Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 56, April 2001

North Korea Warns US, Looks For European Help

As reported in the last issue, the Bush administration is suspending discussions with North Korea on missile, nuclear and related security issues, pending the outcome of a policy review thought likely to last at least a few months. The delay has caused dismay in Pyongyang, and generated evident international unease. South Korea, however, has been expressing some confidence that Washington will elect to resume the increasingly intense and apparently productive dialogue of recent years. Speaking in New York on April 11, South Korea's UN Ambassador, Sun Joun-yung, observed: "I don't think there will be any sliding back on US policies... It is quite natural to see a thorough review on the part of any [incoming] administration... I am quite optimistic that the new US government will come forward with new positions not so much different from the previous [administration]..." Joun-yung added that North Korea's decision to significantly scale back its bilateral relations with Seoul was probably linked to the uncertainty surrounding US policy, but suggested that no change of policy was being signalled: "Of course, I do not know what lies behind such postponement or cancellation of meetings by North Korea... I can imagine that, while waiting for the outcome of the policy review on the part of the US government, they are staying away from a scheduled meeting with South Korea. I am of the view that this is a temporary phenomenon."

Also on April 11, Secretary of State Powell, speaking during a press conference in Paris, gave the latest indication of Washington's apparent ambivalence, or deep-rooted wariness, over re-entering an intense engagement with North Korea: "North Korea is still a country that presents a very, very serious threat to our ally South Korea. Its army is poised at the border of that country. It's a totalitarian regime. We have serious differences with regard to some of the activities of that regime, with missile proliferation, weapons proliferation, some of the programmes they've had in the past. In recent years we have had discussions with North Korea. We are looking very carefully and conducting a review with respect to North Korea, looking how we might monitor and verify some of the ideas that are out on the table with respect to control of such activities. In due course we will engage, and will continue to support President Kim Dae-jung in the South and his efforts. But we are nowhere near even considering anything like diplomatic relations with North Korea because of the reasons I just cited."

On March 23, Powell repeated that neither normalisation of relations nor complete disengagement was being contemplated: President Kim Jong-il "has...showed a certain level of openness over the past year. We're going to examine what he's doing... We will engage in due course, at a time of our choosing... But we will be engaged..."

On March 22, an Independent Task Force on North Korea - consisting of 30 experts convened by the Council on Foreign Relations - wrote to President Bush, urging him to carefully but constructively review US-North Korea relations. Arguing that it "is still too early to judge whether Pyongyang's diplomacy is merely a tactical move or the beginning of a more fundamental transformation toward openness, economic reform, and peaceful coexistence," the letter sets out a number of specific recommendations: "It is in US interests to negotiate a verifiable elimination of North Korea's long-range missile programme"; "The United States should invite its allies to review the Agreed Framework, but there should be no unilateral changes by any party" (the 1994 Agreed Framework stipulates the replacement of North Korea's existing nuclear power plants with non-proliferation-friendly light-water reactors); "We must continue to invest in the US-ROK [Republic of Korea] security partnership"; and "We must continue energetic trilateral US-ROK-Japan coordination". The letter concludes: "If Pyongyang is indeed ready to take further steps toward strengthening peace on the peninsular, then the United States should be fully prepared to respond. In the meantime, we must keep deterrence strong and support the patient efforts of our South Korean ally."

On March 23, the Arms Control Association in Washington held a press conference on the direction of US-North Korea relations featuring former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Robert Galucci, who served as President Clinton's Special Envoy to deal with the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Detailing the significant, if fragile, achievements of the 1994-2000 dialogue, Galucci warned: "I would not like to see us snatch defeat from the jaws of victory here. ... It seems to me that the road we previously defined is not a nice, smooth road...but [one which will] keep the North Korean situation from being a problem...and crisis for us. It seems to me that there's a course that will do that. And there's another course, that may have some rhetorical appeal, but is less prudent."

On March 27, the US-ROK-Japan trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) issued a statement, following a meeting in Seoul, noting: "The US side described the administration's ongoing review of policy toward North Korea and its intention to take into account the views of key allies in this review. The nature of future US dialogue with North Korea will be determined through the US policy review process. The three delegations expressed the shared hope that North Korea would take positive steps to create a favourable environment for continued engagement and to address the concerns of the international community, including the issues of missiles and WMD. The delegations reaffirmed their commitment to continue the 1994 Agreed Framework and called on North Korea to join them in taking the needed steps for its successful implementation."

With reference to the US view of the Agreed Framework, a senior Bush administration official told reporters on March 21: "[W]e're not walking away from [it]... [W]e always leave open the possibility of improving something like this. ... We're taking stock... The implementation has run into some difficulties, so we have to take a look at whether we think it can be implemented, how to move forward... We're looking to see if the assumptions [in the 1994 accord] remain valid... [D]oes it need to be fine-tuned, or do we need to change major elements of it..."

