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By Jenni Rissanen
Introduction
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of the 56th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) closed its session three days earlier than scheduled on November 6, illustrative of the non-confrontational spirit prevalent at this year's gathering. The Committee considered 45 draft resolutions and six decisions in a calm and business-like manner, despite, in the words of its Chair, Ambassador André Erdös of Hungary, meeting in the "aftermath of the horrible terrorist attacks" of September 11. Delegates also seemed curiously unaffected by setbacks in multilateral arms control and disarmament suffered in the last year. This apparent disassociation has added to doubts about the Committee's ability to adequately convey world opinion on disarmament affairs, and amplified the impression that the body is increasingly detached from current realities.
The Chair attempted to have the First Committee respond to these realities by tabling a new resolution on the role of disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in the fight against terrorism. There were two other new resolutions this year, on the use of depleted uranium (DU) in armaments, tabled by Iraq, and on the UN Secretary-General's proposal to hold a conference on eliminating nuclear dangers, tabled by Mexico. Mexico withdrew its resolution, however, after it calculated it did not have enough time to gather sufficient support. It is expected to table the resolution next year.
There was relatively little controversy about the bulk of the 'usual' resolutions. Japan's nuclear disarmament resolution, however, was subject to close examination - particularly in the absence of a nuclear disarmament resolution by the New Agenda countries - creating some turbulence both among and between the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). On the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a procedural decision, rather than the customary substantive resolution, was tabled in view of the imminent Article XIV (Entry Into Force) Conference. The US request for a vote on the decision - which merely asks that the CTBT be retained as an agenda item for next year - and its sole negative vote caused general dismay and cast a shadow across the Article XIV Conference and indeed the future of the entire treaty regime. With respect to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the annual Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) resolution by Hungary was also downgraded to a strictly procedural decision, despite the worrisome events unfolding outside the UN in recent months. Countries could not agree on references to the BWC protocol negotiations, halted in Geneva in late July by the US withdrawal from the talks process. The procedural decision, adopted by consensus, aimed at ensuring UN assistance in implementing the decisions and recommendations of the Fifth BWC Review Conference, due to take place in Geneva from November 19-December 7.
This report consists of a summary of the Committee's general debate (October 8-17) and analysis of selected resolutions and decisions, followed by a summary of all resolutions, highlighting their main points and giving both First Committee and UNGA voting results as well as explanations of positions.
General Debate
The Committee heard 92 general statements this year1, including powerful opening remarks on October 8 by UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala. As Dhanapala noted, delegates were convening in the shadow of the "dark and ominous cloud" of the September 11 attacks. Their starting point needed to be the "sobering realization that last month's tragedy could have been so much worse had nuclear, biological or chemical weapons been used". The international community had the "duty to protect innocent citizens throughout the world by reinforcing the multilateral disarmament regime". Dhanapala wondered whether the Committee's primary focus should change from disarmament to the mere regulation or limitation of arms. Although there was a need for both, he argued in favour of pursuing as a priority the total and verifiable elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. The world would be better off working to eradicate these weapons than "in perpetuating the fantasy that their possession can be permanently limited to an assortment of exclusive, but by no means leak-proof clubs". Recalling the conviction expressed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference that "the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", Dhanapala believed the Committee should keep its focus "on the search for absolute guarantees" because "the more it searches, the more it will return to disarmament".2
Almost all statements began with a condemnation of the September 11 terrorist attacks and expressions of regret and sorrow. Many countries stressed the role of multilateral cooperation in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and underlined the urgent need for progress. As always, nuclear weapons were high on the agenda. The successful outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was frequently recalled, invariably accompanied by reminders that the thirteen practical nuclear disarmament steps unanimously adopted in the Final Declaration were still awaiting implementation. General concern was voiced at the continuing deadlock of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), with no progress in commencing negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material or establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament. There had been little progress in acquiring the ratifications needed for the CTBT to enter into force. Nor had there been progress in the bilateral talks on reductions of strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. However, some were encouraged by the ongoing dialogue on a new strategic framework between the two countries and the talk about deep cuts in the US arsenal. Concerns continued to be expressed with regard to the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. While some speakers expressed the hope that the US and Russia might be able to reach agreement on the issue, others worried that US plans for ballistic missile defense might damage international stability and hamper progress in further nuclear arms reductions. In addition, concerns about the weaponisation of space seemed to be on the rise and many called for its prevention through a legally binding treaty to be negotiated at the CD.
