Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 60, September 2001

Opinion & Analysis

The 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms: A First Step?

By Peter Batchelor

Introduction

This article provides an analysis of the recent United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (hereafter the Conference). Selected documents relating to the Conference appeared in Issue Number 59 (July/August 2001) of Disarmament Diplomacy.

The adoption, by consensus, of a Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms And Light Weapons in All its Aspects (hereafter the Programme of Action), marked the end of a six-year process within the United Nations. While some delegations, and certain non-governmental organisations (NGOs), were disappointed with the outcome of the Conference, the Programme of Action is significant for a number of reasons. First, it is an essential step towards building international norms with respect to the issue of small arms. Second, it represents the first global framework to guide the work of national governments, regional and international organisations, and civil society in combating the illicit trade in small arms. Third, as a politically binding document, it raises the level of political commitment of UN member states to address the illicit trade in small arms above any previous commitment at the global level.

I. The Conference

The Conference was held at UN Headquarters from July 9-20, 2001. The Conference Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) process, which was chaired by Ambassador Carlos Dos Santos of Mozambique, was able to agree, with some difficulty, on various procedural issues, including the modalities of attendance of NGOs. The Chair of the PrepCom also produced two drafts of a Programme of Action (L4 issued on 11 December 2000, and L4.Rev.1 issued on 12 February 2001). The second draft (L4.Rev.1) provided the basis for the negotiations during the Conference itself.

The Conference was opened by the UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette on Monday July 9. In her speech, she mentioned various ways in which the international community could begin to address the illicit trade in small arms. For example, she identified the need for developing a framework of binding international norms and standards to eliminate the illicit trade in small arms.

The first week of the Conference was devoted to statements at the ministerial level. However, ministerial level attendance was poor, reflecting perhaps a lack of commitment to the issue on the part of many countries. During the first week the Conference heard statements from 143 speakers, including one Vice-President, two Deputy Prime Ministers, 38 Foreign and Other Ministers, and 23 Deputy Ministers. Of those, 131 represented their countries, 4 spoke for regional groups and 8 for United Nations agencies and intergovernmental organisations.

Despite the presence of very few ministerial level officials at the Conference, the ministerial session turned out to be much more than a pro forma event. On the first day, US representative John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, gave a tough speech which literally woke up the Conference. He was critical of the draft Programme of Action and identified several aspects which the US could not, and would not, support. These included: measures to constrain the legal trade and legal manufacturing of small arms; the promotion of international advocacy activity by international or non-governmental organisations; measures that prohibit civilian possession of small arms; measures that limit trade in small arms solely to governments; and a mandatory review conference. Most of the other ministerial level statements were not nearly as provocative as the US statement. Generally they tended to highlight specific dimensions of the illicit trade in small arms related to their own country and/or region, while at the same time reaffirming their commitment to ensuring the success of the Conference.

The NGO community had a highly visible presence at the Conference. According to the Department for Disarmament Affairs, 119 NGOs registered to attend. More than 40 NGOs, including representatives from the 'firearms community' addressed the Conference at a special session on the morning of Friday July 13. The National Rifle Association (NRA), and its international arm, the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA), exerted a strong influence over the negotiating position of the US delegation, particularly with respect to the issues of civilian possession and transfers to non-state actors.

On the basis of statements heard during the first week, the President of the Conference, Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia, submitted a revised draft Programme of Action (A/CONF.192/L5) on Monday July 16. Since very little new text had been suggested since the end of the 3rd PrepCom, this draft was not significantly different from L4. Rev.1. By Thursday July 19, there were still a large number of paragraphs that could not be agreed.

On Friday July 20, the President introduced a package of proposals in the form of six Conference Papers (CRP1-CRP6) with new language on all the outstanding contentious issues. One by one, agreement was reached on all issues, except the issues of civilian ownership and transfers to non-state actors, the two issues the US delegation insisted had to be removed for them to join a consensus on the draft Programme of Action. On the morning of Saturday July 21, after lengthy negotiations, the African delegations agreed to exclude the two issues in order to achieve consensus, and in exchange for a strong final statement by the President as to what had happened. In the afternoon of Saturday July 21, the Conference adopted the orally amended draft Programme of Action (A/CONF.192/L5.Rev.1), and its report to the General Assembly by consensus.

II. The Programme of Action

The struggle to achieve consensus on the draft Programme of Action was in the end reduced to negotiations around the two issues mentioned above, civilian possession and transfers to non-state actors. While it appeared that the US was isolated on these two issues, many delegations were quite willing to remain silent during the negotiations, and therefore hide behind the US position. In this way the US delegation actually gave cover to a number of other delegations (e.g. China) who may otherwise have played a more obstructionist role.

