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Introduction
NATO's first Ministerial meetings since the end of the war in Kosovo and the Alliance's high profile Washington Summit took place in December, against a background of the intensifying Russian war in Chechnya and deteriorating NATO-Russia relations. Divisions over ballistic missile defence (BMD), US pressure for greater defence spending and tensions over EU defence plans dominated the winter Ministerial meetings in Brussels. Little progress was made on the arms control review initiated at April's Washington Summit.
Peace support operations in the Balkans remain high on NATO's agenda, with increasing recognition that the Alliance's goal of a "multi-ethnic" Kosovo is still out of reach. If law and order are to be restored and civil society rebuilt, greater resources are urgently needed for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo's new police force, the Kosovo Protection Corps.
Defence Ministers Meeting
The key issues addressed at the meeting of defence ministers on 2-3 December were BMD, defence spending and Kosovo.
The meeting opened with a session of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), at which US Secretary of Defense William Cohen highlighted the potential threat from ballistic missile proliferators, especially Iran and North Korea. US officials briefed the Allies on Russia's draft military strategy, published in October in Krasnaya Zvezda. They also reported on co-operation with Russia on Y2K issues, including the establishment of a permanent US-Russia shared early warning system in Moscow next year. Cohen strongly denied earlier media reports that the last remaining US tactical nuclear weapons would soon be withdrawn from Europe.1 A US official said that NATO's Strategic Concept (updated at the April 1999 Washington Summit) committed the Alliance to continue to maintain nuclear forces and that the US would "continue to maintain its contribution in that connection".
Following the NPG, Ministers met in the Defence Planning Committee to discuss defence capabilities. Both NATO Secretary-General Lord [George] Robertson and Secretary Cohen urged the Allies to "spend more" and to "spend smarter" on defence. Speaking after the meeting, Robertson told the media: "The time for a peace dividend is over because there is no permanent peace - in Europe, or elsewhere… we can no longer expect to have security on the cheap".
US plans for a national missile defence (NMD) system were discussed with French Defence Minister Alain Richard present.2 Although Cohen "reassured" Allies that no decision on NMD would be taken without consultations within the Alliance, the Presidential decision currently scheduled for June 2000 is widely believed to be a foregone conclusion. NATO's communiqués made no reference to the subject, reflecting lack of consensus.
Defence Ministers then met "at 19" (i.e., all NATO countries represented) in a session of the North Atlantic Council. KFOR Commander General Klaus Reinhardt briefed the Council, warning that despite some progress in restoring order to Kosovo, the area is still "not very far away from war" and that on the ground "intolerance is almost tangible". Reinhardt stressed the need for more money to be provided to UNMIK and the Kosovo Protection Corps, to which only three NATO Allies have yet contributed.
The second day of Defence Ministers meetings included sessions of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the European Atlantic Partnership Council (including NATO's Eastern European partners and the neutral countries of Europe). There was no meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), as Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev declined to attend, highlighting the breakdown in NATO-Russia relations. Instead Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an angry statement responding to language in the NATO Defence Minister's Communiqué that called for Russia to exercise restraint in Chechnya.3
Foreign Ministers Meeting
NATO's Foreign Ministers' meetings on 15-16 December were low key, with only nine out of 19 foreign ministers in attendance. They focussed primarily on European defence and Kosovo. Coming shortly after the EU Helsinki Summit, ministers started with a session on developing a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. Although the foreign ministers were able to initiate discussions within the Alliance on the next steps towards developing ESDI, underlying disagreements over European defence persist, with Turkey openly opposed and the US reluctant to support anything other than straightforward increases in European military capabilities within NATO.
NATO's arms control review was set in train with a brief reference in the North Atlantic Council Communiqué, but received little attention in the official briefings. Secretary-General Robertson made no reference to it in his statements, instead reaffirming the role of "credible deterrence" in combating proliferation.
Once again, Russia stayed away, so there was no meeting of the PJC. The rest of NATO's European partners did, however, meet with the Allies in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), where the focus was on Kosovo. EAPC Foreign Ministers were briefed by the head of UNMIK, Dr Bernard Kouchner. He told them that without greater resources there would be "no success" in Kosovo.