On March 18, a statement broadcast on the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang warned of terrible consequences, were the Agreed Framework to be seriously challenged by Washington. Describing such a move as "tantamount to a declaration of war," the statement argued: "If this is the attitude of the United States, we will have to adopt an extreme hardline stance... If the US imperialists demand war, we will respond a thousand-fold... If this is the will of the US, we feel no particular need to be bound by an agreement that may or may not be fulfilled."

On March 22, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Choi Su-hon told Reuters that his government had presented proposals to the European Union - in the person of Goran Persson, Prime Minister of Sweden, the current holders of the EU Presidency - for discussions on the missile issue: "[M]any countries from the European Union [have] expressed new interest...[in a] dialogue... I informed Sweden...that we are willing to have a dialogue on the missile issue with the European Union..." On March 24, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, announcing the dispatch of EU mediators to North and South Korea to assist in the reconciliation effort, made plain the willingness of the EU to respond positively to such requests: "It's becoming clear that the new US administration wants to take a more hardline approach toward North Korea. This means that Europe must step in to help reduce tensions between the two Koreas, not least because the outside world is so worried about North Korean missiles."

Notes: speaking at the Georgetown-Pacific Century Institute in Washington on March 25, the Executive Director of KEDO, Desaix Anderson of the US, staunchly defended the progress made by his organization in moving towards implementation of the Agreed Framework. Challenging the myth that 'KEDO is hopelessly behind or defunct', Anderson notes that the planned site for the replacement reactors, at Kumho, has already taken significant shape: "We have built a village from nothing, built roads, a sewage system, clean drinking water, an electrical plant, a cement factory, have knocked down a mountain to site the reactors, built thirty kilometres of road, are building twenty-ton tetrapods for the breakwater and port, and [have] now ordered the long-lead-time items from factories in South Korea and Japan." More generally, Anderson concluded, the "Agreed Framework and KEDO have also changed the political and security landscape in Northeast Asia. The DPRK regarded KEDO as a test of whether it could deal with the outside world, and have found that they can..."

On March 26, South Korea became the 33rd member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Under the terms of the regime, states parties agree not to export technology or equipment which could help other countries acquire or develop missiles with ranges in excess of 187 miles. Under a 1979 bilateral agreement with Washington, Seoul committed itself to develop missiles with a maximum range of 112 miles. However, in mid-January, the two sides agreed to increase the permitted range to 187 miles (see Disarmament Diplomacy No. 54 for more details). South Korea's accession was warmly welcomed in a March 26 statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry, which expressed the hope that Seoul's "participation in the regime will contribute to the accomplishment of the tasks of resolving the situation on the Korean Peninsular and promoting strategic stability in the region as a whole." The statement added: "We consider that the R[O]K's participation in the work of the MTCR will contribute to the attainment of its chief objectives. The Russian Federation has been consistently coming out in favour of the expansion of the Regime by the addition of states committed to the rules and principles of the MTCR, and against any discrimination [regarding membership] on ideological, political or other grounds..."

Reports: N. Korea warns US on reactor deal, Associated Press, March 18; North Korea lashes out at US, says it risks war, Reuters, March 19; N. Korea nuclear accord part of US policy review, Reuters, March 21; Letter to President Bush from Independent Task Force on Korea, Council on Foreign Relations website (http://www.cfr.org), March 22; North Korea invites EU to dialogue on missiles, Reuters, March 22; Powell pushes foreign policy, Associated Press, March 23; President Bush's deferral of North Korean negotiations, Arms Control Association Press Conference, March 23; Bush urged to reopen N. Korea talks, Associated Press, March 23; Myths of KEDO, speech by Desaix Anderson, March 25 (http://www.kedo.org/myths.htm); EU seeks to fill US role in Koreas, Washington Post, March 25; Experts endorse new look at N. Korea nuclear deal, Reuters, March 26; Republic of Korea's accession to the Missile Technology Control Regime, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 515-26-03-2001, March 26; US-Republic of Korea-Japan Joint Press Statement, US State Department, March 27; S. Korea agrees to missile rules, Associated Press, March 27; Experts urge Bush to resume North Korea talks, New York Times, March 27; Experts urge Bush to continue discussions with North Korea, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers Issue Brief, March 29; S. Korea envoy predicts US will engage with North, Reuters, April 11; US missile defense plans attacked, Associated Press, April 11; Transcript - Powell responses at Contact Group joint press conference, US State Department (Washington File), April 11.