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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 58, June 2001

News Review

US Missile Defence Plans Unfold in New Congressional Setting

On June 6, following the decision of Republican Senator James Jeffords to sit as an independent, the Democrats assumed majority control of both the full Senate and its committees. Carl Levin, a long-time arms control advocate and staunch critic of the Bush administration's missile defence policy, is the new Chair of the Armed Services Committee, replacing arms control sceptic and missile defence enthusiast John Warner. In an even greater contrast, Joseph Biden, a prominent campaigner for an active US role in multilateral arms control, becomes Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, succeeding Jesse Helms, a tireless denouncer and foe of the CTBT, ABM Treaty, CWC, BWC and other major agreements. The new Senate majority Leader, Thomas Daschle, who replaces missile defence cheerleader Trent Lott, has spoken out on many occasions against any unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Although the Democratic Senate is unlikely to temper the enthusiasm of the White House, and particularly the Pentagon, for speedy progress on missile defence testing and deployment, the ability of the key Committees to direct the pace and emphasis of debate may well complicate the issue significantly. According to John Isaacs, President of the independent Council for a Livable World, speaking on May 24: "The abrupt change in leadership places significant hurdles in President Bush's hell-bent drive to deploy a national anti-missile system."

In a letter published in The Washington Post on May 20, Senator Levin set out his fears about a diplomatically mismanaged rush to deploy missile defences: "My concern is not so much that Russia would attempt to build a significant number of new missiles, which it cannot afford. It is that Russia would cease dismantling existing missiles and warheads and pose a greater risk of nuclear proliferation. ... No foreign nation can ever hold a veto over efforts to increase our security. But neither should we hold any delusions about the potentially dangerous actions other nations may pursue in the face of unilateral US missile defences." On May 31, Levin highlighted the serious technological and strategic obstacles in the way of any prudent deployment "I don't think the technology is likely to develop fast enough, even if he [the President] decided to violate the [ABM] treaty... [We must] make sure that we look at the realities of a national missile defence: not just look at that one threat that has been focussed on, the North Korean threat, or just [look at] the threat from ballistic missiles." See Documents and Sources for remarks on US arms control policy by Senator Biden.

The depth of Democratic opposition to Republican missile defence plans was in clear evidence during discussions at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, in late May. Speaking to reporters on May 28, two Democratic Senators were scathing in their assessment. According to Richard Durbin: "many of us question its reliability. Many of us view it as a Maginot Line... [M]any of us wonder if the cost to international security is worth the price..." Barbara Mikulski noted: "We're also concerned that after spending $185 billion...by the time it took to deploy it, anytime between 10 and 15 years, [it] would be obsolete..."

Notwithstanding this shifting political backdrop, the Bush administration is clearly determined to accelerate its programme. On June 8, The Washington Post reported that consideration was being given to stationing five interceptor-missile systems in Alaska by March 2004, a full year in advance of the earliest date by which the interceptor's X-band radar system could enter service. The report quoted a senior Defense Department official noting that: "It is a simple question: is something better than nothing? The President and the Secretary [of Defense] have made it pretty clear they believe that some missile defence in the near future is in fact better than nothing." The plan for interceptor deployment by March 2004 was reportedly set out in an April 23 presentation at the Pentagon by the Boeing Corporation. Boeing is lead contractor for the overall missile defence development programme.

Such provisional, skeletal deployments are sometimes referred to as a 'scarecrow defence'. On June 8, responded to the Post report, Senator Levin noted scornfully: "I don't think scarecrows scare birds. I haven't seen that work very well even with birds; I don't think they work well with countries."

Also on June 8, a Pentagon spokesperson, Air Force Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, told reporters that the next test of the troubled interceptor system would take place "mid to late July, based on current planning." The last test - a failure - was conducted on July 7, 2000. The test will aim, in the common phrase, to 'hit a bullet with a bullet': to destroy a missile carrying a dummy warhead and decoy, fired from the Vandenburg Air Force base in California, with a 120-pound 'kill vehicle' carried on a missile launched from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, 4,300 miles from Vandenburg. In Lehner's words, "hopefully, they'll meet somewhere over the Pacific. ... It's a major challenge."

On June 14, testifying the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Research and Development, Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, Director of the Defense Department's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), urged patience in responding to any further test failures: "I cannot emphasise enough the importance of controlling our expectations and persevering through the hard times as we develop and field a system as complex as missile defence... If we rush development imprudently, I will guarantee you we will get less than satisfactory results... If we were to rush to add complexity to our test flights, for example, a test failure would make it very difficult to identify the actual cause of failure... It is unrealistic to expect all development and testing activities to be successful and to expect all successful programmes to remain untainted by failures... The goal of the missile defence development programme has been to develop, demonstrate, and deploy a mid-course intercept capability to defend all 50 states against a limited attack involving intercontinental ballistic missiles with countermeasures launched by rogue states, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. As with any cutting-edge development programme, we must expect setbacks and the possibility that a particular approach we are pursuing is not the right one.." Overall, however, Kadish expressed himself satisfied and encouraged: "I see the glass as half full rather than half empty. We have made an awful lot of progress." On June 9, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld expressed similar sentiments: "I don't know a single advanced research and development programme in the history of mankind that didn't suffer a series of failures. You end up learning something by trying it..."

