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Editor's note:the Committee agreed its Programme of Work
(A/C.1/52/CRP.1) on 9 October. The Committee's schedule is as
follows: general debate, 13-24 October; "structured thematic
discussion", 27-31 October; "exchange of views on the
rationalization of work and reform of the Committee's agenda", 3-4
November; consideration of draft resolutions, 5-7 November; action
on draft resolutions, 10-18 November.
The extracts below are taken from UN Press Releases, which utilise
the speakers' words as much as possible.
Algeria
Statement by Abdul Abadi
"There was no alternative to the achievement of genuine and
complete nuclear disarmament... It should be the absolute priority.
He supported the proposal to develop a timetable for the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons. Nothing should stand in the way of
negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament. Measures related
to the production of fissile material should be combined with other
negotiations. ...
...the Secretary-General had confirmed the central role that the
United Nations should play in achieving world security but the
decision to form a special Department for Disarmament and Arms
Regulation required clarification, particularly in terms of the
priorities that would be allocated to it. Nuclear disarmament must
remain the absolute priority. Also, such a Department should not
affect the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament or the
Disarmament Commission, which was open to the participation of all
Member States."
Source:United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3083, 16
October
Argentina
Statement by Fernando Enrique Petrella
"Welcoming the progress made towards implementation of the CTBT, he
announced that his Government had initiated the steps for
parliamentary ratification of the Treaty. ...
It was also important to support the anti-personnel landmine ban
which had been agreed to in Oslo. A ban on such weapons was
supported by the Latin American and Caribbean Group. The countries
of the Rio Group - Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Honduras, and
Guyana - wanted to convert the region into one free of
anti-personnel landmines.
Increased security in Latin America had meant the area was free of
arms races... Democratic governments had established confidence in
the region, and the decision of the United States to make the sale
of weapons to the area more flexible would be met with stability.
In a constructive climate, dialogue and joint military exercises
were being undertaken by Argentina with Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.
..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3080, 13
October
Australia
Statement by John Campbell
"Of highest priority was the need to conclude a cut-off treaty on
fissile material... A cut-off was an important corollary to the
completed CTBT and was the next logical step on the path towards
the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It was also the ripest
issue for a multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation within the
Conference on Disarmament. He remained deeply disappointed that the
reservations of a fraction of the Conference's membership were
bogging it down. A cut-off treaty was surely an outcome for which
it was worth putting aside those differences, and it would be
another brick in the wall of nuclear disarmament. ...
It was with considerable frustration that he had witnessed the
lumbering and convulsive attempts of the Conference to find an
appropriate post-CTBT role for itself...
...while the question of the approach to nuclear disarmament was a
major cause of the logjam in the Conference, he was committed to
the pursuit of the ultimate objective - global nuclear disarmament
- through concrete interlocking steps. ...
The world's international security architecture would be poorer, if
the Conference were to stagnate and decline into irrelevance... Its
membership must urgently decide whether that body would make a
central contribution."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3082, 15
October
Belarus
Statement by Sergei Martynov
"Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones was a major prerequisite in
the effort to strengthen nuclear security in Central Europe... The
initiative to establish such a zone in Central and Eastern Europe,
further developed by the Minsk international conference, was a
cornerstone for political and military stabilization in the region.
... On the issue of anti-personnel landmines...it would be more
appropriate to conduct negotiations on such weapons through the
Conference on Disarmament than in the Ottawa process."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3085, 20
October
Brazil
Statement by Celso L.N. Amorim
"... Caution should be exercised, as well as self-restraint, to
avoid a new arms race of sophisticated weapons among the
nuclear-weapon States. ...
On 20 June, the President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
submitted the NPT to the Brazilian Congress for approval... The
option of acquiring nuclear weapons was renounced by Brazil long
ago. His country had actively participated in negotiating the
Treaty of Tlatelolco. The same renunciation was reaffirmed in other
bilateral agreements. Now, in joining the non-proliferation regime
of the NPT, his country intended to further the cause of nuclear
disarmament. But, the NPT by itself did not represent a definitive
solution to the nuclear problem.
...despite solemn commitments to do so under the NPT, some still
argued that the elimination of nuclear weapons was not feasible. To
the contrary, what was unthinkable was that the current unstable
situation could be left unattended.
...Brazil and other like-minded countries intended to table a draft
resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free Southern hemisphere. It was a
step in the direction of freeing mankind of the nightmare of
nuclear destruction."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3081, 14
October
Bulgaria
Statement by Emil Valev
"His country had paid particular attention to the question of
anti-personnel landmines, especially their indiscriminate use...
His country's approach, however, contained some constraints, which
reflected a realistic doctrine on national security and defence.
Thus, it had taken a cautious attitude towards acceptance of
measures that would impose excessive restrictions on national
defence. While the Ottawa process provided a basis for achieving a
widely acceptable international agreement, the Conference on
Disarmament offered the most practical and effective forum for
negotiating a global comprehensive ban on such weapons.
He supported the Register of Conventional Arms and called for its
strengthening, as a step towards setting up a mechanism for
ensuring transparency in the field of conventional armaments. He
favoured the inclusion in the Register of data on military holdings
and procurement through national production..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3088, 23
October
Canada
Statement by Mark Moher
"Recent achievements in the nuclear arena represented only a
fraction of what was needed towards the elimination of those
weapons.... The START process must be revitalized and broadened to
include other nuclear-weapon States and convert promises into
actions. The nuclear-weapon States must comply with their
obligation under the NPT to negotiate in good faith and conclude
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. The NPT review process
must continue to be qualitatively different. Further, the
Conference on Disarmament must overcome its current stalemate and
move forward decisively on nuclear disarmament and a cut-off of the
use of fissile material for weapons purposes. In addition, much
work remained to be done in terms of security assurances and the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
He did not accept the view put forth by some States that vast and
comprehensive progress across the board, such as towards the
elimination of nuclear weapons, was a precondition for specific
progress. He was committed to achieving progress wherever and
whenever possible. For example, he specifically believed it was a
propitious moment to finally get to work to prevent an arms race in
outer space. ... The Register of Conventional Arms would continue
to fall short of its potential, so long as States erratically and
sporadically submitted their data. ...
The Ottawa process...proved that new approaches, new convictions,
new coalitions of like-minded governments and civil society working
together would produce clear and rapid results... Those countries
that would be unable to sign should place unilateral restrictions
on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel
landmines. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3081, 14
October
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Statement by Patricia Durrant (Jamaica)
"Of specific concern to CARICOM States was the danger posed by the
movement of nuclear waste through the waters of the region. She
called on the relevant states to take the views of the region on
the matter fully into account."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3986, 21
October
Chile
Statement by Juan Larrain
"The effort to connect nuclear disarmament to a phased programme of
action was not the right approach. It was important to make
bilateral efforts, but he still attached importance to multilateral
negotiations within United Nations bodies, especially the
Conference on Disarmament. ...
