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NATO Ministerial Meetings
Foreign Ministers' Meeting
Note: as documented above, US missile defence plans have become a major issue in NATO deliberations on arms control and security policy. The following communiqué, issued by Alliance Foreign Ministers on May 29, received unusual scrutiny from media and commentators for its reference to the issue, and in particular the ABM Treaty. Customarily, the Treaty is specifically mentioned and lauded for its important role. In the last Foreign Ministers meeting, for example, on December 15, 2000, the Ministers state (NATO Press Release M-NAC-2(2000)124, paragraph 63): "We continue to attach greatest importance to an early entry into force of that Treaty [START II] and of an early conclusion of a START III agreement, while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons." In the new communiqué, however, the Treaty is not named, a departure predictably welcomed by US Secretary of State Colin Powell: "I must say I'm pleased that this [treaty] didn't warrant particular attention this time round." (US, allies disagree on missile defense, Reuters, May 29.) However, the US was reportedly disappointed that the communiqué referred only to a possible, rather than extant, threat posed by missile proliferation.
Communiqué
North Atlantic Council (NAC) Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Budapest; Final Communiqué, NATO Press Release M-NAC-1(2001)077, May 29, 2001.
"At our meeting today, we took stock of the progress made in promoting the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and gave guidance for further implementation of the [1999] Washington Summit decisions. In particular, we have:
We remain firmly committed to strengthening the EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council] and PfP [Partnership for Peace] to enhance cooperation, transparency and confidence among all the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. ... We welcome continued efforts in the EAPC/PfP framework to support broader efforts underway to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in support of global humanitarian mine action and the promotion of International Humanitarian Law, among other EAPC priority areas. We welcome the launch of the first project undertaken through the PfP Trust Fund on Anti-Personnel Landmine Stockpile Destruction, which will destroy Albania's entire stockpile of 1.7 million anti-personnel landmines. ...
Four years after the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris, the Alliance remains committed to building a strong, stable and enduring partnership with the Russian Federation on the basis of the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual trust. We welcome the progress achieved in our consultations and cooperation in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). ...
We value our ongoing consultations and cooperation with Russia in the framework of the PJC on such issues as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, defence reform, disarmament and arms control related issues, including CFE and Open Skies, scientific and environmental issues, civil emergency preparedness, and the retraining of discharged military personnel. ... We look forward to further consultations on the Russian proposal regarding missile defence and Allied suggestions regarding nuclear CSBMs [Confidence and Security-Building Measures]. ...
We welcome the opening of the NATO Information Office in Moscow as an important step towards improving public understanding of NATO and its partnership with Russia. We look forward to developing NATO's information activities in Russia. We attach great importance to the further development of military-to-military cooperation and, to this end, are pursuing our consultations with Russia to establish a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow, as called for in the Founding Act. ...
As we meet in Budapest, the States Parties of the CFE Treaty are conducting the second CFE Review Conference in Vienna. This is a significant occasion to reaffirm the vital importance of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and stability. The Conference is reviewing the operation of the Treaty and the elements mentioned in the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1999. We hope it will be possible to record important progress on issues relevant to achieving entry into force of the Adapted Treaty. Confidence in the full and timely implementation of all CFE obligations and related commitments is essential to the continued viability of this Treaty.
We note with satisfaction that the Russian Federation has met its East-of-the-Urals commitments to destroy agreed amounts of equipment, while continuing to destroy battle tanks as required. We remain particularly concerned that Russia continues to exceed equipment levels in relation to the Treaty's Article V ('Flank') limits. We note that Russia has notified withdrawals from the North Caucasus. However, Russia has not provided 'maximum transparency' including detailed information on equipment withdrawn and remaining in the region and additional inspection opportunities to monitor equipment withdrawals. This is most regrettable. We continue to emphasise the importance we attach to fulfilment of the November 1999 commitment by the government of the Russian Federation that Russian equipment levels in the North Caucasus would be reduced to the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments and equipment as soon as possible, in conditions of maximum transparency and in a manner consistent with agreed counting rules and procedures. Those conditions currently do not exist sufficient to enable other states parties to verify with confidence Russian TLE [Treaty-limited equipment] withdrawals from the region and resulting equipment levels.
We welcome the Russian Federation's completion of the first phase of its Istanbul commitment to reduce and withdraw forces from Georgia. An important deadline of 1 July 2001 is approaching as by then the Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani will have to be disbanded and the forces withdrawn, as was agreed at the Istanbul Summit. We look for early completion of the negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the remaining Russian military bases consistent with the host states rights under Article IV Paragraph 5 of the current CFE Treaty. We underline the need for substantive and early progress on Russia's Istanbul commitment to withdraw its military forces and equipment from Moldova. The deadline will approach at the end of this year for completion of the first phase of this commitment, the withdrawal and/or destruction of Russian TLE, which has not yet begun to be implemented.
