Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 59, July - August 2001

Opinion & Analysis

Squaring The Circle: Can NMD And Nuclear Arms Control Be Reconciled?

By Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jack Mendelsohn, John B. Rhinelander and Alexander Yereskovsky

Introduction

Willingness to cooperate and compromise will be essential as the United States and Russia begin meeting at senior levels to search for ways to reconcile the deployment of national missile defences (NMD) with the reduction of offensive strategic arsenals and the preservation of overall arms control regime.

So far, Bush administration officials, while willing to "discuss" the issue of national missile defence with Russia and China, have stated that they are unwilling to allow broader Russian and Chinese concerns about the stability of the nuclear relationship to influence key US national security decisions. Administration officials have made it clear that their intent is to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to develop and deploy a national missile defence system unfettered by limits currently imposed by the Treaty. According to the "Missile Defense Papers," a briefing cable sent to embassies and senior officials on July 11, the pursuit of the administration's preferred NMD programme would require that the ABM Treaty be abandoned "within months, not years."¹ On July 25, a White House official indicated that the administration will not seek to alter the ABM Treaty and if the Russians were not prepared for a mutual withdrawal from the Treaty, the administration will "move ahead" unilaterally.²

We believe that it would be an extraordinary foreign policy blunder for the United States to abandon the ABM Treaty. The net result of such a course will be a collapse of the nuclear arms control regime and an inevitable decrease in US security. If, nonetheless, the Bush administration persists in its determination to develop and deploy missile defences, there is an alternative strategy that would allow the United States to explore NMD options while at the same time maintaining and strengthening its strategic relationship with Russia. Retaining, but cooperatively modifying, the ABM Treaty is central to this alternative approach.

We believe the ABM Treaty remains critical to strategic stability in a world that remains governed by deterrence. This has been repeatedly recognised by the United States and Russia and was universally acknowledged by the 187 parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which referred to the ABM Treaty as the "cornerstone of strategic stability." Since 1972, the Treaty has preserved strategic stability by restricting strategic anti-ballistic missile systems and ensuring that Washington and Moscow retained confidence in their retaliatory capabilities - their deterrent forces - at lower levels of offensive nuclear weapons. Despite the administration's rhetoric about deterrence and the ABM Treaty being "artifacts" of the Cold War³, the Russians and Chinese continue to believe in deterrence. They have made it absolutely clear that they intend to maintain their nuclear retaliatory capabilities and are unequivocally committed to responding to US NMD in a manner that could significantly decrease strategic stability and international security.

Modifying the ABM Treaty

Nonetheless, we believe there is a way for the United States to move ahead with work on an NMD system and simultaneously preserve the ABM Treaty and the nuclear arms control regime. This course of action would involve a basic compromise: both sides would agree, by means of negotiated amendments to the ABM Treaty, to relax limits on NMD development and testing of some mobile ABM systems for a fixed period (e.g. 5-10 years). This would be done in connection with two sets of measures to strengthen the existing arms control regime, including steep reductions in nuclear weapons and increased cooperation and transparency in dealing with national nuclear infrastructures.

This 5-10 year period of permitted development and testing would provide the United States with time to develop a more thorough understanding of a feasible NMD architecture while affording Russia an opportunity to adjust its offensive force structure and levels to new, less demanding requirements, become more comfortable with the new strategic relationship the Bush administration claims it is seeking, and consider what sort of negotiated deployment limits on US national missile defences would be non-threatening and non-destabilising. Ultimately, the purpose of this course of action would be to ensure the development of a US NMD programme in a manner consistent with a continuing and strengthened arms control regime, and to preserve strategic stability and enhance both US and Russian security.

NMD Development and Testing

Under this proposal, the first step for the United States would involve the creation of an additional test range in Alaska with two fields, one at Fort Greely and one on Kodiak Island (with five and two launchers, respectively), and an upgrade of the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya Island.