Discussion of biological weapons (BW) took place against the chilling backdrop of the anthrax letter mailings in the United States and elsewhere which had dramatically highlighted the dangers of bioterrorism. Over 30 statements addressed the stalled negotiations on a verification Protocol to the BWC. With the exception of the United States - which told the Committee on October 8 that recent events had only reinforced its decision to withdraw from the talks - varying degrees of regret were expressed at the failure of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) in Geneva to conclude its work in time for the Review Conference.
There were more encouraging developments to reflect on in the field of conventional arms control. Countries generally welcomed the Programme of Action adopted at the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held in New York from July 9-20. It was widely noted, however, that more could have been accomplished. Western countries were disappointed at weak language in the Programme of Action on export controls, and at the lack of parameters establishing what was meant by an 'excessive' accumulation of weapons. Some Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, on the other hand, were unhappy about the failure to include a prohibition on the sales of small arms to non-state actors, regarding this as a major loophole, and about weak language on sales of weapons to the civilian population, which had featured as a sensitive issue for the United States. On other conventional weapons issues, many countries welcomed the increasing membership of the Ottawa Landmines Convention and hoped for a positive outcome to the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (the CCW, also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention), taking place in Geneva from December 11-21.
Nuclear Disarmament
The 2000 NPT Review Conference continued to underpin consideration of nuclear disarmament issues. The New Agenda initiative countries - Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden - chose not to table a resolution, but instead issued a joint Foreign Ministerial Communiqué on October 8 in which they "reaffirmed their determination to pursue the New Agenda initiative with continued vigour" and "agreed that priority would be to pursue their initiative in the context of the forthcoming NPT review process beginning in 2002." The countries held that the "2000 NPT undertaking on nuclear disarmament had been given. Implementation of them was now the imperative".3 Overall, this year's Committee showed that the Final Document has become firmly established as a yardstick against which delegations can measure how faithfully nuclear disarmament resolutions reflect the expressed will of NPT states parties.
This was particularly the case with the resolution introduced by Japan on A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The resolution seemed to be in trouble from the start, due to the difficulty of pleasing both NWS and NNWS. Tabled for the second time under its new title, and resembling the 2000 text to a great extent, the resolution ran into the same basic problem as last year: some countries did not think it fully reflected the Final Document. Particular sticking points in the initial draft were its placement of the mention of the NWS's 'unequivocal commitment' to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and its references to the CTBT. Japan told the Committee it had placed mention of the 'unequivocal commitment' in the operative part of the resolution this year "because we regard it as fundamentally important, and believe that such importance can be better stressed in an operative paragraph rather than in a preambular paragraph."4 The New Agenda countries, as well as some other NNWS, were unhappy about this, saying it implied the commitment was a step yet to be taken, when in fact it was an undertaking already given. Furthermore, they felt that its placement in the same section as 'general and complete disarmament' implied equal value with this concept and thus established a potentially complicating link between the two - a distressing prospect given that one of the key breakthroughs at the 2000 Review Conference was the separation of the issues, meaning the NWS could no longer argue they would disarm only when conventional weapons were also eliminated. The second major problem was the language on the CTBT, said to draw from the G-8 summit's declaration earlier this year, which others considered too weak. The text, departing from the NPT language, stressed the importance of maintaining moratoria on nuclear testing but made no mention of the need to achieve CTBT entry into force. This omission was particularly odd as last year Japan had insisted on a target date, 2003, for entry into force. The diluted text was seen as a major problem in view of the upcoming CTBT conference.
