, will be only an arms control treaty designed to perpetuate the reliance on nuclear weapons by those countries who have concluded extensive testing programmes.
...India's objectives are different. We do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for national security... We are also convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons diminishes international security. We, therefore, seek their complete elimination. These are fundamental precepts that have been an integral basis of India's foreign and national security policy. ..."
Extracts
"A convergence appears to have developed around the Australian formulation to prohibit all nuclear test explosions. Yet, there are doubts whether this formulation will ensure that the ban on testing will be truly comprehensive and that it will serve the objective of halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
To move towards a genuine consensus, it will be necessary to elaborate, in some way, that the Treaty will ban all nuclear testing at any threshold. To this end, the concept of a 'zero- yield' ban needs to be more clearly explained, understood and accepted by all States. We would not be satisfied with a separate agreement on this issue between the five nuclear weapon States, outside the Treaty negotiations."
"The CTBT is supposed to be a first step in the process of nuclear disarmament. If the CTBT does not in fact prevent nuclear weapon States from developing new types of nuclear weapons, there will be no assurance that...the world will not again witness a new nuclear arms race. If the Treaty does not contribute in any significant way to the goal of nuclear disarmament. We will therefore continue to seek an adequate and legally binding commitment to halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan and other non-aligned countries have also sought explicit commitments in the CTBT on nuclear disarmament. We are most disappointed that this desire has been brushed aside by the nuclear weapon States so far. Pakistan will continue to press for a commitment to nuclear disarmament in the CTBT.
We have not endorsed the proposal which would make the Treaty's realisation dependent on the commitment of the nuclear powers to nuclear disarmament within a specific time frame. But we strongly support the position of the Group of 21 in document CD/1388 [proposing an ad hoc committee on 'a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time']. ...
The opening of negotiations on nuclear disarmament will respond to the long-standing aspiration of the world community. It would also facilitate acceptance of the CTBT by all States and thus ensure its early entry into force."
"We must not contemplate a solution where one or more States, capable of conducting nuclear explosions, are not a party to the Treaty. Pakistan's signature and adherence to the CTBT will be dependent on our confidence that all nuclear weapon States and nuclear capable States will join the Treaty."
"We are most concerned about some of the proposals advanced...
First, the use of NTMs [National Technical Means] as a 'trigger' for OSI would allow the use of information which could be subjective, selective and unreliable. ...
Second, we will continue to insist that an OSI must be approved by the Executive Council of the future CTBT Organisation. This is the only way to ensure that such politically sensitive decisions are taken collectively after due care and consideration...
Third, for much the same reasons, the authority to sit in judgment on matters regarding compliance with the Treaty must also be vested in the Executive Council and not rest with individual States parties. ... We should not countenance any mechanism which bypasses the political and technical role of the CTBT Organization. ...
These views are shared by other delegations. ... Our historical experience of undue harassment makes Pakistan specially sensitive to issues concerning the possible mis-use of On-Site Inspections. ..."
"We in Pakistan remain concerned that there could be another nuclear test across our border. This could lead to a grave situation and seriously compromise prospects for non- proliferation. We continue to look for categorical assurances from India against such an event. Instead we have heard statements that India will 'keep its nuclear options open'. We hope, nevertheless, that a positive response will come from Prime Minister Rao to Prime Minister Bhutto's proposal to discuss a nuclear weapons free future for our countries."
Extracts
"...one cannot help but notice the problems that appeared in world politics after the end of the Cold War. I not only mean the escalation of regional and local conflicts or the spread of terrorism but also the possibility of dangerous geopolitical changes, related, first of all to the intended advancement of the NATO military structure to Russia's borders. We consider the drawing of a new division line in Europe as devoid of any rationale, and it can only be considered as a dangerous provocation aimed against Russia's security interests, as a backsliding to thinking in terms of the Cold War. On this question there is a wide political consensus in our country. The plans to expand NATO poison the entire international climate, and the arms control [climate] is no exception.
We are also worried that there are voices in the USA in favour of renouncing the ABM Treaty and creating a territorial ABM defense system prohibited by that Treaty. Should this happen, it would bring the most negative consequences to the disarmament process. The preservation of strategic stability in the world could be questioned, which is, as we see it, unacceptable for the national security of all States without exceptions."
"Russia attaches major importance to the historic decision, taken in May 1995, concerning the indefinite extension of the Non- Proliferation Treaty without any conditions.
Our stance is clear and straightforward: the indefinite extension of the NPT is not a license for any State to possess nuclear weapons eternally. At the 49th session of the UN General Assembly the President of Russia made a proposal on the launching of negotiations among the nuclear 'five' in order to elaborate a treaty on nuclear safety and strategic stability which would allow [us], in a comprehensive manner, to resolve the issues at hand in that area, including those related to the further elimination of nuclear warheads and the reduction of delivery systems.
The Russian delegation is in favour of including the problem of nuclear disarmament in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament as a separate item, from which it is time to delete the reference to the cessation of the nuclear arms race as an already accomplished task. It is necessary to elaborate, through joint efforts, the proposals on the contribution that the CD could make of that global problem. As for the organizational framework of this work, we are ready to be flexible."
Scope
"From the outset of the negotiations, Russia tabled an official proposal to expand the ban on any nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, provided for in the 1963 Moscow [Partial Test Ban] Treaty, to the underground environment, thus making the ban on nuclear tests a complete and general one. ...
Regretfully, this position has not won immediate support from other participants to the negotiations. However, through concentrated efforts, it became possible to make the approaches closer to one another on these key elements of the treaty.
As a result, there are now real possibilities to complete the work on the treaty...in 1996. This has been and still is Russia's goal."
Linkage to nuclear-weapon-free world
"...it is obvious that the comprehensive test ban treaty, while being a powerful instrument for the limitation of nuclear weapons, does not by itself lead to their complete elimination. There is still a lot of work to be done on the way to a world free of nuclear weapons. In this connection, we cannot help noticing the attempts by some participants to the...negotiations to link this treaty to some time frameworks and schedules of the reduction and final elimination of nuclear arsenals. Such a linkage may only, taking into account existing political realities, significantly hamper the elaboration of the treaty."
Verification: International Monitoring System
"As we stated at the CD Plenary meeting on 1 February 1994, that is, at the very beginning of the negotiations: 'The principle of non-discrimination should, of course, also apply to the verification mechanism that will be provided for in the treaty.'
In this connection, the Russian delegation strongly advocates the leveling of the verification conditions of existing nuclear test sites through the improvement of the seismic and radionuclide IMS subsystems.
Should the Russian proposal be adopted, the problem of equal transparency of test sites could be promptly resolved. However, I would like to make it perfectly clear that this problem could and should be settled only in the context of the IMS and not through so-called confidence-building measures, including data exchange that could be provided by national stations on a voluntary basis."
Verification: On-Site Inspections
"On-site inspections should not become routine, recurrent means to remove any concerns, including those that are not sufficiently substantiated. ...
We believe...that the triggering of OSI should be based either on the data from the international monitoring system, or on the data from the IMS and national technical means of verification. ...
Another important element of OSI which could prevent abuses and would, on the other hand, provide for their sufficient effectiveness, should be the 'green light' procedure for taking the decision to trigger an OSI. We are convinced that any automatic character of inspections triggering, especially with the use of the so-called 'simplified first phase', could lead to an unjustifiably frequent, routine use of OSI, in particular with regard to countries with a significant number of seismic events not related to nuclear explosions."
Entry-into-Force
"We notice with satisfaction the growing support for the Russian proposal concerning the provisions of the treaty on the CTBT entry into force, that is, under the condition of its ratification by all States possessing nuclear energy or research reactors that are listed in the appropriate IAEA list. ...
At the same time, we do not refuse to consider other proposals to resolve this issue. However, one should recognize that all previous attempts to reduce the number of ratification instruments necessary for the treaty to enter into force, as compared to what we proposed, proved to be not workable.
We are not sure that the so-called problem of 'hostage taking' in connection with the conditions of...entry into force, which some delegations are stressing, is not an artificial one. However, if this problem does exist, it should be resolved through political means and not by including into treaty provisions that would hamper its universal character and effectiveness.
As for the formula simply providing for a fixed number of States necessary for the treaty to enter into force, without any reference to countries or category of countries whose participation in the treaty would be necessary, it may lead to a situation when the treaty enters into force without some States that play a key role in terms of its effectiveness. This solution, however superficially attractive it may seem, may in reality not be very meaningful, since today more than 170 countries have obligations under the NPT and some regional agreements that put nuclear testing off limits for them."
Withdrawal
"The Russian delegation is an advocate of an advance twelve-month notification for the withdrawal from the CTBT. We consider it imperative to create conditions that would make it most difficult for a country to withdraw from the treaty, since such a withdrawal may, in turn, provoke a chain reaction and lead to the disintegration of the treaty. A reasonably long notification period, for example 12 months, will allow, from our point of view, to take all required measures to clarify and redress the situation that led to a country's decision to withdraw... If such a withdrawal happens anyway, other countries will have more time to assess the situation and to take necessary measures concerning the protection of their national security. An important amount of time may also be needed in order to compensate for the loss to the IMS which may occur if stations located on the territory of the withdrawing State are pulled out from the system."
See also News Review.
Full text
"A study of the radiological situation at the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls in French Polynesia will begin next week.
The study, which has been requested by the French authorities, will be under the guidance and direction of an International Advisory Committee convened by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Hans Blix, and chaired by a nuclear radiation specialist and former member of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Gail de P1lanque. The Committee, which is expected to hold its first formal meeting in the Spring, will bring together experts from Argentina, Australia, 1Germany, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, there will be ex officio experts selected by relevant intergovernmental bodies - the South Pacific Forum, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the World Health Organization and the European Commission.
Project management and coordination will be undertaken by the IAEA.
The study will cover not only the current radiological situation at the atolls but also an evaluation of the long-term radiological situation.
The French authorities have agreed to provide the IAEA with information and data required for performing the study. In addition, the study will involve the taking of terrestrial and marine samples which will occur in mid-year. Analysis of the samples will be carried out thereafter by the Agency's laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria, and Monaco, as well as by a network of laboratories worldwide.
Next week, a reconnaissance mission will travel to the atolls to prepare the logistics for the measurements and sample-taking. The study will take approximately 18 months. The study's findings, conclusions and recommendations will be contained in a report of the Committee to be published by the IAEA."
In mid-March, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) heard testimony on the US stockpile from two senior officials - Dr Harold P. Smith Jr, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and C. Paul Robinson, former chief CTB negotiator and now Director of Sandia National Laboratories. Substantial extracts follow, detailing the expectations and concerns of both officials regarding the long-term ability of the United States to possess and maintain a large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal.
Extracts
"I will begin by stating that today, the stockpile is safe, secure. and reliable. My remarks will focus on the shared responsibility between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) to assure high confidence in the Nation's nuclear stockpile. This responsibility presents a new challenge because the nuclear weapons in our stockpile will be retained well beyond their intended design lifetimes without the benefit of underground nuclear testing.
The President recognized this challenge for the nuclear weapons program in his 11 August 1995 speech announcing the US position on a zero yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT):
"In order for this program to succeed, both the administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this support."
The President further directed a new annual certification to assure the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Finally, he stated that he would be prepared to "exercise our supreme national interest rights under the CTBT in order to conduct whatever testing might be required" if a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to our deterrent could no longer be certified. With this challenge and commitment in mind, I will review some of the changes in the nuclear weapons program and actions that are being taken to ensure that we - and our potential enemies - continue to have high confidence in the stockpile.