The establishment of a new Alaska test range would not require abrogation of, or even amendment to, the ABM Treaty so long as it is done in a manner consistent with the obligations detailed in Article IV of the ABM Treaty and a 1978 Agreed Statement negotiated by Moscow and Washington. These allow for "additionally agreed test ranges" provided that notification of test site creation occurs no later than thirty days after construction has begun.⁴ Notification would be submitted in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) - a forum, created by Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, in which parties discuss ABM Treaty-related issues and advance the Treaty's objectives.

As long as the Bush administration agrees to keep this additional facility as a bona fide "test facility" - as opposed to a deployment site or potential NMD command center - conservatives have their nascent NMD, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has a more "realistic" test bed site, the centrists in Congress have their fiscally-reasonable missile defence development programme, the Russians have a legally contained US missile defence programme, and, as the three US test sites will number 15 or fewer launchers (as permitted by the Treaty), the Chinese can retain their minimum deterrent capability.

A Russian statement made on July 20 has already indicated that Moscow would consider the planned ground-breaking on the Alaska test site a breach of the ABM Treaty.⁵ This would be the case if the United States failed to provide proper notification of its "additionally agreed test range" or if the US test range - particularly the inclusion of Fort Greely and Shemya Island which have no test range role - was in fact an operational deployment area. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz addressed these Treaty compliance problems during congressional testimony on July 20, noting that construction of the new range is an "ambiguous event because it can be argued to be a test facility...or it could be argued to be a deployment, and therefore not permitted."⁶ Russia's objection to the administration's near-term plans for NMD development in Alaska as a potential violation of the ABM Treaty is legally sound. Therefore, Russian willingness to acquiesce to a "test range" interpretation including Fort Greely and Shemya Island, and US willingness to keep them as test sites, would be an important component of this strategy.

In addition to the small test-site deployment of ground-based interceptors in Alaska, there would be an agreement to ease the limits on the development and testing of air-based, sea-based and some space-based ABM components. While testing of these mobile systems could eventually contravene the ABM Treaty, the embryonic nature of current ABM technology relegates the next few years of development and testing to ABM Treaty-compatible realms. In recent congressional testimony, Philip Coyle, former director of operational testing and evaluation at the Pentagon, noted, "[p]erhaps the greatest challenge for NMD right now is building realistic simulators to model how all the elements of a system, from launcher to interceptor to radar to command and control networks, might work together. The NMD program is years behind in this arena, but not because of the ABM Treaty. The problem is a technological one."⁷

The modernisation of land-based missile defences - that is, their development and testing - is permitted by Article IV and VII of the ABM Treaty. The advanced development and field testing of sea-based components and air-based components (such as the Air Force's Airborne Laser), as well as space-based and mobile land-based components, is banned by Article V of the Treaty. But this ban will not present realistic constraints in the short-term because most of these technologies still require basic development and testing, much of which takes place at fixed-sites on land, that need not bump up against the ABM Treaty advanced testing restrictions.

Boost-phase sea-based components, for example anti-ballistic missiles launched on extremely short notice from Navy ships, require development and testing of new interceptors and radars. Current booster rockets are far too slow to reliably engage intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the Navy estimates a workable system is at least eight years off. Similarly, at least 12 years of development and testing of the Airborne Laser will likely be required before it can be made light enough and sufficiently powerful to engage ICBMs from a safe, battlefield distance.⁸ Given the way defence programme schedules tend to stretch out, these are likely to be optimistic estimates. Thus, a 5 - 10 year suspension of the Treaty provisions may not be technically needed for the near term, but it would remove any doubts of the legality of the US development and testing programme.

