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The build-up to the May 23-26 Moscow Summit between US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin has seen intense activity by arms control officials to prepare a formal agreement on the next stage of reductions in the two sides' strategic nuclear weapons. Broad parameters have been in place since the Summit between the two leaders in Washington and Texas last November: reductions to a range of 1,700-2,200 warheads over a ten-year period. The main difference to be resolved concerned the status of the warheads to be removed. As was planned under the agreed framework set out in 1997 by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin for negotiation of a third US-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), Russia would like to see the removed warheads destroyed, fixing the 2,200 ceiling in place; failing this, Russia would at least like to see an unequivocal, legally-binding undertaking by both sides not to exceed the upper level. At the time of the 1997 framework discussions, the Clinton administration was committed to amendment but retention of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Following President Bush's declaration in mid-December of a six-month notice of intent to withdraw from the Treaty, Russia is searching for ways in which, either within the terms of a new arms reduction accord or a declaration of principles governing the new strategic relationship, both the offensive and defensive systems of each side can be taken into account in a calculation of overall strategic balance. Such a mechanism might place limits on missile defences, and/or regulate quantitative or qualitative adjustments to offensive capacity as defensive capacity increases.
For their part, US officials seem to be envisaging an agreement, replacing or taking over from the START process, with a remit to codify and verify the scale and status of the operationally-deployed arsenal only, leaving the question of removed warheads to the discretion of each side, and moving broader or related questions, such as missile defence, to the purview of general political declarations. In addition, while adamant it foresees no need to exceed the ceiling it has committed itself to, Washington appears to be questioning the merits of legally barring itself from reconfiguring its arsenal as it sees fit in response to changing strategic circumstances and emerging threats. Indeed, emphasis on such freedom of action and planning, even for improbable scenarios, pervades the classified US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided to Congress in January 2002.
As reported in the last issue, in early March details of the NPR were published in the US media outlining the circumstances of possible nuclear use against seven countries - two nuclear-weapon states, China and Russia, and five non-nuclear-weapon states, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. In addition to nuclear-use policy, the NPR has heightened already-growing international concern over possible US plans to develop new nuclear weapons and resume nuclear testing.
In addition to sharing these concerns, Russia is being confronted with US allegations against its compliance with international non-proliferation obligations. On April 8, unnamed senior US officials briefed reporters on a decision by the administration not to certify to Congress that Moscow is fulfilling all such obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Moscow had received a diplomatic cable from the State Department outlining the reasons for the decision, one official revealed, noting that the move should be seen as "a signal of our seriousness about compliance on arms control and the need to meet all obligations under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions". Another official elaborated: "What we're trying to do is send a signal that we require full compliance... But we've also made clear in the review of our [non-proliferation] assistance programmes to Russia and the record size of our budget requests that these programmes are very much in our own national security interests. We're trying to find a way to bring these two goals together."
The practical effect of this non-certification is to place under review funds slated for new non-proliferation initiatives in Russia under the terms of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme. Existing contracts, according to the official, will not be affected. The political effect is to increase tensions with Russia at a crucial time in the nuclear reduction talks. On April 9, Alexander Yakovenko, official spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, reacted to the non-certification with puzzled dismay:
"The US administration has decided to freeze its request to Congress for the allocation of funding...aimed at helping Russia with the destruction of weapons of mass destruction... It cites as a ground for the decision certain anxieties about the observance by Russia of the conventions banning chemical and biological weapons... This move...has seriously perplexed us. First, Russia has been undeviatingly abiding by the provisions of these documents. Secondly, if questions arise regarding their observance, they should be solved through the existing mechanisms of bilateral and multilateral consultations. As is known with regard to chemical weapons we are holding consultations with the American side on issues which lie outside the bounds of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Even more surprising are references to the Biological Weapons Convention. It is not understandable how this fits in with the Joint Statement on Cooperation Against Bioterrorism, adopted on November 13, 2001, in Washington by the Russian and US Presidents, which reaffirms their commitment to [the] BTWC and underscores their striving to expand consultations in this field. One gathers the impression that the American references to Russia's alleged non-compliance with its international obligations have mainly been used in order to distract attention from the actions of the US itself, which has refused to support a Verification Protocol to the BTWC and is disorganising the activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Of particular concern is the fact that the American side has taken this decision without exchanging opinions with us and identifying the concrete facts which raise its questions. Such actions may have a most adverse effect on achieving mutual trust, and tell on the cooperation of the two countries in the work of eliminating weapons of mass destruction and in the field of non-proliferation."
On April 10, an unnamed US official told the Washington Times that Yakovenko's reaction suggested the Russians "seem to have received the message" of the improvement needed to ensure re-certification.
For more details of the controversy over Russian compliance with the CWC, see the item 'Russia CW Stockpile in Spotlight', later in this Review. With regard to BWC-compliance, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued the following acerbic statement on April 16: "on April 15, Russia submitted to the UN a Declaration for 2001 on the facilities and biological activities of the Russian Federation related to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. This information is required to be submitted to the UN annually by May 15 in accordance with the decision of the BTWC Third Review Conference. Russia has thus once again demonstrated its adherence to compliance with the Convention and our striving to maintain a climate of mutual confidence among the BTWC states parties. We hope for the same approach from other party states as well."
Note: for discussion of the impact of these and related developments on discussions among states parties to the NPT, please see Rebecca Johnson's NPT Report in this issue, and related material and documentation on our website, http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt.
Negotiation of a new strategic reduction agreement is being spearheaded on the Russian side by Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov and on the US side by John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. The third formal round of meetings - following sessions in Washington on January 29 and Moscow on February 19 - was held in Geneva on March 21-22. Both sides, particularly the US, expressed satisfaction at the progress made. A Russian Foreign Ministry statement (March 22) noted simply: "The delegations focused mainly on discussing a Russian-American agreement on...cuts in strategic arms and a declaration of a new strategic relationship which could be signed during the May visit of [the] US President...to Russia. In the course of the talks, the Russian side presented new proposals on the drafts of the respective agreements, and made reports on the nuclear doctrine of Russia and the prospects of ABM cooperation. A rapprochement of the sides' positions on a number of issues was noted. The sides agreed to hold the next, fourth, round of strategic arms talks in Moscow on April 23-24." In an interview on Russian television on March 22, Mamedov stated: "On the whole we are satisfied with the talks held in Geneva." Asked "how is the question of measures of control over reductions being solved?", he replied: "Our proposal is: in all respects follow the START I Treaty, which clearly sets the procedures of control and destruction and conversion and which will be in force - here the Americans and we have reached very important agreement - until the year 2009." The interview continued:
"Question: '[H]ow realistic is it to prepare this document by the meeting of the Russian and US Presidents?'
