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A monthly digest of news and documents edited by Sean Howard. Credits
The two Opinion Pieces in October's issue endorse the goal of deep, leading to complete, nuclear disarmament. Professor Michael MccGwire examines the argument that movement towards a Nuclear- Weapon-Free World (NWFW) would hold great dangers in a profoundly unpeaceful world. He contends boldly: "The elimination of nuclear weapons is a 'good' in its own right. The aim of a NWFW is not to eliminate war, to achieve comprehensive disarmament, to resolve regional conflicts, or to enhance regional security." However, MccGwire believes that a more peaceful world would result from concerted movement towards zero.
Mike Moore, Editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, mounts a spirited but qualified defence of the stance taken by India over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). "At its core," Moore argues, "India made a principled point: there is precious little hard evidence that the nuclear powers are serious about nuclear disarmament." The most effective response, in Moore's opinion, is for those powers to get serious.
In Guest Analysis, Michael Hamel-Green, an analyst from Victoria University in Australia, assesses the past and potential impact of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs). He concludes by contending that "new patterns of multiform proliferation across a range of weapon categories...suggest that zonal approaches need to take account of all weapons of mass destruction from the very outset - that is, become Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zones."
Documents and Sources includes the 'Ottawa Declaration' in support of a total landmines ban, signed by 50 States; background material to the 1996 session of the UN First Committee; the US Defense Secretary's address to the Russian Duma; a plea for complete nuclear disarmament from former commander of US nuclear forces, General Lee Butler; and statements and briefings concerning the US- China arms control relationship, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the state-of-play in the struggle to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
News Review also covers many of these developments, as well as providing its usual update on events, deeply troubling in both cases, in North Korea and Iraq.
Moldering away on my bookshelves is a century-old edition of Encylopaedia Britannica, once the official voice of the Imperial World. Volume XII, redolent of ethnocentrism, racialism and decades of absorbed cigar smoke, devotes 82 small-type pages to India, then the jewel in the British crown. At one point, the anonymous authors declare: "At no period of its history has India been an altogether unenlightened country." Marvelous. That sentence - so gentle and genteel, so inoffensive to the Western ear - may help explain Western annoyance over the role India played this year regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Many influential Westerners have long regarded India as a faraway land of strange and exotic customs, incomprehensible religious beliefs, puzzling languages, and a diverse array of ethnically distinct peoples. Indians were bright and educable and reasonably enlightened about many issues, some of them important. But when it came to international affairs of State, they could not be depended upon to get things quite right. A case in point: India's growing opposition to the CTBT earlier this year; its attempt to block the draft CTBT in August; and its "not now, nor later" vote against the CTBT at the UN General Assembly in September. Because of its opposition, India has been widely condemned by Western commentators as a "spoiler." It was said to have "isolated itself" from the world community. Its stand against the CTBT was alleged to have been "not principled." It was accused of having plumbed the depths of inconstancy and hypocrisy.
The amount of condemnatory rhetoric directed toward India might have led one to believe that India, a champion of nuclear disarmament for 40-plus years, had finally come out of the nuclear closet and tested a weapon or two, while announcing that it would spend billions of dollars a year to keep its newly minted nuclear weapons in fine fettle well into the next century.
In fact, that scenario, or at least its second half, would more accurately describe the United States. India, a 'nuclear-capable' nation, has never put together a nuclear arsenal, nor has it stuffed file cabinets full of nuclear war-fighting plans. India earned its disaprobation the old-fashioned way this year: by continuing to press for nuclear disarmament.
Don't get me wrong. I am as joyful as the next person that a CTBT has been finally signed. India probably made a mistake in attacking the CTBT so harshly. And it has surely isolated itself, as demonstrated by the UN treaty vote in which only Bhutan, India's quasi-colony, and Libya, a near-consensus 'rogue' state, stood with India. And yet, in the end, I suspect that India's relentless opposition to the CTBT, just as Grandma used to say about castor oil, will be good for us, no matter how disagreeable it may have seemed at the time.
India's opposition to the treaty had three roots. The first was layered over with either hypocrisy or common sense, depending on one's view of the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. As readers of Disarmament Diplomacy know, India has been a keen supporter of a test ban since 1954, when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a 'standstill' agreement. But once an agreement looked do- able, India's bomb lobby rose up to smite this suddenly urgent threat to national security. India, said the nuclear hawks, was flanked by a powerful nuclear-weapon state, China, and by a sneaky nuclear-weapon state, Pakistan. It must not freeze its still- embryonic weapons program.
That sort of we've-got-to-keep-our-options-open argument, in its infinite variations and permutations, is a familiar one in Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, and presumably Beijing. One can wish that India's bomb lobby had not hauled out that argument. But in doing so, India was surely swimming in the main stream.
India's second objection to the treaty was directed at the entry- into-force provision, which may have been intended as a mischief maker. Earlier in the year, Arundhati Ghose, India's chief delegate to the Geneva Conference, said that India would not sign the CTBT as it was shaping up but (and I paraphrase) it would not block the treaty as long as India was not backed into a corner. That, of course, was precisely what Britain, Russia, and China proceeded to do, in their push for a provision that said that the treaty could not enter into force until all 44 nuclear-capable states that were also members of the Conference on Disarmament had ratifed it.
On the surface, an arrangement that would bring in the nuclear- capable nations seemed reasonable. But in India, it sounded a lot like a get-India conspiracy, a way of coercing a proud and populous state to play the villain's role. Britain, Russia, and China, went a common argument, did not really want a CTBT. By insisting on an entry-into-force provision that would surely offend India, they had devised a condition that might cause the CTBT to eventually crash and burn. If that happened, India would absorb the blame.
India's third objection to the treaty was officially raised last January. The CTBT, said India, was no longer a nuclear-disarmament measure, as Nehru had intended it to be. Rather, the nuclear powers - particularly the United States - had converted it, distorted it, disfigured it into a mere non-proliferation measure.
India repeatedly noted that the negotiating mandate devised by the Conference on Disarmament in January 1994 said the CTBT should be an instrument that "would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security." The CTBT that emerged over the summer, said Ambassador Ghose, "failed the intent of the mandate." It did not concretely commit the nuclear powers to nuclear disarmament; and it did not prevent the nuclear powers from making qualitative improvements to their nuclear arsenals by employing highly advanced computer-aided technology.
The ambassador had a point. The fractured and fractious history of test-ban talks plainly suggests that test-ban partisans generally regarded it as a non-proliferation measure, as well as a step, albeit a halting one, on the road to nuclear disarmament. Otherwise, one is hard pressed to explain why the US nuclear weapons labs consistently and systematically opposed test ban talks over the decades.
Although the nuclear powers committed themselves more than 25 years ago to 'good faith' negotiations leading toward nuclear disarmament under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in spite of the fact that they reaffirmed that commitment in May 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the nuclear powers seem content to retain their nuclear weapons more or less forever.
Even after the United States concluded START II with Russia, it announced in its 1993 'Nuclear Posture Review' that it didn't quite trust the Russians. Things might turn sour; given that, the United States would "hedge" its bets - it would keep enough weapons in the closet so that it could quickly reconstitute its nuclear forces to pre-START II levels. And on 11 August, 1995, in the run-up to the final year of CTBT negotiations, President Bill Clinton announced that his administration had become fully committed to a true zero-yield CTBT - but with certain "safeguards."
Among the safeguards: the weapons labs would be maintained in high states of readiness so that they could continue "programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology"; the nuclear test site would retain the "capability" to resume nuclear tests at any time, "should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty"; and the president would be the sole arbiter as to whether the United States should "cease to be bound." Now that is keeping your options open.
The United States has played a now-you-see-it-now-you-don't shell game with the CTBT. In his 11 August statement, Clinton called the coming test ban "an historic milestone in our efforts to reduce the nuclear threat to build a safer world."
Well and good. But to obtain the support of the weapons labs - and ultimately, to ensure that the treaty would have a chance at ratification in the United States Senate - the president had given his blessing to the various "safeguards," most of which are embodied in the 'Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program.'
One goal of the stewardship program is to keep an aging stockpile in good shape. It is hard to argue with that; it sounds rather like replacing weather-rotted shingles on a house or fouled spark plugs on a motor car. But the program's express intent to spend billions of dollars to maintain a second-to-none design component is as bewildering as it is ominous. It is as if the United States expects the CTBT to be a TTBT - a Temporary Test Ban Treaty. The lads at the labs are looking ahead. They have vision. But it is a vision that gives no comfort to those of us who would like to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Consider the words of C. Paul Robinson, director of Sandia National Laboratories, who testified before a Senate subcommittee in March:
"In my view, we will someday have to replace old weapons with entirely new systems; we cannot extend their service lives indefinitely...
... many of the systems in [the] stockpile will require replacement at about the same time at some point in the first half of the next century. The engineers and scientists who will do that work are probably entering kindergarten this year. No old-timers will be around in 2025 who have had actual experience in designing a warhead. We must find ways to qualify these people. They need to work on real systems. We cannot expect them to acquire critical design skills merely by performing piecemeal component replacement work and development simulations. They have to design whole systems with real deliverables to fully develop their capabilities. . . ."
I could go on, of course. But you probably read Robinson's lengthy remarks in the March 1996 issue of Disarmament Diplomacy. And, too, my meaning is not hard to parse. The nuclear powers like nuclear weapons. They believe that these weapons help promote stability and guarantee the peace, at least among the major powers. That's a reasonable viewpoint shared by many responsible people.
The purpose of this essay is not to challenge that sort of thinking. The recent report by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons does that very well. As does An Evolving US Nuclear Posture, issued by the Henry L. Stimson Center nearly a year ago. As do any number of documents issued by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs over the past 39 years.
In 1970, when the NPT went into force, the world had about 40,000 nuclear weapons, according to estimates by the Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin of the Natural Resources Defense Council. Twenty-five years later - 25 years after the nuclear powers committed themselves in Article VI of the NPT to work toward nuclear disarmament - the world still had about 40,000 nuclear weapons.
That is said to represent major progress. Agreed. According to Norris and Arkin, the numbers peaked in 1986 at about 70,000 weapons. Taking 30,000 or so weapons off line is nothing to sniff at. But the downsizing of arsenals, dramatic and welcome as it has been, has been largely limited to obsolete strategic weapons, and tactical weapons, which almost everyone agrees were born useless.
By early in the next century, the numbers of nuclear weapons will have plunged by many more thousands. But the thousands scheduled to remain in the 'enduring' stockpiles will be modern, potent, and precise. Most of us in the arms control field are greatly cheered by the progress that has been made in the past 10 years. But we should also remember that it is still national policy - in the United States and Russia - to risk destroying the world in an attempt to save it, if things should go terribly wrong.
The Indian campaign against the CTBT this year has been heavy- handed and - perhaps - a little hypocritical. But it has not been wholly unenlightened. At its core, India made a principled point: there is precious little hard evidence that the nuclear powers are serious about nuclear disarmament. But thanks to India, if the nuclear powers truly want the CTBT to enter into force, they will have to quit treating nuclear disarmament as a shell game, and get something done.
Mike Moore is editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
The last two years have seen an extraordinary spread in the areas of the globe covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) aimed at outlawing the acquisition or stationing of nuclear arms within particular regions.
As Felicio Jose, a Brazilian diplomat at the UN, recently noted: "the larger part of the orange is now free of nuclear weapons." Seeking to build on and extend the new zonal developments, Brazil is moving to have this year's UN General Assembly recognise and declare the whole Southern Hemisphere as a NWFZ. The Brazilian UN Mission has compiled impressive statistics in support of its initiative. Almost two-thirds, some 105 out of 185 UN Members (see Appendix) have now joined one or other of four regional NWFZs in Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Taking into account the already established Antarctic Treaty zone, the whole Southern Hemisphere is now almost entirely covered by such zones.
Under the Brazilian plan, the two established NWFZs in the hemisphere - the 1967 Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty and the 1985 South Pacific Rarotonga Treaty - would link up with the new denuclearized zones established last year in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty) and Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty). They would form an ongoing lobby group in international forums to press for universal recognition of the non-nuclear status of the Southern Hemisphere and eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons.
The strategy of establishing regional NWFZs as partial disarmament measures aimed at controlling both horizontal and vertical proliferation originally emerged in the 1950s following the failure of the Baruch Plan and other efforts to achieve global abolition of nuclear weapons. The 1957 Rapacki Plan, put forward by Poland's Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki, for a NWFZ in Central Europe is generally acknowledged as the first such scheme, involving the characteristic elements of nuclear weapon acquisition and stationing, and nuclear-weapon State guarantees of non-use or non-threat of use against zone countries.
The Rapacki Plan was quickly repudiated by the Western Powers on the grounds that Western nuclear weapons were needed to deter what was believed to be the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries - an argument that seems less persuasive following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the removal of Russian troops from Central Europe, and the apparent inferiority of Russian conventional weaponry during the Gulf War.
But if the first European NWFZ proposals became casualties of Cold War doctrines, the NWFZ concept was quickly taken up by a number of Third World and non-aligned groupings. African States from 1960 onwards seized on the idea as a means of stopping French nuclear testing in the Sahara, and later as an effort to constrain the nuclear programme of South Africa's apartheid regime.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis deeply shocked many Latin American governments as they realised how close their region had come to being drawn into a nuclear war. Like the Africans, South Americans turned to the NWFZ concept as a means of insulating their region from Superpower nuclear rivalry and activities. Under the expert guidance of the Mexican diplomat Alfonso Garcia Robles, Latin America became, in 1967, the first region to successfully negotiate a NWFZ covering a populated area (preceded only by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty which demilitarised the whole Antarctic region).
But the combination of Cold War tensions and regional conflicts continued to frustrate government or grassroots efforts to establish NWFZs in other parts of the world. In particular, the Western nuclear powers tended to view such zones as a kind of communist plot designed to hinder the movement of Western nuclear forces while doing nothing to constrain the extensive land-based forces of the major communist powers.
It was not until 1985 that the next regional NWFZ was established - the Rarotonga Treaty covering Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific. Again, the primary motivation behind this zone was governmental and grassroots concern about nuclear-weapon State activities in the region, particularly French nuclear testing in Polynesia.
More recently, as a result of a combination of forces, including the end of Cold War tensions, processes of democratisation in many regions, and the growing importance of regional organizations and security dialogues, many of the conditions that inhibited or blocked the establishment of NWFZs have disappeared.
In South America, the return to civilian governments in the two largest States, Brazil and Argentina, led to increased mutual trust and a new willingness to enter into both bilateral and Tlatelolco NWFZ commitments on preventing nuclear proliferation in the region. The coverage of the Latin American NWFZ is now virtually complete, and all five nuclear-weapon States have entered into binding negative security guarantees to the region.
In Africa, the dismantlement of apartheid and the advent of a democratic government in South Africa removed one of the principal barriers to an African NWFZ, and with full South African participation the Pelindaba Treaty was successfully negotiated and opened for signature by April 1996. The treaty is all the more significant in that several of the Arab States in Northern Africa, including Egypt and Libya, were prepared to join the zone even before a Middle East zone could be put in place. All the nuclear- weapon States have signed, or in the case of Russia agreed to sign, the treaty protocols.
In Southeast Asia, following the closure of US and Russian bases in the region, and the UN-mediated settlement in Cambodia, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) States, led by Indonesia, successfully negotiated a Southeast Asian NWFZ in December 1995. Remarkably, all the regional States, including non- members of ASEAN, have already signed the treaty. On the other hand, the five nuclear-weapon States have withheld support on the grounds that the current treaty text and drat protocols extend the zone to the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone boundary rather than being confined to land territory and territorial waters, as is mainly the case in the other zones.
If much of the globe, particularly the Southern Hemisphere, has been effectively denuclearised, what hope is there of any of the Northern regional groupings following suit?
The Middle East
In the Middle East, the UN General Assembly, and a 1992 UN Secretary-General's study, have strongly supported the establishment of a NWFZ. Since 1980, there has been in-principle consensus among all UN Members, including Israel, on the desirability of establishing such a zone. Israel itself has agreed on negotiations on the concept once peace settlements have been achieved with all its Arab neighbours. A complicating factor is Israel's concern that, even if it relinquished its nuclear capability, it would still be at the mercy of chemical and biological weapons. This problem is by no means insuperable: not only are there increasing pressures on all regional States to join and comply with global conventions on such weapons, but a recent innovative UNIDIR study has shown the feasibility of adapting the Middle East NWFZ concept to include all weapons of mass destruction (making the aim a Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone, or WMDFZ) and to introduce it in a gradual, phased way, so that the security of all parties is maintained throughout the whole process (1).
On Israel's eastern flank, the main concern since the elimination of Iraq's nuclear capability has been Iran. However, a promising recent development has been the establishment of a Central Asian regional organization, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Central Asia. The newly independent State of Kazakstan has already called for the establishment of a Central Asian NWFZ , and regional members of the body, including Iran, have been actively considering the proposal. Iran itself has prepared discussion papers on the issue, and has indicated its willingness to consider joining such arrangements, regardless of whether a Middle East NWFZ has been established. If this were to occur, Israel and Western nuclear powers, who have been inclined to portray Iran as a potentially dangerous 'nuclear rogue State', may find themselves running short of both credible nuclear adversaries and convenient rationales for retaining their own nuclear weapons.
This is, of course, the process that Robles, the Nobel Peace Prize- winning architect of the Tlatelolco Treaty, originally had in mind: that NWFZs would gradually shrink the zone of application of nuclear weapons and finally erode the very rationale and legitimacy of the weapons held by existing nuclear States.
Central Europe
In Central Europe, as already mentioned, denuclearisation proposals dating from the late 1950s were doomed by NATO Cold War arguments and policies. The current drive to extend NATO to the new democracies in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics), coupled with lingering NATO Cold War concepts of nuclear first-use and maintenance of nuclear deployment rights in all Member States, presents the greatest obstacle to new proposals for establishing a Central European NWFZ. Ukraine and Belarus strongly support the establishment of such a zone. However, eagerness to join NATO may well induce the Central European democracies to pay the 'nuclear membership price' and refuse to enter into regional NWFZ arrangements, thereby setting the stage for a re-emergence of nuclear tensions and confrontation with Russia.
Northeast Asia
In Northeast Asia, some progress was made, at least on paper, in the Korean Peninsular Denuclearisation Agreement, although this appears to have been sidelined by the subsequent US bilateral agreement with North Korea. In the Asia-Pacific region more generally, the development of regional forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) opens up the possibility of further security and confidence-building measures, including zonal approaches.
South Asia
Only in South Asia, where both India and Pakistan seem set on a mutually suicidal course of acquiring substantial nuclear weapon stockpiles, does there appear to be almost no progress on implementing the NWFZ arrangements endorsed annually by the UN General Assembly. India continues to argue that it must consider not only Pakistan but also China, despite its improved relations with China in recent years. However, in the longer term, India is increasingly becoming internationally isolated in its nuclear policies, and may eventually come to decide that the costs of its current nuclear posture outweigh the benefits. Its recent failure to secure an elected seat on the UN Security Council may well be related to its unconstructive efforts to veto the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and block UN Disarmament Commission NWFZ discussions and initiatives.
Zonal approaches to nuclear disarmament have not been without their critics. Some analysts have cautioned that the implementation of such zones could weaken efforts to achieve more universal measures. On the other hand, where universal measures have not achieved full adherence and/or are viewed by some as highly discriminatory, like the Non-Proliferation Treaty, regional NWFZs offer the twin possibilities of overcoming NPT weaknesses and discriminatory effects.
From another standpoint, some Indian critics have tended to interpret NWFZs as a kind of nuclear-weapon State conspiracy to preserve the existing division between the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'. While there is an element of truth in this, in that the existing zones have gone to great lengths to accommodate nuclear-weapon State demands for nuclear weapon transit through the zones (usually rationalised under the rhetoric of 'freedom of the high seas' or 'innocent passage') in return for negative security guarantees, it may also be argued that NWFZs have successfully curtailed key nuclear-weapon State activities in particular regions, particularly the stationing and testing of nuclear weapons.
Further, regardless of the interests of the nuclear powers, regional groupings have found it in their own interests to establish such zones. In South America, for example, the Tlatelolco Treaty not only serves to discourage external nuclear intrusions, as occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also to reduce costly and mutually destructive nuclear rivalry such as occurred between Argentina and Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s. In Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, the Bangkok and Rarotonga NWFZ treaties will help discourage potential nuclear rivalry between Indonesia and Australia, the two most nuclear-capable countries in the region. In Africa, the Pelindaba Treaty will not only prevent an emergence or re-emergence of nuclear weaponry in such nuclear-capable States as South Africa or Egypt, but also serve as a confidence-building measure to facilitate a Middle East NWFZ, or WMDFZ, that would be very much in the interest of North African Arab States.
Historically, the four existing NWFZs have provided an avenue for asserting regional sovereignty on issues of disarmament and denuclearisation in a period when the great powers, particularly America and Russia, sought to dominate and monopolize the whole arms control and disarmament process. The current Brazilian initiative indicates that NWFZs have further potential as an organizational base for non-nuclear-weapon States to coordinate efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world.
NWFZs have also paved the way for other regional arms control measures. In Latin America, for example, regional forums are currently considering measures to control or outlaw landmines, and agreements on acquisition of advanced conventional weaponry.
These positive benefits and confidence-building outcomes of zonal approaches to denuclearisation should not be interpreted as implying that NWFZs are a substitute for more universal and global measures to eliminate nuclear and other threats of mass destruction. As the former New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, once observed, a NWFZ is rather the first step on a ladder of disarmament initiatives that countries should take - a step that may be taken with or without the initial support of the nuclear powers (although their final assent is obviously a crucial goal of the zonal approach).
Further, the original concept of NWFZs as developed and implemented in the Cold War era is long overdue for review, reassessment and revision in the context of technological and political changes in the post-Cold War era. In particular, new patterns of multiform proliferation across a range of weapon categories, including chemical, biological, fuel-air explosive and missile delivery systems as well as nuclear weapons, suggest that zonal approaches need to take account of all weapons of mass destruction from the very outset - that is, become Weapons-of-Mass- Destruction-Free Zones - or be negotiated with an agenda of follow- on agreements covering all weapons of mass destruction.