The full implementation and verification of the CFE Treaty is essential for ensuring the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. The early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty will ensure the continuing viability of the CFE Treaty in this role and will permit accession by other states. We are committed to that end. However, we have consistently stated that for us ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all states parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments and equipment, and consistent with the commitments contained in the CFE Final Act.
We welcome the positive steps towards ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by Russia and Belarus. This Treaty is one of the widest ranging international arms control efforts to date to promote openness and transparency regarding military forces and activities. We are pleased that the Treaty is closer to entry into force and encourage both Russia and Belarus to complete the ratification process.
The preparation of the first United Nations International Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in July 2001 is the focal point of all international efforts this year to come to grips with the uncontrolled spread and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons. Allies agree that the conference should aim for a programme of action that will best facilitate bilateral and international assistance to the most affected parts of the world. The approach within the Alliance is that these problems must be addressed as part of a long term process with a particular focus on stockpile management and support for the destruction of surplus weapons and associated munitions. The PfP Trust Fund on Anti-Personnel Landmine Stockpile Destruction has been expanded to cover the destruction of surplus munitions and small arms and light weapons. This will further facilitate the programme of activities under the Partnership for Peace work programme chapter on small arms and light weapons.
We welcome the regional initiatives of the European Union and the OSCE on this issue particularly the OSCE's milestone Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons which focuses on the development of norms, principles and measures covering all aspects of the issue. We support the implementation of measures included in the OSCE Document by all member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance as it poses risks to international and regional security and can pose a direct military threat to Allies' populations, territory and forces. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members remains unchanged: to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. In this context we continue to place great importance on non-proliferation and export control regimes, international arms control and disarmament as means to prevent proliferation. Accordingly, the Alliance will continue to enhance its efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We confirm our full support for the NPT, including agreement on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty, and on the commitment of all states parties to disarmament, strengthened IAEA safeguards, and peaceful nuclear cooperation under effective non-proliferation conditions and safeguards. Alliance nations have dramatically reduced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and reaffirm their commitment to work for the further reduction of nuclear weapons globally. More broadly, we reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
We remain strongly committed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Zangger and Nuclear Suppliers Groups as important elements in our efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. We encourage all countries to adhere to and implement unilaterally the MTCR Guidelines and Annex and to the corresponding guidelines and control lists of the other regimes. We also welcome and support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation that we hope will be a universally subscribed mechanism to promote missile non-proliferation.
We reaffirm that the Alliance's defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the threats that the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery can pose. Our response should be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. We will continue to work together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts. In this context multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes, as well as international arms control and disarmament, are important.
We welcome the consultations initiated by President Bush on the US strategic review, including missile defence, with Allies and with other interested parties, and will continue substantive consultations in the Alliance on these issues. The consultations with Allies will include appropriate assessment of threats and address the full range of strategic issues affecting our common security, and the means to address them, including deterrence and offensive and defensive means, and enhancing the effectiveness of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as diplomatic and counter-proliferation measures. We intend to pursue these consultations vigorously, and welcome the United States' assurance that the views of Allies will be taken into account as it considers its plans further.
We also welcome continued work in NATO on Theatre Missile Defence for point and area defence, in particular on the feasibility study on a possible system for the defence of deployed NATO forces. We will continue consultations in the Alliance on TMD issues.
Recognising the achievements of the START process so far, we strongly support the ongoing process of achieving further reductions of the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. Allies concerned will continue working for even lower levels of nuclear forces while maintaining the minimum sufficient to preserve peace and stability. Given the need to reduce the uncertainties surrounding substrategic nuclear weapons in Russia, we believe that a reaffirmation of the 1991/92 Presidential Initiatives might be a first, but not exhaustive, step in this direction. The Alliance welcomes the US commitment to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with US and Allied security needs.
We remain committed to the immediate commencement, in the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in accordance with the Mandate of the Special Coordinator. As long as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has not entered into force, we urge all states to maintain existing moratoria on nuclear testing.
We continue to emphasise the importance of universal accession and adherence to, as well as full compliance with and implementation of, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). While the Russian Federation is responsible for the destruction of its chemical weapons, we confirm our support to Russia in the area of chemical weapons destruction. We welcome the efforts in the Ad Hoc Group of the BTWC to agree on measures, including possible enforcement and compliance measures, to strengthen the Convention. We remain fully committed to pursue efforts to ensure that the BTWC is an effective instrument to counter the growing threat of biological weapons. Also, we appeal to all states to participate constructively in the Conference on Disarmament and in its different activities.