Mamedov: 'We have succeeded in reducing two texts to one - this in diplomatic practice is already considered a great achievement - and did so practically in a month. ... We are...quite optimistic about this, although there still remain two or three questions of principle which need to be tackled so that the agreement is ready for signing.' ...
Question: 'Could you describe a little more fully the bounds of the compromise that Russia is willing to make over the Americans' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty?'
Mamedov: 'We are not willing to make a basic compromise, and that is why the Americans are withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. Although some critics have accused us of willingness to make concessions, it is because we have been upholding our national interests that the Americans are withdrawing unilaterally, not at all with our blessing. What has to be done now is to minimize the damage caused by this erroneous US decision, and prevent a new arms race, including in space, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and so we have advanced proposals - they were transmitted today by Y. N. Baluyevsky, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defence - how to agree with the Americans immediately after June 13 [when the US withdrawal takes effect]. The Americans took our proposals for study and have counter proposals, and we hope that they will already find reflection in the Moscow summit documents.'"
Addressing reporters on March 22, Bolton gave his assessment of progress achieved and remaining: "Basically what we did over the past two days was to consider a number of the issues that remain unresolved between the Russian and the American sides on the offensive weapons document and on the political declaration. We also reached agreement on a number of more or less technical issues in further preparation for the ministerial meeting. We covered such things as how to account for the warheads that are the principal subject of this document. ... In addition on the political declaration on the New Strategic Framework, we are covering the whole range of strategic issues: offensive weapons questions, defensive systems, non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism. ... I would say in summary the talks were very productive. I thought we made progress. We overcame a number of outstanding issues. We still have a number of issues to resolve, but, as President Bush recently said in connection with Defence Minister Ivanov's trip to Washington [in mid-March], he is hopeful that we will be able to have a signing ceremony in Moscow to codify the reductions in offensive weapons..." Fielding questions, Bolton revealed more about the substance of the exchanges:
"Question: 'I believe that the Russians are a little bit concerned that the United States wants to store the warheads that it plans to cut instead of destroying them. Was this discussed as well?'
Bolton: 'The major subject of discussion, of course, is the reduction of approximately two thirds for the United States, from a level of about 6,000 warheads to the range of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads. We have had, over the past several months, extensive discussions on the subject of how to count that reduction. I know that probably sounds like something fairly minor, but in the world of arms control, the question of attributing warheads to various weapon systems versus actually counting the precise number of operationally deployed warheads can make a big difference. We've been exchanging information with the Russians over a several month period to give them a sense of what we mean by our proposed way of counting for these reductions. I think it is safe to say now that, although we have not reached agreement on that question, we have fully explained to their satisfaction what we have in mind. We have a number of other issues dealing with transparency and verification questions. We've had extensive discussions with them about the implications of having the START I treaty continue in effect, which is certainly our hope for the remaining life of that treaty. The issue of warheads that remain after the two countries reach the reduced levels that we are talking about, has also been the subject of conversation... The precedent in prior arms control agreements, of course, is that past treaties have not made any mention of what happens to the warheads that are downloaded. Some go into storage, some are dismantled, some are used for other purposes. I think that while there is not complete congruence on this point yet, the parties have reached an understanding that in order to reach agreement by the summit in May, we have to focus on the subject that is of most concern to us, that is to say, the operationally deployed warheads. That's certainly the direction that we have been urging, and I think that we are going to continue to urge over the next several months. But there is not agreement on it yet.' ...
Question: 'Do we understand well that this new treaty, if there is a new treaty, will replace START II which will never enter into force?'
Bolton: 'We haven't decided on our part whether there will be a treaty or some other form of legally binding agreement, but the intention would be that START I would continue in force. All of its provisions would continue in force, but because START II has not entered into force, it would not. In other words, the documents would be START I and then this agreement.'
Question: 'Have you discussed the problem of the replacement of the ABM Treaty?'
Bolton: 'We have had conversations, since the announcement on December 13 last year by President Bush of our notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, about a variety of possible efforts at cooperation and transparency in connection with the ongoing United States effort to develop a limited ballistic missile defense system. ... We are hoping to have some concrete things to announce perhaps as part of the political declaration...when we arrive in Moscow for the summit. Just one little footnote: one of the things that inhibits our cooperation with the Russians on missile defense is of course the ABM Treaty. So until that treaty expires, we are limited in some of the things we can do, but it's our hope to show to the Russian side that we are open and transparent on missile defense and to engage in cooperation in a way that might be mutually productive.' ...
Question: 'I believe that the United States and Russia are apart on verification issues: you don't agree on how the warhead cuts should be verified. Have you been narrowing this down, and can you tell us what the difference in the two positions is?'
Bolton: 'Actually, there is a substantial area of agreement, beginning with the very firm view of both sides that we will keep the START I inspection verification and compliance mechanisms in place for the remaining life of that treaty. Both sides also, over the years of experience with that treaty, have come up with a number of suggestions that would reduce the burdensomeness of some of the inspections without reducing in any way their capacity to provide information. We have got some additional thoughts that we provided to the Russian side last week when Defence Minister Ivanov was in Washington, that are more particularly tailored to the kind of transparency that we would like to see as we come down to the lower levels that both sides have agreed to. There are a number of issues now relating to the fact that we will be talking about, at least in our view, operationally deployed warheads, as opposed to the kind of verification you need under the START I counting rules where warheads are attributed to particular delivery platforms whether they are carrying the warheads or not.' ...
Question: 'With respect to the agreement you are negotiating, are you discussing a notification period for withdrawal and if so what is the period being considered?'
Bolton: 'Almost every arms control treaty, in fact almost every major international agreement, provides for some kind of withdrawal provision. ... In our draft we have included a withdrawal provision. We had also proposed to the Russians that, short of actual withdrawal, there might be a mechanism whereby we could give notice if we felt international geo-strategic circumstances have changed to a point where the offensive nuclear weapons range might need to be adjusted, so that we could adjust that range without actually withdrawing from the treaty. And we have had some interesting discussions on that. I think it would be fair to say that we have not reached agreement. But I think that the Russian side does not have a much different view of the importance of flexibility for both countries, given the uncertainties that we face looking into the future.'