He was particularly concerned about the worldwide transportation of
dangerous materials, particularly nuclear fuel and radioactive
waste. Such transportation should be controlled. Therefore, he
called for greater information about routes, contingency plans in
case of accidents and provisions for compensation in case of
damage."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3088, 23
October
China
Statement by Sha Zukang
"Continuing research and development of missile defence systems
were not conducive to international peace and security. ...
As for the issue of anti-personnel landmines, was it more important
than the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and outer space
weapons? ... His country had taken a constructive and realistic
attitude towards the amendment to the landmine Protocol and might
ratify that Protocol at an early date. ...
Anti-personnel landmines were defensive in nature...and the
humanitarian concerns about them were caused by the shortcomings of
the older mines, their indiscriminate use and inadequate
post-conflict demining efforts. The elimination of civilian
casualties should be the sole objective. That could be achieved by
clearing the older mines and banning their future use. His
Government was in favour of imposing strict and reasonable
restrictions on the use of anti-personnel landmines, with a view to
achieving their ultimate ban in a step-by-step manner. It reserved
the right, however, to use such weapons on its own territory until
alternative means had been found. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3081, 14
October
Cuba
Statement by Maria de Los Angeles Florez
"The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons had been moments of significance...when her country
ratified the Convention, it noted it could not be responsible for
any chemical weapons on Guantanamo Naval Base. That was the
responsibility of the United States, which was illegally occupying
that portion of Cuban territory.
On the Biological Weapons Convention, she believed that the work
of the fourth review conference should be used as a basis for
continuing to reinforce the Convention. Her country's suspicions
concerning the disregard of the Convention's provisions by a State
party to it were supported by recent evidence [Editor's
note: See Rebecca Johnson's Geneva Update, Disarmament Diplomacy No. 17
July-August].
Her country shared concerns voiced by a number of States on the
question of anti-personnel landmines and their indiscriminate use.
However, those weapons were a means of legitimate defence for many
countries. ... Her country foresaw the use of such weapons only as
a defensive measure, protecting the perimeter bordering the
Guantanamo Naval Base. Once the United States withdrew its forces
from that territory, her country would immediately remove its
landmines. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3087, 22
October
Ecuador
Statement by Luis Valencia Rodriguez
"In July 1997, after the United States lifted restrictions on
weapons exports to the Latin American region, his Government had
sent a communication to Costa Rica suggesting that the countries of
the region declare a two-year moratorium on the import of high-tech
weapons. His country...was concerned about the diversion of
precious resources for weapons."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3080, 13
October
Egypt
Statement by Nabil Elaraby
"In August 1996, Egypt, on behalf of 28 countries, had submitted to
the Conference on Disarmament a programme of action, intended to
overcome the inertia related to nuclear disarmament, especially by
the nuclear-weapon States. That programme should be seriously
studied on a priority basis by an ad hoc committee on nuclear
disarmament... Clearly, the lack of political will remained the
major obstacle for any advance in that direction. ...
While the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the
globe was a concept that promoted non-proliferation within the
framework of the NPT, the General Assembly had been calling without
success for such a zone in the Middle East since 1974. While that
resolution had been adopted by consensus annually since 1980, the
progress achieved was nil. While all the Arab League States had
acceded to the NPT, Israel persisted in defying repeated calls to
join that Treaty and to subject its nuclear facilities to
full-scope IAEA safeguards. ...
While he supported the Register of Conventional Arms as a
confidence-building mechanism...it was not an arms control measure.
He was disappointed at the failure to broaden the scope of the
Register to cover military holdings and procurements through
national production and at its failure to include an eighth
category on stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. ... The
international community could not expect the States of the Middle
East to ignore reports of the existence of weapons of mass
destruction, while continuing to support the Register. ...
The Convention concluded in Oslo contained vague language on [the]
issue [of demining] and did not acknowledge the responsibility of
States in the deployment of mines. He was still studying the treaty
and had yet to formulate his position. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3083, 16
October
European Union (EU) and Other States
Statement on behalf of the EU, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic and
Cyprus, by Arsene H. Millim (Luxembourg)
"The Union believed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) remained the cornerstone of the global
non-proliferation regime, and continued to appeal for worldwide
accession to the Treaty. It was pleased with the work done towards
the next NPT Review Conference in the year 2000.
The CTBT, opened for signature last year, provided a strong impetus
for implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 NPT Review
and Extension Conference... The Union welcomed the fact that 147
countries had signed, and seven had ratified it, and called on all
those who had not yet done so to sign it as soon as possible.
The international community must now quickly negotiate a universal
convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons or other explosive nuclear devices... The Conference on
Disarmament should set up an ad hoc committee to conduct those
negotiations. The Union welcomed the entry into force of START I
and looked forward to the ratification of START II by the Russian
Federation. The Union considered that the creation of
nuclear-weapon-free zones strengthened global, as well as regional
peace and stability, and called for continued work on the
establishment of such zones in South Asia and the Middle East.
...the Union welcomed the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons
Convention... It was important for all States who had not done so
to sign and ratify the Convention - especially the Russian
Federation...
...Stressing the importance of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, the Union called on all States to take part in
it, even registering a response of 'nil', if necessary. ... The
accumulation and destabilizing transfer of small arms and light
weapons was a source of a growing international anxiety, and the
Union welcomed the Committee on Small Arms' adoption in June 1997
of a programme for combating illicit trafficking in conventional
arms.
...the Union had long supported action on anti-personnel landmines,
and had undertaken all possible ways to help bring about a total
ban on them. All States should endorse the objective of their
complete elimination. The Union would continue to press in all the
appropriate forums for such a total ban."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3080, 13
October
Fiji
Statement by Poseci Bune
"His country had been the first to ratify the CTBT. ... However,
the Treaty would be meaningless without rapid and positive
implementation of its provisions. Therefore, he deplored the recent
announcement by one nuclear-weapon State to conduct a series of
sub-critical underground nuclear tests, which represented a blatant
disregard of the expressed concerns of the international community.
He called on the international community to begin negotiations as
soon as possible on a treaty for the establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free world."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3081, 14
October
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
Statement by Naste Calovski
"There should be an international instrument for the limitation of
conventional weapons. Perhaps the Conference on Disarmament could
prepare a regional model instrument on the limitation of such
weapons, based on the experience of the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) Treaty. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3986, 21
October
Georgia
Statement by Geirge Volski
"This month, his country had signed an additional protocol with the
IAEA. Unfortunately, a few days ago at a border guard garrison on
Georgian territory, a dangerously high level of radiation had been
detected. Ten servicemen had been exposed to radiation. The
accident drew attention to the complex issues of nuclear safety.