Section I. The Preamble

A wide range of issues in the Preamble proved highly controversial, and were only able to be resolved in the final negotiation sessions as delegations struggled to find consensus language.

During the negotiations there were many attempts by some delegations (e.g. India) to define the term 'small arms and light weapons'. Some delegations, including the US and the European Union (EU), wanted the term as used in the Programme of Action to refer to strictly military arms. The Programme of Action contains no definition of small arms and light weapons.

Despite significant disagreements amongst delegations, the Conference was able to agree on language which highlighted the "wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences" associated with the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons, and "their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world" (para 2, Preamble). This language in effect creates a broad mandate for the work of NGOs, international organisations and national governments in their efforts to address the many problems associated with small arms.

Defining the term 'the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons' proved controversial, particularly due to objections from the Arab League. This was resolved with the use of a footnote to paragraph 22 (c) in the Preamble. The issue of self-determination, which is a perennial issue in disarmament negotiations, also proved difficult to resolve. The Arab League wanted the full language from the original General Assembly resolution 54/54V included in the draft Programme of Action. This was opposed by Canada, the EU, the USA, Israel, and others. The Programme of Action contains compromise language (para 11, Preamble). Israel, in a note verbale submitted to the secretariat of the Conference on July 20 (A/CONF.192/14), disassociated itself from this paragraph in the Programme of Action.

Various delegations, including Canada, the EU and Costa Rica, tried to get language that linked the illicit trade in small arms to violations of human rights. Other delegations, such as China and some Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states, resisted the inclusion of such language. The Programme of Action contains no language on human rights violations.

Section II: Preventing, Combating and Eradicating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Measures at the National, Regional and Global Levels)

This section, particularly measures at the national level, proved difficult to achieve consensus on. Aside from the failure to agree any language on measures relating to civilian possession and transfers to non-state actors, it proved difficult - despite the best efforts of the EU, Norway, Canada, and others - to agree strong language on export controls. While the EU wanted the words 'export criteria' along the lines of the EU Code of Conduct, the Programme of Action contains compromise language, as follows: "strict national regulations and procedures... (that are) consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law... (and) taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade" (para 11, Section II).

A related issue, limiting the re-export of weapons, also proved difficult to resolve, due to the concerns of China, Russia and certain NAM states, who refused to support any measures which might place restrictions on a state's ability to export or re-export weapons. A compromise was reached with the following language: "to notify the original exporting state in accordance with their bilateral agreements before the retransfer of those weapons" (para 13, Section II). However, in practice, this paragraph does little to restrain the re-export of weapons.

There was considerable debate around the issue of surplus small arms and the destruction of surplus weapons. Despite suggestions by the EU to include language on surplus indicators, along the lines elaborated by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), this proved impossible. Instead, agreement could only be reached on the following language: "to ensure that such stocks declared by competent national authorities to be surplus to requirements are clearly identified.... (and) that programmes for the responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of such stocks are established and implemented" (para 18, Section II).

Measures at the regional and global levels proved far less controversial, with the exception of the issue of transparency. Many delegations, including China and the states of the Arab League, opposed the idea of transparency measures, particularly with respect to the legal trade in small arms. As a result, consensus could only be reached on some very weak transparency measures at the national level (para 23, Section II), which only cover 'information' on various aspects of the illicit trade in small arms. No other transparency measures at the national level could be agreed with respect to the legal trade. At the regional level, language on transparency measures was included in the Programme of Action "measures to enhance transparency, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis" (para 31, Section II). The Programme of Action contains no transparency measures at the global level.

Section III. Implementation, International Co-operation and Assistance

This section proved to be the least controversial, and many paragraphs from the earlier draft (L4.Rev.1) were included in the Programme of Action. The only new paragraphs are para 15, which relates to the provision of assistance "to combat the illicit trade in small arms... linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism"; and para 17, which is concerned with addressing the "problems related to human and sustainable development" in post-conflict situations.

The majority of paragraphs in this section are concerned with international co-operation, the sharing of information and the provision of financial and technical assistance with respect to issues such as tracing and marking, stockpile management, the destruction of surplus stocks, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. Many delegations, particularly from the NAM, insisted on the inclusion of language such as 'upon request' or 'subject to their national practices' to ensure that such assistance does not undermine national sovereignty. The concerns of donor states and international organisations are also reflected in the use of language such as 'where appropriate, 'in a position to do so', and 'within existing resources'.

Section IV. Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

During the PrepComs there had been widely divergent views on how formal the follow-up to the Conference and its Programme of Action should be. This was reflected in the struggle to reach consensus on Section IV.