Question: 'You are saying that you would like a mechanism which would allow you to change the figures, to raise them, conceivably?'
Bolton: 'Right. If there were changed circumstances in the world that might be necessary. It might also be possible, within the range, for the United States to vary up or down, or both sides, the way the drafts are written, to go below the range.'"
Domestic political scepticism about the Bush reduction plan is running high. On March 22, the independent Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) released a detailed analysis of the likely shape and size of the NPR-stockpile, estimating a "responsive force" of 2,400 warheads by 2012 to act as reserve to the operationally-deployed arsenal. Commenting on the NRDC study, Democratic Senator Carl Levin, Chair of the Armed Services Committee, complained (March 22): "What kind of example do we set for other nations when we say we are reducing our strategic nuclear stockpile to 1,700 or 2,200 warheads when what we really are thinking of doing is moving nuclear warheads from missiles and bombers to warehouses where they could be quickly and easily brought back to service?"
On April 4, Levin and Senator Jack Reed (Democrat), Chair of the Armed Services Strategic Subcommittee, wrote to President Bush urging him to pursue an agreement "verifiably and irreversibly reducing the number of strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200". The Senators' argued:
"[W]e are concerned that our keeping thousands of warheads in reserve would exacerbate the danger of nuclear proliferation and terrorism because it would almost certainly lead Russia to do the same. ... [W]e urge you to work for an agreement with Russia to remove, dismantle and eliminate the non-operational warheads from launchers, and to include a comprehensive verification system. In addition, we urge you to agree to an exchange of detailed information on nuclear weapons stockpiles of the two countries, both deployed and in storage, strategic and non-strategic. The Russian government has previously indicated a willingness to do so."
The letter was greeted with perhaps telling applause by the Russian Foreign Ministry in an April 16 statement: "The US Senators believe...reductions must be verifiable and irreversible, and that the agreement should envisage dismantling and liquidation of warheads taken off their delivery vehicles in the conditions of comprehensive control. In the opinion of Levin and Reed, this kind of document could be a constructive contribution to the process of strengthening confidence, predictability and cooperation by the US with Russia, which has been gathering momentum since the events of September 11. It will be recalled that the Russian side has - from the very beginning of the negotiation process to work out a new agreement with the US on cuts in strategic offensive arms - stood for real, not 'virtual', strategic arms reductions and limitation, which would be carried out according to the strict rules laid down in the operative START I Treaty...[which would] generally lead to predictability and the consolidation of strategic stability and international security."
On March 15, Senators Joseph Biden, Democratic Chair of the Foreign Relation Committee, and Jesse Helms, the senior Republican on the Committee, wrote to Secretary of State Colin Powell arguing that "significant obligations by the United States regarding deployed US strategic nuclear warheads [would] constitute a treaty subject to the advice and consent of the Senate". Formal approval of any treaty-status agreement requires approval from two thirds of the 100-member Senate; alternatively, an accord designated as an executive agreement requires only simple majority consent from both Houses of Congress. As a third option, highly unlikely in this case, the President could make a commitment in his own capacity. The Biden-Helms letter maintains: "With the exception of the SALT I agreement, every significant arms control agreement during the past three decades has been transmitted to the Senate pursuant to the Treaty Clause of the Constitution. Mr. Secretary, we see no reason whatsoever to alter this practice." On March 17, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the independent Arms Control Association, described the Biden-Helms letter as "a very welcome message because it could lead the way to a more permanent reduction of US and Russian forces... [A formal treaty] provides both sides with clearer and more durable commitments... Given the magnitude of this subject, such clarity is essential, rather than leaving the door open to renewed nuclear tension."
Asked about the nature of the agreement on April 11, Secretary Powell, admitting "there are a couple of tough issues remaining", told reporters "it will be short, to the point". On April 16, however, Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a senior national security and non-proliferation official under President Clinton, told reporters in Moscow that something more elaborate may be expected: "In this new agreement there will apparently be some measures to monitor warheads cooperatively. This is a very welcome innovation in the strategic arms control process... Historically, the strategic arms reduction agreements hadn't touched on warheads because they were considered too sensitive and difficult to monitor..."
Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, press conference with US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Madrid, April 11: "[W]e have an understanding between the parties that this [agreement] would have to be a legally binding document. In which form it is going to be drawn is still to be discussed... What is a principle for us is that it has to be a legally binding document. As for the...reduction and elimination of nuclear warheads and delivery means, it is one of the most complex issues... There are some nuances in approach... The Russian side stands for making the reductions real...so that we have a real understanding on both sides which levels of nuclear warheads and delivery means each of us possess."
Foreign Minister Ivanov, March 16: "There are forces in the United States who do not want any deals with Russia or any other country. But we will continue talks and aim at reaching agreements."
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, April 5: "There are no differences on the essence of the legally binding document... There are certain differences concerning control mechanisms and approaches to the cuts. ... Despite the increased level of trust between Moscow and Washington, mechanisms of control over nuclear weapons reduction must be preserved."
Defence Minister Ivanov, Washington, March 15: "Part of it [the US stockpile] may be stored. I don't argue with that principle...out of hand... But the devil is in the details: how much, how long, and how quickly it might go back to [being] operational and...jeopardize strategic stability."
Defence Minister Ivanov, March 11: "Can such a reduction [as proposed by the US] be considered a real one? Make your own judgment... If, at a certain point, the United States considers the situation to be taking an 'unfavourable turn', then within several weeks, months or years the number of operationally-deployed warheads may be restored to the desired level."
President Bush, March 14: "The most important thing...is verification - to make sure that whatever decision is made [on reductions], that there is open verification so as to develop a level of trust... I...agree with President Putin that there needs to be a document that outlives both of us. What form that comes in, we will discuss. I'm confident that President Putin is interested in making a deal, coming up with a good arrangement that will codify a new relationship."
The release of classified details of the NPR in the Los Angeles Times on March 9, naming seven potential targets of nuclear attack by the US, provoked an outcry around the globe, amplifying concerns already expressed at elements of the Review as summarised by Pentagon officials in early January (see Disarmament Diplomacy No. 62, January/February 2002). According to the Times article, nuclear attack against the seven named states would be considered as a legitimate option in three instances: in response to an attack using weapons of mass destruction, in order to destroy vital targets immune to destruction by conventional explosives (presumably a reference to low-yield or 'mini' nukes not yet in development), or, in the words of the NPR as quoted in the article, "in the event of surprising military developments".