The end of the Cold War has wrought significant changes in the nuclear weapons program. Over the last decade, there has been an unprecedented shift in emphasis from design, development, fabrication, and testing of new warheads to refurbishment and life extension of existing warheads. Our stockpile has been reduced in size and diversity of weapon types and, by the end of this fiscal year, the current inventory will become the oldest in US history. Today, we do not have the capability to manufacture replacements for the nuclear warheads that comprise our existing stockpile. We must comply with environmental requirements that are increasingly challenging and litigious. The extended underground test moratorium has evolved into a US position for a zero yield CTBT. Finally, without the traditional yardstick of underground testing, it will become ever more difficult to replace the shrinking cadre of nuclear weapons experts. These changes have forced a shift in strategy at the Departments of Defense and Energy and were addressed in the DoD's Nuclear Posture Review.
Approved by the President in September 1994, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) continues to provide the DoD policy [with] guidance [on] force structure, and stewardship obligations for the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile. The NPR codified the national policy of "lead and hedge" as our approach to nuclear weapons and the attendant technology infrastructures. The policy of "lead and hedge" simply means that the US will "lead" strategic arms control efforts toward START II or smaller force levels, but retain the ability to "hedge" by returning to START I levels. It is our policy, as part of this strategy, that until START II ratification and entry-into-force, we will draw down and maintain our strategic forces at warhead levels consistent with START I.
Although primarily a DoD document, the NPR contains infrastructure requirements for the Department of Energy to ensure high confidence in the enduring stockpile, namely:
- Maintain nuclear weapon capability without underground testing or the production of fissile material;
- Develop a stockpile surveillance engineering base;
- Demonstrate the capability to refabricate and certify weapon types in the enduring stockpile;
- Maintain the capability to design, fabricate, and certify new warheads;
- Maintain a science and technology base;
- Ensure tritium availability, and;
- Accomplish these tasks with no new-design nuclear warhead production.
To meet these requirements, we must provide an environment for the development of nuclear experts who can meet tomorrow's ever increasing challenges. The DOE, with assistance from the DoD, is pursuing a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program to meet NPR requirements.
As DOE continues to address NPR infrastructure requirements, the SSMP will provide a structured approach to deal with the lack of underground testing and no new nuclear weapon production. In the past, underground nuclear testing was the ultimate arbiter of the stockpile. Absent this arbiter, the DOE must develop new approaches to ensure high confidence in our nuclear deterrent. The SSMP must include:
1) enhanced surveillance of the stockpile;
2) expanded computational capability such as the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI);
3) above ground experimental facilities (AGEX);
4) subcritical plutonium experiments at the Nevada Test Site and the ability to return to underground testing;
5) a limited capacity to remanufacture warheads in the existing stockpile; and
6) an assured source for tritium.
The DoD is satisfied with the progress that is being made by the DOE to fulfill its responsibilities as delineated in the NPR, but much remains to be done. For example, The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) endorses the DOE' s dual track approach of pursuing a commercial light water reactor and accelerator produced tritium (APT) sources by 2005 and 2007 respectively, but both approaches must overcome technical and institutional challenges. In the case of warhead fabrication, we must first establish a baseline capacity to replace those warheads routinely consumed by the quality assurance and reliability test program (QART) and be capable of expanding this capacity to handle precipitous failures of a type of warhead. We must be ever more vigilant in the stockpile surveillance program and demonstrate that systemic failures can be anticipated with sufficient time to implement corrective actions. The two Departments must continue to certify high confidence in the stockpile without the benefit of underground nuclear testing.
In its effort to improve its corporate expertise in aging nuclear weapons, the DoD is becoming a more active partner with the DOE as warheads and components are assessed and certified. At the individual level, the DoD will increase the number of personnel assigned to the DOE weapon laboratories.
The DoD-chaired Project Officers Groups (POG) will take a more active role in warhead assessment while gaining a more detailed understanding of weapon life extension procedures. At the Department level, the joint DoD/DOE Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) will remain the official forum for resolving inter-Departmental issues between the DoD customer and the DOE supplier of nuclear weapons technology. Additional information briefings will continue to be given to the NWC for review of critical issues involving the health of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
As an example of inter-Departmental cooperation, the DoD and DOE are currently formalizing a new annual certification procedure directed by the President for stockpiled weapons. This challenging task is being led by my office with the support and concurrence of representatives of the Services, the Joint Staff, Strategic Command, DOE, and the DOE laboratories. This new process will include an annual survey of the health of the entire stockpile. It will complement the newly implemented Dual Revalidation process which requires a detailed technical analysis of individual warhead types over a two to three year period. These two new reporting processes will provide timely information on warhead safety and reliability for the NWC.
The SSMP will require continuing support from the Departments of Defense and Energy, the Congress, the Administration, and the public. The DoD and DOE must jointly establish methods to measure success of the SSMP at specific intervals. We cannot afford to wait ten to fifteen years to judge the success of the program. DOE must demonstrate the ability to produce tritium and to rebuild all weapons types in the stockpile. Warheads consumed by the surveillance process must be replaced with certified warheads without the benefit of underground nuclear testing, a major undertaking. Most importantly, opportunities must exist to attract, train. and retain world class scientists and engineers who will be the next generation of stockpile stewards. The safety and reliability of our nation's nuclear stockpile demand an experienced cadre of our nation's best.
Since the Manhattan Project, the United States has invested heavily in the development, production, deployment, and maintenance of the national nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons, even at significantly reduced levels, remain a core component of future national security strategy. Our DoD/DOE shared responsibility is to ensure high confidence in our nuclear deterrent without underground nuclear testing. This enduring responsibility must have the resources necessary to ensure that the stockpile remains safe and reliable, today and in the future.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, absent nuclear testing, the potential for erosion in stockpile confidence will undoubtedly increase with time. To maintain high confidence is a challenge that exceeds those previously faced by our stockpile stewards, but I believe we are on the right track. ..."
Extracts
Sandia is managed and operated for the US Department of Energy by a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. We are, first and foremost, a defense programs laboratory, with responsibility for the engineering development of all US nuclear weapons and for systems integration of the nuclear weapons with their delivery vehicles. National security programs and defense-related environmental programs for the Department of Energy constitute 65 percent of our laboratory's work. Our responsibilities embrace the design, certification, and assessment of the non-nuclear subsystems of nuclear weapons; safety, security, reliability, and use- control; issues associated with the production and dismantlement of nuclear weapons; surveillance and support of weapons in stockpile; and substantial work in nuclear intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty verification technologies. ...
Prior to joining Sandia National Laboratories five years ago, it was my privilege to serve as chief negotiator and head of the US delegation to the nuclear testing talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those negotiations, as you may recall, produced two major agreements: protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. ... Since becoming Sandia's laboratory director in August of last year, I have placed great emphasis on meeting the challenge of maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile in these difficult budget and policy times.
On August 11 of last year, the President released a statement which included the Administration's commitment to maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile:
'As part of our national security strategy, the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States.
I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear weapons laboratories that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear testing... In order for this program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this support.'
The President attached a fact sheet to his statement that outlined a set of Safeguards, A through F, that state the conditions under which the United States can enter into a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). In January of this year, in ratifying the START II treaty, the Senate included within the ratification bill a similar set of Safeguards ((c)(12)(A through F)) that also state an enduring commitment to maintaining a robust stockpile:
'The United States is committed to proceeding with a robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear arsenal at the START II levels and meet requirements for hedging against possible international developments or technical problems in conformance with United States policies and to underpin deterrence.'
Sandia has major responsibilities in ensuring confidence in the safety and reliability of the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile and for ensuring that this vision for the START II stockpile is achieved. ...
Many people suffer from an erroneous perception that the DOE defense programs laboratories have very little work to do right now. Nothing could be further from the truth. The challenges of stockpile stewardship are formidable, particularly in an era of no new weapon designs and no nuclear testing. We have several important projects underway with deliverables due in the next one to three years:
- We are currently engaged in a life extension program for the W87 Peacekeeper missile warhead.
- We are nearing completion on a quality improvement program for the B83 bomb, which will extend the service life of this weapon.
- We are developing Mod. 11 of the B61 bomb as an operational substitute for the aging B53 bomb. This is not a new weapon development program; it is a field retrofit of B6l Mod. 7 components. The Mod. 11 will ultimately permit us to retire the B53.
- We are performing modifications to other versions of the B61 to sustain the reliability scores that have been typical of these weapons in the past. At the same time, we are performing upgrades in their safety and use-control systems.
- We are nearing completion on a prototype redesign of the Safe Secure Transport vehicle used by DOE to transport weapons on the highways. The redesigned Safe Secure Transport will support DOE's growing weapon retirement program during the next several years.
- We are collaborating with the other defense programs laboratories and the DOE Panrex plant (which performs weapon assembly and disassembly) to develop methods to disassemble and dispose of weapon components safely and in compliance with environmental requirements.
Much of our current stockpile activities can be characterized as life extension work. With no new weapon developments planned for the foreseeable future, we will be required to support the weapons currently in stockpile well beyond their designed service lives. We are developing an enhanced stockpile surveillance program to help us plan our life extension activities in an optimum fashion.
The warheads and bombs that will constitute our stockpile under START II were all developed and produced within a rather limited time span; many of them contain similar parts and components and were produced with similar processes. This increases the possibility that portions of the aging stockpile could be subject to common failure modes. The enhanced stockpile surveillance program is designed to help us identify this danger early. ...
A major undertaking in stockpile life extension work is the dual revalidation program we are conducting with our sister defense programs laboratories, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, under the joint sponsorship of the DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. This program will examine and update the design information for every weapon type in the stockpile, including its interface with the delivery system. Since we no longer have available the use of underground testing to validate design performance, the responsible laboratory team for each weapon will comprehensively examine the extant design data using the best design definition tools and methods available to us today. Any missing or incomplete elements in the documented design will be investigated and completed. The revised design data package of drawings, specifications, computer codes, and other documentation will then be given to a design team from a different laboratory for their critical review. In this way, two independent design teams will evaluate the design data package for each weapon in the enduring stockpile and ensure that it is complete and current with modern engineering standards, including the new computational engineering methods. ...
Safeguard B of the Senate' s START II ratification bill also makes a commitment to maintaining the necessary production capabilities to support the stockpile:
'The United States is committed to reestablishing and maintaining sufficient levels of production to support requirements for the safety, reliability, and performance of United States nuclear weapons and demonstrate and sustain production capabilities and capacities. Clearly, to ensure that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable, the nuclear weapons complex must reestablish a modern production capability to repair, requalify, or rebuild warheads and bombs. This can be achieved within DOE's plan for a smaller nuclear- weapon production complex. We vigorously support DOE's program for Advanced Design and Production Technologies (ADAPT) both at the production plants and in the laboratories. ADAPT will develop an affordable design and production capability for DOE that keeps pace with manufacturing technology in industry, on whom we increasingly rely to supply weapon components.' ...
For a variety of security, business, or technical reasons, it is impractical to rely on industry for all the components required for nuclear weapons. This is particularly true for components that are produced in low quantities and are unique to nuclear weapons. Consequently, DOE must retain an in-house manufacturing capability. To most effectively use these capabilities, new or improved processes and materials are being developed to enhance efficiency and minimize wastes, environmental impacts, and cost, and provide greater worker safety.