In the revised draft, the language on the CTBT was strengthened by referring back to NPT language, after Japan learned that it would lose US support for the resolution in any case due to the language on the test ban. The United States, instead of abstaining, felt "compelled" to vote no on the resolution, the only NWS to do so, "primarily due to the CTBT language".5 This stance means the United States now takes issue with language it agreed to just a year and a half ago at the NPT Review Conference. With Britain prepared to vote yes, Japan had now to get France on board in order to secure the traditional support of two western NWS. But securing the support of both France, which abstained last year, and the New Agenda proved a tough challenge. Japan tried to meet the New Agenda's concerns by removing the prefix "taking" in front of "unequivocal commitment" and adding "as agreed" (at the NPT Review Conference), to clarify that the undertaking had already been given. However, it retained the placement of the reference in the operative part, arguing that it followed the same formulation as the Final Document. France was happy with Japan's decision and voted yes, saying the resolution "reflected the balance" of the Final Document.6 The New Agenda countries, however, were not satisfied and abstained en bloc, citing the 'misappropriation' of the language on 'unequivocal commitment' and the linkage to complete and general disarmament. Furthermore, to gather greater NAM support, Japan also removed a reference to delivery vehicles in operative paragraph (OP) 9 from a sentence which called for efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear and other WMD.
Algeria, whose Ambassador Abdallah Baali chaired the successful 2000 NPT Review Conference, tabled a short resolution entitled Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee. The draft requested UN assistance and services for the 2002 Preparatory Committee, scheduled for April 8-19, to prepare the ground for the next Review Conference in 2005. A vote was called by the four non-NPT states in which India voted against the resolution. Cuba, Israel and Pakistan abstained.
Canada again tabled its resolution calling for the negotiations on a treaty banning the production of Fissile Material. It secured China's and Pakistan's support by sticking to the same formula as last year, reproducing language from the NPT Final Document linking negotiations to agreement on a programme of work at the CD. Other delegations would ideally have preferred stronger language urging a prompt commencement of negotiations. The United States' decided not to co-sponsor the resolution this year, raising some questions about whether this traditionally staunch supporter of negotiations will press for their commencement again, or with equal vigour, when the CD opens its 2002 session. The resolution was adopted by consensus.
As referred to above, the United States caused a bigger stir when it came to the draft decision on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The sponsor, New Zealand, had already revised the text, dropping a reference to last year's CTBT resolution which caused difficulties for India. Consensus was then prevented by the demand of the United States - to the astonishment of many, and reportedly at the insistence of the Pentagon - for a vote. In a rare diplomatic occurrence, the United States voted alone against the simple procedural decision in order make a point: it did "not support the CTBT". Assurances that the US intended "to maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing" fell on deaf ears as many wondered about the signal the administration was really sending.7
Mexico came to this year's First Committee hoping to table two new texts, including a resolution on the UN Secretary-General's proposal to hold a UN conference on eliminating nuclear dangers, a suggestion endorsed in the Millennium Declaration. The draft United Nations Conference to Identify Ways of Eliminating Nuclear Dangers in the Context of Nuclear Disarmament underlined that a need existed to address nuclear disarmament in a manner complementing efforts at the CD and in the NPT review process. Mexico wanted the UN to 'decide' to hold a UN conference "to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament" no later than 2006, and to establish a preparatory committee (PrepCom) that would meet at least three times for this purpose. The PrepCom would "make recommendations to the conference on all relevant matters". However, Mexico opted for a procedural decision to have the item included in next year's agenda after it met with strong resistance, particularly from the western NWS who argued that such a conference would establish an 'inappropriate' avenue for discussing nuclear disarmament, detracting from, rather than supporting, the NPT. A number of primarily western NNWS had similar concerns, worrying that the conference might 'take away' impetus from the 2005 NPT Review Conference and its preparatory process.