Further steps might be a new UN comprehensive study of NWFZs and WMDFZs that updates and extends the original 1975 UN NWFZ study, together with UN-sponsored NWFZ or WMDFZ studies on specific regions, such as Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, and Northeast Asia. Such studies could take account of the new international environment and feed ideas, proposals and recommendations into the proposed UN 4th Special Session on Disarmament.
Notes and references
1. Jan Prawitz & James Leonard, A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Middle East, United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, UNIDIR/96/24, Geneva, UN Publication Sales
No. GV.E.96.0.19, 1996.
Latin America: Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) - 33 Members
Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela
South Pacific: Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) - 12 Members
Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati,, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanautu
Southeast Asia: Treaty of Bangkok (1995) - 10 Members
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam
Africa: Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) - 49 Members
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cote
d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Source: Brazilian Mission to the UN, New York, 1996.
Michael Hamel-Green is an Associate Professor at the Social & Cultural Studies Department, Victoria University of Technology in Australia.
The Ottawa Conference, called for and hosted by the Canadian Government, was attended by around 70 States. 50 States signed the following declaration. See News Review for background and details.
Full text
"Following consultations with relevant international agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, the States represented at the Ottawa Conference, the 'Ottawa Group,' have agreed to enhance cooperation and coordination of efforts on the basis of the following concerns and goals with respect to anti-personnel mines:
1. a recognition that the extreme humanitarian and socio-economic costs associated with the use of anti-personnel mines requires urgent action on the part of the international community to ban and eliminate this type of weapon.
2. a conviction that until such a ban is achieved, States must work to encourage universal adherence to the prohibitions on anti- personnel mines as contained in the amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
3. an affirmation of the need to convince mine-affected States to halt all new deployments of anti-personnel mines to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of mine-clearance operations.
4. a recognition that the international community must provide significantly greater resources to mine-awareness programs, mine- clearance operations and victim assistance.
5. a commitment to work together to ensure:
* the earliest possible conclusion of a legally-binding international agreement to ban anti-personnel mines;
* progressive reductions in new deployments of anti-personnel mines with the urgent objective of halting all new deployments of anti-personnel mines;
* support for an UNGA 51 resolution calling upon Member States, inter alia, to implement national moratoria, bans or other restrictions, particularly on the operational use and transfer of anti-personnel mines at the earliest possible date;
* a follow-on Conference hosted by Belgium in June 1997 to review the progress of the international community in achieving a global ban on anti-personnel mines."
Source: Arms Trade News, October 1996.
Extracts
"Allocation of items to the First Committee
1. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 60) .
2. Reduction of military budgets (item 61) :
(a) Reduction of military budgets;
(b) Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures.
3. Question of Antarctica (item 62).
4. The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (item 63).
5. The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields (item 64).
6. Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (item 65).
7. Implementation of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (item 66).
8. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (item 67).
9. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia (item 68).
10. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (item 69).
11. Prevention of an arms race in outer space (item 70).
12. General and complete disarmament (item 71):
(The General Assembly decided that the relevant paragraphs of the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/51/307), which is to be considered directly in plenary meeting under item 14, should be drawn to the attention of the First Committee in connection with its consideration of item 71.)
(a) Notification of nuclear tests;
(b) Transparency in armaments;
(c) Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes;
(d) Convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament;
(e) Relationship between disarmament and development;
(f) Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms;
(g) Regional disarmament;
(h) Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;
(i) Nuclear disarmament;
(j) Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects;
(k) Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;
13. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly (item 72):
(a) United Nations Disarmament Information Programme;
(b) United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services;
(c) Regional confidence-building measures;
(d) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(e) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons.
14. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session (item 73):
(a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
(b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
(c) Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters;
(d) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;
(e) Confidence-building measures.
15. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (item 74).
16. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (item 75).
17. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (item 76).
18. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (item 77).
19. Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (item 78).
20. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (item 79).
21. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (item 80).
22. Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (item 81)."
Extracts
"The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) meets on 14 October to begin its general debate on a wide range of disarmament items. During the current session, it is expected to address such issues as nuclear and conventional disarmament, control of fissile materials for weapons purposes, the problem of landmines, and international traffic in small arms.
The Committee's work begins this year against the background of the General Assembly's adoption, on 10 September, of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), aimed at ending more than five decades of nuclear-test explosions. Citing the action as an historic event, the Secretary-General has pointed to it as a sign of the international political consensus in favour of permanently ending nuclear-weapon testing.
'The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty marks over a quarter of a century of concerted effort by the international community', the Secretary-General says in his annual report on the work of the Organization. 'It has powerful symbolic value for concrete commitment by both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States towards achieving the ultimate goal of a totally denuclearized world.'
Primary responsibility for fulfilling the Treaty's goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation rests with the nuclear- weapon States, the Secretary-General says in his report (document A/51/1). He calls on those Powers to pursue further negotiations towards achievement of a nuclear-weapon free world by further reducing their arsenals and their reliance on such weapons for security. ...
'The race for nuclear arms is clearly in a downward spiral', the Secretary-General says in his annual report.
'Nevertheless, stockpiles containing thousands of nuclear weapons still exist. In addition, vast stocks of weapons-grade fissile material still pose great risks to the world's people and environment.' An agreement this year among the leading Powers to better control, manage and secure the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material was a step in the right direction, he says.
Also imminent as the Committee begins its work is the expected entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention). Opened for signature in January 1993, it is now one short of the 65 signatures needed to enter into force - an event which the Secretary-General, in his report, describes as 'overdue'.
The Committee will also be considering efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In his annual report, the Secretary-General says there has been an upsurge in innovative approaches to the problem of such 'micro-disarmament'. He describes such weapons, including landmines, as today's instruments of choice in conflicts within States, as well as in civil strife, insurgencies and rebellions.
The problem of concealed minefields, which continue to pose a lethal threat to civilian populations, will also come under review. In his annual report, the Secretary-General expresses disappointment at the results of the Review Conference of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), which fell short of establishing conditions for a total ban.
Nevertheless, the convening of the Review Conference in September 1995 did generate a flurry of unilateral, regional and global activity, he states in a report on anti-personnel landmines (document A/51/313). As of 28 June 1996, 54 States had declared their support for a global ban, while many had declared unilateral moratoriums on the production, export and use of such weapons. Calls for a total ban were also issued by a number of regional bodies. Further, the Review Conference was followed by an international conference last month in Ottawa, intended as a strategy session on measures to facilitate a total ban.
The Secretary-General also draws attention to the adoption, by the Review Conference, of a Protocol banning the use and transfer of antipersonnel blinding laser weapons. 'To its credit, the new instrument has outlawed a weapon before its deployment' , he says.
In view of the increasingly destabilizing effects of conventional arms, the Committee will again focus on promoting transparency in arms transfers. To that end, it will examine ways to achieve full participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Established in 1992, the Register contains information on the transfer of major weapons systems - including battle tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery systems, attack helicopters, combat aircraft, warships, missiles and launchers - and their most important suppliers and recipients.
The Committee will also resume its consideration of the proposal to convene a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. A decision on the timing and format of such a session is still pending.
The Committee will have before it the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament (document A/51/27), which concluded its 1996 session two days after the General Assembly's adoption of the CTBT. The text adopted by the Assembly was identical to the version on which the Conference had been unable to reach consensus. In addition to its work on the CTBT, the Conference continued its consideration of such issues as security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, preventing an arms race in outer space, and transparency in armaments. ...
In his report on the 1996 session of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (document A/51/352), the Secretary-General highlights four issues that were of particular concern to the Board: the CTBT; the strengthened review process for the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT); micro-disarmament and antipersonnel landmines; and the proposed fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.
... With respect to the proposed special session on disarmament, some members of the Board expressed concern that it would involve an unproductive attempt to revise the Final Document of the first special session. Many members felt a fourth session could aim at stepping into the next millennium by focusing more broadly on security, peace and disarmament. Nevertheless, it was considered premature for the Board to advise on the appropriate time for convening the session, which should be determined within the preparatory process. Members generally agreed that the session should address both nuclear and conventional disarmament.
... While welcoming the adoption of revised Protocol II on anti- personnel landmines by the parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, members shared the Secretary-General's distress that they had been unable to agree on a total ban. The Board encouraged him to use the Convention's annual review process to promote such a ban.
The Committee will have before it the annual report of the Disarmament Commission (document A/51/42). During its 1996 session, the Commission adopted a set of draft guidelines for international arms transfers, focusing primarily on the question of illicit trafficking. The guidelines are designed to provide and promote the implementation of a set of principles for the conduct of States in the realm of micro-disarmament. They also offer proposals aimed at promoting self-restraint, without affecting the legitimate right of States to self-defence.
The Commission also addressed issues relating to the proposed special session on disarmament. It proved unable to reach consensus on whether to discuss the question of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. ...
'Regional efforts have borne fruit during the past year', the Secretary-General told the Advisory Board on 1 July. 'My own continent of Africa is now a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The nations of South-East Asia have reached a similar agreement. The entire hemisphere of the South is now nuclear-weapon free. There is increased hope that these positive examples will encourage other regions to follow suit - I speak especially of the Middle East - in order to reach a nuclear free world.' ...
In a report on establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (document A/51/286), the Secretary-General urges all concerned parties to tackle the matter with renewed determination. The resumption of discussions would help build confidence and facilitate the peace process. It was regrettable that the views of the main parties in the region had not evolved, particularly with respect to the sequence of events to establish such a zone. He also expresses concern at the apparent impasse within the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, established in the framework of the Middle East peace process. ..."
Extracts
"It is a great pleasure for me to address the First Committee so soon after the successful adoption and signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Speaker after speaker in the General Assembly over the last three weeks defined the Treaty as a landmark, as an important step towards complete nuclear disarmament. The Test-Ban Treaty adds to the 'stockpile' of political and legal instruments which can help us to ward off the threat of nuclear self-destruction that has been hanging over our heads for more than 50 years. ...
On behalf of today's children and tomorrow's generations, I commend the work of the many men and women in public and private life who prepared the ground for this historic achievement. The political and technical work of the Conference on Disarmament, which led to the complex draft text of the Treaty and its detailed verification protocols, was a major accomplishment. The fact that the draft enjoyed the international community's overwhelming support is a tribute to the unique capacity of the Conference. How else could such a complex, multilateral disarmament treaty attract 123 signatures and one ratification in such a short time? How else could such sophisticated arrangements for verifying compliance with the Treaty's provisions have been developed? ...
From the very start of the negotiations, the main objective of many non-nuclear-weapon States was to build into the architecture of the Treaty a renewed commitment by all States, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to a progressive and more systematic process leading to complete nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of the Test-Ban Treaty has increased the momentum towards nuclear disarmament.
Great expectations have been stirred that international security and stability can be assured at the same time that movement towards nuclear disarmament can be quickened. The race to nuclear disengagement and disarmament should become as relentless as was the nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Now, in the closing years of the twentieth century, the question should be: what are the next steps towards a secure and stable twenty-first century, without nuclear weapons and without weapons of mass destruction?
Ideas from prestigious sources have added recently to a sense of urgency regarding nuclear disarmament. I refer in particular to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, issued in July, on whether the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was permitted under any circumstances under international law. While some aspects of the Court's opinion are controversial, it has raised the issue to a new legal level. The Judges ruled unanimously that 'there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control'. This is a new and significant way of perceiving commitments to disarmament negotiations. The Court's opinion has captured, in my view, the understanding of the obligations assumed by States Parties under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. This understanding also applies to the [NPT] Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament Review adopted in 1995. The implication is that negotiations will lead to the conclusion of agreements. My hope is that all States will extract from this particular aspect of the Court's opinion the incentive to strive for concrete and attainable steps towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
At the macro level the international community cannot lower its guard. The destructive force of today's nuclear stockpiles equals 750,000 bombs of the size used at Hiroshima. Some still consider nuclear weapons to be a viable means of warfare. The possibility of nuclear accidents, terrorism and trafficking in nuclear materials persists. The threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons has not been eliminated.
But at the micro level the challenges are no less demanding. Tens of thousands of people are still being killed each year by small arms. Landmines are still being planted faster than they are removed. By their very nature small arms are infinitely more difficult to control than nuclear weapons. The legal and illegal trade in conventional weapons, large and small, jeopardizes the gains that resulted from the end of the Cold War and consumes too much of the budgets of developing States.
What steps must be taken to meet these challenges? The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) should be ratified and implemented. I welcome the reports of progress in the talks between the two sides and urge them to keep up the momentum. Early ratification of the Treaty by the Russian Federation would allow reductions in the nuclear arsenals to proceed, and a START III process to begin. Further joint or unilateral measures by both sides can reduce the risk that the dismantled weapons might be used again.
I have often underlined the importance I attach to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. I welcome therefore the programme announced at the summit meeting of the major developed countries in Moscow in April this year. I also commend the work done by a wide range of intergovernmental agencies, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
The Conference on Disarmament, intensely busy as it was with the Test Ban Treaty, was not able to proceed this year to negotiations on a cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The way forward is now open. A cut-off is a practicable, possible and logical next step in the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I urge the First Committee to take up this item with a new spirit of flexibility and to help set the course for the Conference on Disarmament in 1997.
As Depositary of the Chemical Weapons Convention, I would like to be able to announce the entry into force of the Convention. This would give it full effect as international law, and would allow its sophisticated verification system to come into being. No matter how fool-proof the chemical weapons prohibition regime may be, it will not be credible without the participation of the two major powers. I am gratified that the President of the United States announced during the General Debate that he would not abandon the Convention. The Convention is in the best interest of the entire international community and I urge the Russian Federation and the United States to ratify it as soon as possible. At the same time, I call upon the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, at their forthcoming Review Conference, to strengthen that Convention by finalizing the arrangements for a verification protocol.
Following the adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco by all States of the Latin American and Caribbean region in 1994, I have welcomed the signature of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in December 1995; the signature of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga by three nuclear-weapon States in March 1996; and the signature of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone the next month. These successes have led to a strong call, during this General Assembly, for talks to begin on the establishment of other zones free of nuclear weapons, including in the Middle East and in the southern hemisphere. I welcome these initiatives and urge the States concerned to bring this noble idea to fruition.
For the men, women and children of war-ravaged countries, and for the safety and security of United Nations peace forces, I shall continue to strongly press for a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. I am encouraged by the steps being taken, unilaterally or jointly, by many States to enact national measures to ban or restrict these weapons. And I support the efforts under way in this Committee to begin negotiations towards a total ban.
The Panel on Small Arms established by the General Assembly last year is using an innovative approach by holding workshops in areas where the proliferation of small arms is a source of increased tension. The first workshop took place in South Africa last month. I am encouraged by the process begun by the panel and I look forward to the results that will be reported next year. ...
Developing a disarmament agenda for the twenty-first century must be a priority for the Governments of this century. There now seems to be overwhelming support for the proposal to convene another Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That session could assess the security situation in the post-Cold War era and set the negotiating agenda for the years to come. Preparations for such a session could start as early as next year. The actual timing of the session could be left open, if necessary, until consensus emerges on its agenda and programme. The international community is calling out for a clear message that the Cold War era is over and that Cold War approaches to disarmament are being replaced by new, more effective approaches."
Retired General George Lee Butler was Commander-in-Chief of the United States' Strategic Command between 1992-94. The following extracts from General Butler's remarks are reproduced with kind permission of the organisers of the State of the World Forum, the Gorbachev Foundation in the US. See News Review for more details of the Forum.
Extracts
"... I must say in all candour that this [speech] represents a very conscious departure from a decision I made upon retiring, not to speak publicly on national security matters. ... I amend that decision with considerable reluctance. My decision to step back into public life is prompted by an inner voice I cannot still, a concern I cannot quiet. I am compelled by a growing alarm, born of my former responsibilities, and a deepening dismay as a citizen of this planet, with respect to the course of events governing the role of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the Cold War. ...
... I have certified hundreds of crews for their nuclear mission and approved thousands of targets for potential nuclear destruction. I have investigated a troubling array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces. I have read a library of books and intelligence reports on the former Soviet Union and what were believed to be its capabilities and intentions - and seen an army of 'experts' proved wrong. As an advisor to the President on the employment of nuclear weapons, I have anguished over the imponderable complexities, the profound moral dilemmas, and the mind-numbing consequences of decisions which would involve the very survival of our planet.
Seen from this perspective, it should not be surprising that no one could have been more relieved than was I by the dramatic end to the Cold War. ... Even more gratifying was the opportunity as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy...and then as commander of...strategic nuclear forces, to be intimately involved in recasting our defence posture, shrinking our arsenals, and scaling back huge impending Cold War driven expenditures. Most importantly, I could see for the first time the prospect of restoring a world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons.
Over time, that shimmering hope gave way to a judgement which has now become a deeply held conviction: that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.
... The astonishing turn of events which brought a wondrous closure to...four decades of perilous ideological confrontation presented historic opportunities to advance the human condition. But now time and human nature are wearing away the sense of wonder and closing the window of opportunity. Options are being lost as urgent questions are marginalized, as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War habits and thinking; and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward into the dark world we so narrowly escaped without a thermonuclear holocaust.
What, then, does the future hold? ... Can a consensus be forged that nuclear weapons have no defensible role; that the political and human consequences of their employment transcends any asserted military utility; that as weapons of mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand-fold stronger and more urgent than for deadly chemicals and viruses already declared illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future production?
I believe that such a consensus is not only possible, it is imperative, and in fact growing daily. I see it in the reports issuing from highly respected institutions and authors; I feel it in the convictions of my colleagues on the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; it finds eloquent voice in the Nobel prize awarded to Joseph Rotblat and Pugwash; and a strident frustration in the vehement protests against the recent round of nuclear tests conducted by France.
Notwithstanding the perils of transition in Russia, enmities in the Middle East, or the delicate balance of power in South and East Asia, I believe that a swelling chorus of reason and resentment will eventually turn the tide. ... The terror-filled anaesthesia which suspended rational thought, made nuclear war thinkable and grossly excessive arsenals possible during the Cold War is gradually wearing off. A renewed appreciation of the obscene power of a single nuclear weapon is taking a new hold on our consciousness, as we confront the nightmarish prospect of nuclear terror at the micro level.
Where do we begin? What steps can governments take...?
First and foremost is for the declared nuclear States to accept that the Cold War is over, to break free of the attitudes, habits and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert, and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints.
Second, for the undeclared States to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally indefensible; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the strength of deterrence is inversely proportional to the stress of confrontation; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control.
Third...given its crucial leadership role, it is imperative for the United States to undertake now a sweeping review, led by the President, of nuclear policies and strategies. The Clinton Administration's 1993 Nuclear Posture Review was an essential but far from sufficient step toward rethinking the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. While clearing the decks of some pressing force structure questions, the Review purposefully avoided the larger policy issues. However, the Review's justification for maintaining robust nuclear forces as a hedge against the resurgence of a hostile Russia is in my view regrettable in several respects. It sends an overt message of distrust in an era when building a positive security relationship with Russia is arguably the United States' most important foreign policy concern. It codifies force levels and postures completely out of keeping with the profound transformation we have witnessed in world affairs. And it perpetuates attitudes which inhibit a willingness to proceed immediately toward negotiation of greatly reduced levels of strategic arms. ...
... We are not condemned to repeat the lessons of forty years at the nuclear brink. We can do better than condone a world in which nuclear weapons are enshrined as the ultimate arbiter of conflict. The price already paid is too dear, the risks run too great. The nuclear beast must be chained, its soul expunged, its lair laid waste. ..."
Extracts
"... I have met many times with Duma members in Moscow and Washington, but I believe it is the first time an American Defense Secretary has ever addressed such a large assemblage of Duma members. This meeting manifests the growing spirit of cooperation between our two countries. This cooperation is in marked contrast to the four decades of confrontation during which each country built more and more deadly arms. By the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union each had more than 10,000 nuclear warheads aimed at each other, ready to launch in minutes. ...
During this period, the Russian physicist, Andrei Sakharov, wrote, 'Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations.' Indeed, both of our governments made nuclear control an 'absolute priority,' and somehow we got through that period without 'annihilating humanity' - without a nuclear holocaust. ... But there is still a large nuclear infrastructure remaining - a legacy of the Cold War - and our two governments must deal with it responsibly...
Even after the START I reductions are completed, the United States and Russia will each have about 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads. Additionally, there are thousands of nuclear warheads in our tactical forces, with thousands more in secure storage areas. And there are thousands of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium in storage, with nuclear reactors making still more. This huge infrastructure requires a considerable expense to maintain, and it requires stringent safety and security measures. The security features are particularly important, since a handful of rogue nations are trying to get their hands on our nuclear weapons, or the plutonium which would allow them to make their own. ...
...it is in the supreme interest of Russia and the United States, the two great nuclear powers, to lead the world in controlling these terrible weapons and the deadly plutonium from which they are made. Key to this control is making dramatic reductions in the deadly legacy of the Cold War - the nuclear infrastructure: warheads, missiles, weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, launch facilities, and manufacturing facilities. Together we initiated these reductions in 1991 with the START I treaty which reduces nuclear warheads by half - Russia and the United States are both well ahead of schedule in making the reductions called for in START I. We followed that in 1994 with the trilateral agreement to transfer nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia. Today, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are nuclear-weapons free. The next major step is START II, which will result in another reduction in nuclear warheads by half. Both Russia and the United States have far too many nuclear weapons and we can both improve our security and our safety by making dramatic reductions in them. I urge you to ratify the START II treaty so that both of our nations can proceed to make those reductions.
The United States Senate has comparable responsibility to your own - to provide legislative oversight of our defense programs and to ratify the solemn treaty commitments made by the president. Two of the members of the US Senate are here with me today - Senator Lugar and Senator Lieberman. Last year I appeared before them and other US senators to explain why the START II treaty should be ratified and implemented. They had some very important questions which they expected me to answer.
Let me share with you the questions they asked and my answers to them in the hopes that this may be useful as you deliberate START II.
First: Will the reduction in weapons result in a reduction of danger?
Second: Will the remaining weapons provide adequately for our security?
Third: Is the treaty fair?
Fourth: Will the reduction of weapons lead to a reduction of cost?
Fifth: Will the United States continue to abide by the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty?
And Sixth: Does the treaty contribute to the overall security environment and enhance the United States-Russia relationship?
