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Issue No. 67, October - November 2002
By Rebecca Johnson
"We are like a team of swimmers that has never played together, standing at the edge, discussing tactics and the outcome; we need to take the plunge and once we do we will begin to swim because that is all one can do in the pool."1
The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) closed its doors on its 2002 session on September 13, after failing for a further year to get agreement on a programme of work. Since completing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in August 1996, this "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", as described in the Final Document of the 1978 UN General Assembly's First Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I), has failed to focus discussions or negotiations on any of the important issues on its agenda - thwarting, in particular, international demands for progress towards a fissile material treaty (fissban), nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and legally binding security assurances against nuclear attack.
The verbatim records of the 2002 plenary sessions are woefully thin. Losing hope that substantive work will get underway, fewer and fewer delegations are bothering even to indulge in rhetoric about disarmament issues. A growing number of governments are showing their declining interest in the CD by cutting resources to their disarmament delegations. After barely a year, the personable US ambassador to the CD, Eric Javits, has been suddenly transferred to The Hague to become ambassador to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The official reason is that the Bush administration decided to prioritise chemical weapons and needed a high level, effective diplomat in charge. It is indeed plausible that, having orchestrated the ouster of José Bustani from his position as OPCW Director-General earlier this year, the United States felt it necessary to put more diplomatic resources into keeping an eye on his successor and rebuilding relations with other Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) member states. Nevertheless, removing Javits from the CD would appear to indicate the relatively lowly status now accorded to the Geneva body, especially by Washington.2
In addition to attempts to address the Conference's own failings, the most significant substantive issues raised in the CD this year were PAROS, fissban, and radiological weapons.
As they rotated by alphabet into the Chair of the Conference, various CD presidents have tried to shift the logjam, engaging in intensive consultations to bridge the apparently narrow gap between the positions of a very small number of key states - particularly China and the United States. Building on the work of former presidents - most notably ambassadors Mohamed Salah Dembri of Algeria (June 1999), Jean Lint of Belgium (June 2000), and Celso Amorim of Brazil (August 2000) - there were some valiant attempts to find just the right combination of language and political will.3
Markku Reimaa of Finland tried desperately to obtain agreement on a draft document establishing a working group on nuclear disarmament; an ad hoc Committee on a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material (in accordance with CD/1547); a working group on PAROS; and a working group on Negative Security Assurances (in accordance with CD/1501, para. 2). But despite evoking UNGA resolution 56/24 T (November 2001) on "Multilateral operation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and global efforts against terrorism", Reimaa was unable to muster the necessary support for his proposal to be adopted.
The most significant recent initiative was piloted by Lint and presented to the CD by Dembri on behalf of five "past presidents" - Dembri, Lint, Camilo Reyes of Colombia, Henrik Salander of Sweden, chair of the 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee rather than the CD, and Juan Enrique Vega of Chile. This cross-group of non-aligned and western ambassadors undertook consultations with delegations on the basis of a draft they circulated in late July. On August 29, they issued the results as a proposal for a programme of work (see Appendix). The core proposal comprised four ad hoc committees, on negative security assurances, nuclear disarmament, fissban, and PAROS. Of these, only the fissban committee would have a clear treaty-negotiating mandate, in accordance with the Shannon Report of March 1995. Negative security assurances would be "negotiated with a view to reaching agreement" on arrangements which "could take the form of an internationally binding instrument". On nuclear disarmament, the Committee would "exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this objective, and in doing so shall examine approaches towards potential future work of a multilateral character".
It is understood that all delegations were prepared to accept the framing "mandates" on these three issues as proposed by the past presidents. The issue that caused most difficulty was - not unexpectedly in these days of accelerating US missile defence development - PAROS. The past presidents proposed that the committee should "deal with" the issue and "identify and examine, without limitation and without prejudice, any specific topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space." But the adroit linguistics were not enough to overcome US reluctance and China's demand that PAROS discussions should lead explicitly to negotiations.