The Senate's START II ratification bill also makes a commitment 'to maintaining United States nuclear weapons laboratories and protecting the core nuclear weapons competencies therein' (Safeguard C). ...
During the Cold War, a continuous stream of new weapon development programs permitted us to continuously exercise and improve our capabilities. When problems were encountered in the stockpile, we had experienced designers on hand with the skills to fix them. However, in the future, the engineers who will perform stockpile support and stockpile extension programs will not have had original weapon system design experience. We are moving from experience-based stockpile management to science-based stockpile management. This shift makes the scientific capabilities of the laboratories more important than ever.
One of the major long-term challenges we face is how to ensure the reliability of an aging stockpile. We oversee the stockpile to ensure that weapons continue to be reliable, that they are safe, and that they are upgraded as necessary to maintain their capabilities until they are retired. Unfortunately, we do not possess sufficient data on how reliability declines as systems get older than about 20 years. However, it will soon be our daunting task to ensure that systems remain reliable and safe for decades beyond their designed service lives. ...
One of the great levers of science is computational modeling and simulation. Over the past two decades, advances in computer and information technologies have led to a thousand-fold increase in computing capability. At the same time, the sophistication of our computational software and algorithms for scientific problems has undergone similar increases. Nevertheless, even the commercially available and laboratory technologies of today are inadequate for the stockpile stewardship tasks we will face in the future. Another hundred-to-thousand-fold increase in capability from hardware and software combined will be required.
The Department of Energy's three nuclear weapon laboratories are undertaking a bold initiative in partnership with the US computing industry and with American universities to accelerate the development of strategic computing resources required for their missions. This program, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI), builds on DOE's leadership in new computing methods and on industry's development of new kinds of supercomputers. The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative seeks to advance the development of computers capable of hundreds of trillions of operations per second (hundreds of teraflops) by five-to-ten years. It will also develop a new generation of full- physics, three-dimensional computer simulation tools that are needed for our goal of simulation-driven life-cycle engineering.
These tools will be developed at the three laboratories in collaboration with US research universities and software firms.
The first step in the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative has been a partnership led by Sandia and Intel Corporation to develop the world's first teraflop computer. This project, which builds on previous Intel partnerships with Sandia and Oak Ridge National Laboratories, will field a computer at Sandia in 1996 with over 9,000 individual processors tightly coupled together. It will have ten times the memory (nearly 600 billion bytes) and ten times the speed (over 1.8 trillion operations per second) of any previous machine. This computer will immediately contribute to detailed safety, aging, and nuclear performance studies engendered by real stockpile problems we are dealing with now. It will also be used by the three defense programs laboratories to develop and test the highly detailed software models needed for science-based stockpile stewardship.
In my view, we will someday have to replace old weapons with entirely new systems; we cannot extend their service lives indefinitely. But replacing systems with exact replicas would neither be cost-effective nor technologically feasible. New designs for components and subsystems will be a continuing requirement which will require all the original core competencies we needed to make new weapon designs, as well as contemporary capabilities in advancing technology.
...many of the systems in stockpile will require replacement at about the same time at some point in the first half of the next century. The engineers and scientists who will do that work are probably entering kindergarten this year. No old-timers will be around in 2025 who have had actual experience in designing a warhead. We must find ways to qualify these people. They need to work on real systems. We cannot expect them to acquire critical design skills merely by performing piecemeal component replacement work and development simulations. They have to design whole systems with real deliverables to fully develop their capabilities. Ideally, we would like to train our junior weapon design engineers alongside experienced engineers, but this will not be possible during a decades-long hiatus of no weapon development. The Russian laboratories, by contrast, will be able to pass along their critical weapon design skills to a new generation under their announced plans to rebuild thousands of weapons each year.
... We must maintain and continuously improve our technical competencies required for this work. To do so, it is my view that the following two strategic principles must be observed:
1. We must stay current with advances in science and technology. Managing our nuclear weapons requires advanced technology, some of which is specific to nuclear weapons, but most of which is common to the standard science and engineering disciplines. If we don't keep up with the advancing frontiers in electronics, information science, materials science, and so forth, we won't be able to perform our mission in the long term.
2. We must operate as a multiple-mission laboratory. The nuclear weapons mission requires the stimulus and synergy of a multidisciplinary technical environment to be vital. The days of a high-volume nuclear weapon enterprise are over, but the requirements for laboratory excellence and a robust infrastructure remain. ...
The DOE laboratories cannot be an island; we must interact extensively with industry and universities. The technology bases for government and commercial needs are rapidly converging. I am firmly convinced that collaboration with industry and universities is essential for the DOE laboratories' mission success. ...
Safeguard D of the Senate's START II ratification bill makes a commitment to 'ensuring rapid access to a new production source of tritium within the next decade'.
Tritium decays in stockpiled weapons and must be periodically replaced. A reliable, longterm source of supply for tritium is essential for maintaining the stockpile. Without tritium, our current weapons would have no military utility. To meet stockpile needs, DOE is currently recycling tritium recovered from dismantled weapons. Based on current long-range planning assessments, we will need to have a new production facility for tritium in place before 2005. We must get started now and move quickly. We believe it is prudent policy for DOE to pursue both the commercial reactor and accelerator options. Ironically, the more technically mature method, reactor production, may be stymied by legal impediments caused by our own government policies. ...
Finally, safeguard provisions E and F of the Senate's START II ratification bill reserve the right of the United States to resume underground nuclear testing to maintain stockpile confidence if warhead design flaws or aging problems occur 'that a robust stockpile stewardship program cannot solve,' or if the supreme national interests of the United States are at risk.
You are of course aware that the President has decided to pursue a comprehensive test ban treaty. In contemplating this decision, he consulted with the directors of Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia, the nation's three nuclear weapon laboratories. We told the President that we felt we could meet the challenge-and it will be a challenge-of maintaining the nation's nuclear deterrent under a comprehensive test ban if we vigorously pursue a program of science- based stockpile stewardship. We did not guarantee that we can meet that challenge in the absence of a strong commitment to science-based stockpile stewardship. This commitment will require sufficient funds to support the core program for maintaining the stockpile as well as an investment in special facilities required to perform our work in the absence of underground nuclear tests.
Today's budget hearing is unique in that we have not yet received a final budget mark to know whether an adequate level of funding will be provided to support the nuclear weapon programs. Science- based stockpile stewardship represents the soundest approach of which we are aware to ensure a safe and reliable stockpile without carrying out nuclear tests, and I committed our laboratory to do all that is humanly possible to make it succeed. While we in the laboratories will do our part, we have no chance of succeeding without adequate financial support. We were realistic in telling the administration that the quest to find a substitute for the role of nuclear testing cannot be pursued without an increase in funding, and I was satisfied with the President's commitment and support for the science-based stockpile stewardship initiative. The President made three commitments in this regard: adequate funding, an annual joint review of certification, and identification of 'the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile' as a 'supreme national interest of the United States.'
... I assure you that this is also a question in which great care must be taken so we do not sacrifice the nation's future security by allowing the US nuclear weapons stockpile to erode while we attempt to find ways to maintain confidence in our weapons without nuclear testing.
Ensuring confidence in the stockpile without nuclear testing will be especially challenging for the nuclear design laboratories, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, because some aspects of nuclear explosives design are still not understood at the level of physical principles. Sandia is in a somewhat better position for fulfilling its responsibilities without nuclear testing because our design responsibilities include only the nonnuclear subsystems. We are still able to test in valid ways the electronic subsystems that must function reliably to ensure the safety, security, and controlled use of all US nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, we do have a continuing responsibility to assure that a warhead's electronic systems are viable in the extreme radiation environments of nuclear explosions. In the past, we have relied on nuclear testing for such assurance. However, over the past thirty years we have developed unique high-energy accelerators that permit us to simulate almost all of those radiation conditions in the laboratory. Thus, the steps to achieving substitutes for the full range of underground radiation effects tests of the past are underway in our science-based stockpile stewardship plan.
The requirements for such radiation sources include radiation sciences, ablation and implosion physics, and radiation flow phenomena. Progress has been steady over this long period through advances in engineering and science, but our progress has been spectacular during the last year as a result of our improved diagnostics and theoretical understanding. In recent experiments on Sandia's Saturn accelerator, we were able to create a one-half- million-joule x-ray source in a large-volume cavity and use that source in experiments with Los Alamos for radiation physics experiments. This result is particularly remarkable when you consider that the energy source was only 5 million joules and the conversion to a variable pulse x-ray source was 10 percent. The Saturn accelerator operating with an electrical power of 20 trillion watts was able to compress the pulse through an imploding plasma to achieve an x-ray power of 85 trillion watts! This result has been modeled by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
We predict that our results should be substantially improved by applying the same approach on the larger Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator (PBFA)...later this year, giving over 1.5 megajoules of X-ray output. If this step is successful, then we can begin to study issues of implosion symmetry and stability using this powerful and efficient source of x-rays. ...
Radiation effects are already one example that can be put forward as a science-based alternative to testing. This initial success should give us hope, although it can not yet give us assurance, that a program to replace underground nuclear testing with laboratory experiments can be successful.
I am concerned that some recent policy discussions regarding the content of a comprehensive test ban treaty could restrict the laboratories' ability to conduct an adequate stockpile stewardship program in the absence of testing. If the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency decides to seek provisions in a test ban treaty that restrict inertial confinement fusion (ICF) to only laser and particle beam drivers, based on the negotiating record of the 1975 [sic] Nonproliferation Treaty, then other methods of driving ICF, some of which are being aggressively developed here and abroad, would be treaty violations.
Some would have the United States take the extreme position that inertial confinement fusion is incompatible with a zero-yield policy. This contention has been thoroughly studied in the past and found to be without merit. The yields of ICF are so small that they fall well within the intent of a zero-yield policy, and they certainly do not present a proliferation threat. Further restrictions on ICF are not at all necessary for the purposes of the testing treaty. Moreover, inertial confinement fusion is recognized worldwide as an important experimental tool for the study of high-energy-density physics.
If the ICF language of the...Nonproliferation Treaty were to be carried over to a comprehensive test ban treaty, some of the high- energy accelerators the laboratories use today to simulate a variety of radiation conditions, and some that will be needed in the future, would have to be abandoned. Such restrictions were not part of the laboratory directors' understanding when we told the President we could perform our missions without underground nuclear testing. Our clear expectation was that further limitations would not be placed on our ability to employ the various approaches to inertial confinement fusion in support of the stockpile stewardship efforts. In my view, it is essential that inertial confinement fusion be permitted under a CTBT without such restrictions. ...
At Sandia, we also assure stockpile confidence through non-nuclear assessment. This stockpile evaluation activity involves both laboratory and flight testing of stockpiled weapons, as well as designing test equipment and monitoring test performances. Test results that identify deviations from weapon performance standards are thoroughly investigated and may result in recommendations for stockpile improvement programs.
Joint testing of weapons in their delivery modes is performed in cooperation with the Department of Defense.
We have recently become concerned about DoD budgetary constraints and other complications within the DOE weapons complex that affect the ability of the laboratories and the military services to support the joint DOE/DoD Stockpile Surveillance program. Difficulties in reconfiguring stockpile weapons at Pantex, while the facility was prohibited from operations under restraints of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, delayed certain tests for significant periods.
For several years Sandia has also been concerned over possible Air Force strategic missile testing shortfalls that could impact the reliability and credibility of W62, W78, and W87 warheads. A recent Joint Test Working Group meeting between the testing organizations of the departments of Energy and Defense has heightened that concern. Moving from multiple to single reentry vehicle configurations, eliminating Peacekeeper flight testing, and a decision not to combine reentry vehicle and warhead telemetry tests, are developments that reduce flight opportunities for nuclear warhead surveillance.
