Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 62, January - February 2002

News Review

Pressure and Assurances Fail to Restart US-North Korea Talks

The period under review saw a barrage of highly charged comment from North Korea accusing the United States of preparing to use non-proliferation issues as a pretext for conflict. North Korea has refused to accept President Bush's June 6 offer to resume negotiations with the US on missile and nuclear issues, describing the proposal as a trap laden with preconditions and one-sided demands. US officials have offered innumerable assurances that the offer is sincere, with no strings attached and the only demand for a comprehensive agenda.

On December 4, the Rodong Sinmun government newspaper in Pyongyang alleged: "The US-escalated policy intended to stifle the DPRK compels the DPRK to increase its military capabilities for self-defence... The Bush government is still pursuing the hardline policy to contain the DPRK though it calls for 'resumption of dialogue without precondition'". That these self-defence capabilities were likely to include its ballistic missile development programme was made clear by the newspaper a few days earlier (December 1): "The DPRK's missile development is one of the reliable self-defensive measures to smash the imperialists' moves to stifle the DPRK by force of arms..." On December 9, the newspaper alleged that US was actively preparing for war: "The US designation of the DPRK as the target of the post-Afghanistan war operation compels the Korean people to be in full combat preparedness to lay down their lives for the country... The DPRK is not Afghanistan..."

The White House is expressing growing frustration with the situation. On November 26, President Bush warned bluntly: "If they develop weapons of mass destruction that will be used to terrorise nations, they will be held accountable..." Although not set as a precondition for talks, the US is vigorously insisting on the prompt resumption of full inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

No such inspections have been conducted since 1993. In June 1994, North Korea withdrew its membership of the IAEA. In October that year, the US and North Korea signed an Agreed Framework, under which the Agency would be allowed to monitor the suspension of North Korean graphite-moderated reactors, pending their replacement with light-water reactors (LWRs) by an international consortium, the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organisation (KEDO). North Korea accuses the US of deliberately delaying the implementation of the programme, which was originally scheduled for completion in 2003 but is now not expected to conclude until 2007 at the earliest. North Korea also accuses the US of not honouring promises to provide electricity and other compensation for the suspension of the nuclear programme. Until these problems are addressed to its satisfaction, Pyongyang has made clear it will continue to bar the IAEA from conducting full safeguard inspections.

On January 10, the IAEA announced that a technical team would "visit nuclear facilities in the Nyongbyon area of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from January 15-19." Significantly, the "visit will include the Isotope Production Laboratory, an installation that the DPRK has stated was involved in the early stages of their nuclear programme." According to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei: "This is a small but welcome step towards a return to full-fledged inspections required under North Korea's safeguards agreement." An Agency press release continued:

"Since 1993, the IAEA has been unable to fully implement its...safeguards agreement...and has been therefore unable to verify the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration of its nuclear inventory. If it were to resume these inspections, the Agency estimates the work required to verify that all nuclear material in the DPRK had been declared to the Agency would take 3-4 years with full cooperation on the DPRK side. In May 2001, the Agency proposed to the DPRK concrete steps that need to be carried out in that verification process, and indicated its readiness to start implementing these measures immediately. At a technical meeting between the DPRK and the Agency in Vienna in November 2001, the DPRK did not agree to promptly start to implement those proposals, citing the delay in implementation of the USA/DPRK Agreed Framework as the principal reason for declining. However, the DPRK did agree to a visit, not an inspection, by Agency inspectors to the Isotope Production Laboratory."

In a small sign of hope with regard to the Agreed Framework, in Pyongyang on December 3 North Korea and KEDO signed a Quality Assurance and Warranties Protocol detailing, in the words of a KEDO press release, "principles for establishing and implementing quality assurance activities, as well as KEDO's warranties for generating capacity, major components, nuclear fuel quality, and specified civil construction works for the project." The Protocol was signed by Ambassador Charles Kartman, KEDO Executive Director, and Kim Hui Mun, Director General of the DPRK General Bureau for the LWR Project.

On December 17, twenty nuclear experts from North Korea arrived in South Korea for two weeks of training and education in preparation for operating the two reactors when they finally enter service. The visit was the first of a series scheduled to last through 2002, involving 290 North Korean experts.

Speaking in Seoul to welcome the North Korean visitors, Ambassador Kartman told reporters on December 17 that the US-DPRK "dialogue must resume by early next year". He added, however, that "there's going to be a clearing of underbrush that will be necessary..."

On January 14, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung urged Washington to be as sensitive as possible to North Korean concerns and pride: To reopen talks with North Korea, I think the United States needs to assume a posture that will save face for the North... As far as I know, North Korea wants dialogue with the United States. In fact, I think North Korea is eager for dialogue..."

Note: on January 4, South Korea announced the purchase, for $299.4 million, of 110 medium-range missiles from Lockheed Martin, to be delivered between 2002-2004. The missiles have a range of 187 miles (300 kilometres), the maximum allowed under the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which South Korea joined in March 2001. From 1979-2001, South Korea was bound by a 112-mile (180 kilometre) maximum agreed bilaterally with the United States. According to a South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson: "The 300 km missiles are capable of striking almost all parts of North Korea."

Reports: North Korea rejects US warnings, Associated Press, November 28; North Korea rejects US call for arms inspectors, Reuters, November 29; North Korea calls US 'hostile', Associated Press, December 1; North Korea hints at continuing missile development, Agence France Presse, December 1; KEDO signs accord with North Korea, Associated Press, December 3; KEDO and North Korea sign Quality Assurance and Warranties Protocol for the light-water reactor project, KEDO Press Release, December 3 (http://www.kedo.org); North Korea vows arms build-up to cope with US, Reuters, December 4; N. Korea says in 'full combat readiness' for US, Reuters, December 9; N. Korea techs study S. Korea reactors, Associated Press, December 17; North Korea is muted on ABM pact, New York Times, December 17; US- S. Korea to buy missiles from Lockheed for $299 mln, Reuters, January 4; IAEA team to visit North Korean nuclear facilities, IAEA Press Release 2002/01, January 10; S. Korean President urges dialogue, Associated Press, January 14.