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Russian Duma Hears Report on Nuclear Weapons Complex
On April 18, Lev Ryabev, First Deputy Minister of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry (Minatom), delivered a statement to the Duma on the subject of 'Prospects for maintaining [the] Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex and Supporting Fundamental Nuclear Science in the Conditions of Minatom's reorganisation'. Ryabev spoke frankly about the principal challenges facing the complex, particularly with regard to stockpile stewardship:
"Our primary goal is to ensure the safety and reliability of [the] nuclear arsenal available to Russia. In accordance with the law 'On Ratification of the CTBT', we must submit annual reports to the President on the state of the nuclear arsenal... The service life of [the] nuclear arsenal tested before 1990, when the moratorium on nuclear tests was imposed, will expire in the next few years. New items that we will develop and commission in the future will have some deviations from the characteristics of tested munitions. ... [N]uclear munitions today are the only type of weapons that are not fully tested. Much will depend on the scientific and technological potential that we develop today to ensure the reliability of the nuclear arsenal. This is a very difficult task. ... [I]n laboratory conditions...we have to get the same parameters as a nuclear explosion... This year three supercomputers have become operational... At present, about 20% of specialists working in federal nuclear centres have never participated - and, perhaps, will never take part - in nuclear testing. ... [O]ne of the most important tasks for the near future will be to ensure training and selection of young experts, to provide conditions for their creative activities."
Ryabev urged deputies to redress a significant legal imbalance with regard to the nuclear weapons complex: "In 1995 the Duma adopted the law 'On Nuclear Energy Uses', regulating peaceful nuclear activities. Meanwhile, military nuclear activities are not covered with a similar act. We would like to urge you to elaborate and pass a 'Law on Nuclear Weapons', as I call it, so that we have [a] legal basis for our work."
The Minister's statement also detailed the significant and potentially troubling downsizing scheduled to take place within the weapons complex in the 2001-2007 period: "The majority of enterprises [in the] nuclear weapons complex are situated in the closed administrative territorial units - CATU. Nuclear disarmament makes us reorganise the complex. By 2003, two out of four enterprises for assembling and dismantlement of nuclear munitions will be closed... [The] total amount of specialists employed in [the] nuclear weapons complex to carry out defence contracts is about 75,000 people, and in five to seven years this number will decrease by 35,000-40,000 people. This will be a dramatic change. And it is an urgent task to create new jobs for redundant personnel...[and] develop infrastructure in the closed cities."
Notes: on May 11, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov confirmed that the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) are no longer designated as a separate branch of the military. Announcing the appointment of Nikolai Solovtsov to head the SRF, Ivanov stated: "I emphasise that Solovtsov was appointed Commander, not Commander-in-Chief, of the Strategic Rocket Forces." Solovtsov's predecessor, Vladimir Yakovlev, had occupied the rank of Commander-in-Chief, reserved for the heads of the separate forces - a status which Ivanov's predecessor, Igor Sergeyev, had sought to preserve for the SRF.
Also on May 11, the Russian government announced it had formally approved an agreement on plutonium disposition signed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the G-8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2000. The agreement obliges the US and Russia to each dispose of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium from its nuclear weapons programme over a 25-year period, either by converting it to mixed oxide (MOX) fuel - which would allow for its resale to commercial reactors, a policy strongly opposed by many non-proliferation experts - or immobilising it as secure radioactive waste (see Disarmament Diplomacy No. 48, July 2000). The Duma will now consider a law detailing arrangements and procedures for implementing the plan. According to a government statement: "The realisation of this agreement will clearly demonstrate Russia's adherence to the further development of the nuclear disarmament process and allow [for] the development of Russian-American scientific cooperation." Concerning financing for the project, the statement noted: "Russia would not have to begin building or modifying facilities for salvaging [burning] plutonium without the creation of an essential international fund, to allow salvaging to go ahead at a rate of two tons of weapons-grade plutonium a year." The government estimates at $2 billion the cost of constructing two disposition facilities in Siberia, of which $600 million has so far been donated by Russia's G-8 partners.
Reports: Minister - Russia downgrades nuclear force status, Reuters, April 27; Russia approves nuclear fuel plan but demands cash, Reuters, May 11; The Duma and Arms Control, April-May 2001, Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center).
© 2001 The Acronym Institute.