A similar test support problem may be developing for tactical bombs (B61 Mods. 3, 4, and 10). At a recent Air Force scheduling meeting of DOE, Sandia. and Air Force test organizations, it was revealed that no funding will be provided by the Air Force to support the tactical aircraft and range resources required for nuclear bomb test drops beginning this year.
My concern over these issues is based on Sandia's forty-plus years of test experience with nuclear warheads. We have sized our stockpile surveillance program to yield results within significant parameters. This requires us to test eleven warheads per year of each type. Generally, eight laboratory tests are conducted by Sandia at the Pantex plant and two to four flight tests are conducted jointly with the military. From a study of historical warhead data, we find that approximately 22 percent of the defects discovered in tests are flight-unique; that is, if we don't do flight tests we will likely not see that portion of defects within the system. Given the stringent reliability requirements that nuclear warheads must meet, we have determined that the minimum requirement for warhead flight tests is in the range of two to four per year.
We believe that a nuclear warhead assurance program that does not perform flight tests, or performs fewer flight tests than the minimum required, would lack a credible basis for evaluating system reliability. The credibility of reliability testing diminishes as the number of flight tests decreases. Erosion of credibility in our reliability testing program is serious, and would directly undercut the maintenance of confidence in the stockpile. ...
... To do [our] job, we must sustain a robust core capability in the scientific and engineering disciplines required to respond to emerging and unforeseen challenges relating to nuclear weapons. Yet today that core capability is threatened by erosion of the budget support that we and the White House had agreed were essential to maintain the nuclear stockpile as a supreme national interest of the United States. This comes after a five-year budget trend that reduced the core nuclear weapons funding by nearly half. Similarly, we face other policy challenges ranging from the ability to produce tritium in commercial reactors to the prohibition of certain laboratory experimental facilities under new treaty restrictions.
Our laboratory stepped forward to sign up to the challenges of a new future in which the ultimate security of the nation will be bet on a program of science-based stockpile stewardship, without nuclear testing, rather than on the paradigms of the past. In truth, we are in a precarious position today throughout the nuclear complex to try and meet these challenges without adequate support to carry out the many complex tasks necessary to maintain the vital responsibilities which we must perform for the nation."
On 28 February, the National Security Committee of the House of Representatives heard details of the most recent and authoratative US intelligence assessment of the threat to the United Stares likely to be posed over the next 15 years by ballistic and cruise missiles. The assessment, given by the Chair of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), Richard N. Cooper, is that, aside from Russia, China and other major military and industrialised powers, most of them staunch American allies, no tangible threat exists or is likely to emerge.
Substantial extracts are reproduced below, prefaced by remarks from the Committee Chair, Floyd D. Spence (Republican - South Carolina) reflecting what is clearly a very different assessment.
Extracts
"As everyone knows, the President vetoed the defense authorization bill last December due primarily to the legislation's direction that a national missile defense system be deployed by the year 2003. As I commented during the veto override debate, on a political level, the veto did serve to more clearly define the stark differences between the Clinton administration and this Congress on key national security issues such as ballistic missile defense. It is unfortunate that an issue as fundamentally important as whether or not the American people should be defended against the threat of ballistic missiles in the decade ahead has become so controversial - but it is where we find ourselves.
Adding further to the controversy, the Department of Defense announced last week that they do not intend to spend all of the funding appropriated for national missile defense programs this fiscal year, as well as the surprising decision to delay several of the most promising theater missile defense programs - an area in which I did not believe there was much controversy until now. The combination of the President's strong opposition to deploying a national missile defense and now, an apparently conscious decision to scale-back theater missile programs leaves us plenty to begin sorting through.
This committee has a responsibility to raise the visibility of important security issues and through discussion, debate and even disagreement, to hopefully inform and educate the citizens of this country. Citizens who, interestingly enough, polling data indicates believe that this country already has a defense against ballistic missiles.
One of the principal reasons behind the President's veto was his assertion that there was not a significant enough threat to the US in the next decade to warrant deployment of a national missile defense system. This afternoon's hearing is intended to explore this very issue of the threat in more detail. ..."
Extracts
"My remarks are based on a recent National Intelligence Estimate 'Emerging Missile Threats to North America during the Next 15 Years.' I would add that the focus of that estimate was on emerging threats from countries other than Russia and China, although it did touch on their strategic forces. I will outline the key judgments of that study. In addition, I will comment on the process that generates NIEs in general - and this one in particular - necessary in my view because some questions have been raised about the integrity of this process. ...
...let me make some brief remarks on the missile threats from Russia and China before I turn to the bulk of the judgments of our estimate dealing with other countries.
With the end of the Cold War, the United States faces a clearly diminished threat of nuclear attack by the missile forces of the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to maintain an operational strategic nuclear force capable of delivering thousands of nuclear warheads against the United States. START I has resulted in a numerically smaller force, but Russia continues strategic force modernization programs, albeit within the constraints of a greatly weakened economy.
The Chinese force of nuclear tipped ICBMs is small by US and Russian standards and will remain so. Many of China's long-range systems are probably aimed at the United States. China plans to update this force with new missiles and, unlike the Russians, to increase the number of missiles deployed. Possible future improvements are to include a mobile ICBM.
In our recent NIE, the Intelligence Community reaffirmed earlier assessments that the current threat to North America from unauthorized or accidental launch of Russian or Chinese strategic missiles remains remote and has not changed significantly from that of the past decade.
Nearly a dozen countries other than Russia and China have ballistic missile development programs. In the view of the Intelligence Community, these programs are to serve regional goals. Making the change from a short or medium range missile - that may pose a threat to US troops located abroad - to a long range ICBM capable of threatening our citizens at home, is a major technological leap.
The key judgments of the estimate I noted above are as follows:
First, the Intelligence Community judges that in the next 15 years no country other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.
Second, we believe North Korea is developing a missile, which we call the Taepo Dong 2, that could have a range sufficient to reach Alaska. The missile may also be capable of reaching some US territories in the Pacific and the far western portion of the 2000 km-long Hawaiian Island chain.
North Korea is unlikely, in the next 15 years, to obtain the technological capability to develop and deploy a longer range ICBM capable of reaching the contiguous 48 states.
North Korea would have to develop a new propulsion system, it would have to develop or acquire improved guidance and control systems, and it would have to conduct a flight test program. Meeting these challenges will take time, given the technical and manufacturing infrastructure of North Korea, and the political and economic situation in the country.
We have no evidence that Pyongyang has begun or intends to begin such a program.
Third, no other potentially hostile country has the technical capability to develop an ICBM in the next 15 years.
Fourth, any country with an indigenously developed space launch vehicle - for example, France, Japan, Israel or India - could develop an ICBM within five years if so motivated.
We are likely to detect any indigenous program to develop a long- range ballistic missile many years before deployment.
A flight test is a sure, detectable sign of a ballistic missile program. Normally the first flight test would provide at least five years warning before deployment.
Moreover, we would almost certainly obtain other earlier indicators of an ICBM program.
Fifth, foreign assistance can affect the pace of a missile program. Since specific technological assistance is difficult to predict, the potential for foreign assistance introduces some uncertainty into our predictions of timelines. In making our assessments, we have allowed for acquisition of some foreign technology by the countries of interest.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has significantly limited international transfers of missiles, components, and related technology, and we project it will continue to do so.
That said, leakage of components and critical technologies into developing countries has occurred, and will likely continue. A good case in point - subsequent to the publication of the NIE - is the recent interception of Russian missile guidance components enroute to Iraq.
Sixth, we expect no country that currently has ICBMs will sell them. Each of these countries has agreed to adhere to the MTCR, and transfer of an ICBM would show blatant disregard for the MTCR Regime. Also, exporting countries probably would be concerned that the missiles might be turned against them.
Seventh, we examined worldwide development programs for cruise missiles because of the possibility of their being launched from forward-based ships. By 2005, several countries, including some potentially hostile to the United States, probably will acquire land- attack cruise missiles to support regional goals.
We believe that an attack by cruise missiles launched from ships off the coast would be technically feasible, but unlikely.
I have discussed what the NIE said. Let me spend a few minutes outlining how the NIE process works. A national intelligence estimate is the Intelligence Community's most authoritative projection of future developments in a particular subject area. It is prepared by the National Intelligence Council, which I head, with the participation of all agencies of the Intelligence Community, and it contains the assessments and judgments of all these agencies. Each NIE is discussed and approved at a meeting of the most senior members of the Intelligence Community.
The process for producing NIEs is directed particularly at ensuring presentation of all viewpoints. We do not impose consensus; in fact we encourage the many agencies that participate in NIEs to state their views and we display major differences of view in the main text. Lesser reservations are expressed in footnotes.
The estimate on which I based my testimony today is no exception. It is the most authoritative current statement on the subject by the Intelligence Community. Moreover, the key judgments I outlined were free of contention.
Furthermore, the judgments in the estimates are largely consistent with previous Intelligence Community assessments and with those of individual agencies. The only areas of change are:
- First, the timelines for development of the Taepo Dong missiles. Most agencies believe the Taepo Dong 2 program will move slower than we projected earlier, and there are some concrete reasons for this change.
- Second, for two countries, our estimate of the time required for ICBM development has been extended somewhat. I would be happy to provide the members of the Committee the details of the countries and timelines in closed session.
To emphasize how little our assessments have changed, I would like to read from an unclassified summary of a 1993 CIA report that is similar in content to our recent NIE:
'Analysis of all available information shows the probability is low that any other country [than China or the former Soviet Union] will acquire this capability [for an ICBM attack on the United States] during the next 15 years.' ..."
Each report costs $47, and can be obtained from Penny Hill Press, 6440 Wiscasset Road, Bethesda, MD20816, US, telephone 301 229 8229, fax 301 229 6988.
Review compiled from reports appearing between 15 15 February and 15 March. The Review is an account of news reports and does not seek to put forward or reflect the views or claims of Dfax.
The Clinton Administration spent much of the period under review wrestling with the implications of alleged Chinese transfers of nuclear-weapons related equipment to Pakistan, and chemical- weapons related equipment and cruise missiles to Iran. As of mid- March, no final intelligence assessment had been made of the veracity of the numerous reports.
Pending that assessment, the US has taken limited but hardly negligible action against China, by freezing consideration of new export loan guarantees. There is speculation that Pakistan - to whom China allegedly agreed to transfer 5,000 magnet rings potentially usable in gas centrifuges capable of enriching uranium to weapons-grade - will be reprimanded in the form of a suspension of a long-awaited transfer of over $300 million of military equipment. Meanwhile Iran continues to be castigated as an irremediable pariah with whom all diplomatic and economic links should be severed.