..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3089, 24
October
Ghana
Statement by Jack Wilmot
"[Ghana] regretted the failure of the international community to
progress towards a universally binding treaty on the elimination of
nuclear weapons. In the Disarmament Commission, for example, the
nuclear-weapon States had virtually killed any meaningful
discussions on the subject."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3085, 20
October
India
Statement by Bharati Ray
"[A] careful reading of the 1997 Report on the Conference on
Disarmament would show anyone why, and on what issue, it had
remained deadlocked. The reason why consensus had been eluded on
the objectives and agenda for a fourth special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament was also the same - the
issue of nuclear disarmament. ...
Her proposal for a time-bound, phased programme did not seek to
impede the bilateral process and was not an all-or-nothing
approach, as its critics had said. Rather, it aimed to focus
attention on nuclear weapons and ensure that all States were bound
to their elimination. Yet, efforts to address nuclear weapons
multilaterally had met with constant opposition.
... Through the indefinite extension of the NPT, the nuclear-weapon
States had perpetuated their retention of nuclear weapons and
become more insistent on stand-alone treaties, rather than a
comprehensive approach. Mere non-proliferation treaties had been
promoted as disarmament measures to serve this nuclear monopoly and
perpetuate inequality... Those States were also consolidating the
nuclear-weapon infrastructure, which was being modernized into a
smaller and more sophisticated apparatus.
Her apprehensions over the CTBT last year were coming true... That
Treaty's loopholes were being exploited by some countries even
before the ink has dried. Nuclear testing continued with
non-explosive techniques, existing weapons were being improved and
new types of weapons were being designed. The CTBT was all set to
start a new technology race in the quest for more innovative and
lethal nuclear weapons. The prohibition of fissile material should
halt the manufacture of nuclear weapons and contribute to their
progressive elimination. Yet, any such treaty would only be
meaningful if it was part of a phased programme towards the
elimination of those weapons, within a specified framework of time.
...
...the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was not an answer
to the threats those weapons posed. Given the global reach and
deployment of those weapons, such zones could provide at best an
illusion of security against weapons whose effects do not respect
territorial or regional boundaries. ... While she shared the
objective of banning anti-personnel landmines, she had reservations
on the Convention that emerged from the Oslo meeting. Its objective
could best be reached through a phased approach that would enjoy
international consensus, while addressing humanitarian concerns and
legitimate defence requirements. She presented a number of
suggestions, including universalizing the present export
moratoriums and consideration of non-lethal technologies able
perform the legitimate defensive role of landmines. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3084, 17
October
Indonesia
Statement by Makarim Wibisono
"With the diminished role and utility of nuclear weapons, it was
time to remove them from their alert status, renounce their use and
initiate negotiations for START III in an effort to seek further,
deep reductions.
There was also the need to look at negative assurances to
non-nuclear-weapon States... Rationalization for the continued
possession of nuclear weapons needed to be discarded. So long as
their role was not viewed as illegitimate and so long as nuclear
doctrines were not abandoned, [the] nuclear arms race could be
resumed. Against that sombre background, it was regrettable that
the Conference on Disarmament failed to reach a consensus to
establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence
negotiations for their phased reduction within a specific
time-frame.
The convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament was supported by an overwhelming majority of
Member States... The Secretary-General, in his reform report,
called nuclear disarmament the central issue on the global agenda
and said that nations had come to recognize their stake in
multilateral negotiations. ...
While the Ottawa process represented a significant accomplishment,
it did not provide a complete and final answer to the multitude of
problems posed by anti-personnel landmines... A cautious approach
that took into account the diverse perspectives of all nations was
required. The magnitude of such a task could only be undertaken by
the Conference on Disarmament."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3082, 15
October
Iran
Statement by Mehdi Danesh-Yazdi
"[W]hile several in the international community had demonstrated
their firm determination to end the nightmare of nuclear war, the
nuclear-weapon States had insisted on maintaining and developing
nuclear weapons - thus paralyzing the confidence-building
activities of the Conference on Disarmament and other bodies on
that subject. Some States had unjustifiably suggested that nuclear
disarmament was unfeasible in the foreseeable future. ...
With the insistence of the nuclear Powers to limit the scope of the
CTBT, that Treaty had lost its comprehensive character and its
ability to prevent further developments of nuclear weapons. The
nuclear Powers, thus, were able to utilize advanced technology and
further develop their nuclear stockpiles. Furthermore, they were
able to produce new and more complex types of nuclear weapons
through non-explosive tests. The controversy over vertical
proliferation was accentuated by the sub-critical test that had
been conducted by one signatory State, an action that contradicted
the spirit and objectives of the Treaty. ...
According to published reports, the Middle East and North Africa
imported nearly 40 per cent of the arms sold in the world, he
continued. While Iran had submitted to the Register of Conventional
Arms, the Middle East region, unfortunately, accounted for the
lowest rate of participation in that instrument. ...
While it was expected that the Ottawa process would result in a
comprehensive and balanced document to address both the security
and humanitarian aspects of the problem, regrettably the final Oslo
text did not meet those concerns in a clear and concrete manner.
The Conference on Disarmament should establish an ad hoc committee
with the mandate of negotiating a ban on those weapons."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3088, 23
October
Iraq
Statement by Nizar Hamdoon
"Iraq had discharged all its obligations under Security Council
resolution 687. Yet, the international community focused only on
Iraq while it closed its eyes to Israel's activities. ...
While the Register of Conventional Arms was a long-awaited
initiative, it had encountered various problems... Half the United
Nations members were not providing the necessary information. The
Register must be expanded to include the procurement of
sophisticated technology with military applications.
He said progress towards the elimination of landmines must take
into account the needs of national defence. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3089, 24
October
Israel
Statement by David Dabieli
"[T]he Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel
proposed to the General Assembly a binding code of conduct for
relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. ...
A similar code of conduct could advance regional security and arms
control between the parties of the Middle East... Regional security
dialogue and a gradual implementation of confidence-building
measures, in tandem with the bilateral process between Israel and
its neighbours, would pave the way for more ambitious arms control
and disarmament measures. ...
...the promising work of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms
Control and Regional Security (ACRS), established in the context of
the peace process in Madrid in 1991, had been halted by overly
ambitious and politically unrealistic agenda objectives. All
concerned were called upon to demonstrate the flexibility needed to
resume the talks. His Government attached considerable importance
to the participation of Syria and Lebanon in the working group
towards confidence-building and conventional arms control. ...
Repetition of arguments and counter-arguments would not advance the
issue of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East... The
regional parties did not see eye to eye on some very basic premises
nor on the prerequisites and guidelines or the modalities of
establishing such a zone. ...
The agenda item on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East reflected a transparent political motivation to single out
Israel... It was intended to divert attention from the true risks
of proliferation in the region, deriving from such regional States
as Iraq and Iran, which were engaged in ongoing clandestine efforts
to preserve or to acquire military nuclear capabilities. No
carefully worded, so-called 'mild resolution' addressed to his
country could conceal that fact. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3087, 22
October
Japan
Statement by Akira Hayashi
"[Japan] upheld its non-nuclear principles and maintained a
military force only for self-defence purposes. ... He would
reintroduce in the Committee this year a draft resolution aimed at
achieving the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, encouraged
by support from Member States. ...