Russia quickly expressed alarm. On March 12, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Yakovenko stated: "We have sent a letter to the US State Department asking [them] to explain... The fact is that if the information set forth in the story corresponds to reality, then...it can cause regret and anxiety, not only in Russia, but also in the whole international community. Based on the contents of the story, one has the impression that a transformation of the approaches to using nuclear weapons is taking place in the United States. In particular, it is now recognised that they could be employed in regional conflicts, including against non-nuclear countries which have relinquished the nuclear choice. This transfers nuclear weapons from a means of deterrence to the operational military arsenal of the USA, which lowers the threshold of their application. All this, if it is really so, in the final analysis seriously weakens the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Yet Russia and the USA as some of the depositaries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the contrary, should strive to strengthen, not to undermine, this major element of international security." In an interview published in The Times on March 13, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov commented: "Certain moves taken by the US administration are incomprehensible to Russian society. Among them is the unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the last nuclear review submitted by the Pentagon, which, in the classical spirit of the Cold War, lists Russia as a possible nuclear target."
Of the other named countries, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan stated on March 12: "The nuclear states should unconditionally undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, or use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-free countries or zones. ... In our view, it is the trend of the day for the international community to work for peace, cooperation and development. Any Cold War mentality does not go along with [this] trend..." On March 16, much stronger language was used by Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing: "China wants to make it very clear that China will never yield to foreign threats, including nuclear blackmail". Libya's African Affairs Minister, Ali Abd al-Salam al-Turiki, question by reporters on March 10, expressed disbelief at what seems to have been his first news of the report: "I don't think this is true. I don't think America is going to destroy the world." On March 15, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami argued: "After September 11, America is trying to use the situation to impose its own views and get rid of all obstacles in order to be the exclusive Superpower. If this continues, America will include Europe in the 'axis of evil'... They will add China and Russia [to the axis] and the world will move toward a terrible war. The powers which threaten other peoples with nuclear weapons threaten not just these peoples but all humanity. ... If we have such developments, no peoples will be safe, not even the leadership...which threatens the use of nuclear force." On March 13, a North Korean government statement stated defiantly and with the clear implication of a nuclear retaliatory capacity: "The DPRK will not remain a passive onlooker to the Bush administration's inclusion of the DPRK in the seven countries [named as possible] targets of US nuclear attack, but [will] take a strong countermeasure against it. ... If the US intends to mount a nuclear attack on any part of the DPRK, just as it did on Hiroshima, it is grossly mistaken... A nuclear war to be imposed by the US nuclear fanatics upon the DPRK would mean their ruin in nuclear disaster."
Also on March 13, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was asked for his reaction. He replied cautiously: "On the question of the nuclear advisory report, I think I was as surprised as everybody else. I think that since then the United States administration has attempted to clarify [the situation]..."
It had indeed. Almost immediately (March 9), the Defense Department issued a statement insisting: "This review of the US nuclear posture is the latest in a long series of reviews since the development of nuclear weapons. It does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning. ... This administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of WMD. ... A combination of offensive and defensive, and nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st Century."
On March 10, Secretary of State Powell stated: "I think there is less than meets the eye, and less than meets the headline, with respect to this story. ... [T]his particular study took note of two important developments... One, the Soviet Union is gone and Russia has fundamentally changed... The other development...is that there are nations out there developing weapons of mass destruction. And prudent planners have to give some consideration as to the range of options the President should have available to him to deal with those kinds of threats. ... So I want to make sure we don't get the international community upset by what is essentially sound conceptual planning on the part of the administration." The same day, General Richard Myers, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that "this is...not a plan. This preserves for the President all the options that a President would want to have in case this country or our friends and allies were attacked with weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, biological, chemical, or for that matter high explosives." On March 11, Vice President Dick Cheney, speaking in London in the face of sensationalist British media headlines ('Let's Nuke 'Em All', for example, in the Daily Mirror; 'Bush Plays at Dr. Strangelove', in the London Evening Standard), commented wryly: "The notion I've seen reported in the press that somehow this means we are preparing pre-emptive nuclear strikes against seven countries - I'd say that was a bit over the top."
On March 12, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice argued that no policy shift was underway: "It has long been American policy that the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its friends or its forces would be met with a devastating response. And the President cannot take any options out of his arsenal in making very clear the pledge that a use of a weapon of mass destruction against us would be met with a devastating response. That is how you deter the use of those weapons against you. But the idea that this somehow lowers the threshold for nuclear war couldn't be further from the truth. No one wants to use nuclear weapons, and this President has gone a long way to encouraging and to pressing the case for things like missile defence which might make it unnecessary to worry so much about these weapons of mass destruction."
The President himself commented on March 13: "The nuclear review is not new. It's gone on for previous administrations. ... [T]he reason we have a nuclear arsenal that I hope is modern, upgraded and can work is to deter any attack on America. ... [I am] committed to reducing the number of nuclear weapons. I think it's the right policy for America, and I know we can continue to do so and still keep a deterrence."
On March 14, substantial extracts of the NPR were posted on the website of an independent disarmament group, GlobalSecurity.org. The extracts further confirmed suspicions that the new US policy was at least running the danger of blurring the line between nuclear and non-nuclear use and warfighting, and was embarking on a course of strategic and technical nuclear experimentation. The following selections are representative:
"Nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military capabilities. The combination can provide the range of options needed to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries."
"The planning process not only must produce a variety of flexible, pre-planned non-nuclear and nuclear options, but also incorporate sufficient adaptability to support the timely construction of additional options in a crisis or unexpected conflict."
"Composed of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the strike element of the New Triad can provide greater flexibility in the design and conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation. Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)."
"In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. ... North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs."
"[A] need may arise to modify, upgrade, or replace portions of the extant nuclear force or develop concepts for follow-on nuclear weapons better suited to the nation's needs."
"The current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapons system assignment, and the nuclear command and control system requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role."
"DoD has identified shortfalls in current infrastructure sustainment programs for nuclear platforms. These include the following: solid rocket motor design, development and testing; technology for current and future strategic systems; improved surveillance and assessment capabilities; command and control platforms and systems; and design, development, and production of radiation-hardened parts."
"There are several nuclear weapon options that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation's deterrence posture: possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage."