Mexico had also planned to table a new resolution on tactical (sub-strategic) nuclear weapons (TNW), on the tenth anniversary of the 1991 unilateral initiatives by the United States and the Soviet Union. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) recently arranged a seminar to commemorate these initiatives and discuss the need for further steps. However, Mexico reportedly came under pressure, particularly from the United States, and to a lesser degree from Russia, not to introduce the draft. Although other delegations, including some Nordic and other New Agenda countries, expressed interest in the topic - but not to the extent of introducing a resolution - Mexico decided not to proceed but to speak on TNW instead. It then delivered a statement, supported by the New Agenda, expressing deep "concern that the total number of [tactical] nuclear weapons...still amounts to thousands" and arguing that it was "essential to preserve and to build upon the 1991/1992" initiatives. Mexico specifically called for further reductions, confidence-building measures (CBM) and "concrete agreed measures" to reduce the operational status on TNW.8
Finland and Sweden also delivered a joint statement on TNW, drawing attention to the call included in the 2000 NPT Final Document for further reductions of non-strategic weapons. The two states also welcomed "the decision on increased transparency" by the NWS with regard to capabilities and implementation of agreements.9 Testifying to the growing interest in the issue, the Netherlands was also expected to address the subject, joined by Norway and Canada and possibly other NATO countries. This statement was cancelled, however, reportedly after heavy pressure from the United States, who reportedly felt that the First Committee was not the 'right' forum for dealing with the issue.
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
As mentioned, many statements in the general debate addressed the stalled negotiations on a verification Protocol to the BWC. Despite these concerns, and partly because of them, the First Committee was unable to produce a substantive BWC resolution this year.
The Chair of the Ad Hoc Group, Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary, circulated an informal draft based on last year's resolution but with updated references to the Protocol negotiations. The new sections stated, drawing as expected from the draft procedural report of the AHG's unhappy 24th session (July 23-August 17), that while the Group had not been able to fulfil its mandate prior to the Review Conference, the mandate remained in force and would determine the Group's future work. Further, the draft invited the Review Conference to consider the Group's work and the question of how it could best fulfil the mandate given to it by the 1994 Special Conference. Reportedly, however, the new language did not satisfy a number of parties - thought to include the United States on one side and 'hardline' NAM countries such as China, Cuba and Iran on the other - who would have liked various modifications reopening the issue which prevented the AHG from adopting a report on its last session: namely, how to explain the Group's failure to conclude its deliberations before the Review Conference. Other states felt it was premature to address these thorny issues in advance of that Conference. Given these pressures, Hungary then opted for a straightforward, procedural draft decision, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, duly adopted by consensus.
The withdrawal of the resolution, at the very time when the norm against biological weapons was being violated in a frightening fashion in the UN's host city and elsewhere, added to the feeling that the Committee was failing to adapt to the post-September 11 situation. However, Ambassador Tóth argued that it was more important for the Review Conference itself, of which he will be President, to rise to the occasion. While conceding that the draft decision, "because of its procedural nature," does not bring "to the surface the challenges posed to the international community by recent developments", Tóth said "serious" issues will need to be tackled soon, starting with the Review Conference. He underlined that "action or lack of action" would "shape the future of the biological weapons prohibition regime much beyond the Fifth Review Conference".10
Some countries voiced their disappointment over the fact that the annual consensus resolution had been downgraded. China took the opportunity to point its finger at the United States, without explicitly naming it, saying it had hoped for a resolution explaining why the AHG's negotiations had come "to an abrupt stop" in July, when the whole approach to the Protocol had been "negated". China had also hoped to see a reconfirmation of the AHG's mandate and a reference to the continuation of Protocol negotiations: however, "resistance from certain quarters" had prevented such a declaration.11 Cuba, Iran, Pakistan and Russia had likewise hoped to see a 'substantive' resolution.