Divisions Over BMD
Ballistic missile defences featured at both Foreign Ministers' and Defence Ministers' meetings. The US prepared the ground on both occasions with presentations highlighting the ability of proliferators to threaten the territory of European NATO partners as well as the United States. A declassified report from the US National Intelligence Council was released to the media, spelling out the threat from "Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq".4 Secretary Cohen was keen to emphasise that "the threat is real; that it will, in all likelihood, intensify in the coming years as countries continue to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities".
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (attending the Foreign Ministers' meeting in place of Madeleine Albright) pitched BMD as part of a three-pronged NATO strategy for dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to Talbott, NATO's WMD policy "must have three parts: first we must pursue diplomatic prevention, including arms control; second, we need strong conventional and nuclear forces capable of acting as a deterrent; and third, we must consider how missile defense - national and collective - fits into the equation."
Although many of the Allies share US concerns about the nature and growth of the threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD, they disagree on whether NMD is the right way to address this threat. Britain and France are reportedly concerned that the effectiveness of their own nuclear weapons could be undermined if other nuclear-weapon States (NWS), such as Russia or China, responded to the current US proposals for a NMD system by enhancing their nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
France, supported by a number of Allies, has repeatedly warned of the effect of NMD on arms control and relations with Russia and China. At the Ministerial meeting, French Defence Minister Richard urged caution about a project "that could end up damaging our security if it offers indirect encouragement to an arms race". Richard also warned about the potential cost of missile defence - money that he argued could be better spent on other military projects. He questioned whether NMD would be "a gain in security equivalent to the expenditure".
Britain shares French concerns about the impact of NMD on relations with Russia and China, but is also concerned about potential "decoupling" of US security interests from those of Europe. Unlike France, its priority is to maintain the transatlantic relationship and it is therefore reluctant to criticise publicly, preferring to characterise the issue as a "bilateral" question for the US and Russia.
Germany's Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping, was more conciliatory than Richard, repeating reassurances from Cohen that the project was "being pursued with great care". Speaking with Cohen on the eve of the Defence Ministers' meeting, Scharping was "optimistic" that NMD would "not cause any disruption in the disarmament and arms control process. Nevertheless, Scharping acknowledged that publicity about NMD could fuel anti-Western feeling in Russia during the election campaign, a concern many NATO members shared.
Cohen attempted to address Allied concerns about arms control by reiterating that the current US proposals are for a limited system that is "not directed against the Russians" and "would not undercut the Russian strategic deterrent". According to a US official, the Americans were "committed to working very hard with the Russians to do what the ABM Treaty provides for, which is to update its provision in light of the changing strategic situation". The US view is that NMD can "coexist" with "a state of full strategic stability and… substantial further reductions on strategic offensive arms".
Cohen acknowledged that there is "by no means a consensus within the Alliance" on the utility of even a limited missile defence capability, but insisted that Allies' views would be taken into consideration before President Clinton takes a final decision next June on whether to proceed.
Despite Cohen's reassurances, it is widely believed that the US will decide to proceed with NMD and that the consultation process is more about 'public relations' than substance. One American official indicated that the US expects to be able to "reach a resolution of this issue by negotiation" with the Russians. Talbott also suggested that although the US proposals had "generated controversy on both sides of the Atlantic" there was still "enough common ground" on the issue "for us to move forward together as an Alliance".
Although a number of European Allies have made clear their objections to NMD, many are also hedging their bets, watching closely to see how the technology develops. One of the US selling points for NMD, as Cohen suggested in his briefing, is the possibility that some European NATO members might want access to missile defence technology in the future.
Despite European concerns, the US has now put missile defence firmly on the table for discussion within NATO over the next year, even proposing that the Allies consider the possibility of having some form of "limited" missile defence capability "within the NATO Alliance itself".
Towards a New Cold War?
Although General Rheinhardt described relations between NATO and Russian military forces in Kosovo as "excellent", at a political level NATO's relationship with Russia has fallen to its lowest point since the 1980s. When he started his job as NATO Secretary-General in October, Lord Robertson described establishing closer relations with Russia as one of his "immediate priorities". Instead, differences of opinion over Chechnya, President Yeltsin's comments in China on Russia's status as a nuclear power (see News Review), and Russia's boycott of the Ministerial meetings led one journalist to suggest that NATO was entering a new Cold War.