The first question goes to the heart of most of our concerns: 'Will the reduction in nuclear weapons result in a reduction of danger to our nations?' I believe that the answer is 'yes,' but let me explain why. I have already talked about the nuclear danger we do not face any longer - the danger of a nuclear holocaust. That danger has passed because Russia and the US have a new relationship that involves cooperation, not confrontation.... But as we have reduced the threat to each other, a new threat has arisen - a threat we must address together. This threat is posed by rogue nations and criminal terrorists who would use a nuclear weapon to threaten nations, their citizens, and their legitimate interests. Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have made clear their intention to get weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups have shown that they are willing to use weapons of mass destruction, as [shown by] the sarin nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway. By reducing our arsenals, we reduce the risk that nuclear weapons or nuclear material will fall into the wrong hands. START II seizes the opportunity to reduce this threat in a very big way.
And there is another way START II seizes the opportunity to reduce the nuclear threat: by reducing the numbers of weapons on both sides it reduces the chance of a launch by accident or miscalculation. This is particularly true of MIRV [Multiple Independently-Retargetable Re-entry Vehicles] ICBMs [Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles] - the ICBMs with up to 10 warheads on each missile. MIRV ICBMs are at the same time valuable and vulnerable: valuable, and therefore, an inviting target, because they have 10 warheads; vulnerable because it takes only one or two attacking warheads to destroy all 10 of the warheads. Because they are both valuable and vulnerable, they tend to be kept on a 'hair trigger,' which protects them, but increases the danger of a launch by miscalculation. The only way to get rid of this danger is to get rid of MIRVed ICBM weapons. START II gives Russia and the United States the opportunity to do this together.
The second question asked by the Senate was: will the remaining weapons provide adequately for our security? I believe the answer to this question is also 'yes.' After START II is fully implemented, both nations will still have about 3,000 nuclear warheads. This much firepower is more than needed to destroy any plausible target set. Indeed it is enough to destroy the world. That is more that enough for deterrence. And US and Russian nuclear forces under START II will be structured in such a way that they can survive any plausible attack. Without MIRVed ICBMs, both our forces under START II will be both stable and survivable - threatening any potential attacker with overwhelming retaliation, but not threatening a first-strike. Put very simply, lower numbers plus survivability from attack equals improved security for both our countries.
The third question was whether the START II treaty is fair, or does it give one side or the other a military advantage. I believe that START II is fair, that it gives neither side a strategic military advantage. Each side is allowed the same numbers of warheads - 3,000 to 3,500. On the other hand, under START I, the United States can have more warheads than Russia because of a complex rule by which bomber warheads are discounted. We gave up that advantage in START II - all warheads count as one, whether on bombers, SLBMs [Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles], or ICBMs. We will also eliminate under START II our most modern ICBM - the Peacekeeper - which otherwise has decades of useful service left. And our submarine force will be constrained, for the first time, by a sub-limit on SLBM warheads. Some critics of START II believe the Treaty might still result in a numerical disparity in warheads between our countries. They argue that Russia would have to build more missiles to reach the 3,000 level and would not want to undertake that cost.
This takes me directly to the fourth question: 'Will reducing weapons also reduce cost?' I believe the answer is 'yes' both for Russia and for the United States. I know that many of you do not believe that, so let me explain my answer. There are three factors involved in the costs/savings associated with START II:
1. Cost of dismantling the missiles and launch facilities no longer needed.
2. Savings from not having to operate and maintain facilities reduced by the treaty.
3. Costs associated with building new missiles and facilities compatible with the treaty.
Let me discuss each of these in turn. In the United States, we estimate the cost of dismantling the weapons under START II would be $600 million. I do not know what the Russian costs of dismantlement would be, but I expect they would be comparable. The United States is prepared to assist Russia in defraying these costs under the Nunn-Lugar program. The United States has already provided more than $750 million to Russia under Nunn-Lugar, a third of which was specifically dedicated to START I implementation. Our Congress continues to appropriate funds to the Nunn-Lugar program (about $350 million per year) so we can offer substantial support for START II implementation.
Let me turn to the second factor - the year-to-year savings that would result from START II reductions. In the United States we estimate that we will save almost $5 billion ($5,000 million) over the next seven years by avoiding the costs of maintaining and operating systems that would be dismantled under START II. Again, I do not know what the Russian savings will be, but costs avoided by not having to operate, maintain readiness, and provide safety and security for the 3,000 warheads and associated launch facilities that would be reduced by START II is quite significant.
The third factor is the cost associated with building new missiles and facilities compatible with START II. I know there is a concern that Russia, after eliminating MIRVed missiles, would need to build more land missiles - presumably SS-27s - to reach the 3,000 to 3,500 level. That would be costly. But it is not necessary. We can and should ratify START II now, and move promptly to negotiate START III, with lower levels. Long before all these new missiles people talk about could be constructed, we would have agreement on lower numbers. Then each country could get the advantage of timely planning in sizing missile programs. In any event, whatever temporary disparity in numbers might result, it would certainly be smaller than if we both stayed with START I. In the absence of ratification of START II, United States law requires me to maintain the START I limits. This would result in the United States missing the opportunity to cut our missile force in half, and thereby missing the opportunity to save more than $4 billion ($4,000 million). It would result in Russia either accepting a significant disparity in missile forces or undertaking an expensive missile-building program, or maintaining aging and dangerous MIRV ICBMs in the force a few more years and then undertaking an expensive building program. So my conclusion is that START II makes sense from a cost standpoint both to Russia and the United States.
The fifth question was whether the United States will continue to abide by the ABM treaty. President Clinton has made clear that the ABM treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability between the United States and Russia. The United States has no plans for an ABM system that does not comply with the treaty, or that would undermine the stability it ensures. At the same time, both of our countries must be concerned about the possibility that a rogue nation could launch a few nuclear missiles at our cities and our citizens. That is the value of the ABM system deployed around Moscow - a system that complies with the ABM treaty. And that is why the United States is moving forward with research and development on a limited National Missile Defense system over the next three years - a system that would also comply with the ABM treaty. If the possibility of a rogue state acquiring nuclear missiles becomes real, we then would be in a position to deploy that system over the following three years. This potential deployment would be directed against the actual threat - not against Russia. The United States does not consider Russia a threat, just as the United States is not a threat to Russia.
Our top priority in ballistic missile defense - and I believe Russia's top priority as well - is development of a theater missile defense system. Theater missiles are a real and present threat to our deployed forces and allies. Both Russia and the United States have agreed that theater missile defense systems are allowed under the ABM treaty as long as they do not pose a realistic threat to each other's strategic forces. In fact, Russia and the United States have been cooperating on theater missile defense exercises, and we are prepared to cooperate in the development of theater missile defense systems. Since we both face a common threat, we should work together to find common solutions.
The sixth and final question of our Senate was whether the START II treaty will contribute to the overall security environment and enhanced United States-Russia security relations. My answer to this question is an emphatic 'yes.' Both of us know that fewer nuclear weapons in the world make us all safer. START II allows us not only to make a landmark difference ourselves, but also to set an example for the world. And there is no more concrete way for our two nations to advance security relations than to work together to reduce our nuclear arsenals. START II would be a crowning achievement for our pragmatic partnership - a vivid example of how our countries can work together where our interests overlap. ..."
Source: Perry remarks before Russian Duma, United States Information Agency, 17 October 1996
"I've been here since Monday for a dialogue on arms control issues. This trip was set up by [National Security Advisor] Tony Lake's trip earlier this year and his discussions with Liu Huaqiu, and then by Secretary Christopher's conversations with the foreign minister, as part of a broader effort to renew our strategic dialogue with China on a number of issues, of which arms control and nonproliferation are parts.
This trip is the beginning of several in the very near future. In the next few weeks Undersecretary Lynn Davis will come for a strategic discussion of a variety of issues, and then, of course, Secretary Christopher is coming around 19 or 20 November, and that will lead up to the meeting that the two presidents will have at the APEC Summit in Manila.
We have a broad range of common interests with China in the arms control area, notwithstanding a number of differences which are narrowing on the nonproliferation front. We find increasingly that China is a constructive partner on a number of our global arms control priorities, including, for example, most recently our collaboration in achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which involved in the very endgame of the negotiations a number of compromises by China and a number of compromises by the United States and others, which in the end produced virtually a consensus in the Conference on Disarmament, and then a very successful vote at the United Nations in New York. Incidentally, the test ban now has been signed by more than one hundred countries. The first two were the United States and China.
Our discussions here concentrated on general principles of arms control, exploring each other's perspectives on contributions arms control can make to global safety and to our own national security. And then we went through in some detail a number of the issues that President Clinton raised as our priorities when he spoke to the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September. Those included: further progress on strategic arms control; the fissile material cut-off which [we] will be pursuing in the conference on disarmament in Geneva; we in the United States as well as Russia and other countries need to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and bring that important treaty into force; steps to make the Biological Weapons Convention more susceptible to effective monitoring and enforcement; steps to strengthen and achieve universality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and, in particular, focusing on the need for stronger safeguards to incorporate the lessons we learned from the undisclosed nuclear weapons program in Iraq so that [it] won't happen again; and then finally, an effort to negotiate a global ban on anti-personnel landmines.
We agreed at the end of our discussion...that we would continue this dialogue on a routine basis. We've invited the Chinese counterparts to come to Washington next year at approximately the same time, and we also agreed that there would be expert-level discussions to help support that political-level discussion."
Nuclear-related exports and cooperation
"Question: 'Could you tell us did you touch on the issue of Pakistan and the Chinese nuclear sales - missile parts sales -to Pakistan?'
John Holum: 'Those issues all came up...
Our concerns with respect to nuclear cooperation have been considerably alleviated as a result of the 11 May, 1996 statement in which the Chinese have agreed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and the confirmation that that includes ring magnets of the kind that had previously been transferred. So it is an important step forward.'
...
Question: 'Can you give any details of your discussions on transfer of missile technology that you had with the Chinese?'
John Holum: '...Let me put it in context. We, as you know, have had a continuous discussion with China on missile transfers. In August of 1993, the United States imposed sanctions on China as well as on Pakistan for missile technology transfers under our laws enforcing the Missile Technology Control Regime. Those sanctions were lifted in October of 1994 as a result of a Chinese undertaking not only to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime limitations, but to go somewhat beyond them. But since then, there have been reports in the press and elsewhere on further missile transfers and technology. ...
We routinely discuss those matters with the Chinese. We have not made a determination based on the information we have that any further sanctions are warranted. ...'
...
Question: '...we have already talked about the missiles and the Pakistan nuclear technology, but how do you see the direction moving in this area?'
John Holum: 'I would say that the direction is very promising. Obviously, we have some arguments in the nonproliferation area. One that is of continuing concern is our view that no country should be cooperating with Iran, even in non-military nuclear technology, because it is very clear to us that the Iranians are interested in and in fact are actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and that they are very likely to use the infrastructure, the capabilities that they've acquired through a non-military program to advance their military efforts.
That is an area where China continues, although not in a very large sense, to cooperate with Iran. They point out in response to our concerns that all of their exchanges with Iran in the nuclear field are under international safeguards, which is true, so far as we know. So we have a different point of view on that. The same issue comes up of course in our discussion with the Russians, who are engaged much more in substantial nuclear cooperation with Iran. But I continue to place these concerns - and our differences in these areas are narrowing - in the broader context that is very positive.
For many years China stood apart from the various nonproliferation efforts. In 1992, China joined the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In 1993, they signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which they actively participated in negotiating. In 1994, they agreed to limit their missile transfers in line with the Missile Technology Control Regime. In 1995, they collaborated with us very closely in the effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to make it permanent. They also worked with us in that same period on the problem of the North Korean nuclear program, and their involvement was very constructive and very helpful in bringing about the Agreed Framework which has shut down that danger. And then, of course, in 1996, we have worked very closely together, as I said, in achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.
So, I think there is a definite trend in the direction of greater collaboration, a greater commonality of interests and efforts that we are looking forward to pursuing in the context of the President's agenda for arms control that he announced at the United Nations. ...'
...
Question: '...in light of the fact that many of the companies now that are dealing in either shipments of conventional arms or nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon parts are not necessarily directly linked to the Chinese government, what kind of reassurance, if any, were you given that the Chinese government is able to control this?
John Holum: 'This is a subject that will come up more in Undersecretary Davis' discussions, but it is one of the reasons why we need to have more detailed technical-level, expert-level discussions on all of these various export regimes. It is a very important step in my view, especially given the Chinese habit of living up to principled positions, that China has taken the position it did in 1994 on missile technology transfers and missile transfers... but it is obviously equally important to make sure that there is a capability to enforce those principles through effective export controls, and that means expert-level consultations which we have had and which we want to continue.'
Question: 'Do you mean the US Government is giving China advice as to how to effectively keep these shipments from leaving the country?'
John Holum: 'That's part of it, what are the elements of an effective export control regime but also what specifically, in a case by case determination, these broad limitations mean. What do they mean with respect to judging a specific export? So it's both arriving at a more detailed understanding, common understanding of the content of export controls and how do you go about setting up an effective structure.'"
Fissile materials
"Question: 'Could you address the fissile materials question, especially in light of China's ambitious nuclear energy program which will continue to grow?'
John Holum: 'China is on record as supporting the negotiation of a cut-off, a global cut-off in the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of international safeguards. That was one of the topics we discussed at some length. They have expressed that at the foreign minister level. They have also included that subject in their arms control white paper which was released in November of 1995 and has a very comprehensive discussion of China's positions on these issues. So we are looking forward to their cooperation and to working together to try to bring that agreement into being. It's the next item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva when they meet early next year.'"
Missile defence
"Question: '...on theatre missile defense, the Japanese continue to tell the Chinese that they are only looking at the feasibility of cooperating with the United States on theatre missile defense. Is that an open-ended feasibility study or [does] the United States within the framework of the new security agreement or another framework have an expectation about a schedule in which Japanese cooperation would kick in beyond that state? ...'
John Holum: '...we have, as you know, since the Gulf War, been very actively engaged in pursuing for our own purposes and for protection of US forces abroad a much more capable, theatre defense system than the Patriots that were used in the Gulf War, anticipating that there will be theatre-range threats much more capable than the Scud missiles that the Patriots were not entirely effective in intercepting. That's the main focus of our theatre defense system. We have also had discussions of theatre defense with a number of countries, including Japan. ...
We have made clear to the Chinese that our work on theatre missile defenses is not aimed at China and that we are exploring these issues in this region and elsewhere, mainly to protect our security interest rather than to threaten anyone else's capabilities. These are, of course, entirely defensive systems we are talking about. ...'"
Landmines
"Question: 'Could you bring us up-to-date on any progress you may have made in your discussions with the Chinese on the global ban on anti-personnel weapons, and why do you think China has been moving so slowly in the direction of a global ban?'
John Holum: 'Yes, we did discuss that issue, and we've also worked together with the Chinese in the review conference on the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which has succeeded this year in negotiating a ban on non-detectable, non-self-destruct, non- self-deactivating land mines. So we now have an international agreement under which the production of land mines that don't blow themselves up, or don't self-deactivate in a period of time, will be prohibited. That's a very important step forward, but we obviously want to go the next step and ban anti-personnel landmines completely.
During the course of our meetings here we discussed both the venue and the content of a possible treaty in this regard. China does have a different view from the United States. China has a great deal of land border and large stocks of anti-personnel landmines, so this is something we will have to continue to engage on. But I am hopeful that, in the end, we will come to a satisfactory resolution.
The United States also has some limitations on its ability to negotiate a complete ban because of our commitments on the Korean peninsula and the need for use of anti-personnel landmines there. We're actively engaged, and I hope China and other countries will actively be engaged, in the search for alternatives, so that landmines don't have to be used.
You could almost check your watch and if we were twenty minutes into this press conference probably somewhere around the world somebody has been killed or maimed by a leftover landmine, so this an enormous humanitarian challenge, and I hope we and China and other countries can work together to resolve it.'"
North Korea
"John Holum: '... We...talked about the status of implementation of the Agreed Framework, which is quite positive. I think the figure is roughly 42 per cent of the nuclear fuel rods that were taken out of the reactor have now been canned for ultimate shipment out of the country, and that process is continuing. The five-megawatt reactor is shut down, and the other, bigger reactors that were under construction are inert and rusting, the reprocessing facility is shut down, the seals are all intact that the IAEA has emplaced in North Korea on their nuclear facilities. So we are quite optimistic about that program. ...'"
Source: Official Transcript, United States Information Agency, 9 October.
Extracts
"... We are here today to discuss the Preparatory Committee process leading to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and specifically the first Preparatory Committee meeting to be held in 1997, which will launch the strengthened treaty review process. Altogether there will be three and possibly four preparatory committee meetings that cumulatively will lay the procedural and organizational framework for the Review Conference, but will also examine the substantive issues related to the Review Conference. A caucus of the Parties will convene in New York [in October]...to set dates for the first Preparatory Committee meeting.
For its part, the United States began an internal review of this issue last year, shortly following the 1995 NPT Conference. What has become clear is that the decision on 'Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty' [agreed in May 1995] provides the basic framework and objective for the process - a strengthened treaty review; but it does not provide the details of what it will take to implement and achieve this objective. Working out these details will be the responsibility of NPT Parties and the first PrepCom meeting in 1997 will be especially important in this regard.
The 'Principles and Objectives' decision agreed by the 1995 NPT Conference is one element that could be considered by NPT Parties in determining 'ways and means' to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty during the 2000 NPT Review Conference. There are two aspects to the 'Principles and Objectives' decision that will need to be considered: the relationship between that document and the Review Conference process; and its substance.
A. The Relationship Between the 'Principles and Objectives' decision and the 2000 NPT Review Conference
Some NPT countries refer to the 'Principles and Objectives' decision as the 'yardstick' against which future progress will be measured. Certainly all NPT Parties recognize the importance of this decision and the significance of its development in the 1995 NPT Conference process. But it is not clear just how this decision will affect the 2000 NPT Review Conference process. For the United States, the 'Principles and Objectives' decision represents the important collective political interest and commitment of NPT Parties to see further progress made toward assuring the full implementation of the NPT and a useful reference point for our continued efforts toward that end. The recommendations outlined in the decision are ones we and others should strive to meet. However, it is the Treaty itself that is the source of our obligations and a full and balanced review of the Treaty is the objective of NPT review conferences.
The 'Principles and Objectives' decision was developed for a certain purpose during the 1995 NPT Conference, (i.e., to highlight the Parties' commitment to the NPT and its full implementation, which in turn facilitated agreement to the indefinite extension of the Treaty). Whether or not, as some appear to imply, one should think in terms of creating new or additional Principles and Objectives for the 2000 NPT Review Conference is another question and one that depends on whether NPT Parties believe such a decision will be useful in shaping or reflecting a consensus of views on achieving the full implementation of the Treaty.
B. The Substantive Aspect of the Principles and Objectives Decision
Dealing with the substantive aspect of the 'Principles and Objectives' is a more straightforward exercise. The decision outlines 20 different recommendations for promoting the full implementation of the Treaty. I would like to highlight some of the more significant steps that the United States has taken since May 1995, which illustrate clearly our continued strong commitment to the NPT regime and to the political commitments outlined in the 'Principles and Objectives' decision.
CTBT
The 1995 NPT Conference decisions called for the completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 'no later than 1996.' Achievement of a CTBT has long-been recognized as a key step in achieving the full implementation of Article VI of the NPT. The successful conclusion of the CTBT is an historic achievement that not only completes an arms control quest spanning more than 40 years, but also helps wall off nuclear dangers today and henceforth. ...
Universal adherence
Universal adherence to the NPT has long been supported by the United States. Since the conclusion of the 1995 NPT Conference, five more countries have joined the Treaty: Andorra, Chile, Comoros, the UAE, and Vanuatu. This brings the total number of Parties to 182 and leaves only eight countries worldwide outside the NPT (i.e. Angola, Brazil, Cuba, Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, and Pakistan). Of those remaining eight, five (i.e., Brazil, Cuba, Angola, Oman, Djibouti) either have joined regimes comparable to the NPT or will likely soon adhere to the NPT. In our view, the prospects are good that by the time of the first Preparatory Committee meeting, there will be only three countries worldwide that have not joined the NPT or a comparable nuclear non- proliferation regime. ...
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
The end of the Cold War and the consequent cessation of the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the States of the former Soviet Union has generated new momentum for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs) in many areas of the world. The United States supports the creation of such zones in regions where they would contribute to the achievement of US nuclear non-proliferation goals, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, and where doing so would be consistent with our established criteria for recognizing such zones and with other US national security interests. ...
Strengthening IAEA safeguards
The United States continues its active support for a strong and robust international safeguards system. Efforts are ongoing at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conclude agreement on safeguards strengthening measures. Adoption of these safeguards strengthening measures early, and with the full support of NPT Parties, will be essential to ensuring the full implementation of the NPT. ...
While the strengthened safeguards measures are intended for application in NPT non-nuclear-weapon States, the United States as indicated in President Clinton's statement to the recent IAEA General Conference, 'stands ready to apply the new safeguards as fully as possible in our country consistent with our obligations under the NPT.' Our principle obligation under the Article I of the Treaty, of course, is not in any way to assist a non-nuclear- weapon State to acquire nuclear weapons. To this end, we are prepared to provide the IAEA with information on our nuclear exports and imports, accept the application of new safeguards measures to those of our nuclear facilities selected for safeguards by the Agency, and discuss with the Agency the provision of additional information that would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States.
Nuclear disarmament
The United States continues to be engaged in an irreversible process of nuclear disarmament. The US Senate has provided its advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty.
Once Russia also ratifies the Treaty...START II's implementation will result in further deep reductions in strategic nuclear forces and will enhance stability by eliminating MIRVed and heavy ICBMs. Following the ratification of START II Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin are committed to begin to discuss possibilities for follow- on measures.
President Clinton reaffirmed this commitment in his 24 September speech before the UN General Assembly, stating that he and President Yeltsin 'are ready to discuss the possibilities of further cuts - as well as limiting and monitoring nuclear warheads and materials. This will help make deep reductions irreversible.' There should be no question that the United States is committed to a process of nuclear disarmament and to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. However, nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved on demand or in a vacuum. It is a process that requires an improved international security system in which all States have taken steps to support global non-proliferation regimes. This could include steps to control, and reduce where necessary, the levels of armaments in their respective regions. To be clear, assuring the full implementation of Article VI of the NPT is the responsibility of all NPT countries.