"Test Readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). There are two concerns about the current test readiness program. ... First...the current 2-3 year test readiness posture will not be sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel retire. ... Second, the 2-3 year posture may be too long to address any serious defect that might be discovered in the future. ... Given the certainty of surprise in the future and the broad spectrum of threats, the United States also must have the capability to understand the technological implications of nuclear weapon concepts and countermeasures tested by other states, to ensure that US weapons and delivery platforms (including advanced conventional strike systems) perform effectively. If necessary, this will enable the United States to initiate research into whether it needs to develop an entirely new capability - one that is not a modification of an existing weapon - in time to address the threat. ... DoD and NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] will work to refine test scenarios and evaluate cost/benefit tradeoffs in order to determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness time that best supports the New Triad."
"The United States currently has a very limited ground penetration capability with its only earth penetrating nuclear weapon, the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. This single-yield, non-precision weapon cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located. Given these limitations, the targeting of a number of hardened, underground facilities is limited to an attack against surface features, which does not provide a high probability of defeat of these important targets. ... With a more effective earth penetrator, many buried targets could be attacked using a weapon with a much lower yield than would be required with a surface burst weapon. This lower yield would achieve the same damage while producing less fallout (by a factor of ten to twenty) than would the much larger yield surface burst. For defeat of very deep or larger underground facilities, penetrating weapons with large yields would be needed to collapse the facility."
At a Pentagon press briefing on March 15, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reacted to the leak with his customary concision:
"Question: '[H]as the content of this leak...caused...serious problems between this country and Russia, particularly since the summit is coming up in May?'
Rumsfeld: 'The answer's no. I am disturbed by the leak because I think it's just enormously unprofessional. Is it embarrassing? No. ... It's a very fine piece of work, the Nuclear Posture Review. It has not caused any difficulties with Russia. The Russians had been briefed on it previously, as had our allies. It was even fortuitous, as a matter of fact, because Mr. [Defence] Minister [Sergei] Ivanov was here, and we could give him a personal full briefing on it..."
Speaking alongside Rumsfeld, Defence Minister Ivanov remarked (March 15): "Being a Defence Minister, I understand well that the Defence Ministry of any country must plan any kind of developments."
The NPR, in both its leaked and officially presented form, has driven the prospect of new, special purpose, battlefield, 'low-yield' nuclear weapons to the forefront of the debate of appropriate military responses to the new security environment. In fact, US officials seem quite relaxed about the subject. As Secretary Powell told a Senate Appropriations committee hearing on March 12: "With respect to the development of new nuclear weapons, we are examining whether or not in the current inventory an improvement can be made or [whether] there are new things we should be looking at. That's sensible. ... What we are looking at, and what we have asked the Pentagon to do, is see whether or not...we might want to modify, or update, or change some of the weapons in our inventory to make them more effective... But...there is no new design out there, no new nuclear weapons about to be commissioned into production that would require testing..."
In Congressional testimony on March 6, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, outlining his Department's $5.9 billion 'weapons activities' budget request, noted: "Included in the FY 2002 request is support for an advanced concept initiative, a Phase 6.2/6.2A study for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, which also maintains weapons design capabilities". The study will explore the possible adaptation of the B61-11 gravity bomb mentioned in the NPR extracts. On March 18, John Gordon, head of the Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), told the Senate Appropriations' Energy Subcommittee that the project "simply [involves] taking an existing design and packaging it in a way that gives you the opportunity to penetrate to depths greater than existing systems... There is no defined requirement for a new weapon at this time..."
Neither, Gordon added, was there a short-term requirement to resume testing, either for design or maintenance purposes: "No identified problems...suggest the need to return to testing any time soon. Our nation's nuclear weapons remain safe, secure and reliable... When we find aging problems, we know what to do about them. We know how to fix them, and we go out and do that."
On March 21, the House of Representatives Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganisation heard an assessment of prospects for a resumption of testing in the medium- to long-term from Dr. John Foster, Chair of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile. Introducing Dr. Foster, Republican Representative Mac Thornberry, Chair of the Special Oversight Panel, noted:
"Dr. Foster's Panel was established by the Strom Thurmond National Defense Act of 1999. Congress recognised some of the technical, leadership, and organisational challenges to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile and the importance [of meeting these challenges] to our overall national security. Dr. Foster and his team recently completed the third in a series of reports on this important topic. The Panel's previous two reports described what they called the disturbing gap between stated policy that said maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile is a supreme national interest and the actions taken to support this policy. These reports described specific problems in the weapons programme, particularly in the certification process, management, production capabilities, and test readiness. This third and final report outlines a way ahead for the nuclear weapons complex."
In his testimony, Foster stressed that "test readiness needs to be addressed much more realistically. This is not because a need to test is imminent, but because prudence requires that every President have a realistic option to return to testing, should technical or political events make it necessary. The need to sustain confidence in our deterrent capabilities is as important as it has ever been: other major nations continue to maintain and adapt their nuclear arsenals, and there is continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery methods. We recommend the administration and Congress support test readiness of three months to a year, depending on the type of test." The current officially recommended test-readiness period is 24 to 36 months.
The NNSA continues to invest heavily to improve its computer simulation capacity in the absence of testing. On March 7, an NNSA press release proudly announced that scientists at "Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories had completed two of the largest computer simulations ever attempted, the first full-system three-dimensional simulations of a nuclear weapon explosion. These simulations signify completion of an important milestone in the maturing of NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program... Two years ago, Los Alamos and Livermore scientists completed the first 3D simulations of, respectively, a weapon secondary and a weapon primary, the two stages of modern nuclear weapons. The new simulations build on the experience gained in those achievements to enable simulations of a weapon's complete operation." NNSA Administrator John Gordon enthused: "This is a significant technical achievement. The NNSA's role in spurring the development of some of the fastest computers in the world is already paying dividends. We can now simulate an entire nuclear weapon explosion and learn critical information about the nation's stockpile as it ages."
Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, March 12: "This is a very serious step because it indicates that even if it is [only] a plan, or [just] a conceptual plan, there is some thinking going on in Washington about using nuclear weapons... [The NPR seems to fly] in the face of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty undertakings."
Secretary of State Powell, interview with the Associated Press, March 18: "On a day-to-day basis we are not targeting any countries. The reason [we say this is the case] is for the purpose of being perfectly honest. What does it take to target? Software. It's a matter of inserting information into a system."
Secretary Powell, March 12: "The philosophy of President Bush, the philosophy of this administration, is to continue driving down the number of nuclear weapons... There is no way to read that document [the NPR] and come to the conclusion the United States will be more likely or will more quickly go to the use of nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary... The discrepancy in conventional capabilities between the United States and any other nation or combination of nations is greater than it was 10 years ago, so we're not going to suddenly say, 'let's more quickly go to nuclear weapons'... There is no change in the threshold, there is no more intention to pre-empt than there might have been in some previous administrations..."