The language on Chechnya in the NATO communiqués was reasonably restrained, acknowledging Russia's right "to preserve its territorial integrity and to protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness", and recalling the commitments Russia had made at November's OSCE Summit.5 It prompted a furious reaction, however, from Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which dismissed the statement as "cynical", and coming from those who "so recently carried out massive aggression against sovereign Yugoslavia".6
The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is also affected by deteriorating NATO-Russia relations over Kosovo and Chechnya. In May, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused NATO of breaching CFE limits in Macedonia and Albania.7 Although a newly adapted CFE Treaty was agreed at the OSCE Summit in November, NATO Foreign Ministers noted their concern about "continued Russian non-compliance with the Treaty's Article V ('flank') limits". The North Atlantic Council called on Russia "to honour its pledge to comply with CFE limits as soon as possible and, in the meantime, to provide maximum transparency regarding its forces and weapons deployed in the North Caucasus".8 Russia has indicated that it only intends to exceed CFE limits for a temporary period, but this is an inauspicious start for the newly adapted treaty.
NATO Defence Ministers also noted "with concern" that "Russia appears to be moving towards a greater reliance on nuclear forces to ensure its security".9 Russia's draft military strategy reserves "the right" to use nuclear weapons in response to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and in response to "wide-scale aggression using conventional weapons" in situations critical to Russian national security.10
A US official was reluctant to criticise Russia's nuclear doctrine, however, recognising its similarity to NATO's Cold War doctrine of Flexible Response, elements of which still persist in current NATO nuclear doctrine. Referring to Russia's nuclear doctrine, he said "it would be unseemly for NATO to denounce that doctrine, because it does bear some resemblance to another nuclear doctrine, which was advocated at various points in the past."
The real question according to the US is whether Russia is prepared "to carry on working on a system of arms control for strategic stability and the real conditions that apply now as contrasted to those conditions that applied during the Cold War". Russia, which walked out of the PJC earlier in the year in protest over NATO's bombing of Serbia (Yugoslavia), is still refusing to engage in discussions on anything other than practical arrangements in Kosovo. Since the NATO bombing, the PJC has not met above ambassadorial level. The NATO Defence Ministers indicated their willingness to resume "reciprocal exchanges with Russia on nuclear weapons issues" and called on Russia to "review further its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile with a view toward making significant reductions".11
The underlying problem since the earliest meetings of the PJC is that Russia has not wished to engage on an agenda aimed at greater transparency and reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. NATO, also, has been unwilling to embark on any agenda item - such as de-alerting - that might result in changes to its nuclear doctrine. If Russia had wanted an excuse to close down talks on these issues, Kosovo might have been designed to provide it.
Little Progress on Arms Control
There has been no substantive progress so far in the review of arms control policy, contained in paragraph 32 of the 1999 Washington Summit Communiqué. What little discussion has taken place, has concentrated on what the timetable and product of the review should be and which NATO committee should co-ordinate it.
Canada, one of the key proponents of the review, has proposed that NATO revise its Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament of 1989. The Canadians would like a wide ranging and high profile review that demonstrates renewed Alliance commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the time of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Canada has also urged the Allies to consider the impact on potential nuclear proliferators of Alliance policy statements on the role of NATO nuclear weapons.
NATO's Foreign Ministers' meeting confirmed that the review would address Alliance "policy options in support of confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, and arms control and disarmament".12 The review, which is intended to be "comprehensive and integrated", will be carried out by NATO's Senior Political Committee with the object of producing a report for Ministers at the December 2000 NATO meetings. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy described this announcement as an important signal that NATO is ready to move forward on the issue. He stressed the significance of the timing in the run up to the NPT Review Conference.
The NWS are less enthusiastic and would prefer to keep a lower profile and to focus essentially on improving the "presentation" of NATO nuclear policy, in particular previous reductions in NATO nuclear force levels. They question whether NATO - as an Alliance - can really play a significant role in arms control. They argue that the only major area in which NATO itself plays a role is the CFE Treaty, and that beyond CFE the Alliance can do little more than encourage its members to contribute positively to the arms control regimes as individual states. But in doing so the NWS turn a blind eye to the impact of NATO nuclear doctrine and posture on arms control, and the restrictions which this imposes on the positions of individual NATO member countries in arms control fora.
In a speech covering the full range of NATO issues, US Deputy-Secretary Talbott did not even mention the arms control review, saying only that "NATO has a solid arms control record" and repeating that "the Alliance has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces". With the NWS eager to minimise the scope of the review, there is a danger that it turns into little more than a convenient way of quietly closing down the debate on "no first use", initiated by Germany at the December 1998 NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting.