On 21 February, the New York Times reported that the US had decided, as mandated by the 1994 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Prevention Act (NNPA), to impose limited sanctions - in the form of a suspension by the US Export-Import Bank of consideration of further loan guarantees to US firms wishing to export goods to China. The move was confirmed by the White House on 28 February, when it was revealed that the value of the loan guarantees put on hold was $10 billion, and that the suspension would initially take effect until 23 March. Spokesperson Michael McCurry stressed that the sanctions were comparatively limited at this stage because investigations into the nature and scale of the alleged magnet- ring transfer were still ongoing. According to McCurry, the US "will be engaging with the government of China to raise our concerns to see if they can provide any information that we should consider". This was apparently translated by an unnamed senior official as meaning: "we are looking for information that would help us let them off the hook, including a promise that future shipments of sensitive technology will stop". Also on 28 February, spokesperson Glyn Davies gave the State Department's version of events:
"At the end of last week, the Secretary [of State] did ask Ex-Im to hold off on loan approvals or disapprovals pending the outcome of our deliberations. But our intention, of course, is to fully implement our responsibilities under US non-proliferation statuses... we want to use the non-proliferation statuses to advance our interest in assuring that China implements the NPT. ... we've put a number of questions to the Chinese government. We're not negotiating with them. We haven't called on them to investigate themselves. This is our responsibility...to come to a determination..."
Mr Davies said he "wouldn't necessarily draw" a "linkage" between the coincidence of the 23 March review date with the Presidential elections in Taiwan.
The US has also been considering its response to reports of Chinese support for Iran's alleged nuclear and chemical weapons and cruise missile programme. At a State Department press briefing on 8 March, spokesperson Nicholas Burns, stated that "there's no question that there has been a transfer of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran [from China]". However, Mr Burns added that he wanted "to be very clear about one thing: the United States has not made a determination that in this case sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act or other sanctions are warranted... I just wanted to be clear about that, because there was an inference in some of the reports yesterday that the United States was somehow on the verge of making this decision, and that's not the case."
The US is clearly happier discussing sanctions against Iran, which it is now suggesting is implicated in the terrorist activities of Hamas. During the same briefing, Mr Burns, reacting to reports in the Washington Post containing fresh allegations about Chinese involvement in a rumoured Iranian chemical weapons programme, refusing to be drawn on the specifics of the speculation, said:
"We believe that Iran is engaged in an effort to create an arsenal of weapons which include chemical weapons, and we are actively engaged at all levels - internationally and diplomatically - to try to stem the flow of this type of technology to Iran. ...you know our basic view about the Government of Iran, and we don't believe it can be trusted with this type of technology..."
Mr Burns went on to stress the importance of coordinating international activity aimed at effectively and urgently thwarting Iran's effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction:
"One of the messages that we've delivered to China but also to Russia...is that not only would Israel be a possible...victim of Iranian terrorism, but also others in the region...friends of theirs. This is not an issue that concerns only Israel. It concerns everyone...even regions beyond the Middle East. ... We believe that Iran wants to develop capabilities that would essentially amount to a flagrant violation of international law. We have stood up and taken very strong measures to try to isolate Iran. We'd like to have more support from our European friends who believe that somehow talking to Iran - having talk sessions, diplomatic dialogue - is going to convince the Iranians not to be bad guys, when the fact is that the Iranians...are impervious to any kind of dialogue with our friends in Europe. ...
Our message to the allies is this: we understand you've decided to take a different tack...but where has it gotten you? Has Iran stopped supporting the terrorist groups in the Middle East? No. Is Iran supporting Hamas? Yes. Can you countenance that? We think not. That's the pattern of our dialogue with our European partners."
A particular point of dispute with those partners is the value of suspending economic relations with Iran. Mr Burns freely admitted that this was a painful course of action:
"President Clinton...[has acted] courageously to cut off American economic activity with Iran. There is a hit there to American companies. American companies are disadvantaged because of the steps that we've taken, but we think that the greater good is being served. We don't want to see Iran achieve a capability to become a nuclear power or a power that has chemical or biological weapons."
On 18 February, it was reported in Islamabad that the US had semi- offically told Pakistan of its decision to delay the transfer of $368 million of military equipment. According to Foreign Minister Assef Ahmed Ali: "we have not been told officially, but as a result of the controversy there might be a delay". However, Mr Ali insisted that the transfer - "a moral and legislative obligation" - would take place. Last year, the US Congress passed an amendment (the Brown Amendment) to the 1990 Pressler Amendment prohibiting military transfers to Pakistan on the grounds of accelerating concern over Pakistan's alleged nuclear weapons programme. Under the terms of the Brown Amendment, the Pressler stipulations were relaxed for a one-off transfer designed to mark a new era of US- Pakistan relations.
On 4 March, Foreign Minister Ali expressed extreme frustration at the issue's impact on Pakistan's reputation:
"Both the Chinese and us have again and again reiterated that nothing has been transferred to Pakistan which will promote the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear-related weapons... [US] eyeglasses are focused on the wrong country. This is not where dangerous things are happening. ...
If this [awaited US] determination is to the effect that China has transferred these ring magnets for nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-related programmes, and if the next step is taken, which is sanctions against China and Pakistan, this will be a very grave error... [It] will have consequences on corporate America and...on issues of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. ...
We are prepared to come and discuss non-proliferation issues in the framework of the US proposal given some years back for a conference on South Asian peace and security. ... [We have] a very clear conscience. We have shown a lot of self-restraint in the face of very serious dangers to our security. We have not proliferated. We at least need to be treated evenhandedly, if not favourably. But when we read all these statements and see almost a saturation media campaign against us, then people in our country begin to ask some questions: 'why are we showing self-restraint, when...we get orchestration and a rap on the knuckles'
Speculation in mid-December that India was preparing to conduct its second nuclear test, after a twenty-one year interval, was followed in early March by rumours of preparations by Pakistan to respond in kind. Pakistan, forced onto a resentful defensive by the magnet-rings affair, has responded with denials as adamant as those of India, and by continuing to warn that India still intends to test. For example, on 2 March, Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in an interview with the Egyptian newspaper Akhbar al- Youm, asserted that "reliable reports confirm that preparations are being made in India for a nuclear test... It is time Indian authorities realize the dangers such a step would represent, as it would threaten efforts to ban nuclear tests on the regional and international levels".
On 5 March, a report in the Washington Post referred to US concern over satellite 'evidence' of preparations for a test in the South Western province of Baluchistan. This report was immediately characterised by a Foreign Ministry spokesperson in Islamabad as part of an "orchestrated media campaign based on deliberate leaks of faulty intelligence reports". The spokesperson added:
"Rather than publishing speculative stories about Pakistan, the media would do well to focus on the undeniable actions of India...[including] the testing of [the] nuclear-capable and Pakistan-specific Prithvi missile, the preparations for conducting a second test and the roadblock now being erected in Geneva to frustrate the successful conclusion of the CTBT..."
On 7 March, Pakistan's President, Farooq Leghari, signalling out the Post article for especial castigation, lamented the "erroneous and distorted" coverage his country was receiving. Leghari went on to describe India's Prithvi missile (range 150-250 kilometres) as a "serious tension multiplier in the region".
However, comments made by Foreign Minister Ali on 12 March illustrated why there is a widespread conviction that Pakistan would test if India did:
"If India wants to prove its manhood by conducting a nuclear test then we have the capability to prove our manhood... We don't want to carry out a nuclear test but we have taken all measures for the security of the country..."
The Foreign Minister added a defence of Pakistan's policy of 'ambiguity' on the question of its current nuclear capability: "it is this ambiguity which [has] warded off the possibility of war in South Asia for the last 25 years".
On 10 March, America's Ambassador to Pakistan, Thomas Simons, warned of the consequences of an intensification of the India- Pakistan arms race. Referring particularly to missile development and deployment, Simons stated:
"The problem that I think all of us ought to be facing is, if either country or both countries move forward, [that] there is a very considerable danger of a spiralling arms race which will be tremendously expensive, mind-bogglingly expensive, and which will be horribly burdensome, if not crippling, to both countries."
Following Congress's 26 January ratification of the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, the Duma, has been discussing the merits and demerits of following suit. There is clearly a strong reluctance to do so, stemming from three main, mutually compounding sets of doubts: doubts about the perceived strategic advantage the Treaty gives the US; doubts about the wisdom of ratifying before agreement is reached on the future of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (see below); and doubts about the wisdom of ratifying in the face of NATO plans to expand eastwards.
Lev Rokhlin, the Chair of the Duma's Defence Committee, referred to all three sets of doubts on 29 February, concluding that the Treaty "can be ratified by the Russian side only if there is an appropriate correlation of forces... [President Yeltsin has] voice[d] concern that NATO is heading towards the East, towards the borders of Russia, and parliamentarians share this concern fully... We have to be sure that by signing START-II we are not destroying ourselves..."
Duma hearings - mainly in private - on the issue opened on 19 February. President Yeltsin is still hoping for ratification before the 19-20 April Moscow Summit on nuclear security and safety (see below). The Duma has refused to adopt a target date.
Consultations in the Treaty's Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) have been proceeding for many months to try to reach agreed demarcation definitions separating theater from strategic ballistic missile defense. The US is reportedly seeking to reach two separate agreements, in particular on the speed limits of candidate systems: first, agreement on systems incorporating interceptor missiles travelling at 3 kilometres per second or less, designed to destroy incoming short-range missiles; then agreement on systems incorporating missiles travelling at higher speeds, designed to defend against longer-range attack. Russia is reportedly insisting that the consultations produce a single package resolving all demarcation issues.
The latest meeting of the SCC opened inauspiciously in Moscow on 27 February when the Russian side characterised a freshly unveiled US ballistic missile defense package as "inconsistent" with the ABM Treaty. According to 14 March Washington Times report, Russia's opening statement, cabled back to Washington by the head of the US team, Stanley Riveles, insisted:
"Until there is an agreement, no side will have the right to determine unilaterally whether or not a mobile TMD [Theater Missile Defence] system is consistent with the ABM Treaty."
The Russian statement also reportedly argued that any agreement on "lower-velocity systems" would have be followed "without delay" by negotiation of an accord on higher-velocity systems.
The BMD plan criticised by Russia at the SCC was principally drawn up by the Defense Secretary, William Perry, and Undersecretary of Defense Paul Kaminski. The recommendations, unveiled by the two men at a press conference on 16 February and aimed at mapping out the next six years of research and development, were drawn up after a six-month Pentagon study.
Secretary Perry said his concern was with the threat from short- range missiles, a threat he described as "here and now" and "widely dispersed". Mr Kaminski stressed that the plan was "[ABM] Treaty compliant".
Perry and Kaminski announced the following recommendations:
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): planned expenditure on Army system reduced from $4.7 billion to $3 billion; production schedule extended by two years.
Patriot Pac-3 missiles: planned expenditure on Army system increased by $300 million.
Theater-Wide Upper Tier Program: planned expenditure on Navy system increased by $600 million.
Area Defense Lower Tier Program: planned expenditure on Navy system increased by $150 million.
Medium Extended Air Defense Systems (MEADS): planned expenditure on international programme involving the US, Italy, France and Germany increased by $85 million.
Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) research: to be funded at $10 million for each of the next three years.
Research into National Missile Defense (NMD): planned expenditure to be increased by $200 million.
Most importantly, the Perry/Kaminski recommendations included a commitment to the compatibility of any new system with the ABM Treaty, with no deployments envisaged for at least six years.
The system most negatively affected is THAAD, which is being scaled back to provide a defense specifically against any ballistic missile attack from North Korea. According to reports, Perry and Kaminski want to see two THAAD batteries, each with four launchers, two radars and around forty missiles. According to Congressional testimony in early March by the head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), the Army's Major- General Malcolm O'Neill, North Korea's Taepo-Dong 2 missile, currently under development, is expected to have a range of 6,000 kilometres (3,700 miles), sufficient to reach Alaska.
The Perry-Kaminski plan is a far cry from Congress's ambitious vision for widespread, multisystem NMD. The Financial Year 1996 Defense Authorization Act seeks deployment of a much grander THAAD by 2000.