In addition to the four committees, the past presidents proposed appointing Special Coordinators on "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons"; comprehensive disarmament, which is understood to relate to a range of conventional weapons, though some holdouts from the Mine Ban Treaty seem still to want the CD to talk about landmines; and transparency in armaments (TIA). TIA formerly focussed on the UN Conventional Arms Register but could, potentially, be extended to include nuclear weapons, as transparency was an important principle agreed in the Thirteen Steps addressing nuclear disarmament enshrined in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Of particular note is the growing interest accorded to new types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially radiological weapons. This proposal to deal with the issue - raised most strongly in a discussion paper by Germany4 - follows from the increased post 9/11 awareness of the potential threat of radioactive contaminants being dispersed in a "dirty bomb" explosion.
The "Past Presidents' Initiative" has received considerable interest and support, but the consensus necessary for its adoption was still lacking, principally because China wanted stronger text relating to PAROS. On August 30, China put forward its own language for a mandate for the PAROS committee5, perhaps feeling safe in the knowledge that this would be unacceptable to the United States.
Despite the objections of the United States and several of its allies, PAROS has in many ways overtaken the fissban as the most topical and complex issue on the CD's agenda. The PAROS resolution to the UN General Assembly in November 2001 (UNGA 56/23) reaffirmed the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and, noting that the CD had a "primary role" to play, invited it to establish an ad hoc committee on the subject. The resolution received 156 votes in favour, none against, and only four abstentions (the United States, Israel, Micronesia, essentially a US protectorate, and Georgia, possibly by mistake).
Going beyond familiar rhetoric, on June 27 Russia and China, together with Indonesia, Belarus, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe and Syria, co-sponsored a working paper on "Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects".6 This was a follow-on from China's 2001 working paper on a future international legal agreement on preventing the weaponisation of outer space, showing that in order to gain Russian co-sponsorship, Beijing has been prepared to make some significant shifts in its approach.7
The Chinese-Russian working paper was laid out as a draft treaty consisting of 13 articles. The preamble stated that "only a treaty-based prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space and the prevention of the threat or use of force against outer space objects can eliminate the emerging threat of an arms race in outer space and ensure the security for outer space assets of all countries, which is an essential condition for the maintenance of world peace".
The basic obligations comprise three elements: "Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; Not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states, international organisations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty." The working paper then contained provisions for national implementation measures, the confusingly-termed "use of outer space for peaceful and other military purposes", confidence-building measures, settlement of disputes, implementing organisation, amendments, duration, signature and ratification, entry into force, and authentic texts.
Introducing the working paper, Russia's permanent representative in Geneva, Leonid Skotnikov, referred to the urgency of adopting "all measures possible in order to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space, rather than waste subsequently huge efforts and resources to have it 'de-weaponised'", and noted the "serious gap" in the existing international regime, which did not prohibit the deployment of weapons in space other than WMD (prohibited under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty). The working paper was designed to "stimulate the early start of substantive discussions in the CD on the issue of PAROS". Skotnikov ruled out discussions elsewhere in the event of continuing CD deadlock, underlining that "We do not envisage any tracks parallel to the CD in order to discuss the issue". He also emphasised that the proposal was not intended to prejudice defence-related outer space activities "based on the UN Charter", or to constrict "auxiliary military purposes [such] as communication, navigation, global positioning, systems etc.", including verification technologies that could enhance "strategic stability" and international security.8
For China, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi referred more explicitly to the recent unveiling of "combat theories and concepts related to space warfare". Hu emphasised major parts of the preamble and the basic obligations, and reiterated the urgency of "nipping the danger of the weaponisation of outer space in the bud". He noted that some delegations had already made valuable suggestions, called on all CD members to "join hands with us to substantiate, develop and improve this working paper in a spirit of positive cooperation", and expressed the hope that "the negotiation and conclusion of the above future treaty will contribute to the preservation of peace and the prohibition of weaponry in outer space".9
In its earlier discussion papers, China had proposed that the scope of a PAROS treaty should cover "weapons, weapon systems or their components that can be used for war-fighting in outer space". With such a wide scope, these earlier drafts were clearly intended to prohibit orbital-attack weapons and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), while at the same time they appeared to rule out some of the existing force-support roles, which could be construed as components of weapons. They were, moreover, ambiguous on interference with military space assets by electronic means rather than physical force (for example, hacking or jamming), covered for civilian satellites under the 1932 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Convention, as amended in 1992 and 1994.