On May 31, senior Pentagon official Dov Zakheim predicted that the Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 Defense Department budget request would contain "considerably more" proposed funding for missile defence. The FY 2001 budget includes total spending of $3.8 billion for the development programme. On June 22, an unnamed Defense Department official told reporters the FY 2002 figure would rise to $7.5 billion. See next issue for details and comment.

Looming over issues of testing, funding and possible early deployment is the central political question of the point at which the US moves beyond strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. On May 30, en route from Washington to a NATO meeting in Budapest, Secretary of State Powell was asked to address the legal and diplomatic aspects involved in defining this line:

"Question: 'Mr. Secretary, I get the impression...that there is some internal debate or discussion among the administration over what to do with the ABM Treaty, whether to keep it until research or testing or some technology requires that it be revoked or immediately renegotiated, or whether to get rid of it fairly soon, or drive a stake through the heart of it...so that the message is sent to all those that need [it] to be sent to, including scientists who develop technologies, that we are going to live in a world without these kinds of treaties, that we need to have a missile defence. I wonder which side you are on?'

Secretary Powell: 'This [is the] exact debate I have been participating in for seventeen and a half years since President Reagan first came up with the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. At what point does this [treaty] become a hindrance? And I have had battalions of lawyers argue this point. When you start bending metal? When you start putting components together? Whether you are using new technologies? I think what we are doing now is examining the programmes that look most promising - this is what Mr. Rumsfeld is doing - and measuring the development cycle of those programmes, and [considering] when they would run up against what our understanding is [of] the limits of the ABM Treaty. Even at that point, it is not necessary to go forward if you are willing to accept a delay, or you might not want to accept any delay and move forward right away. ... [N]o decisions have been made. And there are different points of view within the administration and outside the administration. It's something that has been seriously argued [about] for as long as I have been at senior levels of government. ... I don't want to prejudge what it [the President's decision] might be or when it might be and signal a story in any way because I have no story to signal.'"

On June 9, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, asked about the broader relevance of the ABM Treaty for the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, answered candidly: "I am not an expert. I mean, it's almost embarrassing at my age to keep saying I don't know things, but I don't know...[the] whole fabric of treaties that have evolved through the decades and how they interconnect. I don't even know precisely which countries are involved with which of the various treaties. You would need a road map that would like a plate full of spaghetti to understand it. ... It is a hair knot. ... Now, is it possible that there is something in some treaty that has a relevant 21st century value, that is connected to some other treaty. The answer is, undoubtedly. Am I saying that...it ought to be left aside? No, I'm saying I don't know how that connects. Certainly, some of those treaties involve things I've mentioned, such as verification and monitoring. I don't know which ones, and I don't know which ones are still relevant."

International Developments

A flurry of reports in late May suggested that the US was considering a purchase, of unspecified proportions, of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles. Russia sees the missiles as a potentially valuable component of a boost-phase defence against theatre-range ballistic missiles. According to the reports, Washington was clearly hoping such a purchase would help encourage Russian flexibility with regard to US deployment of more ambitious strategic-range systems. On May 28, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov reacted to the speculation dismissively: "I can officially tell you that no offer and no discussion of this issue has taken place. ...S-300 missiles are air-defence, not anti-space weapons. Russia has sold these missiles to many countries. I cannot link this issue with ABM plans." On May 29, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, also denying any deal was under consideration, observed: "It's another matter that in the interests of promoting strategic stability we are ready for...ABM-related cooperation with the US and other states... An example of this is our Euro-ABM proposal, in which, by the way, systems analogous to the S-300 could be used. So, of course, the opportunities for Russian-US cooperation in the military and military-technological fields are there. But this cannot be done to the detriment of strategic stability."

Speaking on Russian television on June 2, Foreign Minister Ivanov outlined Moscow's broad approach to its dealing with the Bush administration on the missile defence controversy: "This combination of firmness on the one hand in defending our position and, on the other hand, our readiness to carry on a constructive dialogue, is the policy we will continue to follow... Why [should the US] take unilateral measures which could worry other countries and, to a greater extent, harm the interests of their national security? ...If we make a mistake in our disarmament policy today then the serious consequences of this will be seen in 10 or 15 years and then it will be very difficult to undo those processes, to try and restore what we might destroy today..."