Despite the US delegation's opposition to a formal UN review process, the Programme of Action contains most of the original elements of the earlier draft (L4. Rev.1). It contains provision for a conference (not capitalised) to be held no later than 2006, although the US delegation was able to get a concession to defer decisions about the date and venue until the 58th session of the General Assembly. It also contains provisions for biennial meetings, although it is not clear when these meetings will begin. The US delegation's agreement to a formal follow-up and review process is viewed as a 'deal' in exchange for having the issues of civilian possession and transfers to non-state actors excluded from the Programme of Action.

It proved impossible to achieve consensus on the need to start negotiations on international legal instruments on marking and tracing and brokering. The idea of an international legal instrument on marking and tracing, which had been promoted by France and Switzerland, was resisted by China, the US and other delegations. The compromise, as reflected in Section IV, paragraph 1 (c) of the Programme of Action, only makes provision for a UN feasibility study. However, in other sections of the Programme of Action, there are significant operational measures with respect to marking and tracing (Section II, paras 10, 36; Section III, paras 10, 11,12).

The issue of an international legal instrument on brokering was strongly resisted by many delegations, including the US, China and others. Many delegations argued that there was no consensus on the dimensions of the issue, and that an international instrument was premature. The compromise, as reflected in Section IV, paragraph 1 (d) of the Programme of Action, is simply "to consider further steps to enhance international co-operation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering". However, a range of measures at national and global levels for dealing with the issue of brokering (Section II, paras 4, 14, 39) is included in the Programme of Action.

The rest of the Follow-up section contains fairly vague language such as "also encourage all initiatives to mobilise resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action..." (para 2b, Section IV). These paragraphs give national governments, regional organisations, international organisations and civil society a sufficiently wide mandate to continue working on all aspects of the small arms issue.

III. Reaction to the Conference

While reactions to the outcome of the Conference were generally positive, many post-Conference statements noted that the views of the overwhelming majority of states had been held hostage by the 'singular interest' of one delegation (US).

In his statement, the President of the Conference congratulated participants for reaching consensus on the Programme of Action. However, as requested by African delegations during the final negotiations, he expressed, in fairly strong language, his personal disappointment at the Conference's inability to agree - "due to the concerns of one state - on language recognizing the need to establish and maintain controls over private ownership of these deadly weapons, and the need for preventing sales of such arms to non-state groups". He also praised the African delegations for their willingness to put aside their concerns in the interests of achieving consensus.

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, also welcomed the outcome of the Conference. He stated that the Programme of Action was an important step in "building norms and in implementing collective measures against this global scourge". Echoing the words of the President of the Conference, he praised the African delegations for their willingness to compromise "in order to begin this historic process of constructive global action". In a direct reference to the US delegation's position on the exclusion of the issues of civilian ownership and transfers to non-state actors from the Programme of Action, the Secretary-General noted the particular importance for states to "exercise improved controls over both the uncontrolled private ownership of military-standard weapons, and ... the transfer of such arms to non-state actors". The Secretary-General also welcomed the constructive participation of civil society during the Conference.

The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), the umbrella organisation representing more than 300 NGOs, welcomed the Programme of Action. However, it expressed disappointment that an "opportunity had been squandered" and that certain critical elements - such as international legal instruments on marking and tracing and brokering, references to human rights, and commitments to greater transparency - had been left out of the Programme of Action. It did, however, acknowledge that significant progress had been achieved in a number of key areas, including more effective post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation programmes, and the destruction of surplus weapons.

Conclusion

The Conference generated two weeks of unprecedented international attention on the various dimensions of the small arms issue. This consciousness-raising aspect of the Conference should not be underestimated and may prove to be one if its most important legacies. In addition, the Conference helped to build new partnerships amongst civil society groups, and between NGOs and government delegations. These partnerships are crucial for future efforts to address the different dimensions of the small arms issue.

The Programme of Action contains many important elements, despite concerns that a number of key issues were left out. It also provides governments, regional organisations, international organisations and civil society with a sufficiently broad mandate to engage in a variety of initiatives to deal with the many dimensions of the small arms issue.

The fact that the Conference was able to agree on a Programme of Action by consensus means that the small arms issue is now firmly on the international agenda, and that there is a formal process to take the issue forward, both inside and outside the United Nations. Without such a consensus document the small arms issue would have disappeared off the international agenda for at least another 5-10 years. This would have been disastrous for local, national, regional and global efforts to deal with the scourge of small arms. The Programme of Action is therefore a vital, and important, first step. It must be supported and monitored to ensure that its many important provisions are fully implemented. In this way it can become a significant basis for further action.

Peter Batchelor is Project Director of the Small Arms Survey project at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author, and should not be interpreted as representing the views of the Small Arms Survey project (http://www.smallarmssurvey.org), or the Graduate Institute of International Studies.