Congressional criticism of the plans was led by Senator Strom Thurmond (Republican - South Carolina), Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), who expressed himself (26 February) "deeply troubled" at the failure to "accelerate both theater and national missile defense". The Navy's Theater-Wide system, Thurmond added, was, not withstanding its $600 million increase, "woefully underfunded". Also on 26 February, the Chair of the House National Security Committee, Floyd Spence (also Republican - South Carolina) was quoted as charging that, as a result of the changes and in particular the timeline for deployment now envisaged, "the United States will remain vulnerable to ballistic missile attack [until] well into the next century".
However, Major-General O'Neill sought to reassure critics on one key aspect of the Perry-Kaminski plan - the decision to delay deployments for six years. According to O'Neill, this decision allows for thorough research and is entirely prudent: "I don't see evidence of anything coming in the six years that I would be worried about". Despite this reassurance, O'Neill, in 7 March Congressional testimony, expressed concern about the new funding levels:
"[The plan is] very severe in cutting back our seed corn for the future... To ensure the continued flow of new solutions to meet evolving ballistic missile defense requirements and technology needs, I urge the Congress to consider the BMD advanced technology program as a strategic investment..."
O'Neill's testimony formed part of an intensive period of Committee and Subcommittee hearings announced by the Republicans at a 28 February press conference headed by Representative Curt Weldon (Pennsylvania). Weldon, a veteran member of Congress, now serving his fifth term, said the hearings would constitute the most aggressive, all-out assault...on this administration's lack of attention to defending the American people that you will ever have seen since I've been in Washington". Weldon savaged the Perry- Kaminski plan:
"There's no direction to deploy. That's been the problem with this whole thing. We study and study and study, and spend money and money and money, but nothing's deployed."
Paul Kaminski testified before the SASC on 6 March. He sought to assure his largely sceptical audience that the Administration would not countenance an overly restrictive agreement with Russia: "I do not see us accepting an ABM demarcation agreement that would limit the theater missile defense systems that I have described to you".
Kaminski failed to impress at least one SASC member, Robert Smith (Republican - New Hampshire), who lamented the extreme difference between the DoD's plan and that set out in the Defense Authorization Act: "We pass a law and it's being ignored...as if it isn't worth the paper it's printed on". Kaminski responded that there was no point in trying to go any faster:
"Some real attention needs to be given to what it is we're defending against. Without finer evidence of what it is, we're not prepared to make that commitment [to deploy]."
In earlier testimony (28 February - see Documents and Sources), the Chair of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), Richard N. Cooper, told a House Committee that for the forseeable future - by which he meant fifteen years - "no country other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada"... no other hostile country has the technical capability to develop an ICBM in the next 15 years".
On 23 February, Japan and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding confirming arrangements for the regular exchange of intelligence information on ballistic missile programmes, particularly, according to reports, those of Russia, China and North Korea. The US is thought to want to move toward a collaboration with Japan on developing and deploying BMD systems.
The briefings will be held between the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and Japan's Defence Agency. The first exchange was scheduled for 6 March.
In mid-March, Canada and the US are reportedly expected to agree a revised North AMerican Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) agreement. NORAD, first signed in 1958, covers collaborative arrangements between the two countries on air defence systems and intelligence. The new agreement, two years in the making, will also detail BMD cooperation.
On 9 March, speaking in Fulton, Missouri, fifty years after Winston Churchill warned of an iron curtain descending in Europe, former British Prime Minister Lady Thatcher urged the construction of a worldwide BMD shield. Lady Thatcher characterised the threat of 'rogue states', headed by "megalomaniacs and strongmen of proven inhumanity", launching nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles as "the single most awesome threat of modern times...equal to, or even more destructive than, the Soviet threat to the West in the 1960s. It is that serious." The imperilled West, she argued, had only one means of escaping, or at least minimising, this threat. It must "install an effective ballistic missile defense which would protect us and our armed forces, reduce or even nullify the rogue State's arsenal, and enable us to retaliate".
Lady Thatcher mentioned North Korea as posing currently the gravest risk, but warned that "once they [ballistic missiles] are available in the Middle East and North Africa, all the capitals of Europe will be in target range".
On 7 & 8 March, The Washington Times reported that the US Department of Defense (DoD) had acquired evidence of a possible Russian nuclear test at its Novaya Zemyla site in the Arctic. Such a test would have broken a long-standing Russian moratorium, since emulated by the US, and would be likely to throw the CTB negotiations into turmoil. The Times article of 7 March quoted an unnamed official as saying: "there's no question it was a nuclear test. The only question is the yield". On 8 March, Defense Secretary William Perry and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, both confirmed that the US was sifting the evidence. Secretary Perry said "some people [are] saying yes and other people saying no". According to Mr Holum, he and other senior officials had been informed of "activity at a Russian test site similar to activity that has occurred during previous nuclear tests. But we are not able to confirm that a test has taken place".
On 8 March, Norway's Foreign Minister, Bjoern Tore Godal, reportedly said Norway had no evidence of a test and that it was "impossible" that a test could have been conducted without being detected by Norwegian seismologists. Pentagon officials also apparently conceded a lack of seismological evidence. One official was quoted on 8 March as saying "there was some activity we would associate with a nuclear test but there was no bang".
Editor's note: on 18 March, Russia issued an unequivocal denial of the reports. According to Foreign Ministry spokesperson Grigory Karasin:
"We have already said that the last nuclear test at the Novaya Zemyla testing ground was carried out in October 1990. In October 1991 Russia brought in a unilateral test ban which has been strictly observed. Our policy remains the same - nuclear tests are not being carried out and are not planned."
With a resumption of testing by China expected sometime soon, two States with an especial interest in exerting maximum pressure to affect a change of policy have been expressing their concern.
Speaking on 12 March, Mongolia's President, Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat, stated:
Mongolia has a moral right to demand from its neighbours [a commitment] to reciprocate our nuclear-weapons-free zone by stopping their nuclear tests... The fact that the People's Republic of China has not ceased its nuclear testing means that Mongolia still remains a potential victim of the effects of those tests... We are also worried by the reports on their plans to dump nuclear wastes in the proximity of our territory. ... Our policy now is aimed at preventing radioactive and other forms of contamination from...neighbouring countries..."
In Japan, Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda warned (13 March) that loans to China could be affected by renewed testing:
"We certainly hope the Chinese will not conduct any further tests... We have already told them that criticism against Japanese loans for the purpose of assisting China would increase."
Japan cut its grants-in-aid to China following its most recent test, in May 1995. It left intact, however, its much larger programme of yen loans. A stronger response to a new test seems unlikely, with Mr Ikeda insisting that "Japan's fundamental policy is to support China's open-door and economic reform policy".
With relief, vigour, and a series of announcements, France has been attempting to emerge from the mire into which its resumption of testing sunk its reputation as a champion of the nuclear disarmament cause.
On 22 February, speaking on French television, President Chirac announced three measures: the cessation of the production of fissile materials (at the Pierrelatte nuclear reactor near Lyons); withdrawal of its force of 18 land-based nuclear missiles based in silos in the Plateau d'Albion in southern France; and the dismantlement of its force of 30 mobile, short-range Hades nuclear missiles, inoperative since 1991 but whose continuing existence, in Chirac's words, "worried the Germans very much". The last two moves will, as the President explained, mean that France's nuclear force will henceforth be carried only at sea and in the air - the end result, in his estimation, being a "more modern and less costly" arsenal.
On 26 February, Chirac, according to his spokesperson Alain Lamoussoure, made the audacious claim to his Cabinet that France was "becoming the number champion of nuclear disarmament". In addition to the measures announced on 22 February, Lamoussoure told the media to bear in mind France's advocacy of "the most ambitious option, which is the zero option", at the CTB negotiations in Geneva, a commitment underscored by the fact that France was "the first nuclear nation to close its testing centre". Consequently, France is also now prepared to sign the Protocols to the 1985 Rarotonga Treaty establishing the South Pacific as a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ).
France's moves were made in advance of its participation in an unprecedented meeting of the European Union (EU) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) - the Asia-Europe Summit, or ASEM - in Bangkok, Thailand, on 1-2 March. France is hoping for an invitation to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which currently consists of the seven ASEAN States - Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam - plus three members-in-waiting, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and Australia, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia and South Korea.
Extraordinarily, perhaps, given the furore in the ASEAN region caused by the tests, France's Ambassador to Singapore, Barry Delongchamps, argued on 26 February that France deserved representation in its own right in part because it was a nuclear weapon State (NWS):
"We consider we should be invited to take a seat in the ASEAN Regional Forum. We are a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council and we are a nuclear power."
Opening the ASEM, Thailand's President, Banharn Silpa-archa, urged "our European friends present today" to sign the Protocols to the South east Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) signed in December 1995. On 29 February, President Chirac had said France had a "constructive attitude" on the issue. Currently, the US is leading nuclear-weapon State opposition to signing the Protocols, on the grounds of the definition of the territory to be affected and the security assurances entailed (see last issue).
According to France's Foreign Minister, Herve de Charette, speaking in Singapore on 5 March, the issue of France's recent tests was not raised during the ASEM.
Earlier (26 February), Japan's Ambassador to France, Koichiro Matsuura, said he hoped the rest of the year would see "the start of a revival in Franco-Japanese relations". However, he added:
"At the same time, we cannot forget that the countries which were the most strongly opposed to the six French nuclear tests carried out from September 1995 were those of Asia-Pacific, and there remains a malaise in their relations with France."
On 28 February, former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, defended Chirac's June 1995 resumption decision:
"...if, as a Frenchman, I wanted the French nuclear weapon to be credible, I would have carried out the tests. I would strive to bring our technology up to the level of the Russians and the Americans."
On 1 March, the IAEA announced the completion of preparations for its inspection of the French test site at the Muroroa and Fangataufa atolls in the South Pacific. See Documents and Sources for the full text of the Agency's press release.
The study, requested by France during its final series of six tests (September 1995-January 1996), is expected to last 18 months and cost around $2 million, to be paid in full by France.
The head of the inspection team - four of whom arrived in the region to conduct a preliminary study on 5 March - is Gail de Planque, a US scientist, who stated on 1 March:
"I won't prejudge the outcome. It's up to the study to assess the radiological situation now and if there are any hazards for people. It'll also examine the possible situations in the future."
Some experts warn of the possible leakage of radioactivity - in particular iodine-131, which can give rise to cancer - from the atolls. De Planque said that, under adverse conditions, that was a possibility: "because of hydrological effects, earthquakes or volcano eruptions, it could leak out..."
De Planque said she had received assurances from the French authorities that "we will have access to all the data, measurements and radiological information which are relevant to this study".
On 5 March, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov, announced plans for a major expansion of a storage site for weapons-grade plutonium. Reports stated that the revamped site, at a chemical facility in Mayak in Cheliabinsk, is expected to become operational within four years and store 40% of total Russian stocks of such materials. Russia has two other storage sites, at the Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-27 nuclear reactors. The cost of the Mayak site - said to be around $300 million - will apparently be half-met by the United States, with $75 million already dedicated. Russia is said to be collaborating on establishing a similar facility in the US.
On the same day, Mikhailov also announced plans to recycle 12 tons of weapons-grade plutonium in 1996, and between 25-30 tons in 1997. All the material will be made available by the decommissioning of nuclear weapons under the START process.