In Shanghai on June 15, a communiqué issued by the Defence Ministers of the newly-formed Shanghai Cooperation Organisation - consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan - noted that "any violation" of the ABM Treaty would cause "enormous harm to the international community's efforts over many years and to the cooperation of different countries on arms control and disarmament, and will have serious negative consequences for international and regional stability and security." The communiqué added: "The Ministers stand against the creation of a theatre missile defence system in the Asia-Pacific region by a small group of states."

On June 4, Japan's Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka angrily denied press reports that she had expressed doubts about US missile defence plans during a visit to Australia. The speculation as fuelled by comments from Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda noting the Foreign Ministry had contacted Washington to ensure "there will be no misunderstanding" with regard to Tokyo's carefully crafted non-committal position. Fukuda added that he had been told about Tanaka's expressions of concern by former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, also visiting Australia for talks with Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. According to Tanaka: "There is no change in our stance to continue discussing the issue closely with the United States. I don't understand why these things are reported; and if leaked, why they are not leaked accurately. Moreover, I find it extremely strange why the former Prime Minister is saying these things..." The same day, Downer told reporters: "I deeply regret that my very constructive and friendly meeting with Ms. Tanaka has been subjected to the distortion and misrepresentation evident in recent media reports. Both Australia and Japan's positions of understanding the United States' rationale for a missile defence system are well known."

On June 6, with his government still on the defensive, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi clarified the degree of this 'understanding': "It is worth researching. But doing research is different from development and setting it up." On June 13, Koizumi remarked: We have to carefully consider this issue, which has enormous influence on global security."

Notes: on June 1, the Russian Space Forces (RSF) were officially reconstituted as an independent branch of the military, a status they held from 1982 until their absorption into the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) in 1997. The SRF has now itself lost its independent status - see last issue.

On June 5, a NATO Press Release announced that its "Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) Programme has successfully reached a major milestone in efforts to field a possible 'layered' [system]...that could provide defence for deployed NATO Forces by 2010 as part of NATO's Extended Air Defence Concept." The Press Release continued: "The Alliance's Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) has announced the names of the two successful bidders for Feasibility Study Contracts to look at the technical feasibility, costs and timescales of a TMD system based on NATO requirements. The two consortia concerned are led respectively by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) of McLean, Virginia, and the Lockheed Martin Corporation of Dallas, Texas. ... Welcoming this development, NATO's Secretary General, Lord Robertson, described the placing of the study contracts as a 'good example of transatlantic armaments co-operation'. 'These contracts', he said, 'will enable the Alliance to better identify TMD options for providing protection against the very real threat of ballistic missiles to our soldiers, when deployed on NATO missions.'"

See Documents and Sources for extensive coverage of missile defence discussions held during President Bush's first visit to Europe in mid-June.

Reports: No delusion on what Russia might do, letter by Senator Carl Levin, Washington Post, May 20; Senate power shift could slow US missile defense, Reuters, May 24; US plans offer to Russia to end ABM Treaty dispute, New York Times, May 28; Russia says received no US missile offer, Reuters, May 28; Congressmen square off on missile defense plan, Reuters, May 28; US may buy Russian technology, Washington Post, May 29; Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov answers a Russian and Foreign media question about possible US purchases of Russian S-300 missile complexes, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript, May 29; Russia denies idea of missile sale, ABM trade-off, Reuters, May 30; Bush to ask for $5.6b for military, Associated Press, May 31; Transcript - Powell remarks en route Washington from Hungary May 30, Washington File, June 1; Missile defenses need more tests, key Senator says, New York Times, June 1; Russia space forces get new status, Associated Press, June 1; Russia ready to be constructive on missile defense, Reuters, June 2; Tanaka denies opposing missile plan, Associated Press, June 4; NATO's Theatre Missile Defence programme reaches new milestone, NATO Press Release (2001)85, June 5; Japanese divided on missile plan, Associated Press, June 6; Missile defense speedup weighed, Washington Post, June 8; First Bush missile defense test said likely in July, Reuters, June 8; Senate arms chair vows fight over missile system, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 9; Transcript - Rumsfeld interview at end of trip to Europe June 9, Washington File, June 11; Japan PM may oppose missile defense, Associated Press, June 13; Missile chief urges patience on defense system, Reuters, June 14; Defense Department Report, June 14 - missile defense testing, Washington File, June 14; China, Russia hold security summit, US on agenda, Reuters, June 14; China, Russia join Central Asia in new grouping, Reuters, June 15; Asian forum against US defense plan, Associated Press, June 15; Details on next NMD test, Baltimore Sun, June 17; Bush to seek $329 billion for defense in 2002, Reuters, June 22.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.