Fissile material issues
The 1995 NPT Conference decisions called for the 'immediate commencement of negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' A fissile material cut-off treaty is one of the measures mentioned in the preamble of the NPT and is widely recognized as a necessary step on the road to disarmament. With the conclusion of the CTBT, the United States believes that the international community should now turn its attention to a fissile material cut-off treaty and should make every effort to initiate negotiations in Geneva, and not allow the will of a few States to block the will of the vast majority of nations who recognize the inherent non-proliferation and disarmament value a successful cut-off treaty will bring. ...
The framework for the strengthened treaty review process makes clear that the PrepCom meetings are to have a substantive character. However, the decision provides relatively little detail regarding how this new, substantive character should be implemented. Moreover the PrepCom will also have as its task the traditional responsibility to develop the procedural and organizational framework for the Review Conference.
In considering the Preparatory Committee process for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the United States is seeking to identify its broad priorities and objectives, as well as to determine how best to organize the PrepCom agenda to deal with the various substantive issues. We have also been considering the range of procedural and organizational issues with which the PrepCom will have to deal. At this stage, our consideration of these issues is still preliminary in many ways. While we will be identifying those issues we believe will need to be addressed, we recognize that this will be a dynamic process and we are committed to working with the other NPT Parties to develop a collective approach and understanding of what the strengthened treaty review process can and should accomplish. To this end, we will be consulting broadly with other NPT Parties. This meeting provides an important opportunity to pursue these discussions. The first Preparatory Committee meeting in 1997, however will be the first opportunity for Treaty Parties to collectively address the cross-section of issues related to the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
In general, our views on the PrepCom process are evolving along the following lines:
A. The PrepCom Agenda Should Be Balanced
We believe it is important to ensure that the PrepCom process and Treaty Review are balanced and treat all aspects of the NPT with equal thoroughness. Although we do not yet know how the PrepCom agenda will be organized, we will be working for the development of an agenda of work that addresses the whole of the Treaty, and does not focus exclusively or to an inappropriate degree only on one aspect of the Treaty, such as Article VI. While we of course recognize the importance that many NPT Parties attach to Article VI, we must remember that the NPT is much more than Article VI and work to keep a balanced focus.
B. The PrepCom Should not Pre-empt the Work of the Review Conference
We will be interested in promoting an agenda of work for the PrepCom that is consistent with the decision on a strengthened treaty review process and that, in this regard, enables the PrepCom to begin to consider the substantive issues related to the Treaty. However, we need to be mindful of the purpose of the PrepCom in contrast to that of the Review Conference. The PrepCom needs to make the necessary procedural and organizational preparations for the Review Conference. The PrepCom will also consider 'objectives, ways, and means' to promote the full implementation of the Treaty and will forward recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. But it is the Review Conference that is the venue for a detailed review of the Treaty and its operation. In our view, the PrepCom process should reinforce and support the Review Conference process, but it should not undertake activities that are the prerogative of the Review Conference, including drafting final document.
C. Past Practice Should Serve as A Guide
The PrepCom will again consider many procedural and organizational issues that have been looked at by previous PrepComs. This includes rotation of chairmanship of PrepCom meetings, documentation, financing, observers, conference agenda, and rules of procedure. For many of these issues, there is an established precedent that has proven workable and acceptable. The United States believes that precedent is a useful guide in determining how to proceed for the future and that, unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise, precedent should be adhered to. Some have suggested that, in order to demonstrate that the PrepCom process is truly revitalized, the 'traditional' aspects oriented to addressing procedural and organizational questions should be totally revamped. The United States would not subscribe to this notion. In our view, an attempt to create a new approach will be time consuming and likely counterproductive. Put simply: we believe in the adage 'if it ain't broke don't fix it.'
D. Consensus Decisionmaking Should be Promoted
There have been no formal rules of procedure agreed for the PrepCom meetings themselves. Rather, the practice has been to make every effort to take decisions by consensus and if necessary to draw on the Review Conference rules of procedure for guidance. The United States believes preserving the practice of consensus decisionmaking during the PrepCom and the Review Conference will be of utmost importance to ensuring a constructive process.
Perhaps the most important decision that will need to be considered by the first PrepCom meeting is that concerning the organization of the work of the Preparatory Committee. NPT Parties need to identify issues to be addressed by the PrepCom, agree to an agenda of work to address those issues, and to ensure that enough time is allocated to each agenda item. The organization of the PrepCom's work will impact the discussion of substance throughout the PrepCom process and the Review Conference itself.
In terms of how the PrepCom agenda could be organized, the US recognizes that there are a number of options. For example:
- Each PrepCom meeting could address a specific issue or set of related issues.
- Each PrepCom meeting could address all issues (i.e., comprehensive).
- Each PrepCom meeting could address all issues, as needed, but have a focus on a select group of issues (i.e., thematic).
- Each PrepCom meeting could mirror the Review Conference Main Committee structure and allocation of issues (although not the product of the Main Committees).
- Each PrepCom meeting could conduct an Article by Article review...
At this stage, the United States has not determined what organization it thinks would make the most sense in terms of both ensuring a productive PrepCom process and preserving our interest in ensuring a balanced treatment of all the relevant issues. This issue will be the subject of further internal consideration in the months remaining before the first PrepCom meeting next year.
With the 1997 PrepCom, the first under the post-1995 NPT Conference regime, we are going to be navigating new, uncharted waters. There is no doubt that the PrepCom process as a whole will address substance in a way that it has not done previously and, as such, the PrepCom will make an important contribution to the substantive work of the Review Conference. The United States is fully prepared to contribute constructively from the outset to ensure that the PrepCom is effectively able to deal with its responsibilities in addressing both substance and process. However, we should not overly raise expectations about what the first PrepCom meeting in 1997 will be able to accomplish in terms of launching the substantive effort leading to the Review Conference.
The first PrepCom meeting will necessarily have to deal first with the key question of what a strengthened treaty review process means and how it should be implemented, as well as deciding on the agenda, structure, priorities, and allocation of work for the PrepCom process. Also, beginning with the first PrepCom meeting, we will need to consider and take decisions on procedural issues such as financing, observers, documentation, chairmanships, and rules of procedure. Discussion of those issues may not be as interesting as the anticipated discussions on substance, but it is absolutely essential to ensure the effective operation of the PrepCom process. Consequently, the United States will be working to make sure that adequate time at the outset is devoted to consideration of key procedural questions. This is not an effort that will be set aside easily or as expediently as some might wish.
In raising this cautionary note, I am not suggesting that the first PrepCom should or will be devoted solely to discussion of procedure. However, I am suggesting that we need first to get our house in order and determine how the PrepCom process - both its substantive and procedural aspects - will operate.
Many countries are just beginning their assessment of the PrepCom process. Over the coming months, there will likely be increasing attention paid to this issue. It will be up to all NPT Parties to cooperate and coordinate to ensure a successful PrepCom process. Throughout this process, we need to work to promote a constructive dialogue and a positive exchange of views among NPT Parties. Above all, we need to remain aware of the fundamental priority of this process: to serve our mutual interest in a strengthened NPT regime. ..."
Source: ACDA's Scheinman on plans for NPT PrepCom meetings, United States Information Agency, 18 October.
Full text
"The Clinton administration's long standing commitment to halt the spread of nuclear bomb-grade materials was advanced when the Department of Energy yesterday accepted the first shipment of spent research-reactor fuel containing weapon-usable enriched uranium, originally produced in the United States. Under a new policy issued by Secretary of Energy Hazel R. O'Leary in May, the department will take back foreign research-reactor spent fuel from 41 countries.
'This action further demonstrates President Clinton's leadership in reducing the worldwide nuclear danger by accepting this fuel after an eight-year lapse in the policy,' said O'Leary. 'The consolidation of this dangerous material in the United States reduces the risk of it falling into terrorist hands.'
This shipment from Colombia and Chile as well as Germany, Switzerland and Sweden contained 280 spent fuel elements. While this fuel contains enough uranium to produce approximately two crude nuclear weapons, it adds less than .002 percent to the inventory of spent fuel currently managed by the department.
'The spent-fuel acceptance policy will make a major contribution to our nuclear weapons nonproliferation objective of minimizing civil commerce in highly-enriched uranium worldwide,' Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in a recent letter to Secretary O'Leary.
Forty years ago, under the Atoms for Peace program, the US began supplying highly-enriched uranium to foreign allies for use as nuclear fuel in their research reactors to produce medical isotopes and conduct scientific experiments in exchange for their promise to forego development of nuclear weapons.
Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is radioactive material that could be extracted from the spent nuclear fuel and used to produce nuclear weapons. Since 1978, the US has successfully assisted reactor operators to convert reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel under the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. Secretary O'Leary's decision to accept and manage the spent nuclear fuel supports the disposition needs of the research operators and encourages their cooperation in the fuel conversion program.
Research reactor fuel accepted under this policy will be stored at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. An accelerated technology development program is underway within the department for safe, cost effective storage and disposal of both the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and domestic fuel."
Full text
"The Department of Energy (DOE) today announced it has completed upgrades at facilities in two former Soviet republics that will significantly advance the Clinton administration's nonproliferation goals of helping to secure and control nuclear materials.
Nuclear material control and accounting upgrades were installed at the Sosny Science and Technical Center in Belarus and the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences Institute of Nuclear Physics. The two sites are the latest facilities to complete the installation of nuclear materials protection, control and accounting upgrades under DOE's cooperative efforts with Russia, the Newly Independent States and the Baltics.
'Completing the upgrades in Belarus and Uzbekistan marks significant progress in reducing the nuclear danger worldwide,' said Secretary of Energy Hazel R. O'Leary. 'They will significantly reduce the risk of theft of bomb-grade materials at the facilities.'
The institute in Uzbekistan houses research reactors that operate on highly-enriched uranium. The technical center in Belarus contains a shut-down research reactor but still stores highly- enriched uranium. The staff of the facilities worked closely with US technical experts to design and install the systems. Sweden and Japan also contributed to the efforts in Belarus, and the United Kingdom contributed to the efforts in Uzbekistan.
DOE's Sandia, Los Alamos and Argonne National Laboratories participated in developing the safeguards, consistent with international standards. In addition to the Belarus and Uzbekistan projects, DOE experts are carrying out similar projects at over 40 locations in Russia, Kazakstan and Ukraine as part of the ongoing effort to reduce the nuclear danger worldwide. DOE completed security upgrades at the Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center in Latvia in March 1996."
Extracts
"US Secretary of Energy Hazel R. O'Leary today announced completion of an analysis of the environmental impacts of current and future activities at the 1,350-square-mile Nevada Test Site and off-site locations in the state of Nevada. Prepared over a 23- month period that included broad public participation, the final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) identifies the Department's preferred alternative: expanded use of the test site for a variety of civilian and defense activities. The Department received extensive comments on the draft EIS from the state of Nevada, relevant federal agencies and other stakeholders, and those comments are addressed in the final document.
In issuing the EIS, Secretary O'Leary said, 'The Nevada Test Site is a unique and valuable resource. We are proud of its important contribution to US national security over five decades. This comprehensive, sitewide environmental impact statement will guide use of the site well into the next century. The expanded use alternative analyzed in the EIS responds directly to President Clinton's direction to ensure national security, protect the environment and enhance America's economic vitality.'
The preferred alternative (i.e., expanded use) represents a continuation of current Nevada Test Site activities as well as a diversification and expansion of defense and non-defense operations. Under this preferred alternative, defense activities would include science-based stockpile stewardship experiments and operations to maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile, including subcritical experiments consistent with the recently endorsed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. No immediate impact to employment is expected. Other environmental studies are underway for other DOE sites and projects, and if their outcomes result in new projects being moved to the Nevada Test Site, more jobs could be created there.
Non-defense uses include:
* A Solar Enterprise Zone - Facilities could include a photovoltaic (PV) power tower or parabolic dish systems, capable of generating as much as 1,000 megawatts of electricity.
* A Spill Test Facility - An important tool used for the simulation and analysis of 'accidental release' of toxic, hazardous chemicals, the facility would also be the ideal venue for training in emergency response to commercial chemical and gaseous spills.
* An Environmental Management and Technology Development Program - a research and development program to create new technologies for landfill stabilization, mixed waste characterization and other processes. The project's aim would be to unite the top talents of DOE with the international scientific community in an effort to speed the progress of environmental clean up and restoration of the nuclear weapons sites.
* A National Environmental Research Park - research into ecosystem preservation, including habitat reclamation, hydrogeologic systems, and remediation.
In the area of waste management, the site would strive for continuous improvement through the development and use of cutting- edge, environmentally friendly technologies and more efficient processes.
The preferred option also has activities including educational tours that would allow the public to see firsthand some of the history and impacts of past nuclear testing.
In order to optimize the test site's capabilities, other public agencies and private industries would be able to conduct compatible research at the Nevada Test Site. The sharing of intellectual and physical resources would create an ideal atmosphere for discovery and innovative science. This model research and development cooperative would serve the public interest by bridging defense and civilian interests in an economically sustainable and environmentally sound manner. ..."
Extracts
"... The question before us today is, Is the Department fulfilling its commitment to the President and to the American people to ensure that America's nuclear stockpile is safe, secure and reliable in the coming decades?
Based on the evidence to date, I believe any impartial observer would be forced to conclude that the answer is 'No', the Department has abdicated its leadership role in this vital area. ... I level this criticism at the Clinton Administration as a whole, which has given our weapons scientists and engineers and skilled laborers what I consider to be a 'Mission Impossible': maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.
The mismatch between the Administration's rhetoric and its actual deeds is profound and growing. One the one hand, Administration officials have testified that a modern, capable nuclear complex, staffed by motivated, skilled scientists, engineers, and laborers, is imperative if we are to retain safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Administration has failed to take actions to sustain - much less modernize - the complex, and has ushered in a period of low morale amid a potentially devastating out-flow of skilled personnel at the laboratories and the production plants.
Let me cite some examples:
First, the Clinton Administration rejected the sound advice of experts, including experts from the weapons laboratories and the Department of Defense who argued in favor of the only tried-and- true approach to assuring nuclear competence - nuclear testing - in exchange for the prospect of an international agreement banning all nuclear tests. Yet, the arguments against the recently- concluded Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are overwhelmingly convincing. For example, the accord is not effectively verifiable, and it will do nothing to prevent non-signatory nuclear wannabe's from achieving a nuclear capability.
Think about it: North Korea achieved a nuclear capability without conducting a test, and Iraq never tested but was within months of producing a nuclear bomb. A CTBT will, however, prohibit the US from undertaking a limited nuclear test program, even if such tests are intended to fix a safety problem on a given weapon design. Second, with the President's decision to embrace a CTBT, the Department was forced to embark on a costly, new program known as 'Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management.' Under this program, DOE plans to develop expensive, new facilities and rely extensively on modeling processes as a surrogate for nuclear testing in order to provide assurance that our nuclear weapons are safe and will perform as advertised. While I support an effort to modernize the production infrastructure and improve diagnostic capabilities at the labs, we must recognize that few of these machines and processes exist today; many will not be available for another decade or longer. ...
Third, and perhaps most disappointing, is the fact that the Clinton Administration has failed to support its own Stewardship and Management program. It is difficult to find evidence of the Administration's commitment to implement the program, and it's easy to find evidence of erosion of that commitment under pressure from the antinuclear community. For example:
- It committed to a six-month underground nuclear 'test readiness' posture but never followed through on it.
- It was originally committed to conducting low-yield, 'hydronuclear' experiments, then folded.
- It then committed to conducting 'subcritical experiments' at the Nevada Test Site but has now delayed those tests twice in three months.
- It woefully under-funded the 'Defense Programs' account in its budget requests for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and has failed to resolve a projected shortfall of $4.5 billion from fiscal years 1997-2002 that will preclude DOE from meeting its programmatic commitments.
- It promised to resume nuclear testing if another nation tested, but after China, France, and Russia tested, it did nothing.
- It repeatedly delayed a final decision on the future size and character of the complex, knowing full well that continued uncertainty over mission-assignments would exacerbate tensions between the laboratories and the plants, when in fact both are needed to ensure a viable complex.
- It has not budgeted funds to recapitalize the infrastructure at the nuclear production plants, and has diverted funds added by Congress for this purpose to other programs and activities.
- It has not provided a definitive plan for how the US will produce tritium, nor has it allocated sufficient resources to carry out an accelerated program.
- It has done little or nothing to halt the haemorrhaging of skilled personnel from the US nuclear establishment. Congress established fellowship programs to address this problem but the Department has refused to obligate the funds.
- It has not conducted all the tests it believes are necessary to ensure the reliability of the stockpile, with tests for some types of weapons far behind schedule, as noted in a recent, critical report issued by the General Accounting Office.
and
- It failed to respond to the Committee's request for a list of permitted and prohibited activities under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As a result we don't know whether the funds we have authorized can be spent without violating the Treaty, or whether other nations that are party to the Treaty share our interpretation of what is allowable under the Treaty. I find this an astonishingly dismal record of performance, one which calls into question this Administration's stated commitment to assuring the safety and security of our nuclear weapons.
Given this record, I expect the Members of this Committee will wish to carefully consider, in the context of next year's debate on the budget resolution and the Defense authorization act, whether DOE is fulfilling its responsibilities and whether some other entity - be it an independent agency or the Department of Defense - would better perform this mission."
Source: Federal News Service Transcripts, 19 September. Reproduced with kind permission of the Federal News Service.
Extracts
"... The United States security environment demands continuing flexibility on the part of the Department to meet a new set of circumstances. The cessation of underground nuclear weapons testing; the President's commitment to sign a zero yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with the necessary safeguards; US ratification of the START II treaty, and a determination that existing weapons can provide this nation's deterrent into the future, while maintaining our nuclear competence and capability, are circumstances that have dramatically redefined the mission of the Department of Energy, Defense Programs to Stockpile Stewardship and Management. The Department, with the help of the Congress, has made significant progress in this critical national security program over the last several months.
Defense programs: objectives and accomplishments
In March, I discussed with this subcommittee the challenging responsibility facing the DOE to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of both testing, and any requirement to produce new weapons. Since then, the Department has, in conjunction with the DoD, completed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP) plan, to meet these challenges. We provided a copy of this classified plan, known as the 'Green Book' to the Congress in April. ... The Green Book will be revised annually and made available to the Congress in the spring.
The Department's objective is to implement a program that:
* Supports the US nuclear deterrent with a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile as the weapons complex is modernized and made more efficient. This complex, along with the implementation of the Stockpile Life Extension Program, will allow DOE to meet, economically and expeditiously, all requirements and contingencies identified by the Nuclear Weapons Council;
* Preserves the core intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons laboratories and the manufacturing facilities. Without nuclear testing, confidence in the US nuclear deterrent will be dependent upon the competency of the people who make the scientific and technical judgments related to safety and reliability of US nuclear weapons and those who must make the weapons and weapons components when needed. The SSMP will be a single, integrated technical program designed to ensure the continued safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The SSMP will seek advances in the understanding of the physics, chemistry, and material issues and provide the infrastructure deemed essential to maintain the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons, including fabrication of replacement parts. The SSMP will allow early detection and repair of problems that may arise with the stockpile and ensure that new people brought into the complex continue to have the capability to make competent technical judgments concerning nuclear weapons in the future;
* Ensures the activities needed to maintain the nation's nuclear deterrent are coordinated and compatible with the nation's arms- control and nonproliferation objectives, including the recently UN endorsed CTBT.
The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will continue to transform the nuclear weapons complex, maintain all existing capabilities, re-establish tritium and pit production capabilities, and assure an adequate manufacturing capacity to support a smaller, aging stockpile. The future complex will rely more on scientific understanding, computer simulations, above ground experiments, computer aided design, and manufacturing agility rather than underground test empiricism and Cold War level manufacturing capacity. Work with private industry through technology partnering can combine our limited resources with industry capabilities to assist us with advanced manufacturing methods, improved materials development, and high speed, integrated computing and communication systems.
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
On February 28, 1996, the Department issued the Draft Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) that, when finalized, will form the basis for the Department's transition to the capability-based complex of the future. The PEIS covers the future capabilities required of the three weapons laboratories (Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore), the four industrial plants (Kansas City, Pantex, Savannah River, and Oak Ridge Y-12), and the Nevada Test Site.
The Department's preferred alternative for stockpile stewardship proposes construction and operation of the National Ignition Facility and the Contained Firing Facility addition to the Flash X- Ray Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Atlas Facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. All three facilities examine different aspects of weapons physics, the key to understanding weapon safety and reliability. The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), at Los Alamos National Laboratory, is another key facility supporting the stockpile stewardship program, that is proceeding ahead of the PEIS. An Environmental Impact Statement has been completed on DARHT and an independently justified Record of Decision has been made. Construction is now underway and the first axis of DARHT is scheduled for completion in 1999.
The Department's preferred alternative for stockpile management proposes to downsize in-place the following activities: weapons assembly/disassembly and high explosive fabrication at Pantex, non- nuclear component fabrication at the Kansas City plant, and secondary and case component fabrication at Oak Ridge Y-12. Pit component fabrication is to be re-established with a small production capacity at Los Alamos. Based on pit surveillance data and stockpile requirements, the Department believes that this will be adequate. The Department will develop a plan for larger scale pit production capacity if it should be needed at a later time.
The Department has received a large number of comments on the Draft PEIS. I would like to address two specific congressional concerns on the Draft PEIS: (1) that it does not adequately deal with the production capacity that will be needed to maintain the stockpile over the next 10 or more years; and (2) that it is based on overly optimistic assumptions about arms control agreements.
The preferred alternatives described in the Draft PEIS will preserve the critical capacity and unique assets that exist in the Department's production plants. Although there would be downsizing of the production plants commensurate with a stockpile, none of the plants would be closed.
The Draft PEIS addresses a range of stockpile sizes consistent with DoD plans as reflected in the Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. The Department's use of the additional $106 million in the FY 1996 Energy and Water Development Act, P.L. 104-46 and the Production Capability Assurance Program (PCAP) should reinforce to the Congress our commitment to maintaining the production complex. The PEIS reflects the Department's realistic and pragmatic approach in anticipating future arms control agreements. The stockpile has already been significantly reduced through dismantlement afforded by START I. Post Cold War. dismantlement to the START I sized stockpile level directed by the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum is more than 70 percent complete and the balance should be done within the next few years. Thus, while some downsizing of facility infrastructure seems reasonable given the smaller stockpile, the downsizing is planned to be gradual (1998-2005) and therefore flexible to meet changing world circumstances. This approach supports fully the DoD lead but hedge strategy.