Iraq sought to turn the First Committee's attention to the use of depleted uranium (DU) in armaments - an issue that received media and government attention last year due to health problems suffered by NATO soldiers and civilians in Kosovo suspected to have been caused by DU-ammunition used by NATO during the 1999 war. Iraq introduced a new draft resolution, Sub-Item on the Effects of the Use of Depleted Uranium in Armaments. The draft referred to "new types of weapons of mass destruction" and to "the facts that have come to light on the use of [DU] shells in military operations during recent years". Iraq proposed that the Committee ask the Secretary-General to seek views on "all aspects of the effects of the use of depleted uranium in armaments and to submit a report" on the findings to the next session of the General Assembly. The resolution met with strong opposition for three main reasons: first, the mere fact that it was proposed by Iraq; second, the resolution's equation of DU-ammunition with weapons of mass destruction; third, scepticism at the need for further scientific studies, since the World Health Organization (WHO) and UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) had already studied the issue and found no conclusive proof of widespread health risks or environmental contamination. Despite these obstacles, Iraq managed to garner sufficient support for the adoption of the resolution, albeit by a narrow margin. The resolution was defeated in the General Assembly by nine votes.
Ambassador Erdös tabled a new resolution in his capacity as the Chair of the First Committee. The text, Global Efforts Against Terrorism in the Area of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, was drafted as a response to the attacks of September 11, which Erdös said had acted as "a dramatic wake-up call", bringing home the realisation that the "time has come to take a second look at how disarmament diplomacy has been working". The draft, referring to recent Security Council resolutions on terrorism, noted the lack of sufficient progress in global arms control efforts and reaffirmed the importance of effective multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations in the maintenance of international peace and security and in the campaign against international terrorism. The Chair was keen that the Committee adopt the resolution by consensus, arguing that anything less would send "a very wrong signal". Erdös even told delegates that if unanimity proved elusive he would withdraw the resolution.12 Nevertheless, his draft did not prove satisfactory to everyone, and he agreed to revise the text, taking into account suggestions from the African Group, the Arab League and others. The revised version added references to the UN Charter and "all General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to terrorism", and reaffirmed multilateralism "as a core principle" in disarmament and non-proliferation. Member states were asked not only to "renew" their commitment to multilateral cooperation but also to "fulfil" their obligations. The revised draft was given a new name: Multilateral Cooperation in the Area of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and Global Efforts Against Terrorism. Despite some dissatisfaction about the revised version, and the way in which consultation were conducted, Erdös did not want to make further changes, fearing this might prompt further, contradictory suggestions. A decision on the resolution was postponed by 24 hours at the request of a number of Arab states which had hoped for a reference in the operative portion of the text on the need for total adherence by states to all disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, an indirect reference to Israel. Realizing that the Chair was determined not to change his draft, these countries decided not to block consensus. The draft was the sole resolution to be considered during the last day of the Committee's proceedings, and was duly adopted without demur.
ABM Treaty and Missiles
For the third consecutive year, Belarus, China and Russia tabled their resolution on Preservation and Compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. The draft was nearly identical to the previous texts, and, as in 1999 and 2000, Russia insisted the resolution was of a "non-confrontational character", "not directed against any country" or infringing "upon anybody's interests". The co-sponsors intended "to ensure the continuity of the position taken by the international community in support of the ABM Treaty, to preclude its revision or erosion, to prevent the deployment of Treaty-banned ABM systems...and thus ensure preservation of the Treaty as it is and full compliance with its provisions".13
The discussion that followed was a virtual repeat of last year: the United States expressed strong opposition, and France, one of the few Western backers of this resolution since its introduction, hesitated to reaffirm its support. In 2000, France negotiated a reference to President Clinton's announcement postponing a decision on the deployment of a missile defence system; this year, it wanted a positive reference to the on-going consultations on the ABM Treaty between the United States and Russia. Not wanting to lose French support, the sponsors reluctantly agreed. A new operative paragraph (OP7) was added, welcoming the ongoing dialogue on a new strategic framework between the two countries and expressing the hope that the dialogue would lead to substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces and contribute to the maintenance of strategic stability. However, to the co-sponsors' great disappointment, this did not suffice for France, which in the end abstained, arguing that the text did not adequately "reflect the on-going evolution or offer any new keys to a new international system".14 France's change of mind meant that Ireland was the only European Union (EU) state to vote for the resolution. The resolution was adopted with a large number of abstentions both from Western and NAM countries.
