Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 58, June 2001

Documents and Sources

US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Congressional Testimony

Prepared remarks by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 21, 2000.

"Since coming into office five months ago, I have been asking a great many questions and discussing a number of key issues regarding how our Armed Forces might be best arranged to meet the new security challenges of the 21st Century. ... Later this month, I will be available to discuss the 2002 budget amendment. But before we get to budgets, I think it would be useful to discuss the larger strategic framework, and our efforts to craft a defense strategy appropriate to the threats and challenges we will surely face in the 21st Century. As you know, we have conducted a number of studies...including missile defense, space, transformation, conventional forces, and morale and quality of life. We have just completed a month of consultations with our friends and allies on the new and different security challenges we will face in the 21st Century. ... And we have also begun a notable process within the Defense Department. Over the past several weeks, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, each of the Service Chiefs of Staff, on occasion the CINCs [commanders-in-chief], and the few senior civilian officials in the Department who have been confirmed, held a series of meetings to discuss the US defense strategy. We did not include staff, and met daily, two to three hours at a time, often on weekends - for a total of some 20-25 hours - to produce detailed strategy guidance for the execution of the Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). That senior group of military and civilian officials has agreed on some ideas that could become a new strategy and a force sizing approach. Over the next six to eight weeks, we will test those ideas through the QDR process against different scenarios and models, and will discuss our ideas and findings with the members of this committee. By later this summer and early Fall, we will know whether we have something we can confidently recommend to the President, the National Security Council and the Congress, and which will help us prepare the 2003 budget.

Strategic Environment

... Imagine, for a moment, what might happen if a rogue state demonstrated the capability to attack US or European populations with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction? A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations could give rogue states the power to hold our people hostage to nuclear blackmail - in an effort to prevent us from projecting force to stop aggression. In the event of a hostile threat by one of these states, we would have three unpleasant choices: acquiesce and allow it to invade its neighbors (as Iraq invaded Kuwait); oppose the threat and put Western population centers at risk; or be forced to take pre-emptive action. Intentional vulnerability could make building coalitions against aggression next to impossible. At worst, it could lead to a rise in isolationism... So if we are to extend this period of peace and prosperity, we need to prepare now for the new and different threats we will face in the decades ahead - not wait until they fully emerge. Only if we act now will we be able to live in peace in that quite different world.

Our challenge in doing so is complicated by the fact that we cannot know precisely who will threaten us in the decades ahead. ... [T]he world of 2015 will almost certainly be little like today and, without doubt, notably different from what today's experts are confidently forecasting. But while it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten, or where, or when in the coming decades, it is less difficult to anticipate how we will be threatened. We know, for example, that:

Our open borders and open societies make it easy and inviting for terrorists to strike at our people where they live and work.
Our dependence on computer-based information networks make those networks attractive targets for new forms of cyber-attack.
The ease with which potential adversaries can acquire advanced conventional weapons will present us with new challenges in conventional war and force projection, and may give them new capabilities to deny the US access to forward bases.
Our lack of defenses against ballistic missiles creates incentives for missile proliferation which - combined with the development of nuclear, chemical and particularly biological weapons of mass destruction - could give future adversaries the incentive to try to hold our populations hostage to terror and blackmail.

There are some important facts which are not debatable: The number of countries that are developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction is growing. The number of ballistic missiles on the face of the earth, and the number of countries possessing them is growing as well. Consider that:

In 1972, the number of countries pursuing biological weapons was unknown; today there are at least 13 we know of, and they are of increasing sophistication and lethality;
In 1972, 10 countries had chemical programs we knew of; today there are 16 (4 countries ended their chemical weapons programs, but 10 more jumped in to replace them;)
In 1972, we knew of only 5 countries that had nuclear weapons programs; today we know of 12;
In 1972, we assessed a total of 9 countries as having had ballistic missiles; today we know of 28.
And note that those are only the cases we know of. There are dangerous capabilities being developed at this moment that we do not know about, and may not know about for years, in some cases until after they are deployed. That has been the case in the past, and despite our best efforts, we must understand that it is the case today.

This proliferation of dangerous technologies is aided by the same globalization that is helping to fuel our current prosperity. What all this means is that soon, for the first time in history, individuals who have no structure around them to serve as a buffer on their decision-making will possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the means to deliver them. ... We know from experience that they have already demonstrated a willingness to use these weapons. Saddam Hussein used gas on his own people, fired ballistic missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, and has an aggressive nuclear program. Iran has recently used ballistic missiles to strike opposition bases in Iraq. So using these kinds of weapons does not seem to offend their sensibilities.

But we must remind ourselves that these weapons do not have to be used to alter behavior. The regimes seeking ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons see them not only as weapons to use in war, but as tools of coercion - means by which they can intimidate their neighbors and prevent others from projecting force to defend against aggression. The countries pursuing these technologies are often poor - in the case of North Korea, starving - but they are determined. They are taking funds that could provide basic sustenance to their people in some cases, and improve the quality of life in others, and investing those funds in ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. And they are doing it for a purpose: because they have decided it is very much in their interest, and strengthens their influence in the world. They are doing it because they believe that they can use these weapons to deter us from acting in ways contrary to their interests. That is why they are not constrained by diplomatic efforts to halt their programs; they are not constrained by international 'norms' and arms control regimes; and we cannot rely on them being deterred by the threat that we would use nuclear retaliation against the people of their countries they in effect hold hostage - the Mutually Assured Destruction concept that contributed to stability with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. These are very different regimes.