The Department has completed an extensive series of public hearings on the PEIS at all the affected sites and in Washington, D.C. The comment period closed on May 8, 1996. The Department expects to issue the final Environmental Impact Statement in October and a Record of Decision in November 1996.
Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP)
The mission of the SLEP is to sustain the current nuclear weapons stockpile while maintaining a high level of confidence in the stockpile without underground nuclear testing. The SLEP serves as the operational basis for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program Plan, establishes the requirements to meet nuclear weapon stockpile commitments to DoD, and provides the basis for coordinating stockpile activities between DOE and DoD. It will build on and enhance past practices to maintain a viable nuclear weapons stockpile. ...
The underpinning concept for the SLEP is 'all components of a nuclear weapon are limited life components.' The SLEP will focus and prioritize the efforts of the weapons complex. The Enhanced Surveillance program will provide data to understand better material and component aging phenomena and determine the limit of components and materials. This will provide the needed information to determine a life extension program and sustain a safe, reliable stockpile meeting DoD performance requirements.
The SLEP integrates stockpile management activities and establishes requirements and priorities to support budget and workload planning. These activities to support the stockpile are embodied in four key functions: maintenance, surveillance, assessment and certification, and refurbishment. The underpinning activities for these functions are based on science and modeling based capabilities and our capability to manufacture a reliable product. Ongoing activities include support for DoD requirements, established by the NWC, the B61-3/4/10 Use Control upgrades, the B83-1 Quality Improvement Program, the W87 Life Extension Program, the W88 pit rebuild program, the manufacturing of tritium bottles for the W62 and W78 warheads, and support for resumption of Enriched Uranium Operations at the Y-12 Plant.
Enhanced Surveillance
Enhanced Surveillance is a new and important research and development program that will enable us to predict when problems will arise in the stockpile. It is a complex-wide integrated program involving the four production plants and the three weapons laboratories. It is the one program that links together the advanced science capabilities inherent in stockpile stewardship with the day-to-day needs of supporting the weapons in the stockpile.
Enhanced Surveillance focuses on three major areas: 1) materials science, 2) materials aging model development, and 3) testing and monitoring technologies. This program is developing models which account for aging effects in weapons materials, components, and systems that help us to predict service lifetimes and to schedule (with the DoD) necessary component replacement. This may have the effect of making all weapons components subject to replacement at regular intervals. ...
The surveillance techniques, procedures, and models developed in this program will be incorporated into the ongoing core surveillance program when we are confident of their validity. With these new tools, our program of stockpile surveillance will emphasize prediction and preventative maintenance.
The Enhanced Surveillance Program Plan has been developed and research and development was initiated in March 1996. Specific activities that are now underway include: studies for advanced diagnostics of materials and components, establishing a priority structure for component/subsystem aging model development, and failure mode analysis for materials aging.
In FY 1997 the Enhanced Surveillance Program will: develop methods for fabricating diagnostic prototypes, complete the initial set of material models and begin experiments for validation, begin development of firing system and surety system models, define initial integrated sensor package for in-weapon monitoring, and complete micro-structure assessment of high explosives in the stockpile.
Annual Certification
A primary DOE responsibility is to certify the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. As a result of the President's 11 August, 1995, announcement to seek a zero yield CTBT, the Secretaries of DoD and DOE have put in place an annual certification process requiring the considered advice of the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Commander of the US Strategic Command, and the Directors of DOE's Nuclear Weapons Laboratories, on whether the stockpile is safe and reliable in the absence of nuclear testing.
All active and inactive weapon types have been assessed by the weapons design laboratories and the DoD-led joint Project Officers Group. The laboratory directors and the Commander of US Strategic Command have provided their advice to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense. We expect the first annual certification to be completed in October 1996. All indications are that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. It is important to note safety and reliability issues are continually assessed by the DOE.
Tritium
An integral part of ensuring confidence in the stockpile is providing an adequate supply of tritium, a radioactive gas required for all US nuclear weapons to operate as designed. Tritium, with a half life of 12.3 years, decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per annum. To meet current stockpile requirements, the Department is recycling tritium from dismantled weapons. According to the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM) signed by the President, 11 March, 1996, a new tritium production source may be needed as early as 2005 to maintain the START I stockpile, and the associated 5-year tritium reserve, until full ratification and entry into force of the START II Agreement.
Last year, the Department embarked upon a dual track strategy for developing a reliable source of tritium to meet national security requirements. One track will investigate the purchase of a commercial reactor or irradiation services. The other track will develop and test accelerator production of tritium. We are also continuing to study a possible role in tritium production for the Department's FFTF reactor.
We have established a Tritium Program office under the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs and within it two offices to develop the two tracks. The stated goal of that office is to present to the Secretary two feasible means of producing tritium with the costs well defined. By the end of 1998, the Department, in consultation with the DoD, will select one of these alternatives as the primary tritium production method. The other, will become an assured backup capability. To ensure the highest priority is given to this program, the Secretary created, and I chair, a senior departmental body, the Tritium Management Board to oversee the work of the office and the two tracks.
There are no serious technical issues associated with the production of tritium in a light water reactor, but there are regulatory and licensing uncertainties.
Tritium producing targets for use in light water reactors were developed and tested several years ago. While additional target qualification studies are needed to support regulatory and owner approval for their use in commercial reactors, the work already accomplished has demonstrated that the target will work extremely well in light water reactors.
In early 1996, the Department invited expressions of interest from electric utility companies owning commercial nuclear facilities to determine their preliminary level of interest in either selling a reactor or irradiation services to the Department for tritium production. The response to that invitation has been very encouraging, and we are now developing a formal solicitation of proposals for the sale of facilities or services to the Department to make tritium. The Department and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding in May governing the interaction between the two agencies for target qualification and NRC reactor licensing activities.
Planned technical activities in FY 1997 for the commercial reactor approach will include target fabrication demonstrations to support target procurement, extraction process development to support conceptual design and construction of a tritium extraction facility at Savannah River. In addition, in FY 1997 the Department will issue a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the purchase of one or more light water reactors or irradiation services, and evaluate these proposals.
With regard to the accelerator alternative, there are several features and portions of the technology that need to be demonstrated at production power levels and the costs need to be better defined. The exploration of the accelerator concept includes a development effort to select between technical alternatives, testing to establish performance and reliability, and the use of industry for conceptual and engineering design and, if built, construction and commissioning. These efforts will narrow the design, cost and schedule uncertainties.
Los Alamos National Laboratory is carrying out the development activities, and they are well under way. We have just selected Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc. and General Atomics as our industry team to design and build the plant. The Savannah River Site will be the location of the accelerator if a decision is made to proceed with construction. The Westinghouse Savannah River Corporation, or its successor, will operate the plant should it be built.
In FY 1997 the accelerator team will focus on developmental engineering and component qualification to establish baseline design of the accelerator components. Materials tests have already begun at Los Alamos for the 'target' section of the plant, where the tritium is actually made by the accelerated protons. The first parts of an engineering model of the early portion of the proton accelerator are being built, and the first is operating at or better than the design specifications. Early next year the team will complete a Conceptual Design Report (CDR) for the APT production facility, which will establish baseline design and greatly narrow the cost uncertainty. This report would also provide a basis for requesting approval to begin engineering design in FY 1998.
Earlier this year the Secretary requested that a study to examine the feasibility of using the FFTF to produce tritium be conducted. The Tritium Management Board requested that the JASONs provide an independent review [of] the technical issues associated with the use of the FFTF. A decision by DOE on the FFTF is expected by the end of the year.
Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI)
ASCI is designed to accelerate the development of nuclear weapons simulation codes, scientific understanding of weapon behavior, advanced computer platforms, and computing environments and infrastructure. These advances are essential for addressing the challenge of using simulations for investigating performance, safety, and reliability of weapons in the nuclear stockpile.
In FY 1996, ASCI began work on 11 entirely new codes, including four 3-D full physics codes that will directly increase the ability of laboratories to predict the integrated performance and safety of weapons through computational means. In December 1996 the world's fastest computer will be delivered to Sandia National Laboratories. This computer will run at more than one trillion operations per second and will be dedicated to solving difficult weapons problems.
DOE has entered into an agreement with IBM for the next generation computer. On July 26, 1996, the President announced the award of a contract for a computer to be delivered to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1998 that will be capable of three trillion operations per second. More computers will follow, on a development path toward a goal of 100 trillion operations per second.
To link these new computers to laboratory researchers, the first secure high-speed data network linking the Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established on 20 October, 1995. These are only the first of a series of advances in computational capability that will provide another essential tool needed to maintain confidence in our nuclear stockpile through simulation.
The ASCI program will continue to advance during FY 1997. Significant efforts will be required to continue the development of the codes started in FY 1996. The development of these codes includes the delivery of the initial capabilities required to certify planned near-term stockpile modifications. The development of these codes also requires a significant integration with Defense Programs experimental facilities for verification and validation. Advanced modeling, software, and infrastructure work will be required to enable weapons code development and simulation on those computers.
National Ignition Facility
The proposed National Ignition Facility (NIF) is designed to produce, for the first time in a laboratory setting, conditions of temperature and density of matter close to those that occur in the detonation of nuclear weapons. The ability to study the behavior of matter and the transfer of energy and radiation under these conditions is key to understanding the basic physics of nuclear weapons and predicting their performance without underground nuclear testing. Experiments at the NIF would provide data essential to test the validity of computer based predictions and demonstrate how aged or changed materials in weapons could behave under these unique conditions. Two JASON panels have stated that the NIF is the most scientifically valuable of the programs proposed for science-based stockpile stewardship. The National Academy of Sciences has initiated its review of the scientific and technological readiness for NIF construction; we expect to have its report by March of 1997.
Construction of the NIF at LLNL is part of the stockpile stewardship preferred alternative in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The environmental analysis concerning the NIF in the final PEIS will-be sufficient for approving its construction and operation. The final decision on whether to proceed with NIF, and if so where will be made in the Record of Decision scheduled to be issued in November.
The NIF project currently has about 300 persons involved in design and project-specific research and development. The project is expected to begin site preparation in FY 1997 which would allow major construction to begin in FY 1998 and project completion at the end of FY 2002. Title I design activity is now underway and will provide cost estimates on the project baseline in October 1996. The FY 1997 budget request of $191 million will allow the DOE to prepare an industrial component fabrication capability and to complete Title II, site-specific, detailed construction design. This work will provide the basis for a construction decision by the Administration in mid-1997. ...
The December 1995 DOE report 'The NIF and the Issue of Nonproliferation' has guided planning for the facility's use. Implementation of the report's recommendations will be outlined (along with scientific plans) in the 'Facility Use Plan of the NIF' to be issued in draft about October 1. ..."
Source: Federal News Service Transcripts, 19 September. Reproduced with kind permission of the Federal News Service.
Extracts
"Let me begin by addressing the subject of the threat.
Last spring I was in Taipei when the Chinese government announced its intention to begin ballistic missile launches three days later into two 20-mile-square impact areas, one a mere 20 miles off Taiwan's northeast coast and the other 30 miles off the southwest coast. These launches interfered with access to Taiwan's principal port, Kaohsiung, to Taipei's international airport, and to rich fishing grounds. After originally stating that the firings did not constitute a blockade, were only political theater - albeit 'a little too close to the edge of the stage' - and announcing that 'there will be consequences should these tests go wrong,' I was glad to see that the administration later labelled the firings reckless and provocative.
But the main point here should never have been what the consequences would be in the event that China turned out not to be able to hit even a square in the ocean 20 miles on a side. The main point is what the consequences are when such tests go right.
The key issue is that off Taiwan this past March, as well as in the streets of Tel Aviv and Riyadh in early 1991, we have been given an important insight into the future of international relations. It is not an attractive vision. Ballistic missiles can, and in the future they increasingly will, be used by hostile states for blackmail, terror, and to drive wedges between us and our friends and allies. It is my judgment that the administration is not currently giving this vital problem the proper weight it deserves. ... let me say a few words in general about the threat that ballistic missiles are coming to pose to American interests in the world.
First, although ballistic missiles are normally discussed in the same breath with weapons of mass destruction, it is important to realize that it is not always necessary to deploy nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological warheads in order to use ballistic missiles - even with current accuracies - as weapons of terror and blackmail. The Chinese, for example, have admitted that they were using these recent missile launches near Taiwan to attempt to influence Taiwan's Presidential elections and to affect Taiwan's conduct of its relations with other countries. Saddam's SCUD attacks on Israel, using conventional high-explosive warheads, were clearly an attempt to provoke an Israeli response and to split the coalition against Iraq, which included a number of Arab states which would have had great difficulty fighting alongside Israel against another Arab nation.
Second, we are in the midst of an era of revolutionary improvements in missile guidance. These improvements will soon make ballistic missiles much more effective for blackmail purposes - again, even without the need for warheads containing weapons of mass destruction. The press has reported, for example, that the US Government is adopting a policy to permit other-than-US-government- users of the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite network to have much greater confidence that the satellites' signals will not be interrupted or degraded by the US. The press also reports that the administration believes that regional agreements will ensure that the signals cannot be used by hostile forces. But the efficacy of such arrangements remains to be seen. The current type of GPS access is adequate for many commercial purposes. But if the policy of 'selective availability' of GPS is about to be abandoned, there will be a definite risk not only that guidance signals, provided by the US will be usable by other nations for their ballistic missile systems (that is true today), but that truly excellent accuracy will thereby be achievable for many countries' missiles.
With such guidance improvements, it is quite reasonable to believe that within a few years Saddam or the Chinese rulers will be able to threaten something far more troubling than firings of relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles. They may quite plausibly be able to threaten to destroy, say, the Knesset, or threaten to create, in effect, an intentional Chernobyl incident at a Taiwanese nuclear power plant.
Third, even relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles may be given awesome power if equipped with weapons of mass destruction. Although attention is usually focused on the possibility of various countries' obtaining nuclear warheads, nuclear capability is at least somewhat constrained by the difficulty of acquiring fissionable material. Loose controls over fissionable material, particularly in the former Soviet Union, are nevertheless quite troubling because unauthorized sales and smuggling of fissionable material to rogue states are becoming increasingly likely. But it is even easier to acquire the wherewithal to produce chemical or, much worse, bacteriological warheads than it is to acquire fissionable material. Chemical and bacteriological weapons will be available far sooner and to a much larger number of countries than will nuclear warheads. Bacteriological warheads in particular will serve about as well as nuclear ones for purposes of turning a country's ballistic missiles into extremely effective tools of terror and blackmail, even if they are never launched. ...
Fourth, it is not necessary to be able to conduct an effective counterforce strike with ballistic missiles against ICBM [Inter- Continental Ballistic Missiles] silos, bomber bases, and other nuclear facilities in our continental heartland in order to use ballistic missiles for terror and blackmail directly against the United States. This concern with a counterforce strike against nuclear facilities in the interior of the lower 48 states was, of course, a principal issue for us during the long strategic stand- off against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Much of our strategic analysis during those years centered on the ability of, particularly, our ICBM's and strategic bombers to withstand such a strike and retaliate effectively. For example, the Scowcroft Commission Report in 1993, of which I was the principal drafter, was heavily devoted to this question.
But in current circumstances, nuclear blackmail threats against the United States may be effectively posed by, e.g., North Korean intermediate-range missiles targeted on Alaska or Hawaii, or by relatively inaccurate Chinese ICBM's targeted on Los Angeles.
Fifth, we should not automatically assume a benign post-Cold-War world in which Russia is a friendly democracy, with a few inconsequential anomalies, that is steadily developing a free enterprise economy and China is a free enterprise economy, with a few inconsequential anomalies, that is steadily becoming a friendly democracy. It is at least as likely, in my judgment, that the Russia that will face us will come to be autocratic and imperialistic - we may hope, but we should not be confident, that it will retain some measure of civil liberties and some free sectors in its economy. As for the new China, in addition to our serious differences with its leaders over civil liberties, proliferation, and trade, we may well have seen its international face in the Taiwan Straits this past spring. In short, we cannot discount the possibility of serious international crises developing in the future with either country - including crises in which Russian or Chinese officials will repeat new versions of the barely veiled threat expressed to former Assistant Secretary Freeman this past spring: American leaders 'care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.'
It is with these considerations in mind that I have some thoughts about NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] 95-19 covering 'Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next Fifteen Years.' ... One major reason, it seems to me, why this estimate seems to differ in important ways from the major assessments during my tenure...lies much more in the questions that were asked. To focus an NIE on the threat to the contiguous 48 states, in my judgment, is to focus on a sub-set, and not a particularly useful sub-set, of the strategic problems that are posed for us by other countries' possession of ballistic missiles in the post-Cold- War era.
If broad conclusions are drawn from an NIE of such limited scope as they apparently were - for example, that 'intelligence indicates' that ballistic missiles do not pose a serious threat to US interests - the conclusions could be quite wrong, even if the drafters of the NIE answered as best they could the questions they were asked. If decision makers conclude, and I believe this would be a serious error, that this NIE - at least as it has publicly been described - covers the most important questions about ballistic missile threats to American interests, what would they say about, e.g., nuclear blackmail threats against Alaska and Hawaii? These sorts of threats will in great likelihood be present from North Korean intermediate range missiles in well under fifteen years. Such questions as these seem to be an afterthought, at least in the public description of the NIE. But the last time I looked, Alaska and Hawaii had not been admitted to the Union on terms that exclude them in some way from the common defense called for in the Constitution's preamble. As objects of blackmail they are of no less concern to us than Oklahoma and Kansas. ...
There are other aspects of the scope of this NIE that are troubling. The unclassified version of the GAO's [General Accounting Office] recent report on the NIE makes several important points. First, and most significantly, the GAO stressed that the NIE did not 'identify explicitly its key assumptions' and did not 'account for alternative economic and political futures.' The GAO also pointed out that the NIE did not 'quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments' (although quantification can be over-used, I believe, in intelligence estimates, some use of rough 'gambler's odds', such as stating that there is 'a one-in-three chance' can assist understanding). The GAO added that the evidence presented in the NIE 'is considerably less than that presented in the earlier NIEs, in both quantitative and qualitative terms.' ...
The concentration on indigenous ICBM development seems to me to limit sharply any general conclusions that might legitimately be drawn. ... Indigenous development of ICBM's was of interest during the Cold War because the Soviets sought to maintain a monopoly on their most precious military capabilities and export of fully developed ICBM's was not in the cards. But in the Cold War's aftermath, Russia, China, and North Korea are in the export business for missile technology and components, and for some technologies related to weapons of mass destruction as well. Moreover, with respect to some such exports the degree of control exercised by Moscow. and perhaps by Beijing, may not be at all complete. Consequently, transfers deserve more attention than they did during the Cold War.
A further problem is created by transfers of ballistic missile technology or components to a country which is friendly to the US if that country should later turn hostile through a revolution or radical change in government. Even with the best intelligence in the world it is impossible to forecast fifteen years in advance such events as the Iranian revolution of the late 1970's, which turned a friendly state into a hostile one.
Moreover, indigenous capabilities may be enhanced by unconventional means. A country without traditional ICBM technology that has been able to produce warheads carrying weapons of mass destruction - such as biological - may be able to produce a functioning ICBM by strapping several smaller boosters together, a technique sometimes used for space launches. Even if accuracy and performance were not up to our standards, such a missile, equipped with such a warhead, might serve quite adequately for purposes of blackmail and terror.
Because of these uncertainties we should study carefully the possibility of technically feasible threats, not only threats for which we actually see nations conducting tests and assembling components. One reasonable course of action, for example, would be for the government to assemble a small technical 'red team' of bright young American scientists and engineers and let them see what could be assembled from internationally available technology and components. I would bet that we would be shocked at what they could show us about available capabilities in ballistic missiles. We should remember that by assessing only what we could actually see, we badly underestimated Iraq's efforts in the years before the Gulf War, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction.
It may be that the President was relying on something other than this recent National Intelligence Estimate when he said, in vetoing the 1996 Defense Authorization Bill, that intelligence 'does not foresee' the existence of a ballistic missile threat to the US 'in the coming decade'. But to the degree that the President was extrapolating a general conclusion from the very limited part of the overall ballistic missile threat that appears to be assessed by this NIE, [I] believe that this was a serious error. ..."
Source: Federal News Service Transcript, 24 September. Reproduced with kind permission of the Federal News Service.
Editor's note: Mr. Cooper was formerly the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, and Chief US negotiator at the Defence and Space Talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva.
Extracts
"...My main purpose is to discuss, from a technical perspective, the impact of the ABM Treaty on constraining design, research, testing and deployment of effective ballistic missile defenses - and the major costs for strict adherence to 'perceived' restrictions of what are, in fact, ambiguous terms of that treaty. Also, I shall comment on the additional dangers to America and our overseas troops, friends and allies because our continued attachment to the ABM Treaty precludes building the most effective defenses - which, incidentally, are also the least expensive and can be built fastest.
Let me begin by elaborating a specific example that illustrates the inherent ambiguities of the ABM Treaty and the double standard applied to US and Soviet - now Russian - interpretations in view of these ambiguities.
Including External Sensors - A Case Study
President Bush's March 1992 Report to Congress on Soviet Non- Compliance explained that the US Government judged it probable that the (formerly Soviet) Pechora-class Large Phased Array Radars (LPARS) supported the Moscow ABM system with handover data suitable for target acquisition by the Pill Box engagement radar. Such LPARS are permitted only if pointed outward on the country's periphery - a provision of the Treaty violated by the Krasnoyarsk radar, as then Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze finally admitted in October 1989 after five years of denials. If integrated with the Soviet's Moscow ABM system, they could provide data on attacking ballistic missiles to enable the Moscow command system to launch Moscow-based interceptors before Moscow-based ABM radars could gather information needed for that purpose.
The US had judged such an activity to be a significant Treaty violation and limited US activities accordingly, but the President's 1992 report noted that the ABM Treaty was not explicit regarding this activity - and no violation was charged. After a year of internal review and discussions with the Russians, the President, in his January 1993 Report to Congress on Soviet Non- Compliance concluded - and I quote:
'In light of the ambiguity of the Treaty language, and based on further review of the issue and on the probable Soviet practice...the USG now judges that the support of ABM systems by early warning radar providing precise handover data will not constitute use of the early warning radar as ABM radar in violation of the ABM Treaty. ...'