It was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had been
unable to agree on a process to ban the production of fissile
materials, particularly since the majority of States seemed to
support such discussions... He hoped that next year the Conference
would be able to make more progress. ... Perhaps negotiations could
begin immediately on the technical aspects of a cut-off treaty for
fissile materials. Such an approach had been successful in the
approach of the ad hoc group of scientific experts on seismic
events, prior to the commencement of the CTBT negotiations.
...it was important that the Conference grapple with the issue of
landmines. ... His Government would soon decide whether or not to
sign the treaty negotiated in the Ottawa process. Nevertheless, it
was convinced that the international community must continue to
strive to realize the universal and effective elimination of those
weapons.
... Subsequent to the indefinite extension of the NPT, the first
meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the year 2000 Review
Conference had been held this year. At the first meeting,
nuclear-weapon States had provided information on the measures they
had taken for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. That was
an important effort, bringing increased transparency to the nuclear
disarmament process, and providing greater confidence between those
States and the non-nuclear States. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release, GA/DIS/3081, 14
October
Jordan
Statement by Rajad Sukayri
"[U]nless the Register of Conventional Arms was broadened to
encompass military holdings and procurement through national
production, as well as stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction,
its effective operation could not be expected in the near
future."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3986, 21
October
Kazakhstan
Statement by Akmaral Arystanbekova
"She supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
Central Asia. ... Since broad areas of her country had suffered the
effects of nuclear explosions, she understood the importance of
strengthening environmental safeguards and that was another reason
to strive for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
the area. She was grateful to the Secretary-General for her support
for such a zone, which had also been a topic in the international
conference on disarmament that had taken place in Tashkent this
year. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3082, 15
October
Kenya
Statement by Mary Odinga
"[Ominous] undercurrents permeated the recent disarmament
developments. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention had
entered into force with the absence of one of the major declared
possessors of chemical weapons. Equally disappointing was the
announcement of sub-critical testing by a key State party to the
CTBT, which burst the euphoric bubble following the Treaty's
signing last September."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3089, 24
October
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Statement by Kim Chang Guk
"In the region of north-east Asia, in particular the Korean
peninsula, the legacy of the cold war remained intact... South
Korea was introducing up-to-date military equipment on a large
scale, with a contract to buy more than $3 billion worth of AWACS
aircraft and $370 million worth of 'Stinger' missiles.
France and other major Powers were also racing to sell weapons to
South Korea..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3087, 22
October
Republic of Korea
Statement by Park Soo Gil
"The new adopted Protocol to the IAEA safeguards would strengthen
the non-proliferation regime by improving the Agency's ability to
verify the compliance of States parties to the NPT... He was
working actively towards the implementation of that Protocol and
urged other States to do the same. ...
...there had been progress in resolving the North Korean nuclear
issue in the context of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the
United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That
agreement had now entered the implementation stage. However, once
again, the North Korean nuclear issue could only be resolved when
North Korea complied fully with the IAEA safeguards, as well as
with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, as agreed by the two sides in 1992. ...
The guidelines on small arms developed by the Disarmament
Commission last year should serve as a code of conduct to enhance
transparency in international arms transfers and to eradicate such
transfers. But, the success of those guidelines required the
enactment of national legislation.
Concerning landmines, his Government had decided to extend for an
indefinite period its moratorium on their export and had
contributed financially to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund
for Assistance in Mine Clearance. Any effort to curtail the
deployment of landmines, however, should take into account
legitimate national security concerns. For the people of his
country, many of whom lived within shelling range of the most
militarized border in the world, a total ban on anti-personnel
mines would actually increase, rather than reduce, the possibility
of civilian death and injury by diminishing the effectiveness of
military deterrence against a recurrence of war. While he supported
the spirit of the Convention negotiated in Oslo, he regretted that
it did not duly take into account the legitimate security concerns
of the Republic of Korea."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3083, 16
October
Kyrgyzstan
Statement by Zamira B. Eshmambetova
"Nuclear-weapon-free zones now covered almost the whole of the
southern hemisphere. Her country supported the establishment of
such zones, as well as the establishment of single-State zones for
countries - such as Mongolia - where the nuclear policies of
neighbouring States prevented regional agreements. She supported
moves to establish such a zone in central Asia and she called for
United Nations assistance in setting up a conference next year in
her capital to work towards the establishment of such a zone."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3087, 22
October
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Statement by Alounkeo Kittikhoun
"[He] supported the strengthening of the Biological Weapons
Convention. At the same time, because of the importance of
biotechnology for economic development, any verification regime
should take into account the security and economic interest of the
developing countries that were parties to the Biological Weapons
Convention. As for the NPT, it had been two years since its
indefinite extension and the work towards nuclear disarmament was
far from over. The Preparatory Commission...should engage
immediately in substantive work for the full implementation of the
obligations under the Treaty, and all States, particularly the
nuclear-weapon States, should fulfil their promises...
Any agreement to ban landmines should take into account the
legitimate security concerns of States, as well as their legitimate
rights to self-defence."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3088, 23
October
Libya
Statement by Abdul Hafid S. Sheikh
"There were many gaps in the CTBT, as more technically-developed
countries could still improve on their nuclear arsenals by
conducting laboratory experiments. His country had registered its
opposition at the time the Treaty was approved. No one could say
that partial efforts would suffice or would slow the development of
nuclear weapons. Agreements of the past had not had a big impact on
nuclear arsenals."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3087, 22
October
Malaysia
Statement by Hasmy Agam
"Member States must be prepared to discard old and outmoded
security concepts, notably the cold war doctrine of nuclear
deterrence...
While bilateral and unilateral arrangements aimed at reducing the
current nuclear weapons stockpiles were welcome, even the
implementation of START II would render elusive the goal of a world
free from nuclear weapons. ...
The CTBT, hailed by the international community, clearly lacked an
explicit commitment towards the definitive end of the nuclear arms
race... Far from comprehensive, it allowed the nuclear-weapon
States to use advanced technology to modernize and upgrade their
nuclear weapons systems through laboratory test explosions. One
nuclear-weapon State recently announced plans to conduct a series
of subcritical underground nuclear tests, a programme that would
undoubtedly be emulated by other nuclear Powers equally eager to
upgrade their own nuclear arsenals.
The Preparatory Committee, meeting this year for the NPT Review
Conference in the year 2000, made little real progress in the
efforts towards the agreed goal of the elimination of nuclear
weapons. It was essential that future sessions make an accurate and
objective assessment of compliance with the NPT obligations...
...the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to even agree on
its programme of work for its 1997 session, let alone make any
progress on the negotiations, was equally disappointing. Clearly,
the continuing impasse reflected the differing positions between
the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States on both
the approaches and substantive aspects of the work of that body.