Other Issues: Weapons in Space and TMD

Space-based tracking sensors are also a part of the proposed US NMD system, although Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits ABM components in space. Geostationary space-based early warning sensors such as the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and a Space-Based Infrared System-high earth orbit (SBIRS-high) have not been considered ABM components and, therefore, are not constrained by the Treaty.⁹ Under our proposed approach, Article V would be amended to permit the development, testing and deployment of space-sensors that can substitute for ABM radars, such as the SBIRS-low earth orbit satellite tracking system. In exchange for this relief from this ABM Treaty constraint, the United States would agree that the Treaty should continue to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of space-based kill vehicles. Placing weapons in space, by which we mean kill vehicles but not sensors, would precipitate an arms race in that arena and lead to the proliferation of space warfare countermeasures - such as anti-satellite weapons and orbiting mines - which would be highly detrimental to US security and economic interests.

In addition, the administration should not seek to link NMD and theater missile defence (TMD) radar systems only, as it appears, for the sake of violating the ABM Treaty. The Treaty currently prohibits giving ABM capability to non-ABM systems, such as theater missile defences, and prohibits testing non-ABM systems in an ABM mode (that is, against strategic missiles). There are sufficient technological challenges remaining in the development of front-end kill vehicles, new boosters and new tracking systems. Efforts should be focused on advancing those programmes rather than simply linking systems at an early date for purposes of "treaty-busting."

Strengthening Strategic Nuclear Arms Control

If the United States and Russia negotiate an arrangement that would permit a vigorous RDT&E (research, development, testing and evaluation) programme coupled with limited fixed-site US NMD deployment, they should also be prepared to agree to cooperate in the strengthening of the strategic nuclear arms control regime - along the lines recently endorsed by US Secretary of State Powell. Secretary Powell announced that he and President George W. Bush are considering "an arrangement...with President [Vladimir] Putin, that deals with strategic offensive systems, strategic defensive systems, limited defensive systems, non-proliferation activities and...transparency activities."¹⁰

In our view, strengthening strategic nuclear arms control should involve significant reductions in the US and Russian offensive nuclear weapon arsenals. The US should propose a cutback of stockpiles to between 500 and 1,000 strategic weapons and 500 tactical weapons (the latter are particularly vulnerable to misuse or mishandling). The Russians have for some time been prepared to reduce to 1,500 or fewer strategic nuclear warheads, although this was an offer made in the context of a viable ABM Treaty and constrained missile defences.

These nuclear force reductions should be undertaken along with the implementation of stricter regulation of fissile material production and storage and heightened transparency throughout both the US and Russian nuclear infrastructures. These measures could complement or expand upon initiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), which supports the destruction and deactivation of portions of the Russian nuclear arsenal.

In addition, the US and Russia would undertake an extensive series of bilateral confidence-building measures, such as enhanced, cooperative early warning networks, full disclosure of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons plans and programmes and the rapid deactivation of weapon systems slated for elimination. These confidence-building steps could also include the formalisation of ABM-related confidence-building measures and networks for information exchange not included in the original treaty. For example, Article XII of the ABM Treaty calls only for "national technical means of verification", which confines verification to remote, satellite-based observation. This provision falls far short of the rigid verification obligations that evolved post-ABMT, such as on-site inspections allowed for in Article XI of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Washington and Moscow should also consider pursuing other means of enhanced international cooperation in the missile defence arena. This should include exploration of a joint NATO-Russia missile defence system, akin to the European missile defense system (EuroBMD) that President Putin proposed in February to defend against non-strategic (i.e. intermediate-range, tactical and shorter range) missiles. According to the Russian proposal, extensive consultations among interested states - to determine the political, economic and strategic approaches to and costs of the system - would precede all testing and development.¹¹ While NATO officials have agreed to "seriously study the details of the proposal", and a Pentagon official remarked that the White House is also "prepared to study the Russian plan,"¹² there is no indication the Bush administration intends to pursue this offer.

Beyond a Decade of NMD Development and Advanced Testing

Under our alternative approach, the US would agree to postpone seeking any further amendment to or abrogation of the ABM Treaty during the 5-10 year period it is developing a more coherent view of the most favourable NMD architecture. Using this development and testing period to more rigorously define the most effective NMD architecture will allow the United States to offer specific, rather than open-ended, NMD proposals and to conduct focussed negotiations on possible amendments to the ABM Treaty.