... What [this] means...is that Soviet - and presumably Russian - broad interpretations of the Treaty could not be called cheating even though we had - for 20 years - considered such actions to be violations and had restricted our activities accordingly.
Whatever had been the prior US interpretation, the US should fully exploit the same ambiguity following this Soviet/Russian precedent - rather than continuing to restrict its own activities as though nothing had happened. Clearly, we can upgrade our own Early Warning Radars to support any future National Missile Defense [NMD] system. By direct analogy, we should also be able to design our NMD systems to exploit precise target handover data from any sensor not otherwise precluded by the Treaty and not connected with ABM interceptors, including space-based sensors.
The Costs of Corrupting TMD
Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration is precluding the use of such handover data even for Theater Missile Defenses, which were never supposed to be limited by the Treaty. ...[the Administration] is negotiating with the Russians to include such inhibitions as de facto amendments to the letter and purpose of the ABM Treaty, turning it into an ATBM [Anti Theatre Ballistic Missile] Treaty - and the Clinton Administration has made clear it intends to do so without the approval of the Senate, ignoring the Senate's constitutionally mandated treaty-making responsibilities. ...
... Such policy constraints - I call them a deliberate 'dumbing down' of our fighting capabilities - are a direct consequence of an excessive commitment to the ABM Treaty and, by extension, to its underlying idea that intended victims of ballistic missiles are most safe when vulnerable to attack. We can work hard to shoot down cruise missiles...but as a matter of theology, our policy is that we must not do all we can to defeat ballistic missiles. That is a matter only for arms control.
...we should not impose upon ourselves restrictions in excess of those that can be verifiably imposed on the systems of the former Soviet Union. Taxpayers should be offended by the excessive costs of 'dumbing-down' our military capabilities. More than that, American, allied and friendly lives are literally at stake; we should deploy defenses that are all they can be. ...
...The Clinton Administration has cancelled essentially all programs that could provide a boost-phase intercept capability in the near term - even though threat missiles that release multiple warheads in their boost and ascent phases of flight may and probably will appear in the near-term, perhaps before effective defenses can be built even if responsive boost-phase intercept programs were re-instituted. Such a development would defeat all of the TMD systems currently being developed by the Clinton Administration. I believe this blind spot is related to the fact that if a ballistic missile can be destroyed in its boost phase, it doesn't matter what its range is or what its target is. Heaven forbid that we should be able to destroy missiles aimed at the United States - that might violate the ABM Treaty.
Primarily because of political realities - largely associated with the ABM Treaty - since the early 1990s, Congress has directed that the main development and funding emphasis be given to ground-based US homeland defenses - they can be Treaty compliant, at least initially. The needed multi-site ground-based interceptor system will be the most expensive, least effective defense - and, believe it or not, it will take the longest to build. ... And it will have no capability to counter missiles that release their warheads early in flight- in their boost and ascent phases.
Ever since the Missile Defense Act of 1991, which was crafted to assure enough votes in Congress to commit to building at least some defense while accommodating ABM Treaty concerns, the most effective, least expensive, and nearest term deployment options - space-based defenses - have been put on the back burner. Previously, there had been a fully approved acquisition program to develop Brilliant Pebbles, a space-based interceptor system. In spite of the annual programmatic turbulence introduced by Congressional cuts, this was my soundest program from management and technical perspectives. Indeed, Defense Secretary Les Aspin's Inspector General in 1994 judged this program to have been managed 'efficiently and cost-effectively within the funding constraints imposed by Congress' and observed that termination of key contracts 'was not a reflection on the quality of program management'. ...
Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations
The above examples illustrate how the ABM Treaty has frustrated - and continues to frustrate - the development of the most effective defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges. It has accomplished its purpose - no effective defense of the United States of America can be built consistent with its terms. Furthermore, it is corrupting our programs to defend our overseas troops, friends and allies - programs which never were supposed to be limited by its terms. It costs us dearly in treasure, time and, perhaps soon, lives. Actually, it has probably already cost us lives - the 28 military personnel killed when an Iraqi Scud hit their barracks during the Gulf War might have been spared if Patriot had not been dumbed-down and delayed because of ABM Treaty concerns. And America's continuing vulnerability is making the ballistic missile the surest way to threaten the US - the weapon of choice for State terrorists. Building effective missile defenses should have a high priority in our counter-terrorism efforts.
If the ABM Treaty constraints were removed, we could fully exploit existing technology to build the most affordable and effective defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges. Under that condition, I would give the highest priority to building as soon as possible very effective, continuously on-station, wide area defenses against missiles that rogue leaders can use to threaten even distant nations.
As was recommended by the Heritage Foundation's Team B, which I was privileged to lead, I believe the least expensive, most effective program would provide a global defense-first from the sea and then from space. A global defense could always be present - consequently it would avoid the difficulties of deployment in an escalating crisis, such as the political constraints that delayed the deployment of Patriots to South Korea during its stand-off with North Korea a couple of years ago. All ground-based defenses will have this difficulty.
For under $1 billion/year, the Navy's Aegis system - in which we have already invested about $50 billion - can be rapidly upgraded to become an effective global defense. For $2-3 billion, 650 interceptors can be deployed on 22 cruisers around the world - with the first on station as early as in the year 2000. Then, a cruiser in the Sea of Japan, if not dumbed down to meet perceived ABM Treaty constraints, could shoot down missiles launched from North Korea toward Japan or the United States. Similarly, cruisers in the Mediterranean Sea could intercept missiles launched from North Africa and the Middle East toward Europe or the US. Missiles in the North Atlantic or North Pacific could defend the US against missiles launched from almost anywhere in the world. ...
As noted in the above discussion, boost-phase defenses will be necessary to defeat ballistic missiles that release their warheads early in their flight. I believe that this threat will likely develop faster than apparently is contemplated by the Clinton Administration, given its lackadaisical attitude toward programs to develop such defenses even against theater-range ballistic missiles.
Starting today from scratch with an investment of $1-2 billion a year, deployment of a global space-based system could begin as early as in 2001. It could provide multiple intercept opportunities against ballistic missiles with ranges greater than a few hundred miles - in time, under a hundred miles, launched from anyplace on earth toward any other place. ...such a space- based defense could be placed in orbits so that the US could be defended against missiles launched from rogue states but not Russia - if the US were to adopt the bizarre view that it wishes to remain entirely vulnerable to Russian missiles. ...
...I believe that the ABM Treaty is a relic of the Cold War and that its adverse restraints on our ability to defend Americans at home and abroad should be discarded - as amicably as possible, but also as soon as possible. I am satisfied that the threat to the United States is a present and growing danger, demanding an urgent response with the best and most affordable defenses available.
For five years in Geneva, I argued with the Soviets that we should move beyond confrontation and threats of mutual annihilation to cooperation - including on missile defenses. In 1992, in the same UN speech in which he proposed the deeper reductions that became START II, Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed that SDI be redirected to take advantage of Russian technology and build a global defense for the world community. The Bush Administration made progress toward agreement on that agenda, but in the final analysis it failed to capitalize on Yeltsin's initiative. And the Clinton Administration did not continue that negotiating agenda - rather it called the ABM Treaty the 'cornerstone of strategic stability' and has sought to 'strengthen' it by making it an ATBM Treaty as well.
This trend is, in my opinion, quite contrary to US national interests. Indeed, it is even contrary to Russia's interests in the long run - if cooperation is truly Russia's objective. In any case, I urge that the US clearly - unambiguously - state its intention to build the most effective, affordable defenses that current technology permits with or without Russia's cooperation. If Russia chooses to cooperate, we can work together to assure that the global defense serves our mutual interests. Otherwise, we should withdraw from the ABM Treaty as is permitted in Article XV. ..."
Source: Federal News Service Transcript, 26 September. Reproduced with kind permission of the Federal News Service.
Extracts
"The UK was, as you all know, one of the founders of the Missile Technology Control Regime back in 1987. It is therefore a particular pleasure for me to see, as its tenth anniversary approaches, not just the original seven countries around this table but 28 others - from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australasia and Europe. The longer-standing members of this regime will, I am sure, join me in extending a sincere welcome to delegations from those countries who have recently joined us, in particular the Russian Federation, South Africa and, at her first plenary, Brazil.
There is, I think, no better testimony than the presence of these new members, to the continuing relevance of the MTCR. We welcome their contribution to the regime and to our wider global efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But I do believe that the effectiveness of the MTCR would be strengthened by further expansion of its membership. There are a number of countries waiting in the wings, all of whom have a good claim. We should encourage those who share our aims and objectives and whose membership would enhance the regime's effectiveness. This plenary meeting provides the opportunity to find the right way forward.
Universal adherence to the MTCR is not yet an achievable objective. We must make it so. I therefore hope that partners will continue to develop contacts with non-partners, under the Outreach programme. Only by explaining the aims, objectives and procedures of the regime can we hope to encourage wider adherence to its guidelines.
In this regard, I think that Russia's ideas for increasing transparency are particularly important. It is vital that the Missile Technology Control Regime should promote dialogue and cooperation with their non-partners and demonstrate that its activities are intended to promote the security and stability of all states.
We have also made useful progress towards solving the problem of transhipment. The Washington seminar was, thanks to our American colleagues, a valuable exercise which, for the first time, brought together MTCR partners and non-partners in a spirit of dialogue and cooperation. I hope this plenary will follow-up the success of that seminar by identifying the best ways of encouraging further contacts with countries which are major transhipment centres.
Although our particular interest at this meeting is the control of missile technology, this past year has seen some significant developments in the wider field of non-proliferation.
After more than 20 years of negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention will finally become reality early in 1997. The CWC closes the last major gap in the net of treaties seeking to counter weapons of mass destruction. It represents a major landmark.
We have made a further significant step with the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by an overwhelming majority of states. It is clear that the CTBT will establish an international ban on nuclear testing and make an important contribution to non- proliferation. We now hope that all countries, including those in South Asia, will sign and ratify the treaty.
We are also seeing progress towards effective verification provisions for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The BWC has been in force since 1972, but it has lacked teeth. Serious negotiation are now under way to remedy the situation, and I am pleased to say that the UK is playing a prominent part.
And in the field of conventional weapons, we have finally seen the launch of the Wassenaar arrangement. Of course, this is not related to weapons of mass destruction and has a rather different set of aims from the treaties I have described. But it is a further illustration of the internationally shared goal of making the world a safer place.
It is in this general context that the MTCR plays an indispensable role. We do not have a treaty in this area. So the MTCR has been crucial to preventing the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles. Fewer countries now possess a ballistic missile capability than in 1987 when the MTCR was first established.
But that, alas, does not tell the whole story. We have no grounds for complacency. We see, in several parts of the world, the proliferation of missiles and missile technology which represent a significant threat to regional peace and stability, and in turn global security.
Iraq's use of SCUD missiles during the Gulf War demonstrated the threat posed by ballistic missiles. And we now know that Iraq developed chemical warheads for delivery using ballistic missiles. In the Middle East, too, some countries are continuing to seek missiles and missile technology to threaten or intimidate their neighbours. North Korea has reportedly exported SCUD missiles and production technology to the Middle East. The threat of nuclear- armed missiles in South Asia remains. Clearly, the consequences of such proliferation are of concern to us all.
That is why the British Government strongly endorsed the decision at last year's plenary in Bonn that the MTCR should explore ways of tackling regional missile proliferation, and go beyond its traditional, rather narrow, role as an export control regime.
None of us pretends that this is not sensitive ground. But I believe that the attitudes round the table this time last year, and at the reinforced point of contact meeting in June, show that this is the way forward and is ground on which we should not fear to tread here in Edinburgh. ..."
Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 October.
Extracts
"At the January 1994 Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government formally acknowledged the security threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated delivery means and recognised this as a matter of concern to the Alliance. They therefore decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation. The first result of these efforts was a comprehensive statement of NATO's approach to proliferation laid out in the Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction issued at the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9 June 1994...
The security challenges and risks which NATO faces now are different in nature from what they were in the past: they are multifaceted, multidirectional and hard to predict or assess. At their North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996, Foreign Ministers reiterated that the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons...and their delivery means continues to be a matter of serious concern to NATO as it can pose a direct threat to international security. Of particular concern are growing proliferation risks on NATO's periphery, the role of suppliers of WMD-related technology to them, the continuing risks of illicit transfers of WMD and related materials, and political- military uncertainties and future technological trends related to WMD.
In responding to the risks of proliferation, the principal objective of the Alliance is to prevent proliferation or, if it occurs, to reverse it through diplomatic means. In this regard, NATO seeks to support, without duplicating, work already underway in other international forums and institutions. The Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) was established by the North Atlantic Council to address the political aspects of NATO's approach to the proliferation problem. The SGP has considered a range of factors in the political, security and economic field that may cause or influence proliferation and identified political and economic instruments available to prevent or respond to proliferation. The Group continues to assess proliferation problems in geographical areas of particular concern to the Alliance, with the main focus on developments on the periphery of NATO's territory. In addition to this, it also discusses and shares information on bilateral allied programmes to assist in the withdrawal and dismantlement of WMD in Russia and the other Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union.
The SGP has focused its activities on current political issues with a view to contributing to the implementation and strengthening of international arms control, disarmament and non- proliferation norms and agreements. It has emphasised the need to make clear to potential proliferants the grave consequences of efforts to acquire WMD and the necessity of respecting international non-proliferation norms. The Group has also underscored the importance of creating a climate of confidence and security that contributes to alleviating regional tensions and reducing possible incentives for would-be proliferants to acquire WMD. Important consultations are held with Partner countries, including with Russia and Ukraine in a 16+1 format, with the aim of fostering a common understanding of and approach to the proliferation problem. Finally, in its dialogue with Mediterranean non-member countries, the Alliance is making information available to these countries about its approach to WMD proliferation risks.
Allies recognise that political efforts to prevent proliferation may not always be successful. For this reason, the Alliance is also addressing the defence aspects of dealing with proliferation risks to ensure it can safeguard the security of all its member States despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.
While proliferants will probably lack the capability to threaten the destruction of NATO member States, any crisis involving proliferants could carry the risk of NBC weapons being used. It is important to ensure that NATO's military posture makes manifest Alliance cohesion, and that it provides reassurance and maintains NATO's freedom of action in the face of proliferation risks. NATO's military posture should demonstrate to any potential aggressor that the Alliance cannot be coerced by the threat or use of NBC weapons and has the ability to respond effectively to threats to its security as they emerge.
The NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) was established by the North Atlantic Council to address the military capabilities needed to discourage NBC proliferation, deter threats or use of NBC weapons, and to protect NATO populations, territory and forces... In the first phase of its work, the DGP conducted a comprehensive assessment of the risks to the Alliance posed by proliferation. Building on this assessment, the DGP has in a second phase identified a range of capabilities needed to support NATO's defence posture for that purpose. Its findings can be summarised as follows:
a. Military Capabilities Complement Prevention Efforts
Alliance military capabilities reinforce and complement international efforts to prevent proliferation. Robust military capabilities signal to proliferants the utmost seriousness with which NATO approaches proliferation risks, Alliance resolve and its refusal to be intimidated by NBC threats. This, in turn, should strengthen internationally shared norms against proliferation. All of the Alliance's military capabilities have a role in devaluing NBC weapons by reducing the incentives and raising the costs of acquiring or using them.
b. No One Capability Alone Will Suffice
Complementing nuclear forces with an appropriate mix of conventional response capabilities and passive and active defences, as well as effective intelligence and surveillance means, will reinforce the Alliance's overall deterrence posture against the threats posed by proliferation. Such a mix of capabilities will provide a firm basis for deterring or protecting against the risks from proliferation, and will also contribute significantly to the Alliance's primary aim of preventing proliferation.
c. Core capabilities
Greatest emphasis should be placed on core, integrative capabilities that would make the most substantial contributions to the Alliance's objectives for dealing with proliferation. They include:
* Strategic and Operational Intelligence;
* Automated and Deployable Command, Control and Communications;
* Wide Area Ground Surveillance;
* Stand-off/Point Biological and Chemical Agent Detection, Identification, and Warning;
* Extended Air Defences, including Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence for Deployed Forces;
* Individual Protective Equipment for Deployed Forces.
In the third phase of its work programme, the DGP has made specific recommendations to improve Alliance military capabilities to address the risks posed by NBC proliferation. Defence Ministers meeting in Brussels on 13 June 1996 endorsed the DGP's recommendations and adopted a detailed plan for action including accelerated force goals for the Allies concerned. These new force goals, which are currently in preparation, will be considered by Ministers at their meeting in December 1996.
NATO's response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an integral part of the continued adaptation of the Alliance to the new security environment. The SGP and DGP will continue in their work to intensify Alliance political and military efforts against proliferation. In addition, consultations will continue with Russia and other Partners in order to develop a common approach to this international problem. Taken together, NATO's efforts will place the Alliance in a much stronger position to prevent proliferation or reverse it through diplomatic means, to deter the use of NBC weapons and to protect NATO territory and populations from NBC attack."
Extracts
"An intergovernmental working group established to produce proposals to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention completed its fifth and final session in Geneva today [27 September] without finalizing its work. The group's report will now be considered by a review conference scheduled to be held in Geneva from 25 November to 6 December.
The session was the latest in the continuing effort to provide verification measures to strengthen the Convention, which was opened for signature in April 1972 and has since been signed and ratified by 139 States, as well as signed by a further 18.
Efforts to strengthen the Convention began at the Third Review Conference in 1991, which established an ad hoc group of governmental experts (the 'VEREX' group) with a mandate to identify measures which could determine:
- Whether a State party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes; and
- Whether a State party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
The mandate noted that 'Such measures could be addressed singly or in combination. Specifically, the group shall seek to evaluate potential verification measures, taking into account the broad range of types and quantities of microbial and other biological agents and toxins, whether naturally occurring or altered, which are capable of being used as means of warfare.'
The VEREX report was considered at a Special Conference of States Parties to the Convention held in Geneva in September 1994. That meeting, recognizing the complex nature of the issues involved in strengthening the Convention, underlined the need for a gradual approach towards the establishment of a coherent regime to enhance the effectiveness and improve compliance with the regime.
The Special Conference agreed to establish a further ad hoc group with a mandate to draft proposals to be included in a legally binding instrument to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. Among matters the group was requested to consider were the following:
- Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention;
- The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence- building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;
- A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX report. Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost-effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse; and
- Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of article X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, noting that its provisions should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.
The ad hoc group, chaired by Tibor Toth (Hungary), held three sessions in 1995 and two this year. In all, there were 71 meetings: 28 on issues related to 'Measures to Promote Compliance'; 23 on 'Definitions of Terms and Objective Criteria'; 12 on 'Measures related to article X'; and eight on 'Confidence- building Measures'.
Although unable to complete its mandate of elaborating consensus draft proposals on possible verification measures, the ad hoc group believes it has made substantial progress. It recommended that the Fourth Review Conference endorse its work and its intention to intensify work towards the completion of the mandate.
A meeting in April 1996 of the Preparatory Committee for the review conference recommended that Sir Michael Weston (United Kingdom) should preside over the review conference. Ogunsola Ogunbanwo, of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, has been nominated by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as provisional Secretary-General of the conference."
Extracts
"On 2 October 1996 the Council of Ministers adopted the following guidelines concerning France's contribution to the global campaign against anti-personnel mines:
1. France confirms its decision to refrain from producing and exporting anti-personnel mines. The Government will submit a bill designed to give legislative effect to these commitments. It will report to Parliament on the progress of the international campaign against anti-personnel mines and the contribution which our country has made thereto.
2. France proposes to arrive at a legally binding and verifiable international agreement on a total and comprehensive ban on anti- personnel mines. Hence, it will refrain from the use of anti- personnel mines, except where such use is absolutely necessary to protect its forces. In the latter case, any exception could be authorized only by a decision of the governmental authorities. Anti-personnel mines would be used strictly in accordance with safety requirements and in complete conformity with the international conventions in force.
3. France will continue with the reduction by destruction of its stockpile of anti-personnel mines initiated in September 1996. ...
These decisions have far-reaching implications.
France is the first permanent member of the Security Council to adopt a doctrine based on such a strict ban on the use of anti- personnel mines.
France's choice of a non-use doctrine is particularly significant in the light of its international responsibilities and the involvement of its troops in global peacekeeping efforts.
This new doctrine admits of no geographical exceptions; it applies to all categories of anti-personnel mines, and has been adopted for an indefinite period.
The sole exception to the proposed ban is highly restrictive, as it requires a decision by the governmental authorities, based on the absolute necessity of ensuring the safety of our forces.
Secondly, the Government is submitting to Parliament a bill which will give legislative effect to the commitments undertaken previously to refrain from producing and exporting anti-personnel mines.
Such a move is designed to meet the concern with giving a more legally binding effect to the commitments which we made to stop exporting (1993) and producing (1995) anti-personnel mines. Thirdly, these guidelines meet the goal set by the President of the French Republic of 'further mobilizing the international community to move towards a total and comprehensive ban on anti- personnel mines'.
France believes that these efforts will acquire their full meaning only through the adoption of a legally binding and verifiable international agreement on a total and comprehensive ban on anti- personnel mines.
It hopes that the United Nations General Assembly will adopt an approach aimed at the rapid opening of multilateral negotiations for a ban on anti-personnel mines.
The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva appears to be the appropriate forum for negotiations. Political conferences, such as the one held at Ottawa, Canada, from 3 to 5 October 1996, should help to provide the momentum needed to move towards a ban on anti- personnel mines.
France calls upon all States to emulate its efforts."
Extracts
"[Preface]
I [Ambassador Paolo Fulci, Permanent Representative of Italy] have the honour to refer to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs' note of 19 January 1996 regarding resolution 50/70 B, entitled 'Small arms', adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1995.
On behalf of the European Union and of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with it (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) as well as of the associated countries Cyprus and Malta, I am pleased to provide you with the attached common reply concerning the resolution...
I would be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under item 71 [General and Complete Disarmament] of the provisional agenda.
...
2. EU is of the view that the combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons that followed the end of the Cold War poses new challenges to the international community. The Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly and the Security Council entitled 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace' (A/50/60-S/1995/1) stressed the urgent need for practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts that the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing hundreds of thousands of people, and identified light weapons as including, inter alia, small arms and anti-personnel landmines.