State Department official Mark Groombridge, April 2: "As long as Iraq and North Korea continue to remain in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it does not make sense for the United States to unilaterally disarm its nuclear force posture."
US Democratic Senator Jack Reed, March 12: "It seems to me we are turning away from what was our traditional approach to arms control, which was a very deliberate, concerted, consistent effort to limit the use of nuclear weapons and not to expand their use..."
US Democratic Representative Dennis Kucinich, March 20: "Some of our leaders have been thinking about nuclear war. ... The Nuclear Posture Review: 1) assumes that the United States has the right to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike; 2) equates nuclear weapons with conventional weapons; 3) attempts to minimise the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons; 4) promotes nuclear response to a chemical or biological attack. Some dismiss it as routine government planning. But it becomes ominous when taken in the context of a war on terrorism which keeps expanding its boundaries, rhetorically and literally."
US Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman, March 10: "Frankly, I don't mind some of these renegade nations...[being made to think] twice about the willingness of the United States to take action to defend our people and our values and our allies."
Unnamed former US State Department official, March 11: "If you say that you believe in deterrence, and then you say it can't deter rogues, then what is the point of threatening them? There's a contradiction here. ... This will mean one more turn of the paranoia wheel in North Korea..."
Unnamed former Clinton administration official, quoted in the New York Times, March 17: "The danger of this way of thinking is that it treats a nuclear weapon as just one instrument you have available. Of course, no President would use it if he could get the job done with a conventional weapon. But what if the CIA Director walks into the Oval Office one day and says, 'Mr. President, we know where there are nuclear and biological weapons deep down in Tora Bora, but the only way to get at them is with a nuclear weapon'?"
Robert Alvarez, Energy Department official under President Clinton, March 18: "Getting nuclear weapons untangled from Cold War doctrines and putting them on the shelf for use is a huge departure from the past..."
Frank Gaffney, Defense Department official in the Reagan administration, article in USA Today, March 13: "[T]he new review calls for a nuclear posture comprising forces that are modern, safe and appropriate to the missions they might, in extreme circumstances, have to perform. In order to establish these requirements, the military has been charged with examining where the wars of the 21st Century might be conducted and with whom. ... Notwithstanding the histrionics of critics who misperceive this as evidence of incipient attacks on some seven countries, it is as responsible as it is necessary to our security. ... [T]he Bush NPR strives further to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict by recognising the important contribution that advanced conventional munitions and missile defences can make to US security - contributions the Clinton administration largely ignored. This comprehensive approach to restoring and enhancing the US deterrent posture represents a change alright, but a change very much for the better."
Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and former Ambassador Thomas Graham, article in the Los Angeles Times, March 13: "Should the recently leaked Nuclear Posture Review...become official policy, we can expect nuclear weapons to spread around the world. We will live in a far more dangerous world, and the United States will be much less secure. ... [T]he NPR...appears to set forth a 40-year plan for developing and acquiring new nuclear weapons. It reportedly calls for new air, sea and land launch platforms to be developed and deployed in 2020, 2030 and 2040, and it calls for new low-yield and variable-yield warheads that probably would require nuclear testing. Maintaining a permanent rationale for a robust US nuclear arsenal and a resumption of nuclear testing flies in the face of vital US commitments. These matters are far too important for the administration to decide on its own. There must be a full public debate, in Congress, on the future of our nuclear deterrent and the nuclear non-proliferation regime."
Russian President Vladimir Putin, interview with Russian and German journalists, the Kremlin, April 7: "We cannot yet talk about a new US nuclear strategy because, luckily, for the moment it is nothing but utterances by people who do not hold top jobs in the United States... [But] here is why [the speculation] cannot but worry us... We are hearing some statements about the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States against non-nuclear states, among others. That's first. Second, we are hearing declarations and suggestions to develop low-capacity nuclear warheads and possibly use them in regional conflict. This lowers the threshold for the possible use of nuclear weapons to a very low...level..."
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, April 9: "[W]e cannot fail to be worried by reports that a change of approaches to nuclear weapons use is occurring in the US. In particular, their use in regional conflicts, including against non-nuclear states, is now recognised as possible, which is contrary to obligations which the nuclear powers have assumed with respect to the NPT. As to the possibility of the development of low-yield nuclear charges, this is very dangerous because it lowers the threshold of nuclear weapons use - from a weapon of deterrence they are, in essence, turning into operational weapons. Neither should it be ignored that the US has refused to ratify the CTBT and is leading matters to reducing the preparation time for the resumption of nuclear tests 'if necessary'..."
Foreign Minister Ivanov, March 13: "It is clear that a nuclear state would define sites which could become the target of a nuclear strike in the event of a crisis or conflict. So, essentially, there is nothing new in that part. What we are concerned about is the form and timing for such information to appear. It reads like it was written at the height of the Cold War without any regard for the current state of relations between our two countries."
Dimitry Rogozin, Chair of the Russian Duma's Defence Committee, March 12: "They've brought out a big stick - a nuclear stick that is supposed to scare us and put us in our place."
Former Australian Ambassador to the UN and UNSCOM Chair Richard Butler, article in The Age, March 17: "Last week, we learnt through the leaking to the press of the secret portions of [the NPR]... key elements of the planning being carried out to deal with the 'axis of evil', and another few of the traditional adversaries of the US. Simply, the US would nuke them. ... The bottom line is this. If the US now cedes the moral ground previously staked out in the policy of nuclear deterrence - the hallmark of which was no-first-use of nuclear weapons - it will fulfil the terrorists' and the outlaws' most demonic picture of the US as a state that preaches probity and restraint to others but reserves complete freedom of action to itself, now apparently including the use of nuclear weapons. ... Where this would then lead is beyond human calculation."
Canadian Senator Douglas Roche, former Ambassador for Disarmament, article in The Globe and Mail, March 12: "This document [the NPR] and the thinking behind it are reckless. They not only jeopardise international law but the support of America's closest allies. Canada must state its position immediately."
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, March 12: "I will raise it [the NPR] with the President... I'm sure it is not a document that is subscribed to by the administration. We have asked for clarification..."
New Zealand Disarmament Minister Matt Robson, March 12: "Nuclear weapons must be left in the 20th Century. We cannot allow them to become the weapon of choice for the 21st Century. ... If the recommendations in this leaked [nuclear posture] report were taken up by the Bush administration, it would throw the disarmament agenda internationally into disarray."