The December 2000 Report on options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament demonstrates the long-standing commitment of the Alliance to the goals of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Council in Permanent Session is following up on the recommendations contained in this report and particularly those for confidence and security-building measures related to nuclear issues with Russia through the PJC.
We are pleased that NATO's WMD Centre continues to contribute to improving co-ordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO Headquarters, including the strengthening of our commitments to arms control and non-proliferation. After its first year of work, we note with appreciation the contribution of the WMD Centre in supporting the tasks of the NATO Senior Groups on Proliferation. The WMD Centre also provides information to Partner countries on proliferation issues; of particular note are ongoing consultations with Russia on the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. ..."
Defence Ministers' Meetings
I. Defence Planning Committee & Nuclear Planning Group
Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Defence Ministers' Meeting, Brussels; Final Communiqué, NATO Press Release M-DPC/NPG-1(2001)87, June 7, 2001.
"4. At our Nuclear Planning Group meeting, we reaffirmed the continuing validity of the fundamentally political purpose and the principles underpinning the nuclear forces of the Allies as set out in the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept. We emphasize again that nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance.
5. Ten years ago, with the 1991 Strategic Concept, the Alliance embarked on a number of decisive strategy and policy changes to adapt to the post-Cold War security situation. Looking back, we are satisfied that NATO's new strategy of reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, reaffirmed in the 1999 Strategic Concept, has been fully translated into NATO doctrine, and that NATO's drastically reduced nuclear force posture fully complies with Alliance key principles. Nuclear forces are a credible and effective element of the Alliance's strategy of preventing war; they are maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability, under conditions that continue to meet the highest standards of safety and security.
6. Reviewing the status of NATO's nuclear forces and related developments, we appreciated information by the United States Secretary of Defense on a range of topical issues. We expressed interest in consulting with the United States on its deliberations to adapt deterrence concepts and forces to meet future security challenges and noted the prospect of associated further reductions in strategic nuclear forces. We received information from the United States Secretary of Defense on the nuclear deterrence and force posture reviews currently in progress in the United States, including missile defence, and appreciate the assurance of continued, substantive consultations in the Alliance on these issues.
7. NATO has a long-standing commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, which will continue to play a major role in the achievement of Alliance security objectives. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We reaffirm our commitment to work for further reductions of nuclear weapons, and our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We recognize the achievements of the START process to date and strongly support the ongoing process towards achieving further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. As long as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not entered into force, we urge all states to maintain existing moratoria on nuclear testing.
8. On the basis of President Bush's 1991 Nuclear Initiative, NATO took the decision to reduce the number of nuclear weapons available for its sub-strategic forces in Europe by over 85 percent. These reductions were completed in 1993. Given the need to reduce the uncertainties surrounding non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia, we believe that a reaffirmation of the 1991/1992 Presidential Initiatives might be a first, but not exhaustive, step in this direction. Therefore, we renew our call on Russia to complete the reductions in its non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile targeted for implementation by the end of year 2000.
9. We value exchanges with the Russian Federation on a range of nuclear weapons issues under the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and look forward to consultations on the nuclear confidence and security building measures proposed by NATO, which seek increased transparency with Russia on nuclear weapons matters on a reciprocal basis. We see these proposals as a basis for enhanced understanding, trust and cooperation. We expressed our expectation that substantial consultations with Russia on these issues will benefit our stated goal of a genuine and reliable partnership with the Russian Federation."
II. North Atlantic Council
North Atlantic Council Defence Ministers' Meeting, Brussels; Final Communiqué, NATO Press Release M-DPC/NPG-1(2001)86, June 7, 2001.
"4. On missile defence, the United States Secretary of Defense briefed us on the United States assessment of the current and evolving threats from the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. We welcome the consultations initiated by President Bush and agreed that it was important that, as Defence Ministers, we continue to consult closely on the assessment of threats and the means to address them and related issues, including multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes, as well as international arms control and disarmament."
Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks
"Nuclear Posture
In light of this changing world, we are examining our nuclear force requirements, following President Bush's guidance to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with our present and future national security needs and our Alliance commitments. Moving to lower numbers could be done in a number of ways, including reciprocal approaches, arms control, unilateral initiatives - or some combination. But I know President Bush's determination, and it will be done.
The number of US non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe has been reduced dramatically since the Cold War. However, I do not envision any significant change to our nuclear posture in Europe. They continue to provide a political and military link between the US and European Allies. At this point we have not considered making any reductions in the existing numbers of these weapons.