3. Since [the] EU will provide a separate answer to resolution 50/70 B concerning the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines, the present answer will not refer specifically to such weapons. EU has adopted and is inspired in this field by a joint action to help combat the indiscriminate use and spreading throughout the world of anti-personnel landmines, which are very dangerous for civilian populations.
4. A number of questions can arise on what can usefully be done and what is practical in tackling the problem of small arms. Small arms disarmament, or 'micro-disarmament' as some are now calling it, tends to be impractical during a conflict. However, it could form part of post-conflict peace agreements. Although study of the problem is still at an early stage, it can be assumed that the United Nations may have a relevant role to play in this field.
5. A few preliminary considerations need to be made before attempting to provide specific comments...
Small arms account for the greatest percentage of deaths and injuries in many armed conflicts. Though they do not pose the same strategic threat as, for example, those arms which fall into the seven categories of the United Nations Conventional Arms Register, they may have serious destabilizing effects on the regions concerned. The question of small arms acquisition depends, to a large extent, on responsible national legislative measures ensuring proper control on civilian and military use. Legislation must be in place to ensure that enforcement measures to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons - including their illicit production and trade - are effective and efficient, including measures to control goods in transit and those moving through free zones.
Successful regional agreements that have led to the disarming of warring factors should be studied carefully in an attempt to distil model elements that could help form the basis of future agreements.
6. There is, first and foremost, a definition-related aspect of the matter as regards the criteria to adopt in order to make an appropriate definition of the types of small arms and light weapons currently being used in conflicts.
One definition could be that such weapons are all small arms with 'automatic firing devices' that can be carried by an infantry soldier or perhaps a small vehicle or pack-animal. Another definition could comprise those weapons which do not need elaborate logistical and maintenance capability and can be employed by insurgent groups and paramilitary formations. Whatever definition is used, an analysis of the weapons actually being used in conflicts around the world could comprise: automatic firing hand-guns, automatic assault rifles, sub-machine-guns, machine- guns, rocket-propelled grenades, light anti-tank weapons, small- calibre mortars, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and handplaced mines.
7. As to the nature and causes of small arms' destabilizing accumulation and transfer, in his January 1994 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General identified four basic reasons: earlier supply during the Cold War, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets and criminal activity combined with the collapse of governmental law and order. The European Union would like to underline among these: internal conflicts, uncontrolled or excessive transfer of arms to regions of (intra- or inter-State) conflict, uncontrolled disposal of surplus weapons as a consequence of the reduction of people employed in the armed forces and the lack of a sense of personal security.
8. Violent inter-State conflicts, occurring in States subject to ethnic tensions and outright criminality, entail humanitarian costs. Provision of security assistance to thwart the lack of personal security should not be confused with defence assistance.
Such provision of assistance needs oversight by a neutral authority (such as the United Nations or other regional organizations). This should be combined with internal actions such as improved internal controls and procedures, tightening of national legislation and better training for indigenous security forces.
9. Reductions in the number of people employed in the armed forces, if not well managed, may increase uncontrolled access to small arms. Diversity of demobilization experiences among countries may, however, complicate the problem. (Statistics indicate that in recent demobilizations in Africa and Central America some one million soldiers and guerrilla forces were demobilized during the 1990s and more demobilizations are planned. In other countries in Asia and Latin America, large numbers of ex- combatants have also been demobilized.) In tackling demobilization problems, transparency, precision with regard to arms collection, safe storage and, if possible, on-the-spot destruction should be ensured to prevent diversion. ...
10. The lack of a sense of security fuels demand for weapons. Availability of weapons, in turn, fuels cycles of banditry and violence. In the context of small arms, the concept of security is related, first of all, to personal security. Provision of personal security is a basic responsibility of Governments.
11. With regard to intra-State conflicts, it can be observed that it is above all necessary to provide non-violent alternatives to post-conflict societies. These alternatives are often difficult to achieve as they are mostly of a medium- or long-term socio- political and economic nature and are national rather than regional in character.
12. Whereas during the Cold War the main objective was stability in the international arena, now the objective is to stabilize domestic situations. The United Nations is the main international organization requested by Governments to undertake tasks such as facilitating dialogue between warring parties, preventing renewal of internal armed conflict, strengthening infrastructure, improving local security and facilitating electoral processes.
13. Effective means to strengthen control and reduction of weapons during peace operations should be explored and could promote greater stability. Management and control of small arms and light weapons could become an important component of the settlement of conflicts, such as confidence-building measures, weapon control agreements, control of illegal weapons and transfers across borders. In some cases, buy-back programmes, such as those tried in Nicaragua and Haiti, could be explored. Thought could also be given to controlling the spreading of bullets and ammunition used for automatic small arms and light weapons.
14. The ideas outlined above may be some of the measures the implementation of which requires further study. However, the European Union is of the opinion that, in considering ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade, it will be important to remain focused on the real problems and not to allow duplication of efforts already under way elsewhere."
Review compiled from reports appearing between 15 September and 15 October. The Review is an account of news reports and does not seek to put forward or reflect the views or claims of Dfax.
As reported by Rebecca Johnson in the last issue, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva between 1994-96, was opened for signature at the United Nations on 24 September. That day, it was signed by 71 States, including the five declared nuclear-weapon States. On 14 October, Sylvana Foa, spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, reported that 124 States had signed, including 39 of 44 States with nuclear facilities whose ratification will be required for the Treaty to enter into force. The five exceptions are Algeria, Bangladesh, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North Korea), India and Pakistan. Of these, India has denounced the Treaty as iniquitous, while Pakistan has pledged not to sign until India does. If entry into force has not been achieved in three years, a special conference of signatories can be convened to discuss ways forward.
Notable signatories thus far include: Egypt (14 October) and Israel (25 September). One State, Fiji, has already ratified.
Editor's note: see last issue for comments made by the nuclear- weapon States at the signing ceremony.
Israel
"When we get down to ratifying the treaty we will also take into consideration the attitude of other countries in the area..."
Japan
"We heartily welcome today's signing...which will be a historic step toward creating a world free from nuclear weapons..."
Pakistan
"Let me state that just as we are prepared to sign any and all nuclear treaties if India simultaneously signs with us, any step of nuclear escalation by our neighbour will find a response from us to preserve our national security. ... The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is exactly the kind of global measure for non-proliferation and disarmament that India has been championing for years... Now the world can clearly see the reality..."
United States
"I don't know how it [India's position] is going to change, I don't know when it's going to change, and in fact I cannot even be certain whether it's going to change. But I think there will be a number of internal and international pressures that will build on India to change its position."
Editor's note: on 14 October, India's Minister for External Affairs, Kumar Gujral, stated that Canada was planning to resume peaceful nuclear cooperation with India. Canada withdrew all support for India's nuclear programme after India exploded a nuclear device in 1974. According to Gujral: "This development belies the fears that India will be isolated following its refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."
Reports: Hashimoto hails signing of global N-test ban pact, Kyodo News Service, 24 September; US ponders next step with India on test ban, Reuter News Reports, 25 September; United States hopes for Indian shift on nuclear test ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 25 September; Israel signs global nuclear test ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 25 September; Pakistan reiterates it will not sign nuclear test ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 2 October; Bhutto threatens to match Indian 'nuclear escalation', Agence France- Presse International News, 3 October; Bhutto calls for regional security conference, United States Information Agency, 3 October; Bhutto offers India talks on ending arms race, Inter Press Service International News, 4 October; 124 sign nuclear test ban treaty - Fiji ratifies, Reuter News Reports, 14 October; Egypt signs nuclear test ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 14 October; India, Canada to resume nuclear cooperation - FM, Agence France-Presse International News, 14 October.
In San Francisco in early October, a 'State of the World Forum', hosted by the Gorbachev Foundation, heard calls from former political and military leaders for urgent and radical nuclear disarmament, aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
On 3 October, retired US Air Force General Lee Butler, a former Commander-in-Chief of strategic nuclear forces, spoke of his conviction that "a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons." See Documents and Sources for substantial extracts from his address. Speaking to reporters the same day, Butler added: "When I [retired] and...put all the pieces together, I discovered that the puzzle didn't make any sense. The premise didn't make sense that...somehow we could find security in nuclear weapons... I think we were extraordinarily fortunate to escape the Cold War without a nuclear conflict." Now "the nuclear beast must be chained, its soul expunged, its lair laid waste."
Gorbachev addressed the Forum on 6 October, expressing grave concern about the state of the US-Russia, and more broadly NATO- Russia, arms control relationship:
"The disappearance of the Soviet Union from the geopolitical arena has created a new situation, and I am afraid that some are trying to play new geopolitical games... If that happens, then the process of nuclear disarmament in Russia will be very difficult, including ratification of START II... If we hear from the United States that military budgets here could grow, if ballistic missile defences will be created...[and] if NATO expands to the east, then in Russia people are beginning to think, 'what's happening? Is it a return to the past?'"
Reports: Former US Commander says scrap nuclear weapons, Reuter News Reports, 3 October; Russia nuclear disarmament not assured - Gorbachev, Reuter News Reports, 6 October.
US Defense Secretary William Perry has continued to seek to reassure that NATO has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any new Member States. On 21 September, speaking en route to Helsinki at the beginning of a tour of Scandinavia, Perry said that "there is no interest and no plan in NATO today for either number...of [nuclear] weapons or increasing [the] places where they are based." However, he also reiterated that the Alliance felt under no compunction to rule out any such increases in the future: "I don't think we're to the point where anybody's ready to make guarantees or commitments. I think NATO would want to see what's happening in the world, what's happening in Russia."
Perry coupled his latest reassurances with an appeal for Russia to enact deep cuts in its arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons. This arsenal is currently stored out of range of NATO territory, but Perry (21 September) urged discussions on action to prevent future redeployment: "We must get a meaningful, in-depth discussion of the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. And do to that - I'm talking about theatre tactical nuclear weapons, we need to get the players together." Describing the issue as a "complication", Perry elaborated: "Both Russia and the United States have made dramatic decreases in strategic nuclear weapons. But Russia has not made comparable decreases in its tactical theatre nuclear weapons." The US objective, he added, was for Russia to eliminate its entire stock: "We have urged them to do that. We will continue to urge them to do it."
It was not clear from his remarks, as reported, whether such elimination would be likely to induce a NATO commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new Alliance Members.
At a press conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 7 October, Russia's then Security Chief, General Alexander Lebed, gave his view of the arms control implications of possible NATO expansion. Lebed was asked if he could confirm that "NATO enlargement could affect the attitude of Russia towards not just the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Treaty but also the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] II." He replied: "When you look at the Duma today, most of the members consider that NATO enlargement will lead to enormous changes in the strategic climate and therefore it will not be possible to ratify the START II Treaty. And we're also worried about all the other treaties which have already been agreed on."
Lebed suggested that "we need to have either an agreement or a treaty [with NATO] which would be very specific in terms of its legal obligations and under that treaty all the duties and rights of those who have signed...would be made quite clear and START I and START II would be signed in that context along with the treaty on the elimination of chemical weapons and several other treaties as well. It's a problem which is a very widespread one and we need an integrated approach."
On 15 October, the day before a visit to Russia by Secretary Perry, an unnamed official from Russia's Defence Ministry was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying: "Adjustments must be made in both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the [START II] Treaty." The same day, a member of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, Vladimir Averchev, said "we hope that...Perry will say the Americans are ready to extend the [2003] deadline" for the implementation of START II. "Russia," he said, "cannot fulfil the conditions of START II within the timeframe laid down because of financial difficulties."
See Documents and Sources for extracts from Perry's address to the Duma.
Reports: NATO wary of nuclear-free pledge to Russia - Perry, Reuter News Reports, 21 September; Perry blames NATO uncertainty on Russian delay in reducing [tactical nuclear weapons], AP Datastream Washington News Wire, 21 September; NATO expansion could undermine arms pacts - Lebed, Reuter News Reports, 7 October; Press Conference of Secretary General and General Lebed, NATO Transcript, 7 October; Russia to seek amendments in START II Treaty - report, Agence France-Presse International News, 15 October; Perry heads to Russia to defend START II, reaffirm military ties, Agence France-Presse International News, 15 October; Russian Duma members sceptical of START II, Armed Forces Newswire Service, 15 October; Russian ministry wants changes to key N-arms pact, Reuter News Reports, 15 October; Russian official wants changes to major arms pact, Reuter News Reports, 15 October.
As reported in recent issues, Ukraine is repeatedly exerting diplomatic effort to press the issue of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in Central Europe. This is also favoured by Belarus. Russia favours a prohibition on the deployment of nuclear weapons outside the territory of the nuclear-weapon State.
Addressing the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September, Ukraine's Foreign Minister, Hennadi Udovenko, stated:
"I would like to emphasise that the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of our neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe is a matter of great concern to us... We believe that support of the idea of a non-nuclear Europe would promote an atmosphere of confidence between and among the States of the region and would prevent the emergence of new dividing lines on the European continent."
Speaking in Kiev on 4 October, Udovenko revealed that he had "sent letters to the Foreign Ministers of 16 NATO countries and to NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and asked that this [NWFZ proposal] be discussed... We have received their answers. These letters were very serious. They did not reject the idea and showed that they were ready for talks."
Editor's note: On 15 October, Ukraine's Environment Minister, Yuri Kostenko, told a press conference that his government was struggling to meet its commitment to close a reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant by the end of October. The pledge was given at the April 1996 'G-8' (group of seven leading industrialised nations plus Russia) Nuclear Safety Summit. According to the Minister:
"At this moment the decision is made and the station is preparing to close the first block [reactor] by the end of October. But on the other hand only one block running at Chernobyl is dangerous."
Kostenko said the reason for the current problems was lack of adequate financial assistance. However, he was reassured by recent discussions with G7 officials in Paris: "We will receive $600 to $800 million from the EBRD [European Bank of Reconstruction and Development] to finish the blocks. Talks will be solved by the end of this year and we will see financing next year." Despite this apparent progress, Kostenko emphasised that "we did not come to an agreement on stopping the first block."
Reports: Ukraine worried about potential nuclear neighbours, Reuter News Reports, 26 September; Ukraine says West interested in non-nuclear zone, Reuter News Reports, 4 October; Ukraine not sure it can shut Chernobyl reactor, Reuter News Reports, 15 October.
On 16 September, France ceremonially removed its land-based nuclear force from active service at the Plateau d'Albion site in Provence. The decision to decommission, and not replace, the force of 18 S3-D missiles, each reportedly capable of delivering a 1 megaton warhead over a range of 3,500 km/2,200 miles, was taken on 22 February this year, with further details announced on 6 September (see last issue).
The S3-D force entered service at Plateau d'Albion in 1970. Its decommissioning will take an estimated 30 months, and cost an estimated $77.5 million.
A 16 September statement from President Chirac read: "A page of history has turned... But the will of the nation to guarantee its ultimate safety in all circumstances remains." The Chief of General Staff, Air Force General Jean Rannou, claimed that "these have not been 25 wasted years but 25 years of peace."
Editor's note: On 23 September, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) announced that France had become the first nuclear-weapon State to ratify its accession to the Protocols of the 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba). The OAU statement reportedly followed a 20 September meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the Organisation's Assistant Secretary-General, Ahmed Haggag, and France's Ambassador to Ethiopia, Louis Amigues. China, the UK and US have all signed the Protocols, and Russia has stated its intention to do so (see Guest Analysis in this issue, and Disarmament Diplomacy No. 4, April 1996).
On 24 September, the leader of France's National Front party, Jean- Marie Le Pen, criticised the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), characterising France's willingness to join as "ridiculous and dangerous". Le Pen explained:
Stopping testing means implicitly renouncing our ability to defend our independence and thus our sovereignty... [France] should possess extremely sophisticated ways of penetrating enemy systems, which would necessitate continuing tests..."
Reports: France prepares to dismantle land-based nuclear missiles, AP Datastream International News Wire, 16 September; Chirac turns page on land-based nuclear missiles, Agence France-Presse International News, 16 September; France shuts down land-based nuclear missiles, Agence France-Presse International News, 16 September; France ratifies Africa's nuclear-free zone treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 23 September; French far- right leader denounces nuclear test ban treaty, Agence France- Presse International News, 24 September; Missiles scrapped, News from France, 24 September.
In Beijing in early October, the United States and China held warm and positive discussions on a range of arms control and non- proliferation issues. The US delegation was led by John Holum, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). After meeting with Vice Foreign Ministers Liu Huaqiu and Li Zhaoxing, Holum stated (9 October): "We find that China is an increasingly constructive partner in a number of our global arms control priorities." See Documents and Sources for further details.
On 10 October, a spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry, Shen Guofang, told reporters that, during the discussions:
"China advocated that an agreement on mutually giving up the first- use of nuclear weapons be reached between China and the US. This could also be similar to what China and Russia have done in promising not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to target strategic nuclear weapons at each other..."
According to reports, Shen claimed that Holum had expressed some interest in exploring a non-targeting agreement.
9 October saw the appearance of the latest in a long-line of US press reports alleging Chinese support for Pakistan's suspected nuclear weapons programme. The Washington Times reported that China had sold a furnace and diagnostic-equipment to an unsafeguarded nuclear facility in Pakistan. If true, the sale would appear to contradict an undertaking given by China to the US in May. However, according to State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns (9 October):
"Based on information currently available, we have no reason to believe that China is acting in a way that is inconsistent with the statement that China made on 11 May. ... The senior-level people in this government have looked at these specific charges. We do not conclude that China has violated [its commitments]... I think we have worked to push the Chinese government towards a more serious commitment to join us in fighting proliferation..."
An official from China's Embassy in Washington, Yu Shuning, was quoted on 9 October as maintaining simply: "We have all along abided by our obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."
Reports: US, China make progress on proliferation issues, Kyodo News Service, 9 October; Administration finds no violation in pledge on nuclear sales, AP Datastream Washington News Wire, 9 October; Washington upbeat on non-proliferation talks with Beijing, Agence France-Presse International News, 9 October; China sells more nuclear-weapons-related equipment to Pakistan - report, Agence France-Presse International News, 9 October; China reportedly sold more nuclear equipment to Pakistan, Agence France- Presse International News, 9 October; US says China has honoured nonproliferation pledge, Agence France-Presse International News, 9 October; US says China did not violate nuclear pledge, Reuter News Reports, 9 October; US denies report on China's nuclear sale to Pakistan, Kyodo News Service, 9 October; China-US discuss mutual no-nuke pact, Kyodo News Service, 10 October.
In New York on 23 September, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russia's Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov announced that agreement had been reached on agreeing definitions of 'low-velocity' theatre missile defence systems permissible under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Both men spoke with confidence of the prospects of achieving agreement on higher velocity systems.
The agreement essentially authorises systems whose interceptors do not have velocities of more than 3 kilometres per second, and which have not been tested against targets with velocities in excess of 5 kilometres per second, or ranges greater than 3,500 kilometres. US systems thus authorised include its Patriot missiles, currently undergoing upgrade, and a planned Navy Lower Tier system. See last issue's Documents and Sources for the full text of the joint US-Russia statement.
According to Christopher, "this important progress assures that we can effectively defend against theater missiles while keeping the integrity of the ABM Treaty" intact. Primakov said the breakthrough "undoubtedly can move ahead the process of ratification" of the START II Treaty by the Russian Duma.
It was also announced on 23 September that talks, in the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative Committee (SCC), on high-velocity systems would commence on 7 October.
On 9 October, a lawsuit disputing the legality of the Administration's current missile defence plans, was barred from proceeding. The case was brought on 17 July by 41 members of Congress, and had its legitimacy vigorously disputed by the Department of Defense. Federal Judge Stanley Sporkin argued: "The dispute between the Executive and Legislative branches with respect to the ballistic missile defense program is not yet ripe for resolution by the judicial branch."
Specifically, the lawsuit concentrates on the planned schedule for the development of two missile defence systems (the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) and the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system. Sporkin commented: "The funds appropriated for the THAAD and NTW remain available for obligation until 30 September 1997, and the ongoing dialogue between the Department of Defense and the Congress suggests that the two branches of government may yet have a meeting of minds." However, "there may come a day when Congress will speak more clearly on this matter and dialogue with the Executive branch will have been exhausted. If and when that day comes, this court will revisit the critical areas presented here. The Court does not believe that the Executive can blatantly defy the Congress where the national security interest may be at stake."
At the core of the lawsuit - referred to in court as Spence [Chair of the House National Security Committee Floyd Spence (Republican, South Carolina)] et al verses Clinton - is the contention that the Administration is insufficiently committed to THAAD and NTW, and in so being is running the risk of jeopardising US national security. In detail, the argument is that while Congressional legislation (in Section 234 on the FY96 Defense Authorization Act) calls for the deployment of THAAD in 2000, and NTW the following year, the Administration is unlikely to consider itself in a position to make a decision about deployment before 2003.
A prominent mover of the lawsuit was Republican Representative Curt Weldon (Pennsylvania), who, speaking on 9 October, described Sporkin's decision as a "victory", on the grounds that "it sends a signal to the Administration that we're not going to roll over, and when we do something legislatively we expect compliance." However, Weldon conceded:
"I think the dates already have slipped realistically... Because the Administration last year didn't follow through it makes it almost impossible to move the deployment date for THAAD [to] before 2003. ... [But] we're going to keep forcing them to do it as quickly as we can... The date is not important as much as getting a commitment from the Administration to proceed. The Administration is leaving our troops exposed..."
Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Col. Nancy Burt also expressed satisfaction with the ruling, insisting on 9 October that:
"The Defense Department is committed to developing an effective missile defense program and will continue to work with the Congress to deploy affordable and operationally effective theater missile defenses."
THAAD itself, meanwhile, continues to frustrate its supporters. Plans to test a limited system before the end of 1998 are currently being cast into doubt by "recent testing difficulties" which have "exhausted the remaining margin on this program" and "have added considerable risk to our ability to hold [to the deadline", according to the head of Pentagon acquisition Paul Kaminski, addressing a Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee in late September. Kaminski added that the next test of a THAAD interceptor - the seventh of 14 - was planned for December. As the interceptor had failed to intercept anything in its previous three tests, the "success of that [fourth] flight test is going to be very critical" in determining "whether or not we can stay on track." The last test was held in July. On 9 October, the incoming Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, argued that the interceptor was suffering from "engineering" rather than "technical" defects. "The challenge is to get every component to work together at the same time," he revealed to reporters.