That certainly raised questions about its future role and
effectiveness. ... The opinion of the International Court of
Justice on the total elimination of nuclear weapons was an
important contribution. In light of the continuing impasse in the
Conference, the sponsors of last session's draft concerning the
Court's opinion would renew their call at the current session."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3080, 13
October
Maldives
Statement by Ahmed Mujuthaba
"[T]he cold war remained cold, because of nuclear weapons. Cold war
adversaries said that the cold war was dead. However, nuclear
testing continued, old arsenals were being upgraded and new ones
were being invented. ...
What could one of the smallest nations on earth do to eliminate
weapons of mass destruction? Countries like the Maldives could not
spend money on military matters. Although international peace and
security was a global concern, small States were limited in their
ability to meet their security requirements. Thus, for those
States, the United Nations remained the only guarantor of
security."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3088, 23
October
Mali
Statement by M. Sekouba Cisse
"While he welcomed the Oslo agreement to ban anti-personnel
landmines, the lack of any norms governing conventional weapons,
particularly small arms, was of grave concern.
... There was a movement in the United Nations towards what could
be called micro-disarmament, and that was drawing attention to the
problems caused by the proliferation of small arms. Small countries
must be helped. His country would soon submit a draft resolution on
the subject, with the support of other countries...
An international forum was held in Mali last March to discuss the
issue... Several recommendations had been made, among them
establishing an integrated system to combat such weapons;
establishing an international registry for them; and fostering a
culture of peace. ... He also recommended a regional moratorium on
exports of such weapons, which should be open to participation by
all African States.
The decisions that had been made during the forum in Mali were in
line with the recommendations of the Panel of Governmental Experts
on Small Arms... His Government had created a national commission
to combat the proliferation of small arms."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3085, 20
October
Marshall Islands
Statement by Laurence N. Edwards
"[N]uclear disarmament was important to his country, which had been
the site of 67 nuclear explosions between 1946 and 1957. That was
7,000 times the yield of the atomic weapons used during the Second
World War. He was encouraged by the IAEA in its process of
conducting a survey in the northern areas of his country and looked
forward to its report.
... The international community should work towards a convention
prohibiting the production, testing, deployment, stockpiling,
transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons. Such a convention would
be a major step towards the ultimate elimination of such weapons.
..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3084, 17
October
Mexico
Statement by Antonio de Icaza
"[S]ignificant progress in arms control and reduction had taken
place since the end of the East-West struggle. The complex
verification system provided for in the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was an important starting point...
He hoped that the ratification process by the Russian Federation
would not be hindered by the continuation of nuclear tests.
...In the context of negotiations between the United States and the
Russian Federation, the protocol to the 1993 Treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)
increased the possibility that the agreed reductions would take
place, including the start of negotiations for a START III.
Those bilateral achievements, however, could not hide the
exasperating lack of consensus in the international community on
disarmament measures and pursuits into the next century... That
lack of consensus had spread to the main multilateral deliberative
body, the Conference on Disarmament. ...
Nuclear disarmament was not just a priority, but the obligation of
all States. His Government had submitted to the Conference on
Disarmament last June a draft mandate on an ad hoc committee on
nuclear disarmament, which called on all States to undertake a
phased programmed with time-frames leading to the total elimination
of nuclear weapons. However, time seems to have stopped in that
body on that issue... Unable to devote itself to such priorities,
the Conference on Disarmament waivers between stagnation and
irrelevance.
To further nuclear disarmament, he would submit a draft on
consolidating the regime of the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of
Tlatelolco). He welcomed the decision by concerned States to set up
a regime of denuclearization in Central Asia modeled on existing
treaties. ...
...nuclear disarmament should not be left exclusively to the
nuclear-weapon States. Their refusal to deal with that issue in
multilateral forums would not make the issue disappear. ...
Given the excessive availability of conventional weapons, he said
the producers and purchasers of such weapons shared a
responsibility to ensure that the quantities and level of
sophistication did not exceed legitimate defence needs. He welcomed
efforts to reduce the excessive accumulation of such weapons and
had co-sponsored a draft that would have the Conference on
Disarmament support regional conventions on conventional weapons.
His Government had also undertaken initiatives leading to the
anticipated conclusion this week of negotiations to combat the
transfer and illicit use of such weapons in his region."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3080, 13
October
Mongolia
Statement by Jargalsaikhany Enkhsaikhan
"Located between two nuclear-weapon States, his country had
promptly fulfilled its treaty obligation by ratifying the CTBT in
July... He urged all States that had not done so to ratify it as
quickly as possible. His country had submitted its two
seismological and radionuclide stations to the International
Monitoring System set up under the CTBT. ...
He welcomed the initiative taken by the five Central Asian states
to establish such a nuclear- weapon-free zone. His country was
endeavouring to make its modest contribution of a single state
nuclear-weapon-free zone, reflecting the evolving reality. That had
the support of all five nuclear-weapon States, and he hoped for
recognition of the zone, like other nuclear-weapon-free zones, by
the General Assembly."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3089, 24
October
Myanmar
Statement by U Mya Than
"[T]o carry out nuclear disarmament measures the nuclear-weapon
States must do so in good faith... They must not attempt to
circumvent existing treaty provisions in order to gain technical
and strategic advantage. In that regard, he was concerned about the
nuclear-weapon test carried out by one nuclear-weapon State. All
such tests must be stopped..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3082, 15
October
Nepal
Statement by Janardan Acharya
"Given the fervent plea for nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of
a treaty on a time-bound elimination of those weapons was not only
a legitimate demand, but an achievable one. It was, therefore,
regrettable that the current momentum in disarmament had been
severely impeded in the Conference [on Disarmament]. ...
...the Convention agreed upon in Oslo was welcome and one which
Nepal would consider signing in Ottawa in December."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3084, 17
October
New Zealand
Statement by Clive Pearson
"[S]even countries had so far ratified the CTBT, which remained a
priority for New Zealand, as it was a step towards nuclear
disarmament. He hoped the number of ratifications would swell
during the year. There should be no doubt that this treaty, and its
State signatories, mean business...
Unfortunately...along with all the disarmament successes of the
year, 1997 had not been a good year for the Conference on
Disarmament... If the deadlock continued during the year, it would
call into question the credibility of the Conference, and the body
would thus have difficulty securing financial resources.
He remained committed to the Conference, but it must prove that it
was still capable of delivering. There must be a greater
willingness to entertain movement and engage in compromise. The
Conference must fully engage in debate on nuclear disarmament and
provide leadership on the issue. That debate must not be suffocated
in Geneva.
Packaging nuclear disarmament into time-bound outcomes was not
productive, nor was linking progress on nuclear issues to progress
in other areas of arms control...
There had never been a better time to engage in nuclear
disarmament... The fact that they [nuclear weapons] have not been
used for 50 years does not mean that the risks are in any way
lessened as time goes by. The longer we retain them, the greater
the temptation of others to acquire them." Source: United
Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3081, 14 October
Niger
Statement by Mallam Daouda
"[I]n Africa illegal weapons of all types were being used to kill
women, children and men. Although not an arms producer, his country
remained a major victim of those deadly devices. He was, therefore,
deeply convinced that the consolidation of peace and security
hinged on undertaking specific disarmament measures that sought to
control small and light weapons.