Iranian government spokesperson Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, March 11: "The Islamic Republic believes that the era of using force to push forward international relations is long past, and those who resort to the logic of force follow exactly the same logic as terrorists, although they are in the position of power..."
UK Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, March 20: "[Rogue states should be] absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons... What I cannot be absolutely confident about is whether that [preparedness] would be sufficient to deter them from using a weapon of mass destruction in the first place..."
UK Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs spokesperson Menzies Campbell, March 10: "[The NPR] completely changes the terms of debate about nuclear deterrence... Britain will have to think very carefully now about its support for systems such as the national missile defence system..."
US missile defence development has been proceeding apace. On March 15, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced it had "successfully completed a test involving a planned intercept of an intercontinental ballistic missile target." An MDA press release continued: "The test took place over the central Pacific Ocean. A modified Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) target vehicle was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., at 9:11 p.m. EST, and a prototype interceptor was launched approximately 20 minutes later and 4,800 miles away from the Ronald Reagan Missile Site, Kwajalein Atoll, in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The intercept took place approximately 10 minutes after the interceptor was launched, at an altitude in excess of 140 miles above the earth and during the midcourse phase of the target warhead's flight. This was the fourth successful intercept for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (BMD) Segment, formerly known as National Missile Defense." The statement concluded: "Tonight's test is a major step in our aggressive developmental test program... We will continue to pursue this testing regime to achieve a layered approach to missile defense, using different architectures to deter the growing threat of ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction..." According to the MDA, at least 19 more tests, of increasing sophistication, are planned before 2006 or 2007 before the system may be deemed fit for service.
On March 16, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told CNN: "I'll say right off the bat, before some critic discovers it, this was not a 'realistic' test of exactly what intercepts would have to do. But it's the first time we have had anything that looked like a decoy warhead, and it picked out the real warhead from the decoys."
Wolfowitz was referring to the chorus of disapproval from numerous independent US groups and analysts at the artificiality of the interceptor tests hitherto. On March 3, David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) published a detailed analysis of a test 'successfully' conducted on January 25 this year (see last issue). According to Wright, the "target used in the test was considerably larger than important targets that NTW [the Navy Theater-Wide system being tested] is presumably being developed to engage, such as a warhead from a North Korean Nodong missile. Using a larger target increases the range at which the Aegis SPY-1 radar can detect and track the target, and provides a larger target for the kill vehicle to impact. In the test, the kill vehicle apparently collided with the booster of the target missile, and would not have destroyed a warhead on the missile. Moreover, it appears that the planned flights will continue to use this large target for the next several years. The use of a large target may be appropriate at such an early stage of the test program. But the use of such a target limits what conclusions can be drawn from successful intercepts about the capability of the system in operational conditions."
It was this test to which MDA Director Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish referred glowingly when opening a statement to the Senate Appropriations' Defense Subcommittee on April 17: "Over the past year, we have made considerable progress in demonstrating key missile defense technologies and integration concepts. This past January we took a significant step forward and broke new ground with the successful midcourse intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile target using a sea-based interceptor."
Kadish summarised MDA plans to open a ballistic missile defence (BMD) 'System Test Bed' at Fort Greely in Alaska by 2004. The Test Bed will form the initial, trial portion - derided as a 'scarecrow' defence by critics - of the ground-based interceptor component of the national missile defence system. On March 19, the Pentagon announced it would begin environmental-impact studies in April related to the site's development. According to MDA spokesperson Lt. Col. Rick Lehner: "If there are any impacts, we are confident we can mitigate those impacts in time to meet our 2004 schedule". On April 12, the US Army reported that ground-clearing work at Fort Greely had been halted to investigate the discovery of dozens of barrels apparently containing toxic materials left over from the facility's now-defunct chemical weapons testing range.
On April 11, the Defense Department's quarterly Selected Acquisition Report estimated the total cost of missile defence research, development, testing and evaluation - but not procurement, maintenance, servicing or operation - to be $47.2 billion, down from the previous estimate of $59 billion due to the cancellation of a number of prototype systems, most expensive among them the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense programme. On March 12, Democratic Representative Dennis Kucinich complained about the costs involved: "We can't afford to waste billions of dollars...[due to the a] theological fascination with missile defence... No threat assessment exists to justify the spending." The same day, Republican Representative Christopher Shays asked: "Why would someone send a missile when they can just put it [a weapon of mass destruction] in a suitcase? It's inexcusable for this administration not to recognise that possibility and act on it." On March 11, addressing the Senate Governmental Affairs' International Security and Proliferation Subcommittee, Robert Walpole, the CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, argued that the range of serious threats the United States needed to confront over the next 15 years included the "probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against US forces or interests", and that this threat "will continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature". Walpole added that the threat from non-ballistic missiles, particularly cruise missiles, was also serious and likely to grow.
On April 11, the Washington Post reported Defense Department interest in exploring the possibility of arming missile-interceptors with nuclear explosives designed to destroy incoming targets above the Earth's atmosphere. The article stated that William Schneider, Jr., Chair of the Defense Science Board, had acknowledged receiving encouragement from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in exploring the option of nuclear-tipped interceptors. Schneider was quoted by the Post as stating, referring to the Secretary, "we've talked about it as something that he's interested in looking at". Schneider, who served as Under Secretary of State under President Reagan, added: "The issue hasn't been looked at for about 30 years. The last test involved a four-megaton device on a Spartan interceptor in 1971." The article further quoted physicists Richard Garwin, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, as warning: "When you actually look at the question, you find that it takes a very large warhead - more than a megaton - to destroy anthrax spores in bomblets that may be spread over a distance of five kilometers or more. Worse, there are hundreds of civilian satellites as well as many US military satellites vital to our national security that would be imperilled by nuclear explosions. And there are electromagnetic pulse vulnerabilities in an advanced society such as ours that would occur to any point within line-of-sight of the nuclear explosions." During his April 17 testimony, MDA Director Kadish was asked to comment on the story. He stated that "we have no part of our programme that involves nuclear-tipped interceptors", while adding "some people are thinking about it".