Tests for the THAAD radar system are reported to have commenced satisfactorily. The first of two scheduled tests was held, at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, on 10 October. Army spokesperson Sandra Trousedale announced that "the THAAD radar detected, acquired, and tracked target objects throughout their flight." The second tested is reportedly scheduled for Spring 1997, at the Kwajalein Missile Range at the Johnston Atoll.
According to reports, the limited system being aimed at would consist of 40 interceptors and 2 radars, deployed as a 'user operational evaluation system.'
In mid-September, the General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report critical of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment released in November 1995, which claimed that "no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 States." The GAO report, Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of Certain National Intelligence Estimates, published on 12 September, objected to the fact that this claim was "Worded with clear...certainty." "We believe," the GAO argued, that "this level of certainty was overstated, based on the caveats and the intelligence gaps noted."
Speaking on 12 September, Chair of the House National Security Committee, Floyd Spence, reacted:
"Despite the CIA's [Central Intelligence Agency's] refusal to grant GAO investigators access to analysts associated with the estimate, the report, nevertheless, provides a useful contribution to the ongoing debate by raising legitimate questions about the assumptions, methodology, evidence, and treatment of alternative views in the 1995 estimate."
Under the recently passed FY97 Defense Authorization Act, the Director of the CIA, former Deputy Defense Secretary John Deutch, is mandated to assemble a panel to report on the analysis and conclusions of the NIE assessment. Additionally, the legislation stipulates the formation of an independent nine-member Commission to "assess the nature and magnitude of existing and emerging missile threats to the United States."
On 2 October, the Center for Strategic and Budget Assessments (CBSA) think-tank in Washington, released a report suggesting that it would be foolhardy to expect interceptor systems such as THAAD to significantly counter the ballistic missile threat. "Missile defenses," the report argues, "will not improve enough to make such defenses dominant in future warfare." Instead, the CBSA advocates a much greater emphasis on disabling and neutralising ballistic missile system by means of electronic warfare.
Editor's note: On 24 September, the Congress began a series of hearings on missile defence issues. See Documents and Sources for extracts.
Reports: GAO - CIA underrated threats from foreign ICBMs, Military Space, 16 September; Intelligence estimate on missile defense 'overstated,' GAO says, Aerospace Daily, 16 September; GAO critical of NIE on ballistic missile threat, BMD Monitor, 20 September; Christopher, Primakov approve anti-missile agreement, United States Information Agency, 23 September; Congress orders outside review of missile threat, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 23 September; US, Russia hopeful on swift conclusion of ABM Treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 24 September; US and Russia agree on modification of ABM Treaty, Armed Forces Newswire Service, 25 September; Senators are cautious about missile defense demarcation deal, Aerospace Daily, 27 September; Kaminski - Thai's failures could jeopardize deployment date, Armed Forces Newswire Service, 1 October; Judge to hear case for dismissing missile defense suit, Defense Daily, 3 October; Judge deciding whether to hear missile defense case, Defense Daily, 4 October; Line between strategic and theater missiles narrows, BMD Monitor, 4 October; CBSA - focus on electronic defense against missiles, BMD Monitor, 4 October; Next THAAD test critical to program, BMDO chief says, Defense Daily, 9 October; Army conducts successful THAAD radar test, Defense Daily, 10 October; Court dismisses GOP lawsuit over missile policy, AP Datastream Washington News Wire, 10 October; Judge dismisses missile defense suit, Defense Daily, 11 October.
Progress towards replacing North Korea's heavy-water nuclear reactors, suspended since an October 1994 Framework Agreement between the US and North Korea, has been continuing, with further agreements on protocol texts between North Korea and the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the body charged with providing the replacement, light-water, reactors. However, tensions between the two Koreas have been greatly exacerbated by the running aground of a North Korean submarine in South Korea on 18 September.
On 24 September, US Secretary of State Christopher stressed that the US did not want the incident to disrupt North Korea-KEDO relations: "We think the nuclear agreement is an extremely important agreement... It remains in the interests of both countries and indeed the region as a whole..."
However, on 15 October, it was reported that North Korea had sought reassurances from the US that progress would not be jeopardised by or linked to the submarine incident. According to a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson, clarification was necessary after suggestions that the US State Department Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, in a visit to Seoul the previous week, had told South Korea such a linkage would be warranted:
"Taking the seriousness of the issue into full consideration, we have asked the US side to make an official explanation about the result of the South Korean visit of Winston Lord... Our future decision and action will be adopted according to the stand of the US side...
At the [Lord-South Korea] conversations, the US side confirmed that it would continue with the provision of light-water reactors...[but also] expressed understanding on the 'stand' of the South Korean authorities to delay the[ir] provision on the pretext of the incident of the submarine. ... If the US administration...decided to leave the provision of light-water reactors to the unilateral decision of the South Korean authorities, it will, needless to say, have a decisive influence on the implementation of the agreement... If things go that way, it goes without saying that the future of the DPRK-US framework agreement has already been decided on..."
Lord met South Korea's Foreign Minister, Gong Ro Myung, on 11 and 12 October. Speaking after the 11 October meeting, the Foreign Minister commented: "[we] agreed in principle to implement the nuclear agreement, not to scrap it. The situation does not permit [scrapping] it." Yoo Mung Hwa, Director-General of the South Korean Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau, who also attended the meeting, told reporters that "we...agreed that the freeze of nuclear weapons development is very important to world peace and, therefore, implementation of the [framework] agreement is important." However, the previous day, South Korea's President Kim Young-Sam was quoted as observing that, as a result of the submarine incursion, "the reactor construction project will...take some more time." "We are in no hurry," he added.
On 29 September, following negotiations between North Korea and KEDO in New York lasting from 22 August - 26 September, it was reported that agreement had been reached on the text of the two final protocols - concerning arrangements at the site of the new reactors, Sinpo, and details of North Korean labour costs and services - needing to be drawn up before implementation can proceed. According to North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA): "Full conditions for starting the light-water reactor have been created with the agreement on the protocols." However, on 10 October, KEDO spokesperson Jason Sheplen stated that political approval from KEDO was still awaited. There was a suggestion in some reports that this approval is being withheld as a political protest against the submarine incursion.
North Korean officials met officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna from 23-27 September to attempt to make progress of Agency inspections at North Korean facilities suspended under the Framework Agreement. No statement was issued after the talks, and, according to an unnamed IAEA official, "there doesn't seem to have been much progress." On 17 September, US Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary had claimed that the Framework Agreement had been a "tremendous success", meaning that "the IAEA is stymied no more" in its attempts to ascertain the full extent, and extant status, of North Korea's nuclear activities. The previous day, Agency Director General Dr. Hans Blix had concluded that "the IAEA remains unable to verify the initial declaration of nuclear material" made by North Korea.
Meeting in Luxembourg on 1 October, European Union (EU) Foreign Ministers mandated the EU Commission to seek entry into KEDO for EURATOM, the Union's nuclear energy organization. The EU has offered to contribute $18 million to KEDO for each of the next five years.
On 25 September, South Korea's Unification Ministry claimed that North Korea was producing around 100 Scud missiles per year, and had exported a total of 400 to the Middle east. According to the Ministry statement: "Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the start of supplies of conventional Soviet-made weapons in the early 1990s, the North has focused its arms exports on strategic weapons including Scud missiles."
Reports: IAEA chief denounces North Korea for lack of cooperation, Agence France-Presse International News, 16 September; O'Leary praises North Korean nuclear cooperation, Agence France-Presse International News, 17 September; North Korean delegation leaves for nuclear talks in Vienna, Agence France-Presse International News, 22 September; Sub has not sunk North Korean nuclear deal - US, Reuter News Reports, 24 September; N. Korea can produce 100 Scud missiles yearly - Seoul, Reuter News Reports, 25 September; North Korea and KEDO agree on protocols for reactor project, Agence France-Presse International News, 29 September; EU to negotiate ties with Korea nuclear group, Reuter News Reports, 1 October; IAEA's meeting with North Koreans failed - report, Agence France-Presse International News, 2 October; Talks with North Korea 'in flux' on nuclear project, Agence France-Presse International News, 10 October; S. Korea agrees to preserve N. Korea nuclear pact, Reuter News Reports, 11 October; N. Korea issues veiled threat over nuclear accord, Reuter News Reports, 15 October; North Korea threatens to abrogate nuclear deal with US, AP Datastream International News Wire, 15 October; N. Korea asks US for reassurances on nuclear agreement, Agence France-Presse International News, 15 October.
On 11 October, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), investigating weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) programmes in Iraq, submitted its half-yearly report to the UN Security Council. Its verdict, yet again, was that it still has much work to do to establish what the actual situation is; that its work continues to be seriously hampered by Iraq; and that it was highly likely that Iraq retained WMD, and WMD-related, stocks. Concerning the latter claim, the report contends that UNSCOM "continues to believe that limited, but highly significant quantities may remain, as Iraq has not been able to account for a number of proscribed missiles and certain high-quality chemical and biological warfare agents."
Iraq recently submitted 'final declarations' to UNSCOM on the status of its alleged chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles, programmes. The report, submitted by Commission Chair Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, was strongly critical of the declarations: "Major sections are incomplete, inaccurate or unsubstantiated. Materials acquired for proscribed activities are understated." Speaking the same day, Deputy Commission Chair Charles Duelfer (US) argued; "Iraq still needs to take a fundamental decision to give up what they still retain and it is clear that they have not done that yet."
Duelfer visited Iraq at the start of October, reportedly telling his hosts on 1 October that the forthcoming report would be damning. On 3 October, Duelfer what he described as "letters...to explain part of the Iraqi declarations." However, he added that "we still believe that Iraq retains prohibited materials and documents. The doubt exists in each of the areas - chemical, biological and ballistics."
On 2 October, addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Iraq's Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf alleged that UNSCOM's investigations, which he said had involved 373 inspections and over 3,500 inspectors, had been deliberately perpetuated and subverted by the US and UK. Mr. al-Sahaf claimed that UNSCOM's findings "emanate from American and British intelligence services and their agents" and asked: "What has this huge army of inspectors been doing for all this long period of time? They did not come to Iraq for a vacation." The Foreign Minister suggested that all five permanent members of the Security Council, plus Egypt, should "directly participate in the evaluation of [UNSCOM's] work and final conclusions." UNSCOM argues that but for Iraqi obstruction it would already have concluded its studies. According to the 11 October report, Iraq had consistently "put obstacles in the way of rapid completion of the implementation tasks." Thus:
"The Commission has therefore not reached the stage where it can state with confidence that everything that is proscribed to Iraq has been identified and disposed of."
The report means that sanctions against Iraq, in place since the Gulf War, will be maintained. Resolution 986 makes allowance for an emergency sale of oil to raise funds for humanitarian supplies. In May, the Security Council decided that a $2 billion should proceed. However, concerns, principally raised by the US, over implementing and overseeing a sale have continually prevented progress. On 27 September, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched an appeal for $39.9 million to begin to implement an emergency relief programme "until such time as Security Council resolution 986...may be implemented." The appeal concludes:
"Efforts so far to meet the urgent needs of vulnerable groups in Iraq have been hampered by a sharp decline in contributions to essential humanitarian efforts. This year only $12 million have been pledged or received by the United Nations, and only $17 million have been made available to non-governmental organizations and bilateral programmes.
The proposed Programme targets the most basic needs of vulnerable groups throughout the country in the priority sectors of food, health, nutrition, water and sanitation, as well as other essential services to facilitate the resettlement of the displaced people. Donors are urged to contribute generously to this appeal."
Reports: United Nations seeks $39.9 Million for emergency relief needs in Iraq, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 27 September; UN envoy to discuss Iraq's banned weapons programs, Agence France-Presse International News, 29 September; UN tells Iraq its weapons reports are flawed, Reuter News Reports, 1 October; Iraq grants interviews but fails to allay missile fears, Agence France-Presse International News, 1 October; Iraq rejects UN claim it has not come clean on weapons program, Agence France- Presse International News, 2 October; Iraqi FM says Egypt should join disarmament Commission, APS Diplomat, 2 October; Disarmament official ends visit, APS Diplomat, 3 October; Iraq clarifies its weapons declarations to UN, Reuter News Reports, 3 October; Iraq hiding material, documents linked to banned weapons - UN, Agence France-Presse International News, 3 October; Iraq hands over letters on banned arms, UN envoy denies bias, Agence France-Presse International News, 3 October; UN chief arms inspector has doubts on Iraqi proposal, Agence France-Presse International News, 4 October; Arms inspector hands over critical report to Security Council, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 October; UN accuses Iraq of concealment, delaying sanctions lifting, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 October; Iraq admits to concealing weaponry - UN, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 October; Iraq may still be concealing nerve gas and missiles, AP Datastream International News Wire, 11 October; UN still refuses to clear Iraq on dangerous arms, Reuter News Reports, 11 October.
Speaking in London on 10 October, Sergei Kisilev, the Deputy Head of Russia's Delegation to the Preparatory Commission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), spoke of the practical difficulties involving in Russia fulfilling its obligations under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Like the other chemical weapons Superpower, the US, Russia has yet to ratify the Convention. As of 10 October, 64 States had ratified. The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification.
Kisilev admitted difficulties in raising the estimated $3.6 billion required to eliminate stocks. This basic difficulty looked like being compounded by others: organizational, legal and ecological. He elaborated:
"It will require a real organizational effort to build destruction facilities in the areas where the stocks are located and certain legal requirements will also have to be met. ...
It's our responsibility to finance the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia and it's a tough job. At present we can't see where the finance will come from but it is a 10-year destruction programme so we can spread out the sums, Most of the money will come from the government. Parliament undertook to allocate certain sums for the programme last year but only part of this has been provided by the Finance Ministry. ...
We have strict ecological requirements in Russia and we have to ensure that the technology is ecologically safe. This is an absolute requirement."
Kisilev made an appeal for help: "Russia did not take the initiative in chemical weapons development but was propelled along by the arms race. The problem has now been inherited by mankind including Europe. So other countries who believe the destruction of Russian stocks is in their interest can draw their own conclusions. Perhaps the European Union could help?"
Russia possesses an estimated 40,000 ton stockpile.
Report: Russia to ratify chemical weapons treaty - eventually, Inter Press Service International News, 10 October.
On 1 October, South Korea joined the 'Australia Group' of States seeking to prohibit the transfer of chemical-and-biological- weapons-related materials and technology. South Korea becomes the Group's 31st member. Founded in 1985, it also includes the US, Japan, Australia and most EU States. According to a South Korea Foreign Ministry statement on 2 October;
"By joining the Australian Group, our country will be able to contribute to international efforts to prevent proliferation of biochemical weapons."
Report: Seoul joins chemical arms non-proliferation body, Reuter News Reports, 2 October.
In Ottawa in early (3-5) October, the Canadian Government hosted a Conference designed to further the cause of a complete landmines ban. Entitled 'Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines,' the Conference, attended by 71 States (47 participating States and 24 observer States), ended with the release (5 October) of the 'Ottawa Declaration' urging a total ban, signed by 50 States (the 47, plus Bolivia, Colombia and Iran) - see Documents and Sources for full text. The Conference is an evident reflection of dissatisfaction with attempts to secure a ban through the painstaking review of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which adopted in May a new protocol seeking to ban certain types of mine (see Issue No. 5) as a transitional step to abolition.
Speaking on 5 October, an up-beat Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, stated: "Over the past last few days, representatives of 70 countries, non-governmental organizations, and multilateral agencies, and private citizens, have told us that this gathering has added greatly to the momentum to ban AP [anti-personnel] mines." Axworthy added a potentially momentous offer: "If the will is there, and we believe it is, we are offering to host an AP mines ban treaty-signing conference in December 1997 as a sign of our commitment to the ban. ... We will work to elaborate a text of such a treaty with any and every other like-minded country." The aim would be for such a treaty to enter into force in 2000. The Minister added, however, that not 'every' country could realistically be expected to join a ban, at least initially; the priority, though, was to get a ban in place: "I am convinced that we cannot wait for the universal treaty. We may have to proceed with a treaty that does not, in the first instance, include all of the States of the world."
In the run-up to the Conference, Canada made two related announcements: on 2 October, that it planned to destroy a minimum of two-thirds of its landmines stocks ("a powerful message to the world that we are committed to the eradication of these weapons," according to Defence Minister David Collenette); on 3 October, that it would be contributing an additional $2 million (Canadian) to global de-mining programmes.
The Ottawa Conference also concentrated French minds, with the following statement being released by Government spokesperson Alain Lamassoure on 2 October:
"[In Ottawa,] France will support the conclusion of an international accord to be legally-binding and technically verifiable, on the total and general ban of anti-personnel mines... France will formally announce [that it] is to end the use of anti-personnel mines, except when absolutely necessary to protect its forces in the framework of a military operation. ... [France will also announce] that it is continuing to reduce its stocks of mines by destroying them, in an operation which began in September..."
On 10 October, it was reported that France planned to destroy half its landmine stocks. No numbers or schedules were forthcoming from an unnamed Defence Ministry source.
The United States' representative at the Conference was Thomas McNamara, Assistant secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. Describing a total ban as "one of the President's top arms control priorities," though also stressing the "unique" situation in the Korean Peninsular ("[we] will protect our right to use APL there until alternatives become available or the risk of aggression has been removed"), McNamara, speaking on 3 October, itemised the political and practical steps his government was taking to further this objective:
"I cannot overestimate how seriously the United States takes the goal of eliminating APL entirely. Beginning in 1999, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit an annual report to the President and the Secretary of Defense outlining his assessment of whether there remains a military requirement for the exceptions I have noted [Korea, and use of mines in demining and countermining training and operations]. ...
In addition to this Conference, the UN General Assembly session is an excellent opportunity for all of us to help keep the spotlight on efforts to ban APL. ... the APL resolution the United States is proposing in the UN General Assembly this year goes further than previous resolutions in that it focuses on a call for concluding negotiations as soon as possible on an agreement to ban APL, while the previous resolutions focused on export moratoria and the 'eventual elimination' of APL Many of you have joined the US in adopting bans, moratoria, or other restrictions on APL. ..."
Despite his enthusiasm for a ban, McNamara was unpersuaded of the benefits of fixing target-dates, telling reporters on 4 October: "Fixing a date is not, in our opinion, the best way of going about it. I don't think the year 2000 is a realistic date."
Speaking for the UN, Undersecretary-General Yasushi Akashi expressed confidence (3 October) "that this occasion will provide an important impetus to the global endeavour aimed at putting an end to the scourge of landmines." Akashi's confidence was based in part on the fact that "the number of States which support a global ban...has significantly increased."
In cautious contrast, Russia's representative, Viatcheslav Sergueev, told reporters on 3 October: "The idea of a total ban is a rather new one, and we are here to see how those countries which support it are moving forward."
China, a major mines producer, did not attend the Conference. On 18 September, a senior Chinese official, Peng Qingyuan of the National People's Congress (NPC), argued that "the efforts to solve the problem of landmines should take into consideration humanitarian concerns and the justifiable military need for self- defense in sovereign States." Landmines, Qingyuan added, were "a justifiable means for self-defense in many countries, particularly in those with long land boundaries." Qingyuan was speaking at the 96th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), held in Beijing, 16-20 September. 600 Parliamentarians from 133 States called unanimously on 20 September for all States to work to make progress towards a ban.
A further Conference, to review and if need be hasten progress, is scheduled for June 1997 in Belgium.
Addressing the UN General Assembly on 23 September, Brazil's Foreign Minister, Luiz Felipe Lampreia, declared "a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines." Lampreia urged: "We would like to see all countries that export landmines or that have the capacity to do so join us in this decision."
Many Foreign Ministers referred to the landmines issues in their address to the General Assembly. Speaking both for Ireland and the EU, Dick Spring stated powerfully: "It is an incredible and obscene irony that at a time when the United Nations...is continuing its vital work of mine clearance, further millions of anti-personnel landmines are deployed annually."
Reports: Landmines a legitimate form of defence - official, Agence France-Presse International News, 18 September; Inter- Parliamentary Union calls for ban on landmines, Agence France- Presse International News, 20 September; Brazil kicks off General Assembly debate with call on landmines, Agence France-Presse International News, 23 September; New signs of UN push for landmine ban, Reuter News Reports, 24 September; France to back total ban on anti-personnel mines, Agence France-Presse International News, 2 October; Canada pledges to destroy most of its landmines, Reuter News Reports, 2 October; Powerful nations push for landmine ban, Reuter News Reports, 3 October; Conference aimed at global ban on landmines opens with hope, warning, Agence France-Presse International News, 3 October; McNamara Ottawa speech on banning landmines, United States Information Agency, 3 October; Statement by Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 5 October; 50 countries say they will work for ban on anti-personnel mines, Agence France- Presse International News, 5 October; Canada sets Dec 97 deadline for treaty ban on mines, Inter Press Service International News, 7 October; France to destroy half its anti-personnel mines, Reuter News Reports, 10 October.
In early October, it was reported that NATO was on the verge of proposing changes to the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. According to an unnamed Alliance source on 3 October: "The 16 countries in the Alliance have agreed on a mandate for negotiations to modernise the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which will be presented Tuesday [8 October] in Vienna." The source also predicted that negotiations were likely to commence immediately following a 2-3 December OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) summit in Lisbon. Russia also wants changes to the Treaty, though it is likely to be wary of accommodating future deployments in an enlarged NATO.
Speaking to reporters in Brussels on 7 October, NATO Secretary- General Solana said that "as far as the CFE Treaty is concerned...probably tomorrow NATO nations will table in Vienna a proposal for a modification of the...treaty, that will take into account several issues that are of concern to Russia, including the question of grouping, which...is one of the most complicated questions that we have to tackle in finding out whatever adaptation of the...treaty might be possible."
Reports: NATO countries want to modernize CFE Treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 3 October; Press Conference of Secretary General and General Lebed, NATO Transcript, 7 October.
In the last issue of Disarmament Diplomacy (CTBT Special Report, by Rebecca Johnson, p. 22), India's ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Arundhati Ghose, was incorrectly quoted as declaring that India would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "not now, not later." This should have read: "not now, nor later." The error was due to a late editorial change, made without the author's knowledge.