Mikhailov's press conference presented an almost rosy picture of the nuclear safety and security situation in Russia. The average cost of dismantling a Russian nuclear missile, he apparently revealed, was between $10,000-$15,000, compared to the US average of between $50,000-$100,000. The Minister added that 60% of the Atomic Ministry's (MinAtom) defence facilities were in the process of being converted to exclusively civilian use.
Mikhailov also used his press conference to defend Russia's ongoing and extensive nuclear weapons research programme. Claiming that the programme's stress lay on improving the safety of nuclear weapons and ensuring their capability to elude ballistic missile defences, Mikhailov explained: "the world has not so far become a world where nuclear military research should be ended".
The main concern in the US, however, is the safety and security of storage sites and disposal practices. On 13 March, Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat - Georgia) argued:
"As economic conditions in the former Soviet Union continue to deteriorate, the likelihood of a theft of nuclear materials is increasing more rapidly than our ability to secure and protect these lethal materials. ... The threat [of theft] is no longer merely theoretical. The leakage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union is now a fact... we're dealing with reality."
Nunn was speaking following the release of a study into the issue by the US General Accounting Office (GAO). Testifying before the Senate on 13 March, Harold Johnson of the GAO summed up the report's dark findings:
"Social and economic changes in the newly independent States have increased the threat of theft and diversion of nuclear material, and with the breakdown of Soviet-era control systems, the newly independent States may not be able to counter the increased threat."
Mr Johnson did not, however, go as far as Senator Nunn in claiming that illicit trade was already established:
"While there is no direct evidence that a black market for stolen or diverted material exists in the newly independent States, seizures of direct-use material in Russia and Europe have increased concerns about the adequacy of controls at nuclear facilities."
The GAO report itself was reported to state:
"Much of this [fissile] material is outside of nuclear weapons, is highly attractive to theft, and the newly independent States may not have accurate and complete inventories of the material they inherited."
Equally grim findings were contained in a Harvard University report, 'Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy', in a study supervised by former senior Defense Department official Graham Allison (See Documents and Sources).
On 4 March, Department of Energy Deputy Secretary Charles B. Curtis announced plans to spend $330 million over the next six years on helping to increase safety and security. Despite this expenditure, Curtis was of the desperate opinion that "we are going to have to be lucky" to avoid a significant illicit transfer of weapons-grade materials.
The funding will reportedly be dedicated to around fifty storage sites, with priority purchases being surveillance and monitoring equipment. The sites to benefit are in Russia and six former Soviet republics: Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Preparations for the 19-20 April Moscow summit on nuclear safety and security are proceeding apace, if not uncontroversially. The summit was proposed by Russia at the June 1995 meeting of the Group of 7 (G7) leading industrialised nations in Halifax, Canada.
On 11 March, it was announced that the summit would include Ukraine, in addition to Russia and the G7. The announcement was made by President Chirac's office in Paris. By virtue of France being the host State for the next G7 summit - in Lyons in June - President Chirac is due to co-Chair the summit with President Yeltsin. The addition of Ukraine, according to the French statement, was warranted by "the importance to [it] of the themes of the summit". April will also see the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine. There had been suggestions that Russia was unhappy about letting Ukraine, and also Belarus (affected even more calamitously by Chernobyl), attend the whole summit. [Editor's note: as of 15 March, there appeared to be no reports of a general invitation having been issued to Belarus.]
The invitation comes at a time of renewed tension in the arms control relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Relations had generally been improving due to the convergent antipathies of both States to the proposed eastwards expansion of NATO. However, Ukraine is unhappy about the help it is, or is not, being given to meet its denuclearisation commitments under the Lisbon Protocol (1992) to the START I Treaty. This unhappiness came to the fore on 21 February when President Leonid Kuchma, visiting Washington, told reporters he had lodged an official complaint to the US about alleged Russian non-compliance with agreements aimed at speeding up implementation of the Protocol. According to the President:
"We have voluntarily given up our weapons and we were supposed to be repaid with the fuel which could be sufficient for running our atomic power plants for seven years, but Russia doesn't repay us for this..."
US Defense Secretary Perry responded sympathetically:
"Ukraine made the greatest decision of the three countries in its decision to go non-nuclear but both the United States and Russia have important responsibilities to provide support to Ukraine to fulfil that commitment."
There are reports, said to emanate from Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom), of a difference of emphasis between Russia and the G7 on the agenda for the April summit. Russia is said to hope to focus on issues of nuclear safety (weapons and reactor design, preventing nuclear accidents, etc), with the G7 pushing for a focus on nuclear security (accounting and securing fissile material stocks). There is a clear determination on both 'sides', however, to avoid any public dissension at the summit. In the words of one MinAtom official: "the idea is to keep the meeting technical, general, and free of major disputes".
On 15 March, Brazil's President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, made clear Brazil still does not intend to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), perceiving such membership as a hindrance to the development of a civil nuclear programme. Speaking in Tokyo, President Cardoso explained:
"Brazil's reservations about signing the treaty are purely technical. The pact, in a sense, forbids development of nuclear technology and makes it impossible to get access to technology for peaceful purposes..."
Brazil is one of only five States outside the NPT. The others are Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan.
Following its election on 2 March, Australia's Liberal-National Party has moved to relax long-standing Labour controls on the export of uranium. Speaking on 15 March, Resources Minister Warwick Parer said Australia should take advantage of more markets, particularly in Asia:
If a nuclear power plant is built in Indonesia, or Japan, or Korea - and the Koreans are heading towards 50 per cent nuclear dependency - they will require uranium... If we don't take advantage of that it will mean that our competitors like Canada will take advantage of it. It doesn't make sense that Australia sits on 30 per cent of the world's resources and gets 10 per cent of the market while Canada has 10 per cent of the reserves and gets 30 per cent of the market..."
In February, Indonesia announced plans to start operating nuclear reactors within the next three years. The first reactor, predicted to cost around $2 billion, has been designated a controversial site - at Mount Muria, in an earthquake region of central Java. Parer said Australia would look carefully at the plans for the site, but predicted such examination would only bring reassurance:
"We would have to carefully look and make sure that Indonesia had put in place the proper safeguards... It's up to them to go ahead and make that decision: one, whether to build it, and two, the location of it in a safe area... There's no way in the world the Indonesians are going to build something which is going to put primarily at risk their own population, which is a very big population."
The new government is also committed to opening new uranium mines. Two are currently in operation, with three more now planned.
On 26 February, European Union (EU) Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels, agreed to approve a $6.3 (5 million ECUs) contribution to the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Corporation (KEDO) - the organisation now preparing to provide North Korea with new, light-water reactors. The contribution was formally announced at the 1 March ASEM (Asia-Europe Summit) in Thailand.
The EU announcement was reportedly delayed by France seeking to extract a commitment from KEDO on establishing an EU seat on its Executive Board, currently dominated by officials from the US, South Korea and Japan. Apparently, no such commitment was given, but KEDO has been given to understand that no further contributions will be forthcoming until it is agreed to put such an arrangement in place. There were also reports that France wanted a commitment by North Korea to buy European nuclear technology.
In Seoul on 11 March, the Executive Director of KEDO, Paul Cleveland - taking over from Stephen Bosworth - met South Korea's Foreign Minister Gong Ro-Myung to discuss implementation of the accord, under whose terms - sketched out in an October 1994 Framework Agreement and filled in by a supplementary December 1995 agreement - US-origin reactors of a type standard in South Korea are to be constructed at Shinpo on the Northeast coast of North Korea. The meeting was held in advance of a full KEDO meeting at its New York headquarters on 18 March (see next issue). Reportedly, a meeting between KEDO and North Korea was also being planned, with the venue being contested between Shinpo, New York and Beijing.
Editor's note: during Congressional testimony on 19 March, the US official in charge of policy towards North Korea, Ambassador Winston Lord, gave the following summary of the completed and planned work of KEDO. Extracts follow.
"The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was founded one year ago by the US, Japan and the ROK to implement portions of the Agreed Framework, including the light water reactor project and the provision to the DPRK of interim energy supplies in the form of heavy fuel oil. KEDO, under the leadership of Executive Director Stephen Bosworth, is moving ahead purposefully to accomplish these tasks. After Ambassador Bob Gallucci was appointed the President's Special Advisor on Bosnia, Ambassador Paul Cleveland was appointed to serve as the US representative on the KEDO Executive Board. The appointment of such a senior diplomat is another sign of the importance the Administration places on smoothly implementing the Agreed Framework.
On December 15, 1995, KEDO and the DPRK concluded an agreement for the supply of proliferation-resistant light water nuclear reactors to North Korea. The supply agreement follows up on the joint statement negotiated with the North Koreans by my deputy Tom Hubbard last summer in Kuala Lumpur, which makes clear that North Korea will receive South Korean standard model reactors, and that South Korea will play a central role in all aspects of the LWR project. It was this December agreement that triggered the North Korean commitment under the terms of the Agreed Framework to allow the IAEA to resume inspections on declared nuclear sites not subject to the freeze.
KEDO is now preparing for negotiations with the Korean Electric Power company (KEPCO), the South Korean firm with which it plans to conclude the prime contract for the LWR project. In the meantime, KEDO has already conducted four site survey visits to the proposed site in North Korea where the reactors will be built. A fifth KEDO team will travel to the DPRK in the near future to complete the evaluation, leading to a formal designation by KEDO within the next few months of the construction site. South Korean nationals have been included in each of the KEDO delegations, marking a modest step forward in North-South contacts. Contrary to rumors that were circulating...last fall...South Korean members of the KEDO site survey teams have received the same treatment as the members from the US and Japan.
KEDO will soon begin negotiations with the DPRK on a series of implementing protocols to supplement December's LWR supply agreement. KEDO is also supplying the DPRK with 500,000 tons per year of heavy fuel oil, as stipulated in the Agreed Framework. These shipments replace the electric power potential the DPRK lost by freezing its nuclear program, and will continue until the first LWR goes on line. The DPRK has accepted our proposed method for verifying that this heavy oil is not diverted for uses other than those stipulated in the Agreed Framework.
Financing our commitments under the Agreed Framework is an important priority and a major focus of our work. The Administration has requested a very modest sum considering the importance to US security interests of implementing the Agreed Framework. The President will soon convey to the Congress a 614 waiver and Congressional certification package, as required by law so that we may use the money appropriated by Congress for KEDO projects in FY 1996. I hope the Congress will conclude its review of this matter as quickly as possible so that KEDO will continue to be able to meet its commitment to provide heavy oil to the DPRK. Japan has recently agreed to provide $19 million to help KEDO finance the purchase of heavy oil. Japan did this in anticipation that the US would soon be in a position to play its own, necessary role in financing this part of the project.
We are also working with our South Korean and Japanese allies to secure new members and new contributions for KEDO. KEDO is gaining increasing international support, with ten countries having joined or indicated their intention to join. Some twenty countries have contributed financially or plan to contribute. Most recently, the European Union has decided to make an initial contribution of $6.3 million for KEDO, while France and Germany will also make national contributions of $2 million and $1 million respectively."
Two teams inspectors arrived in Baghdad on 24 February as part of the exhaustive investigation by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) into Iraq's alleged programmes to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One, headed by Cees Wolterbeek of the Netherlands, continued the Commission's investigations into Iraq's chemical weapons programme; the other, headed by American Richard Spertzel, continued to investigate the biological weapons programme.