...Niger had associated itself with the United Nations and certain
neighbours to carry out global action to combat the scourge of the
illegal arms trade... It had established national import and export
legislation and in 1994, a commission for the collection and
control of illegal weapons, charged with minimizing the
insecurities spawned by such trafficking. It had already recorded
some success in its task...
...He expressed concern...that with its vast desert territory,
Niger might be used by the nuclear Powers for the dumping of
nuclear waste. He, therefore, sought mechanism's for the sound
management of such waste."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3085, 20
October
Nigeria
Statement by Maria Laose-Ajayi
"[T]he accumulation of weapons continued, against the backdrop of
the ever-present nuclear threat. ...
In April 1997, the new review process of the NPT had begun... The
process may be new, but the old attitudes seem to persist. The
request of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT was still
being denied. The ability of the Treaty to stop vertical
proliferation of nuclear weapons remained in doubt.
Conventional weapons were the only means by which many countries
defended themselves... International action was needed for their
control. Calling for control of conventional weapons, while
pursuing an aggressive arms sales policy, was dishonest and a
disservice to the cause of peace."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3986, 21
October
Norway
Statement by Leif Arne Ulland
"The international disarmament agenda should encompass a programme
for managing disarmament, including the secure and environmentally
safe handling of fissile material... His Government had drawn up a
plan of action on nuclear activities and on chemical weapons in
areas adjacent to its northern borders. Its goal was to achieve
safe and cost-effective operations under independent control and
inspection, in keeping with international guidelines. ...
On the issue of achieving a ban on the use of fissile material for
nuclear weapons, he made several recommendations, including the
international inspection of the stocks held by nuclear-weapon
States and the creation of an international accounting mechanism.
...
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3083, 16
October
Pakistan
Statement by Siddique Kahn Kanju
"Major concerns remained in the field of nuclear disarmament, such
as some nuclear-weapon States were still engaged in nuclear testing
and research programmes, contrary to the spirit of the CTBT;
non-nuclear-weapon States were still threatened by the use of
nuclear weapons; threats to the strategic balance between the
nuclear-weapon States could lead to a revival of a nuclear arms
race, both on the ground and in outer space; and, if there were a
re-emergence of great Power confrontation, it would be extremely
difficult to manage nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear disarmament was, therefore, the highest priority... It was
not the exclusive concern of the nuclear-weapons States. In
particular, the 20 or so countries that could build such weapons
should be included in disarmament negotiations. There should be an
international, legally-binding multilateral agreement committing
all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a
fixed time-frame. There should also be a prohibition on the
production of fissile material. However, his country would only
support such a treaty if it did not allow unequal stockpiles of
fissile materials.
He endorsed the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
However...the Indian declaration that it possesses chemical weapons
came as a rude surprise to Pakistan, since we had signed a
bilateral declaration in 1992 affirming neither India or Pakistan
possessed chemical weapons. His Government was now in a quandary,
because under the Convention, India could continue to hold such
weapons for another 10 years. Furthermore, [Pakistan] must now
seriously question all of India's declarations, including those
relating to non-development of nuclear weapons...
His country was an original party to the Treaty on Certain
Conventional Weapons, and had participated in the Ottawa process as
an observer. However, because of the security situation along its
long borders, his country could not accept a total ban on such
weapons. There were a number of other countries in such a position.
...
His country's approach to disarmament was determined by its
challenging security environment... Short-range and nuclear-capable
Prithvi missiles targeted Pakistan's major cities and
defence assets. Its neighbour had spent billions of dollars on
armaments and the planned development of the medium-range
Agni - and perhaps longer-range missile systems - threatened
not only his country, but the entire region."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3084, 17
October
Philippines
Statement by Jaime Lopez
"Although some critics had called the nuclear disarmament proposal
by the Non-Aligned Movement of countries unreasonable, calling for
true nuclear disarmament was not entirely unreasonable.
The Non-Aligned Movement could hardly be considered unreasonable,
when the obligation to rid the world of nuclear weapons had been in
the NPT for three decades and had been enunciated by the
International Court of Justice last year... Furthermore, those who
had advocated true nuclear disarmament had been open to compromise.
From the NPT to the CTBT, disarmament had given way to
non-proliferation. ...
With the entry into force last May of the South-East Asia
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the world became even smaller for
nuclear weapons... Regional strides had been undertaken and his
Government's constitutional policy against nuclear weapons had
found greater meaning. As the Committee considered the forthcoming
resolution on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and
Adjacent Areas, it should decide to strengthen it, rather than
compromise and weaken it.
The Ottawa process stood fast and resisted compromise that would
have betrayed the humanitarian imperative to ban the insidious
anti-personnel landmine.... His Government was preparing
legislation to criminalize the possession, use of or trade in
anti-personnel mines and their parts. That legislation would
transcend the usual territorial, legal application and apply to any
violation anywhere in the world where a domestic link was present.
...
...caution was needed, lest the reform of the structures and
approaches of disarmament and international security result in
bringing the disarmament momentum of the last few years to a
screeching halt. If the attempt to inject reform into disarmament
was an intentional and clever ploy to distract and delay, then we
might as well invoke divine intervention. If the price of genuine
and meaningful reform would put on virtual hold any disarmament
progress, then the parties must be prepared to pay that price. But,
to detract ever so slightly from those disarmament efforts to deal
with reform, especially if true reform was not forthcoming, would
be unacceptable. The pursuit of disarmament was too urgent and the
stakes far too high."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3085, 20
October
The Rio Group
Statement on behalf of the Rio Group (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Honduras and Guyana), by Saguier Caballero (Paraguay)
"[T]he Group would participate actively in the Ottawa process to
ban landmines. The countries of the Group would work to make their
region the first to be free of that type of weapon...
The Group had reaffirmed its commitment to strengthen
confidence-building measures and measures to increase transparency
in security in order to ensure a safer region... The Group had
begun negotiations on an international convention that would combat
the production and illicit transfer of firearms, explosives and
other related materials."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3083, 16
October
Russia
Statement by Vladimir P. Lukin
"While his Government continued to oppose NATO expansion, it was
strenuously working to transform the closed-bloc structures into an
integral part of a European and universal security system. In order
to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe, his
Government was willing to go [its] part of the road. For example,
an initiative was under consideration to change the targeting of
Russian nuclear systems, so they would no longer be directed at
NATO countries.
His Government was willing to undertake consistent action, together
with other nuclear-weapon States, aimed at the reduction and
ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals by all the members of the
'nuclear club' . ...
It was important that the Conference on Disarmament initiate
negotiations on a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the
production of fissile materials... His country had already stopped
the production of weapons-grade uranium and a national programme to
stop the production of weapons-grade plutonium would be implemented
by 1998. The decision to gradually remove from Russia' s nuclear
military up to 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and up to 50
tons of weapons-grade plutonium was an effective contribution
towards rendering the process of nuclear disarmament
irreversible.