Although it suits the NWS for the arms control review to have a limited scope in the area of nuclear posture, the US, backed by Britain, has pushed for the review to be "comprehensive and integrated", insisting that NATO's response to the proliferation of WMD and conventional weapons would be an integral part.
It is clearly important for NATO to consider how it can support the biological, chemical and missile technology control regimes. The US, however, appears to prefer a "comprehensive" review in order to deflect attention from NATO nuclear policy by putting the emphasis on the risks of WMD. Placing the review in this context allows the US to promote military responses to proliferation, many of which have a counterproductive effect on arms control, such as deterrence, counter proliferation and NMD. There is already some evidence of this approach in the NPG's Communiqué, which includes in the paragraph on arms control, reference to the "evolving threats from proliferant states" and reaffirmation of "our belief that Alliance forces deter the use of weapons of mass destruction".
Although Canada describes the arms control review as an important step in the direction of its long-term objective of "getting rid of nuclear weapons", it is not yet clear for what specific goals the Canadians will be aiming. The removal of the last remaining US tactical nuclear weapons from NATO states in Europe, the declaration of a "no first use" policy, and a commitment by NATO to the elimination of nuclear weapons in line with Article VI of the NPT, remain the obvious areas in which NATO could send a clear signal of its commitment to the non-proliferation regime. If NATO is serious about rebuilding relations with Russia it should also consider making its assurances that the Alliance will not deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of new members legally binding and subject to verification.
Dutch Foreign Minister Van Aartsen has indicated that the Netherlands had already been consulting with a number of countries including Germany, Italy, Belgium, Norway and Canada. In 1999, a similar grouping of five NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway) made joint proposals, first on a working group to exchange information on nuclear disarmament at the CD in Geneva, and then on security assurances at the NPT PrepCom.13
A number of proposals had been made concerning possible topics for the review, including increasing transparency, working towards legally binding security assurances, and new initiatives on nuclear arms control including tactical nuclear weapons. Van Aartsen told the Dutch Parliament that over the next year NATO would have to "discuss the possibility of reducing the numbers of NATO nuclear weapons in the framework of simultaneously reduced and negotiated reductions on the Russian side."14
Kosovo Under-Financed
The foreign ministers attending the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meeting heard a powerful and strongly worded request for resources from the head of UNMIK, Dr Bernard Kouchner. Kouchner's message was simple: "We need money. Without money, no success… Without money, no confidence… Without money, no restarting of daily life." He said his repeated requests for funding were making him feel like a "beggar".
UNMIK needs assistance in three principal areas: money to pay the salaries of civil servants and teachers, help with finding missing persons, and contributions of police officers to help restore law and order to Kosovo. Although UNMIK has requested 6,000 police officers, only 1,800 have been provided, a situation that Kouchner described as "ridiculous and a scandal".
In an impassioned presentation, Kouchner's frustration at the lack of resources was clear: "If all the nations of the world fighting for freedom and fighting to protect minorities cannot send me 6,000 police officers, what kind of peacekeeping operation is this?'' He did "not want to hear any comment or criticism" of law and order in Kosovo until he had those police officers.
Secretary-General Robertson and KFOR Commander Rheinhardt, both backed Kouchner's demands. According to Rheinhardt, the amounts of money needed are small - US$120 million for civil servants' salaries and US$10 million for the Kosovo Protection Corps. Robertson "urged Ministers to devote the critical resources to the UN and to the Kosovo Protection Corps necessary for success." He reiterated that the resources are small, but said they would "make all the difference between success and failure in Kosovo." NATO is concerned that unless UNMIK gets the backing it needs, parallel structures organised by sectarian elements in Kosovo's different communities will start to emerge.
EU states have been generous with funding for projects that they can be easily identified with, but less forthcoming with less glamorous items of expenditure such as basic salaries. Domestic shortages of police officers have contributed to the shortfall in personnel provided for Kosovo.
Robertson made the obvious comparison between the efforts and expenditure undertaken by NATO countries during the bombing of Serbia, and the willingness of NATO members to commit resources now. Telling foreign ministers to lobby their governments, he said: "We used all the energies of NATO… to stop the killing… We must now make that peace successful and that requires extra efforts… The international community must do more."