On 1 March, the Spertzel team left Iraq. On 3 March, Spertzel, speaking in Manama, said that in his view "a full, final and complete declaration is clearly a long way off". For instance, destruction of stocks of biological weapons' agents, such as botulinal toxin and aflatoxin, had still to take place, and "unless they are destroyed, there can be no final declaration". Spertzel added:
"The documents provided by Iraq assert that all ammunition filled with agents have been destroyed. However, these have to be verified...and the biological team must be absolutely satisfied that Iraq does not have the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction. Right now we are not confident of making such a remark..."
The day before, the Arab newspaper Al-Hayat had reported the Chair of UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus, as claiming that the Commission was now in possession of all the information it needed with respect to weapons and technologies "imported or produced by Iraq" but added "we don't know what has been destroyed". Ekeus referred to the recent (December 1995) seizure by Jordan of missile guidance systems making their way into Iraq from Russia. The systems were discovered, Ekeus said, "in the Tigris river". Gyroscopes were reportedly also discovered in the Tigris by UNSCOM officials. In the Chair's opinion:
"The affair is particularly important because it shows Iraq still has the resources to buy banned products."
Ekeus added that his next report to the UN Security Council, due in April, would contain "very important explanations" concerning the finds.
On 7 March, UNSCOM Deputy Chair, Charles Duelfer of the US, arrived in Baghdad voicing customarily grave concerns:
"We are looking for information which can be substantiated, which can be documented. We believe there are documents still in Iraq which help us certify that we have accounted for weapons...
In the chemical and biological areas, we want to be sure the produced agents are accounted for. We also have to be able to assure that the munitions have been accounted for.
In the missile area there are some production areas [which] need further examination and [which] we still think we are not quite sure we [have] accounted for...
We are receiving now new documents from Iraq. We have to evaluate those and to see to what extent there [are] supporting documents associated with these declarations..."
Duelfer was able to come back to the press as soon as the next day with some startling revelations:
"We have obtained five footlockers full of documents which we believe our relevant to our work."
The documents, Duelfer said, had been unearthed by the Wolterbeek team from the ruins of the Muthana chemical weapons production site, 90 miles north of Baghdad. As Duelfer explained: "In essence the [Wolterbeek] mission was to excavate buildings at [the] Muthana State Establishment that had been bombed and virtually flattened during the war... We have uncovered at least 3,000 pages of documents related to the programme as well as computer discs and a lot of ammunition." Although the find was so recent, and the documentation in some disrepair ("a lot of chewing has been conducted by rodents," as Duelfer put it), the Deputy Chair was already able to disclose that a number of the recovered papers "describe programmes in which we are interested, and some of them describe the methods the Iraqis had used to conceal information, to hide information, and that is very important... [Other documents give] information on what happened during the last year before the coalition forces started their bombing campaign. ... We take all the leads we can get."
In the assessment of team leader Wolterbeek:
" We have to investigate whether the munitions are prototypes or anything new... I'm personally convinced there's more information to be discovered."
Less revealing was the search of the Irrigation Ministry in Baghdad on 9-10 March, which uncovered, in Duelfer's words, "nothing related to prohibited programmes". The search of the Ministry had been dramatically held up on 8-9 March when Iraqi officials refused entry to a team of inspectors led by Nikita Smidovich of Russia. The inspectors, numbered around 40, set up 'camp' outside the Ministry for 18 hours before 25 inspectors were admitted, conducting a seven hour search some suspected may have been rendered pointless by the prior removal of documents. Duelfer did little to quash this suspicion when he stated (10 March):
"It is possible our information was wrong... I cannot say with certainty there was evidence of moving or concealing information prior to our arrival."
On 9 March, during the stand-off, Duelfer had lamented:
"Basically the inspection has been compromised. Twelve hours have gone by... People are flowing into the building and we have no control over what would happen inside the building to materials or documents..."
The Security Council met twice during the mini-crisis to voice its concern and demand that Iraq permit the inspection. According to Council President Ambassador Legwaila J. Legwaila of Botswana, on 9 March:
"[The Council] is unanimous in demanding that Iraq allow access to the inspectors because there is no building insofar as the resolutions of the Security Council are concerned which is beyond inspection..."
After the Security Council meeting, Iraq's Oil Minister, Amir Muhammed Rasheed, negotiating with the UN on the emergency sale of Iraqi oil to buy humanitarian supplies, insisted that "there is absolutely nothing, neither in this building of the Ministry of Irrigation nor any other building, in Iraq which comes in contradiction with the Security Council Resolution 687". Resolution 687 instructs Iraq to cease and destroy its missiles and weapons of mass destruction programmes.
The Ministry stand-off was immediately followed by another, at a facility, believed to be a training camp for the Presidential Guard, in Sarabadi, 35 miles southeast of Baghdad on 11 March. Sarabadi is within a few miles of what is considered by UNSCOM to be Iraq's main biological weapons centre at Salman Park. On this occasion, thirteen inspectors were kept waiting for around twelve hours. According to Iraq's Ambassador to the UN, Nizar Hamdoon, speaking on 12 March, the problems were being caused by spot, i.e. unannounced, inspections which abrogated a "gentleman's agreement" between the two sides that advance warning would be given of any investigation of sites "sensitive to the State".
The same day, Charles Duelfer defended UNSCOM's actions, insisting that "surprise inspections are a requirement. There are no sanctuaries, no exceptions..."
Also speaking on 12 March, Rolf Ekeus defiantly complained:
"We are very concerned that these incidents could form part of a pattern... The mission will continue. We are serious about that... I hope this is the last event of its kind. I hope we won't see a pattern of delays, because this would undermine our work..."
Ekeus added that, despite these problems, UNSCOM's work to date meant that Iraq's WMD "capability is limited. I don't think they have the capacity to acquire such weapons as long as the international controlling machine is in place".
Inbetween the two stand-offs, Mr Duelfer received (11 March) a renewed pledge of cooperation from Iraq:
"We discussed the [Ministry] incident in great detail. The result is a commitment on the part of Iraq to continue cooperation with the Commission and the UN..."
Editor's note: during Congressional testimony on 20 March, a senior IAEA official, David Kay, outlined the currently understood scope of Iraq's WMD programmes ('Iraq and Beyond - Understanding the Threat of Weapons Proliferation', prepared statement before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations). Extracts follow:
"With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat, a broad consensus seems to be forming that US foreign and defense policies and budgets can now be premised on the absence of any major threat to the United States or its allies and on such timely detection of any newly developing threat that defensive measures can be deferred until after a threat emerges. The case of Iraq should offer a warning against too much optimism.
The failed efforts of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspectors and national intelligence authorities to detect prior to the Persian Gulf War a nuclear weapons program of the magnitude and advanced character of Iraq's should stand as a monument to the fallibility of on-site inspections and national intelligence when faced by a determined opponent. The Iraqi military buildup, as well as the multiple failures of its timely detection, is an experience rich in lessons that, if correctly understood, may help in detecting other covert weapons programs and, equally important, US understanding of the limits of its ability to guarantee timely detection.
During the inspections in Iraq after the Gulf War, an immense military production establishment was found that was producing or striving to produce a broad range of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and missiles capable of delivering them. The nuclear program alone involved investments amounting to around $10 billion. Inspectors and those who monitor proliferation were surprised by the magnitude and advanced state of Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear explosive devices. At the time of the Gulf War Iraq was probably less than a year away from its first crude nuclear device and no more than three to four years away from more advanced, deliverable weapons. Moreover, the amount of foreign assistance and technology that fuelled the Iraqi arms program was truly staggering.
We now know because of the dogged determination of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM)...a great deal about the extent of the Iraqi efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These efforts included:
The nuclear program had for ten years before the war involved a large clandestine effort - approximately $8-10 billion, more than 20 sites and more than 15,000 people pursuing multiple routes to enrich uranium, directed toward producing nuclear weapons. Of the 25 major nuclear facilities now identified in pre-Gulf War Iraq, only six were known at the time the War broke out. Foreign assistance, both technical and equipment, from Western-based companies and the lax export control regimes operated by several of our Western allies played a major role in this program. Beginning in 1987 the Iraqis had also embarked on a testing program to field radiological weapons which would have had as their sole purpose rendering large areas uninhabitable and terrorizing civilian populations. Soon after their invasion of Kuwait. Iraq embarked on a crash program to strip the uranium out of the fuel in their safeguarded research reactor and further enrich it at a secret centrifuge facility. The aim of this crash effort was to produce a single nuclear device by April 1991.
The biological weapons program was of astounding scope, including the production of thousands of liters of botulism toxin and of anthrax and smaller amounts of a number of less well understood, but still deadly, agents. At the time of the Gulf War biological agents had been weaponized, and missiles. artillery shells and aircraft - Iraq now says 191 warheads and an aerial spraying system designed to spray 2000 liters of agent over a target - stood ready to rain their deadly payloads onto civilian and military targets. At least two of Iraq's major biological weapons facilities were unknown at the time of the Gulf War.
The chemical program had not only produced hundreds of thousands of gallons of lethal mustard and nerve agents, but chemical weapons had also been used by the Iraqi regime on its own people as well as against Iran. The Iraqi Army at the time of the Gulf War - and still today - had more combat experience in employing chemical weapons than all the combined armies of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Iraq's missile program is perhaps better known, if not better understood, as a result of the dramatic television footage of Scud attacks during the Gulf War. This well funded, and foreign assisted program had already given Iraq the ability to attack, ultimately with its weapons of mass destruction, all of the States of the Middle East and of US forces that might come to the aid of these States.
Finally, it should now be clear to all that the Iraqi efforts to acquire these weapons did not end with the Gulf War. Just in the last several months new evidence has come to light that Iraq is continuing to secretly, and in violation of its obligation under Resolution 687, continuing to import equipment to extend the range of a new class of Scud-type missiles, produce additional chemical and biological weapons, and continue work on nuclear weapons- related projects. ..."
On 25 February, a report in the New York Times reported the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), former Deputy Defense Secretary John Deutch, claiming that Libya is currently preparing what will be "the world's largest underground chemical weapons plant". The plant, which Mr Deutch said his Agency expected to become operational in 1997 or 1998, is situated in a mountain site 40 miles (64 kilometres) southeast of Tripoli. The claim is also made that the site currently holds around 100 tons of chemical weapons.
On 26 February, Libya's Embassy in Egypt issued the following denial of the report:
"The stories spread by American media about a chemical weapons factory in Libya are completely unfounded. This is part of a malicious media campaign conducted by certain American circles to drag down Libya and make false accusations against the country. ... Those who are conducting this campaign should concentrate instead on Israel's nuclear arsenal, which threatens all Arab countries. Libya has always supported all regional and international initiatives aimed at making the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons."
Libya is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but not yet of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Editor's note: on 19 March, Brazil became the 49th State to ratify the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which will entry into force following the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification. Brazil's ratification, according to a statement issued by the Convention's preparatory commission based in The Hague, "has a special meaning due to the size of the country's chemical industry" (Brazil ratifies chemical arm ban, Agence France-Presse International News, 19 March). The full list of States to have ratified, with date of ratification in brackets, follows:
According to the Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin No. 31 (March 1996), 15 States are expected to ratify imminently: Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Gabon, Hungary, India, Latvia, Mali, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom. This would bring the total number of ratifications to 64, perhaps leaving the door open for entry into force to be secured by the ratifications of Russia and the United States.
On 11 March, the Dutch Defence Minister, Joris Voorhoeve, announced that the army was to stop being equipped with anti- personnel mines and would destroy its current stock of 180,000 mines. The destruction of stocks would take place, it was reported, in a joint operation with the Belgian army, though it was not clear how many Belgian mines would be destroyed.