Despite the beginning of work by a UN Panel of Governmental Experts on missiles, Iran tabled for a second year its draft resolution simply entitled Missiles. The draft's primary purpose was to express satisfaction at the Panel's establishment and its first session in 2001, and to ask the Secretary General to continue seeking member states' views on the issue of "missiles in all its aspects". The Panel is due to submit its report to the 57th session of the UNGA. Although some of the initial scepticism about Iran's motives has faded with the establishment of the Panel and the commencement of its deliberations, some doubts remain, reflected in the 57 abstentions on the text, primarily by NATO, EU and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) countries.
Small Arms
Two countries which traditionally introduce separate small arms resolutions in the Committee, Japan and South Africa, joined forces this year and tabled a draft on The illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects together with Colombia, whose Ambassador, Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, chaired the 2001 United Nations Conference on small arms and light weapons. Welcoming the adoption of the Programme of Action, the resolution calls on all states, with the support of the UN and other international and regional organisations, to implement the measures contained therein, including the destruction of surplus, confiscated and collected arms. Formalizing the recommendations of the Conference, the draft resolution decides to convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress in the implementation of the Programme. Furthermore, meetings would be convened on a biennial basis, starting in 2003, to consider national, regional and global implementation. The draft also includes a decision to establish a governmental group of experts to seek countries' views on developing a legal instrument on the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons, as proposed by France and Switzerland, and to examine the idea's feasibility. Despite some concerns by Britain and the United States on the budgetary and financial implications of the meetings, and doubts by Cuba about the fast pace of progress envisaged, the resolution was adopted by consensus.
Conclusion
As was the case last year, and despite the tension and gravity of the current international situation, the 2001 First Committee negotiated and voted on its resolutions in a largely routine manner. Although the Committee responded to the new challenges by passing a resolution highlighting the role of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in the fight against terrorism, many observers were left with the feeling that business was being conducted very much 'as usual'. The traumatic impact of the September 11 attacks, and the subsequent intense anti-terrorism coalition-building, may partly explain why the Committee seemed generally unaffected by various setbacks in arms control which may have generated more controversy and angst in other circumstances. Whatever the reasons, the effect was hardly encouraging to those looking to the UN disarmament system for signs of urgency and vision at this time of grave threat.
Notes and References
1. For the full text of many of the statements, and a wealth of related material, see the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org. For a substantial compilation of excerpts from the statements arranged around key themes, see Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/un/2001comp.htm.
2. Under-Secretary General of Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, October 8, 2001.
3. Ministerial Communiqué, issued by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, press release, New York, October 8, 2001.
4. Seicchiro Noboru, Ambassador of Japan, First Committee, October 23, 2001.
5. Sherwood McGinnis, Acting Representative of the United States at the First Committee, November 5, 2001.
6. Hubert de la Fortelle, Ambassador of France, First Committee, November 5, 2001.
7. Sherwood McGinnis, Acting Representative of the United States at the First Committee, November 5, 2001.
8. Gustavo Albin, Ambassador of Mexico, on behalf of the New Agenda countries, First Committee, October 24, 2001.
9. Markku Reimaa, Ambassador of Finland, First Committee, October 23, 2001.
10. Tibor Tóth, Ambassador of Hungary and Chair of the AHG, October 30, 2001.
11. Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador of China, First Committee, October 31, 2001.
12. André Erdös, Ambassador of Hungary and Chair of the First Committee, October 23, 2001.
13. Sergei A. Ordzhonikidze, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, First Committee, October 23, 2001.
14. Hubert de la Fortelle, Ambassador of France, First Committee, November 2, 2001.
© 2001 The Acronym Institute.