In contrast to NATO's usual spin about "building a multi-ethnic society" in Kosovo, Kouchner was more realistic, saying that "multi-ethnic" was not the right word for Kosovo at the moment. According to Kouchner, improvements are needed in security and civil rights, before a multi-ethnic society becomes a realistic goal. Robertson acknowledged that after "ten years of apartheid and two years of the most savage violence" Kosovo was not going to be an "ideal society".
Reassurances on European Defence
European defence was inevitably a central topic at both NATO Ministerial meetings, especially as the defence ministers met shortly after the annual Franco-British Summit and the foreign ministers met just after the EU Helsinki Summit. The Franco-British Summit has called for the EU to set itself the goal of a rapid reaction force of 50-60,000 personnel, deployable within 60 days to undertake the full range of crisis management operations,15 an objective that was endorsed at Helsinki.
At the Defence Ministers' meeting France and Germany proposed that Eurocorps, their joint force including Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg, could take over next year as the headquarters for KFOR. France and Germany see a revamped Eurocorps as providing a key role in any EU rapid reaction force. Eurocorps has a controversial background, however, being closely associated with French aspirations for a future European army. Reactions were muted.
Britain's Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, gave the Eurocorps plan qualified support, and said that Britain had "demonstrated the abilities that are required to organise these kinds of campaigns and if they need our help we would certainly be prepared to give it". According to one British official, the UK would not attach forces to Eurocorps permanently. The offer was "only providing a particular part of the mission, for a limited period and as a part of Nato".
The US was reluctant to give its backing to Eurocorps. Secretary Cohen stressed that, "there was no decision made that the Euro-Corps should take over the command of KFOR. It is a proposal that has been offered and one that will be studied and we will see how the Euro-Corps unfolds in the future." An American official said that the US had "no objection in principle" to the Eurocorps offer, but added the reservation that Eurocorps would have to be "augmented" to be militarily effective.
NATO's Foreign Ministers were briefed by the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (and former NATO Secretary-General), Dr Javier Solana on European plans to develop an autonomous capability to conduct crisis response operations. The North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers' session formulated a cautious response to the EU plans and set out NATO's plans for future development of ESDI within the Alliance.
On most of the Helsinki decisions NATO "noted" rather than "welcomed" EU aspirations. One exception was the commitment at Helsinki to enhance future military capabilities, which the US particularly commended. NATO Secretary-General Robertson also endorsed this aspect of the European defence plans, but warned the EU that it "must deliver on these commitments".
NATO also emphasised the need for the "fullest possible participation" of the eight Alliance members that are not members of the EU. Non-EU members of NATO argue that they must be included since a future EU-led crisis management operation could escalate resulting in a threat to NATO territory.
EU members attempted to "reassure" their non-EU Allies that they would be properly involved and consulted in the EU plans. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said he had been "reassuring them that we are fully aware of the importance of having them as part of any European security structure and indeed we want them to participate because it will make it more effective." Portugal, which will hold the EU Presidency for the first six months of 2000, undertook to develop the links between NATO and the EU.
The North Atlantic Council Communiqué attempted to bridge the gaps between the positions of EU and non-EU members on ESDI. It used language supported by the EU referring to the initiation of discussions on practical arrangements for "assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and for ready EU access to NATO collective assets and capabilities". The Communiqué combined this with language preferred by Turkey, emphasising that this must be on a "case-by-case basis and by consensus"16 Turkey continues to oppose greater EU defence co-operation despite the EU's recent offer of member candidate status. By emphasising the need for consensus Turkey hopes to retain the option of blocking EU access to NATO assets if it chooses.
NATO has now initiated further discussions on its next moves on ESDI. According to one NATO official, the Alliance will now work on "how to make a generous offer" to the EU regarding access to NATO assets. ESDI remains a sensitive subject within the Alliance. Despite reassurances, Turkey was reported still to be taking the view that the EU stance towards non-EU Allies was "unsatisfactory".