Reports: An analysis of the 25 January 2002 test of the Aegis-LEAP interceptor for Navy Theatre-Wide, by David Wright, Union of Concerned Scientists Working Paper, March 3; Congressional testimony by US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, March 6, 2002, US Energy Department transcript; NNSA laboratories each complete first 3D simulations of a complete nuclear weapon explosion, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Press Release NA-02-08, March 7; US works up plan for using nuclear arms, Los Angeles Times, March 9; Statement on Nuclear Posture Review, US Defense Department News Release 113-02, March 9; US nuclear plan sees new weapons and new targets, New York Times, March 10; Nuke plan sparks overseas reaction, Associated Press, March 10; Transcript - Secretary Powell interviewed on CBS's Face the Nation, US State Department (Washington File), March 10; Transcript - General Myers interview on CNN March 10, Washington, March 10; Globe reacts to US nuclear plan, Associated Press, March 11; Administration says America must be ready to use nuclear weapons, Associated Press, March 11; CIA - missile threat growing, Associated Press, March 11; Lawmakers doubt need for defense plan, New York Times, March 12; Cruise missiles getting attention, CIA official says, Global Security Newswire, March 12; Bush nuke targeting plans draw fire, Inter Press Service, March 12; Robson urges re-think on nuclear plan, New Zealand Government Press Release, March 12; Lawmakers question need for missile defense, criticize administration over first-strike comments, Associated Press, March 12; Transcript - NSC Advisor Rice says US has made no decision on Iraq, Washington File, March 12; US now less likely to go nuclear, says Powell, Reuters, March 12; Russian defence minister holds Washington talks, Reuters, March 12; Russia assails US stance on arms reduction, New York Times, March 12; Remarks by Alexander Yakovenko, official spokesperson, March 12, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Foreign Ministry spokesman's press conference, March 12, 2002, Chinese Foreign Ministry transcript; Cheney faces doubts on nuclear policy, Boston Globe, March 12; UN's top disarmament official 'alarmed' over reports of new US nuclear posture, UN News Service, March 12; Rethink the unthinkable, by Douglas Roche, The Globe and Mail, March 12; Canada to seek clarification of US nuclear plans, Reuters, March 12; A pretty poor posture for a superpower, by Robert McNamara and Thomas Graham, Los Angeles Times, March 13; North Korea hits out at US arms review, Reuters, March 13; Press Conference by President George W. Bush, The White House, March 13, 2002, White House transcript; Transcript of Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's interview with The Times, Moscow, March 13, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Transcript of press conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at Headquarters, March 13, UN Press Release SG/SM/8160, March 13; Russia questions US nuclear targeting, Associated Press, March 13; Russia says ties with US developing 'positively', Reuters, March 13; Nuclear reform overdue, by Frank Gaffney, USA Today, March 13; Bush 'deeply concerned' about policies of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Washington File, March 13; CNDP denounces USA's nuclear terror, Bush focuses on cutting nuclear arms, Associated Press, March 14; DoD news briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 15, 2002, US Department of Defense transcript; Iran says US wrong to threaten with nuclear bombs, Reuters, March 15; Iran Khatami says Europe next on US list, Reuters, March 15; Russia satisfied with US nuke reasons, Associated Press, March 15; Missile intercept test successful, US Department of Defense News Release 127-02, March 15; China accuses US of 'nuclear blackmail', Reuters, March 16; New missile defense test succeeds, Associated Press, March 16; Russia opposes US defense plans, continues talks, Reuters, March 16; Russia may soften on US weapons, Associated Press, March 17; Why nuclear is not the answer, by Richard Butler, The Age, March 17; Senators insist on role in arms pact, New York Times, March 17; Nuclear arms scientists may lack 'sense of mission', USA Today, March 18; Colin Powell interview excerpts, Associated Press, March 18; Bush finds that ambiguity is part of nuclear deterrence, New York Times, March 18; Nuclear security chief says new weapon would simply enhance penetration of current ones, Associated Press, March 18; Pentagon agrees to new missile test impact studies, Reuters, March 19; Statement by Representative Dennis Kucinich, Congressional Record, March 20; Britain's nuclear warning to Saddam, The Times, March 21; US, Russia hold third session of arms reduction negotiations, Washington File, March 21; Statement by Representative Mac Thornberry, Chair, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee' Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy ReOrganisation, March 21, 2002, House Armed Services Committee transcript (http://www.house.gov); Prepared statement of John F. Foster to the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee' Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy ReOrganisation, March 21, 2002, House Armed Services Committee transcript; House discusses nuclear testing, Associated Press, March 21; Foster Panel recommends US prepare for nuclear testing, Global Security Newswire, March 22; Transcript - Bolton calls US-Russia arms talks 'very productive', Washington File, March 22; On Russian-American talks on START-ABM issues and the formation of a new strategic relationship between the two countries, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 528-22-03-2002, March 22; US will hold 2,400 warheads in short-term reserve, Reuters, March 22; Russia and US narrow differences in arms talks, Reuters, March 22; Transcript of remarks by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov, March 22, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Russia's ex-nuclear minister speaks for resumption of nuclear tests, Associated Press, March 28; US arms stance comes under fire at China meet, Reuters, April 4; Letter from Senators Carl Levin and Jack Reed to President Bush, April 4 (Council for a Livable World website, http://www.clw.org); Russia prepares for arms summit, Associated Press, April 5; Putin alarmed by US nuke proposals, Associated Press, April 7; Putin says West suits Russia, but warns US, Reuters, April 7; US warns Russia of need to verify treaty compliance, New York Times, April 8; US questions Russian compliance, Associated Press, April 8; Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov interview to German newspaper Financial Times Deutschland, published on April 9, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Remarks by Alexander Yakovenko, official spokesperson, April 9, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; US slammed over disarmament cutbacks, Washington Times, April 10; Transcript - US-Russian agenda 'moving forward', Powell says, Washington File, April 11; Nuclear-tipped interceptors studied, Washington Post, April 11; DoD releases selected acquisition reports, US Department of Defense News Release 176-02, April 11; Chemicals discovery halts Alaska missile-site work, Reuters, April 12; Powell makes summit plans with Russia, Associated Press, April 14; Pentagon lowers cost estimate for combined development, Global Security Newswire, April 15; Analysts say US-Russian nuclear deal to include comprehensive verification regime, Associated Press, April 16; On Democratic Senators Carl Levin and Jack Reed letter to US President George Bush concerning Russian-American Treaty on Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 756-16-04-2002, April 16; On Russia's submission of a declaration related to Convention on Prohibition of Biological Weapons to United Nations, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 755-16-04-2002, April 16; US official - no plans to use nuclear-tipped missile-defense system, Associated Press, April 17.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.