While this trend in proliferation is taking place, we are also seeing another trend unfold that has both negative and positive aspects: the increasing power, range and sophistication of advanced conventional weapons. If harnessed by us, these advanced weapons can help us to extend our current peace and security well into the new century. If harnessed by our adversaries, however, these technologies could lead to unpleasant surprises in the years ahead - and could allow hostile powers to undermine our current prosperity and our ability to contribute to peace. Future adversaries may use these advanced conventional capabilities to deny us access to distant theaters of operation. And, as they gain access to a range of new weapons that allow them to expand the 'deadly zone' to include our territory, infrastructure, space assets, population, friends, and allies, we may find future conflicts are no longer restricted to their region of origin.

For all these reasons, a new approach to deterrence is needed. ...

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

... As we began our review, I asked the members of our group to think about and answer a series of questions. ... One of the key questions before us is whether to keep the 'two nearly simultaneous Major Theater War' (MTW) force-sizing construct. I must say at the outset that suggestions that the 'two nearly-simultaneous Major Theater War' approach has been scrapped are not correct. ... The two MTW approach was an innovation at the end of the Cold War. It was based on the proposition that the US should prepare for the possibility that two regional conflicts could arise at the same time. If the US were engaged in a conflict in one theater, an adversary in a second theater might try to gain his objectives before the US could react. Prudence dictated that the US take this possibility into account. ... The two MTW approach identified both Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia as areas of high national interest to the US. In both regions, regimes hostile to the US and its allies and friends possessed the capability and had exhibited the intent to gain their objectives by the threat or use of force. ... The two MTW approach served well in that period. It provided a guidepost for reshaping and resizing the force from one oriented to a global war with a nuclear superpower, to a smaller force focused on smaller regional contingencies. But when one examines that approach today, several things stand out... [W]e have underinvested in dealing with future risks. We have failed to invest adequately in the advanced military technologies we will need to meet the emerging threats of the new century. Given the long lead-times in development and deployment of new capabilities, waiting further to invest in 21st Century capabilities will pose an unacceptable risk. We are, in essence, risking our future security. ...

[T]he US must assure its ability to:

Defend the United States;
Maintain deployed forces forward to reassure friends and allies, to pursue security cooperation, to deter conflict and to be capable of defeating the efforts of any adversary to achieve its objectives by force or coercion, repelling attacks in a number of critical areas, and also be capable of conducting a limited number of smaller-scale contingencies; while
Assuring the capability to win decisively against an adversary threatening US vital interests, anywhere in the world.

This approach takes account of the following:

The threat to the US has increased. Terrorism and attacks by special operations forces, including the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, is a growing concern. Cyber-attacks are increasing. The threat of ballistic and cruise missile attack is increasing. Allied and friendly nations are also at increased risk. A new defense strategy would need to take this growing and increasingly complex threat into account, and provide forces to address it. ...
In the end...the US must have the capacity to win decisively against an adversary. The US must be able to impose terms on an adversary that assure regional peace and stability - including, if necessary, the occupation of an adversary's territory and change of its regime. ...

Some of the investment options we have discussed include: ...

Space, to provide nearly continuous space-based coverage of critical areas of the world to support both civilian and military decisionmakers and operators, and to develop and field capabilities to monitor objects in space and protect US space systems;
Missile Defense, to be able to defend the United States, our friends and allies and forward deployed forces; ...
Precision strike, to enable the US to strike targets rapidly, on a global basis, carrying larger payloads of weapons, with a higher-degree of discrimination; ...
Research and development base, to ensure the US military maintains an asymmetric advantage over adversaries and to hedge against an uncertain future and the potential for surprise...

The portfolio of capabilities, in combination with a new strategy, could help us to meet four defense policy goals:

First, to assure our friends and allies that we can respond to unexpected dangers and the emergence of new threats, that we will meet our commitments to them, that it is both safe and beneficial to cooperate with the United States, and, by the same token, that it is possible to find ways to resist intimidation and blackmail by others;
Second, to the extent possible, dissuade potential adversaries from developing threatening capabilities, by developing and deploying capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete;
Third, deter potential adversaries from hostile acts, and counter coercion against the US, its forces, its friends and its allies;
Fourth, should deterrence and dissuasion fail, defend the United States, our forces abroad, our friends and allies against any adversary, and, if so instructed, decisively defeat an adversary at the time, place and manner of our choosing. ...

Preparing for the 21st century will not require immediately transforming the entire US military - just a portion. The Blitzkrieg was an enormous success, but it was accomplished by only a 13% transformed German army. ...

Conclusion

Change is difficult. Changing the Defense Department is like turning a great aircraft carrier - it does not turn on a dime. But the greatest threat to our position today is complacency. Thankfully, Americans no longer wake up each morning and fret about the possibility of a thermonuclear exchange with the old Soviet Union. They look at the world, and see peace, prosperity and opportunity ahead of them. We need the humility to recognize that, while America has capabilities, we are not invulnerable - and our current situation is not a permanent condition. If we don't act now, new threats will emerge to surprise us, as they have so often in the past. The difference is that today weapons are vastly more powerful. Mr. Chairman, I have spent the past 25 years in business. Any successful executive will confirm that the safest and best time for a business to adapt is when it is on top - and the most dangerous is to wait until an innovative competitor comes along and finds a way to attack your position. ..."

Source: Text - Rumsfeld Testifies on Need for New Strategic Framework, Washington File, June 21.