Officially, the US declared that: "We are not against; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it." But many remembered Strobe Talbott telling a conference at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) in October 1999 that he sensed "a basic difference of views on opposite sides of the Atlantic". Talbott had continued: "Many Americans are saying: never again should the United States have to fly the lion's share of the risky missions in a NATO operation and foot by far the biggest bill. Many in my country, notably including members of Congress - are concerned that, in some future European crisis, a similar predominance of American manpower, firepower, equipment and resources will be neither politically nor militarily sustainable…"17
Conclusions
NATO is now seriously looking at implementing decisions arising from the Washington Summit and the lessons learned from the war in Kosovo. The result is a new focus on ESDI, with much of the impetus coming from EU members, but behind the scenes many of the old tensions over European defence persist. At the same time there is increasing pressure from the US for European Allies to increase their defence spending. Tight budgets and competing domestic priorities will make it difficult for most of them to spend any more on defence, but the rhetoric that NATO intends to enhance its already formidable forces signals an end to the period of optimism that followed the Cold War. In Kosovo, Allies and others are now reluctant to come forward with the comparatively small contributions needed to make the UN Interim Administration there more effective.
Relations with Russia, already soured by NATO enlargement, the wars in Kosovo and Chechnya, are further threatened by US plans to develop NMD. Whilst it is possible that the US may strike a deal with Russia on the ABM Treaty, just as public demonstrations of reconciliation were achieved after NATO enlargement and the war in Kosovo, the underlying damage to NATO-Russia relations is manifested in Russia's nuclear doctrine. Prospects for a START III Treaty with Russia, already hampered by US plans for NMD, are further reduced as the US seeks to retain nuclear superiority and seems unwilling to countenance the lower warhead limits preferred by Russia. The US also ignores the impact of its NMD plans on the wider non-proliferation regime, inciting potential proliferators to attempt to acquire greater capabilities in order to overcome missile defences.
There are several ways that NATO could make a positive contribution to the current situation, particularly regarding arms control, but to be of significance most measures will require changes to the Alliance nuclear posture. For example, NATO could do more to demonstrate its stated commitment to transparency by declaring the number and locations of NATO nuclear weapons and allowing independent verification of the reductions its members have made in tactical nuclear weapons. NATO is also well placed to undertake practical measures to reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons.
Above all, NATO needs to get talks with Russia in the PJC back on track. The PJC was supposed to consult on nuclear arms control issues including warhead accountancy, nuclear doctrine, transparency, safety and security - all of which are important to improve confidence in the non-proliferation regime and to prepare the way for any further nuclear reductions.
Yet since the Washington Summit, NATO has prioritised the defence aspects of its response to proliferation over its review of arms control policy. If NATO continues to ignore the impact of its military posture on arms control, the price may be that Alliance predictions of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Notes and References:
1. See "Les USA vont retirer leurs bombes nucléaires en Europe", Agence France Presse, Brussels, November 4, 1999.
2. France does not participate in the Nuclear Planning Group or the Defence Planning Committee since it is not a member of NATO's Integrated Military Structure.
3. "Russia Calls NATO 'Cynical' Over Chechnya", Reuters, Moscow, December 3, 1999.
4. "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015", US National Intelligence Council, September 1999.
5. North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers' session, Final Communiqué, NATO Press Release, M-NAC-D (99) 156, December 2, 1999 and North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers' session, Final Communiqué, NATO Press Release, M-NAC2 (99) 166, December 15, 1999.
6. Op Cit, Reuters, December 3, 1999.
7. "Russia complains of CFE violation by NATO", Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 38, June 1999. See also Documents & Sources and New Review in this issue.
8. Op Cit, NATO Press Release, M-NAC-2 (99) 166.
9. Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, NATO Press Release, M-DPC/NPG-2 (99) 157, December 2, 1999.
10. Translation from BBC Worldwide Monitoring, October 11, 1999, provided courtesy of Georg Schoefbaenker. Original source: Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, in Russian, October 9, 1999, pp3, 4.
11. Op Cit, NATO Press Release, M-DPC/NPG-2 (99) 157.
12. Op Cit, NATO Press Release, M-NAC-2 (99) 166.
13. See Geneva Update, Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 33, and Briefings from the Acronym Institute on the Third NPT PrepCom available on the Internet at http://www.acronym.org.uk/nptdesc.htm.
14. Minister Van Aartsen (Foreign Affairs, Netherlands), "Statement made in the parliamentary debate on the foreign affairs budget", Lower Chamber, December 8, 1999. Unofficial translation by Karel Koster.
15. "Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence", Franco-British Summit, London, November 25, 1999.
16. Op Cit, NATO Press Release, M-NAC-2 (99) 166.
17. "Remarks at a Conference on the Future of NATO", Strobe Talbott, The Royal Institute on International Affairs, London, October 7, 1999.
Nicola Butler is the Acronym Institute's Senior Analyst.
© 2000 The Acronym Institute.