...the recent signing in New York of the agreements on the
demarcation between the strategic and non-strategic anti-ballistic
missile systems represented substantial progress towards
strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. They offered
Russia and the United States new opportunities to work together
towards reducing their nuclear weapons to a level 80 per cent below
that which existed during the cold war. The work of experts on
START III would continue, with full-scale negotiations for that
treaty beginning upon the entry into force of START II.
The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of
the world significantly enhanced stability and security and
promoted the narrowing of the sphere of nuclear preparations...
Particularly welcome was the idea for establishing a
nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe. The Duma
was actively engaged in ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention
and hoped to complete that process soon... Negotiations on the
Biological Weapons Convention should produce a verification and
compliance system that was reliable, not burdensome... In the
process, it was important that the Convention be strengthened, not
revised.
...he favoured the elimination of anti-personnel landmines through
a gradual process that included agreed stages. While President
Yeltsin had expressed support for the principle of the Convention
negotiated in Oslo, Protocol II of the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons balanced the interests of States and took into
account their actual capabilities and security interests. A hasty
prohibition, unaccompanied by measures to strengthen stability,
could have a negative impact, including upon anti-terrorist
activities. The proper forum for the discussion of landmines was
the Conference on Disarmament...
...a number of linkages had been insisted upon by various countries
in the multilateral negotiating process this year in order to shake
the role of the Conference on Disarmament into taking a ' fast
track' approach. Such an approach was incapable of assessing the
security interests of all countries."
Source: United Nations Press Release, GA/DIS/3081, 14
October
Saudi Arabia
Statement by Saud Abdul-Aziz Al-Dail
"The Register of Conventional Arms should include weapons of mass
destruction, as well as advanced technology that had military
applications. The Register did not take into consideration the
situation in the Middle East, which was characterized by a lack of
qualitative balance because of Israel's possession of nuclear
weapons."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3085, 20
October
Senegal
Statement by Ibra Deguene Ka
"[T]he recent conference in Tashkent, Kazakstan showed the
willingness of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
Central Asia, a move that would also strengthen existing zones.
However, general and complete disarmament was still a distant goal.
Many States were asking what should be done now to follow up on the
momentum created in the last five years. He deplored the situation
of uncertainty in the Conference on Disarmament. The spirit of
consensus that had always guided that body seemed to have been
eclipsed by a reign of suspicion, where any proposal was viewed
with caution."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3986, 21
October
Singapore
Statement by Anil Kumar
"[D]isarmament was not a simple process... It was not about simply
banning a category of weapons and it could not be clinically
insulated from the overall political and security context in which
it occurred. For example, the anti-personnel landmine ban agreed to
in Oslo had been lauded as a bright success in a relatively bleak
disarmament year. Yet, there were many countries not in a position
to join the global ban. Even though United States President William
Clinton had called for a ban on such weapons, in the end the United
States was unable to sign the treaty, as it felt the ban would put
its troops in South Korea at risk. That position was quite
understandable.
His country's position on such weapons had been active and open...
It had supported all efforts against their indiscriminate use.
However, his country believed that security concerns and the right
to self-defence of any country could not be disregarded. Thus, he
could not support a blanket ban on such weapons."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3088, 23
October
South Africa
Statement by Peter Goosen
"[South Africa] would continue to work with States that had begun
efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,
and would continue to support the initiative to promote the
southern hemisphere as a zone free from nuclear weapons. ...
The membership of the Conference on Disarmament should be
democratized... Some had argued that the Conference could only
function with a limited membership, but the weakness of that
argument had been demonstrated by the negotiations that had taken
place under the umbrella of existing treaties and also by the Oslo
conference. The national security and other concerns of States were
protected by the conference's rules of procedure, not by limited
membership."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3082, 15
October
Sri Lanka
Statement by Bernard Goonetilleke
"[T]he NPT clearly expected the nuclear arms race to be ended and
nuclear disarmament to take place at an early date. However,
despite the passage of more than 25 years since the Treaty went
into effect, nuclear weapons had not been totally eliminated. Given
the obligation of nuclear-weapon States under that Treaty to pursue
in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to
nuclear disarmament, the position taken by some of those States
since the last Review Conference was rather disturbing. While there
were reductions envisaged in the START treaties, it had to be
pointed out that START II had not yet been ratified by Russia and
that, even once it was ratified, thousands of nuclear warheads
would remain in the hands of the two major nuclear-weapon
States.
To make matters worse...some nuclear-weapon States advanced the
view that negotiations should first be conducted between the two
major nuclear Powers, to be followed by the remaining three when
the former's nuclear weapons were reduced to hundreds. They had
also taken the position that nuclear disarmament should not be
subjected to multilateral negotiation, thus turning the
international community into mere spectators. ...
Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States seemed to overlook their Treaty
obligations, as well as the recent calls made by the Non-Aligned
Movement of countries, the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice and the Canberra Commission. Furthermore, they
seemed to ignore the fact that the rationale put forth for
retaining those weapons - namely the theory of nuclear deterrence -
was being rejected by the same persons who had earlier embraced it.
In addition, the Conference on Disarmament had been prevented from
commencing work on the subject...
Turning to the subject of security assurances...the last Review
Conference of the NPT determined that further steps should be
considered in that regard, including in the form of an
internationally legally binding instrument. Despite that decision,
no step whatsoever had been taken for more than two years to
satisfy that justifiable demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States.
It was against this background that the States parties belonging to
the Non-Aligned Movement and a cross-section of other States
demanded that, at the next review conference, a legally binding
security assurances regime be concluded. ...
Transparency...could not be selective or limited to conventional
weapons alone, while ignoring the weapons of mass
destruction...
While he welcomed the Canadian initiative for a convention banning
anti-personnel landmines... such a measure should also take into
account various aspects of defence, including alternative methods
and the use of landmines by irregular forces. Given his country's
security concerns, it would not be in a position to become a party
to the landmine Convention in the immediate future."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3083, 16
October
Syria
Statement by Khalil Abu-Hadid
"[T]he Conference on Disarmament must set up a specialized
committee in order to deal with disarmament matters, particularly
aimed at negotiating a phased programme of nuclear disarmament
within a specific time-frame..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3087, 22
October
Tanzania
Statement by Mahmoud H. Jabir
"[Tanzania] attached great importance to the establishment of the
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Regrettably, some major permanent
members of the Security Council and some major maritime users had
not participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian
Ocean, which created serious implications in the region. ...
While the adoption of the CTBT last year held some promise, the
Treaty lacked an explicit commitment towards a definite end to the
nuclear arms race... Less than one year after the Treaty's
existence, one nuclear-weapon State had announced its plans to
conduct a series of sub-critical underground nuclear tests.