Focussed negotiations, with recognisable limits, are more likely to incline Moscow to engage in serious discussions about the future of the US-Russia strategic relationship and they would in turn, garner greater domestic and international support for US efforts to deploy a limited national missile defence system. Additionally, and importantly, restricting NMD efforts over the next decade to development and testing, preserving the essence of the ABM Treaty limits on deployment, and adopting a series of important strategic nuclear reduction, transparency and confidence-building measures will give Russia time to evaluate and adjust to a new strategic relationship if, indeed, that develops.

Obviously, any amendments to the ABM Treaty (i.e. to permit advanced NMD development and flight testing) would require the approval of the Duma and the Senate. Neither body seems likely to consent to these changes without resistance. Therefore, strong political leadership in both countries will be needed to convince their legislatures that this approach represents an acceptable compromise for the next decade and that it will ultimately serve to integrate the Treaty into a new security and arms control framework and strengthen the US-Russian relationship. style='mso-tab-count:1'>

In sum, our proposal seeks to preserve the essence of the ABM Treaty - legal constraints on the deployment of large-scale defences - while permitting US NMD advanced development and flight testing of sea- and air-based systems, linking that relief to concrete examples of a basic change in the nature of the strategic relationship between two former rivals. In exchange for freedom to progress through the RDT&E phase of an as yet unarticulated national missile defence, the United States would endorse further and significant US-Russian offensive nuclear arms reductions, an increased bilateral commitment to confidence-building and transparency measures, and accept the prospect of eventual negotiated limits on US NMD deployments.

Notes and References

1. Administration Missile Defense Papers, July 2001, Cable from the White House to US Embassies and Senior Officials. (available at http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/default.asp)

2. Alan Sipress, "US Will Not Seek to Alter the ABM Treaty; Joint Withdrawal With Russia is Goal," The Washington Post, July 25, 2001.

3. Linda Petty, "Bush Promises to 'Renew Bond of Trust' Between President, Military," CNN, September 23, 1999. (available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS)

4. Sidney N. Graybeal and Patricia A. McFate, "More Light on the ABM Treaty: Newly Declassified Key Documents," Arms Control Today, March 1993, p. 15.

5. Peter Baker, "Russia says Alaska Test Site Would Break ABM Pact," The Washington Post, July 20, 2001.

6. Jefferson Morris, "Wolfowitz Challenged on Missile Defense R&D Program, ABM Conflicts," Aerospace Daily, July 20, 2001.

7. Prepared Testimony by the Honorable Philip E. Coyle before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, July 17, 2001.

8. Philip Coyle, "NMD Development is not Hostage to the ABM Treaty," The Defense Monitor, Special Issue: June 2001, p.5-7.

9. Dr. David C. Wright, "National Missile Defense: The Role of RAF Fylingdales and Menwith Hill," ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defense, No. 4, March 2001.

10. Steven Mufson and Alan Sipress, "Powell Says US Will Seek Arms Accord with Russia," The Washington Post, July 14, 2001.

11. Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Missile Defense for Europe: The February 20 Proposal is More Serious than it Seems," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Report. (available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports).

12. "Russia Welcomes US Reaction to its European Missile Defense Plan," The People's Daily, February 22, 2001. (available at http://www.english.peopledaily.com)

Ambassador Thomas Graham, President of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS), was a member of the US SALT, INF, START and NPT delegations, and President Clinton's Special Representative for Arms Control from 1994-1997. Jack Mendelsohn was a member of the US SALT and START delegations. John B. Rhinelander was legal adviser to the US SALT I delegation. Alexander Yereskovsky was Russian Deputy Commissioner to The Standing Consultative Commission, implementing body of the ABM Treaty.