A New Framework of Deterrence
Our thinking on reductions in nuclear forces is guided by a larger vision - a realization that we need a new response to a world that is notably different from the Cold War. During the Cold War, our aim was to deter one adversary from using an arsenal of existing weapons against us. In the 21st Century, our challenge is to deter multiple potential adversaries not only from using existing weapons, but, to the extent possible, dissuade them from developing new capabilities in the first place. Just as we intend to build 'layered defenses' to deal with missile threats at different stages, we also need a strategy of 'layered deterrence' that can deal with a variety of emerging threats at different stages. We do not intend to abandon nuclear deterrence. Rather, we see it as one layer of a broader deterrence strategy that includes several mutually reinforcing layers of deterrence.
Such a strategy would aim to: dissuade countries from pursuing dangerous capabilities in the first place, by developing and deploying capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete; discourage them from investing further in existing dangerous capabilities that have emerged, but are not yet a significant threat; deter them from using dangerous capabilities once they have emerged to threaten us all, with the threat of devastating retaliation. For example, overwhelming Naval power discourages potential adversaries from investing significant resources into a competing Navy to threaten freedom of the seas - because, in the end, they would spend a fortune and not accomplish their strategic objectives.
We must develop new capabilities that, by their very existence, dissuade and discourage potential adversaries from investing significant resources into hostile capabilities. Just as we do not intend to abandon nuclear deterrence - but rather integrate it into a broader deterrence approach - the same holds true for arms control. Arms control negotiations have had a role in our strategy. Arms control agreements have been valued in our Alliance for various reasons, including that they can help to create transparency, foster predictability, and promote dialogue among nations.
In devising a new framework, we would seek to achieve these desirable functions and we think we can do so. We want to get the new framework right. Either way, we see a good prospect for early reductions in nuclear forces. This framework does not view Russia as an enemy. We expect to deal with Russia as we deal with other countries - not as an enemy, not as a state with whom we are locked in a posture of Cold War balance of terror or mutual assured destruction. The world has changed. Our thinking about deterrence, security, arms control, nuclear forces, and missile defense must change accordingly. We need to get over the Cold War, and the legacy of Cold War thinking and approaches that still narrow and restrict our thinking. And, as President Bush recently declared at the National Defense University, 'Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and defenses.'
Missile Defense
Development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses will be an element of this new framework for deterrence. As a result of a first round of consultations following President Bush's May 1 address, we have a better understanding of Allied views - both those supportive of our position, and those with questions and concerns. I am pleased to see that our Allies have welcomed the US commitment to conduct close and substantive consultations.
We intend to build and deploy defenses to protect the US, our forward deployed forces, and in cooperation with friends and allies. We expect to deploy 'layered defenses' which would intercept relatively small numbers of ballistic missiles of various ranges in various phases of flight. Our development program will test a range of US technologies and approaches. As this program progresses, we will likely deploy test assets to provide rudimentary defenses to deal with emerging threats. We will likely continue to improve the effectiveness of any deployed capabilities over time. We intend to deploy limited numbers of defenses consistent with technical maturity and the threat. The Corona satellite program, which produced the first overhead reconnaissance satellites, had 11 straight test failures. Where would we be today if President Eisenhower had cancelled it? Where would we be if the Wright brothers had quit after their first 20 test failures? Answer: without airplanes. Testing is how we learn. Testing leads to knowledge.
Our goal is to deploy defenses against handfuls of missiles, not hundreds. We will not make decisions on systems architecture until our technologies have been tested, and it is likely they will evolve over time. We welcome your input in this regard. We look forward to exploring opportunities for enhanced cooperation with friends, allies and others. A number of Allies have, over the past several years, done impressive work on shorter-range ballistic missile defenses. The development and testing program we envision will offer opportunities for Allied participation.
ABM Treaty
Deploying missile defenses capable of protecting the US, friends and Allies will eventually require moving beyond the ABM Treaty. We understand this conclusion is not welcomed by some. It is simply inescapable. The United States intends to find appropriate defenses. The ABM Treaty's very purpose several decades ago was to prevent the US and USSR from doing just that. The treaty stands in the way of a 21st Century approach to deterrence. It prevents deployment of defenses that can deny others the power to hold our populations hostage to nuclear blackmail. We will be consulting closely with you and with Russia to find a new framework that will enable us to test and deploy defenses against new threats. Such defenses are no threat whatsoever to anyone. They are defenses, not offences. And by no stretch of anyone's imagination could they even begin to deal with the thousands of weapons deployed by Russia. And Russia knows that very well, let there be no doubt."
Source: Text - Rumsfeld remarks to North Atlantic Council June 7, US State Department (Washington File), June 8.
© 2001 The Acronym Institute.