..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3087, 22
October
Thailand
Statement by Asda Jayanama
"Complimenting the NPT, the Bangkok Treaty had entered into force
in March, clearly representing the commitment of the 10 countries
of the region to keep the area free from nuclear weapons. He urged
the nuclear-weapon States to join their efforts. ...
He was dismayed that the fourth special session of the General
Assembly had not yet been convened and that there was, as yet, no
date set for such a session. He urged all parties concerned to
agree on this as quickly as possible. He also applauded the work of
the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in
Asia and the Pacific, noting the usefulness of the Kathmandu
process."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3084, 17
October
Tunisia
Statement by Ali Hachani
"[Tunisia] had followed the Ottawa process as an observer. While it
would work towards ending the suffering caused by such weapons, he
believed that the right of countries to use such weapons to defend
their borders should be taken into consideration. ..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3088, 23
October
Turkey
Statement by Tuluy Tanc
"While the result of the Oslo conference was welcome, Committee
statements last week indicated that the convention fell short of
achieving universality. For one thing, it left out one-fourth of
the world's land mass. Furthermore, the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva was the most appropriate forum for addressing the
problem. ...
... Since its establishment in 1992, the Register of Conventional
Arms had significantly contributed to promoting openness and
transparency in military matters. As stated in the
Secretary-General's recent report, however, in order for the
Register to fulfil its potential, it must increase participation
and expand its scope. All neighbours, including those in the Middle
East, should participate in the Register. A similar system had been
adopted within the framework of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in July 1997.
...he supported the new programme measures contained in the [IAEA]
'93 + 2 Programme' successfully finalized in June 1997. He
particularly supported the measures involving broader access to
information, as well as physical access including no-notice
inspections and the use of environmental sampling methods. The safe
transport of radioactive materials required a separate, legally
binding measure. In attaching the highest priority to preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, his country had
joined the Missile Technology Control Regime last April."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3087, 22
October
Ukraine
Statement by Ihor Kharchenko
"[W]orld security could not be stable as long as nuclear weapons
were relied upon... The removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine
should be emulated by all States, primarily the nuclear-weapon
States, in order to ensure that weapon's removal from the face of
the planet. That effort could be best elaborated in a programme of
complete nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. At
the same time, a number of relevant steps could be immediately
undertaken such as: nuclear forces could be taken off alert;
warheads could be removed from delivery vehicles; and the
deployment of non- strategic nuclear weapons could be stopped. In
addition, all nuclear-weapon testing could be banned...
The reductions of nuclear forces and the subsequent dismantling of
nuclear warheads produced a growing amount of nuclear fissile
materials, which might be reused for military purposes. The storage
sites of those materials were a permanent source of environmental
and terrorist threats to all nations. A cut-off treaty, therefore,
should not be limited only to the ban of such production, but for
the reduction of fissile stocks. ...
While he shared the noble aspirations of the Ottawa process and
commended its results, the Conference on Disarmament could best
negotiate an agreement that would include a number of States not
yet ready to sign the agreement reached in Oslo."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3084, 17
October
United States
Statement by John D. Holum, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
"[T]he pace of nuclear disarmament was picking up, largely because
the countries whose arms were directly involved had moved in bold
but practical increments. START I reductions were ahead of schedule
and the Russian Federation and the United States had cleared away
all remaining obstacles to the Duma's ratification of START II.
With steps being set for early Russian ratification and entry into
force of START II, it was possible to move on to even deeper
reductions and more comprehensive controls on nuclear arms. In the
Committee, Russian and American delegations would urge the adoption
of a resolution supporting that process on which so much of the
world' s future security rested.
...the practical approach called for the consolidation and
realization of past achievements, through entry into force and
compliance, enforcement and implementation. Respective governments,
for example, needed to secure approval for ratifications and
commitments to such organizations as the IAEA were crucial. Each
country had the responsibility of applying the powerful new
safeguards adopted in May to the real world, by upgrading bilateral
agreements with the IAEA. The United Nations had a vital role in
stimulating governments to take compliance seriously. A United
States-sponsored resolution this year in the Committee would
re-emphasize that point. ...
...the United States had not given up on the negotiation for a ban
on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. ... How
could reduced roles for nuclear weapons be achieved if it was not
even possible to begin discussing a cap on their indispensable
contents? ...
... While the United States had worked diligently to find an
outcome to the Ottawa process, the result was one which it
welcomed, but could not join. ... But, all countries in a position
to do so should sign the Convention, and then turn to the critical
landmine work that lay ahead. ...
The Conference on Disarmament was in the grip of a linkage virus...
The linkage disease proposed to stall the proven step-by-step
approach by the United States and Russia - that was in fact
bringing nuclear disarmament closer - and drag all possible
progress on other issues into the same morass. That linkage virus
had paralyzed the Conference. We will see if it proves to be fatal,
he added.
...the United States was reorganizing its arms control operations
by integrating the 38-year old Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
into the Department of State. That step would enhance the role of
arms control and non-proliferation in United States foreign policy.
Independent policy advocacy and compliance reviews would be
preserved, as the Department's senior arms control official would
report directly to the President and the national security
leadership."
Source: United Nations Press Release, GA/DIS/3081, 14
October
Uruguay
Statement by Jorge Perez-Otermin
"[H]e could not believe that it was impossible for nuclear weapons
to be completely eliminated by the year 2025. ... A positive step
would be the complete denuclearization of the southern hemisphere,
by combining existing nuclear- weapon-free zones.
He was concerned about the decision of the United States to lift
restrictions on exports of weapons to Latin America. The region was
in the midst of a period of peace and stability. He hoped that
would not be disrupted by an influx of weapons, as such weapons
tended to have a force of their own. He was concerned, too, about
the world trade in weapons and the international transport of
dangerous materials. In that context, his country had recently
adopted a law banning the passage within its territory of any kind
of dangerous waste."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3082, 15
October
Venezuela
Statement by Ramon Escovar-Salom
"[Venezuela] believed firmly in the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones and warmly welcomed the initiatives for
the establishment of such a zone in Central Asia. He hailed the
political will demonstrated by Mongolia in its wish to free itself
from nuclear weapons, and of the initiative for such a zone in
South Asia.
Concerning international arrangements to provide guarantees to
non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, he appealed to States to arrive at a speedy agreement on a
common formula which could be included in a legally binding
international instrument. ...
... While he could not at the time go along with the agreement
reached in Oslo to ban anti-personnel landmines, that agreement was
of great significance and he was open to further dialogue on that
matter."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3986, 21
October
Zimbabwe
Statement by Cavins Mugaviri
"Last year...his delegation had expressed its suspicions over a
flawed CTBT text which was snatched away from the Conference and
dragged to the General Assembly for adoption. It was procedurally
wrong to bypass the Conference. Meanwhile, nuclear testing
continued unabated, so long as it did not entail explosions.
The fear that bypassing the Conference might become a precedent was
confirmed by the current impasse on nuclear disarmament in the
Conference..."
Source: United Nations Press Release GA/DIS/3089, 24
October
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.