Responding to the Chinese-Russian working paper, Eric Javits told the CD that the United States saw "no need for new outer space arms control agreements and opposes the idea of negotiating a new outer space treaty". He said that the US was willing to support establishment of a PAROS Committee to carry out "broad ranging" and "exploratory" discussions at the same time as the Conference negotiated a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Noting the pre-eminence of states' own national security needs, Javits argued that confidence-building measures rather than a new treaty were likely to be the most effective outcome of CD discussions.10
The two most significant initiatives relating to the fissban came from South Africa and the Netherlands. The Netherlands Delegation had taken the initiative of convening two informal, open-ended meetings on the issue during the session, in June and September. Reporting after the first session, Ambassador Chris Sanders expressed satisfaction that some 40 countries had been represented in the discussions.11
On May 23, South Africa put forward a well-argued, technically pragmatic working paper on "The possible scope and requirements of the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT)".12 Introducing the paper, which he hoped would complement the recent efforts undertaken by the Netherlands, Japan and Australia on this issue, Tom Markram said it arose from South Africa's practical experience in building and then destroying its nuclear weapon programme. A leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), South Africa would like to see stocks (past production) addressed in the treaty, one reason why it refers to it as an FMT, rather than the more limited FMCT. Drawing on South Africa's experience and technical expertise, however, the working paper was partly designed to show advocates of including stocks the complexities and limitations, and to suggest some "practical, achievable and effective" ways of dealing with the issue.13
The working paper locates the fissban in the context of the NPT obligations, as reaffirmed and refined in 2000, especially with regard to the commitment to negotiate a fissban and the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament steps. It looks at ways of addressing stocks as well as a basic production cut-off, without compromising civil (commercial) nuclear energy programmes, which South Africa has a vested interest in. In particular, the paper argues that there need to be carefully worked-out definitions and a clear understanding of which fissile materials are to be covered in the treaty. It proposes that the FMT should focus on closing down production facilities specifically for nuclear materials "that can be made to chain react for the purpose of a nuclear weapon", and that an auxiliary function would be to deal with excess weapons material.
With respect to tritium (a hydrogen isotope used to boost nuclear fission and therefore increase the yield-to-weight ratio of explosions) South Africa noted that a tritium ban would "starve certain nuclear weapons of an essential component, leading to the natural 'death' over time of many modern weapons". While noting that this would handicap the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons, though not result in complete elimination, the working paper acknowledges that a total ban on tritium production would not be feasible as "the need for tritium will, in practice, only disappear to the extent that nuclear disarmament undertakings reach their final objective". Instead, the paper advocates that the production of tritium in civil nuclear reactors for use in nuclear explosive devices should be prohibited.
The production of highly enriched-uranium (HEU) for naval reactors is also considered a special problem, and the working paper comes down on the side of making allowances for this to continue. After considering verification and proliferation questions, South Africa concludes that the FMT would probably not be able to cover a) weapons-grade material in existing weapons and in reserve for weapons; b) associated fabrication, refabrication and storage facilities; c) facilities for the active dismantling of obsolete or redundant weapons or those subject to disarmament agreements; or d) fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities associated with military naval reactors. Noting the difficulties of verifying the completeness of declarations of past production through materials accounting, South Africa suggests that declarations on this subject could still be made as a "political gesture of goodwill" by the eight states principally targeted by the treaty (the NPT-defined nuclear weapon states, Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States, and the de-facto nuclear weapon states outside the NPT, India, Israel and Pakistan).14
The issue of radiological weapons has been kept on the CD agenda since 1979, but seldom discussed, despite frequent representations over the years by Egypt. It has come to the fore again in view of the growing concern about "dirty bombs", in which conventional explosives would be detonated to disperse radioactive materials, causing potentially enormous economic, social and health disruption, and hundreds or thousands of deaths over time. As noted, Germany put forward a discussion paper suggesting the issue should be revisited and explored in the CD. As a consequence of Germany's push, which no-one opposed, the past-presidents initiative proposed the appointment of a special coordinator to undertake consultations on this issue. Germany's paper raised the central question of whether radiological weapons should be subject to an international ban, and put forward some ideas for relating the issue to enhanced international cooperation on the security and protection of radioactive materials, in addition to addressing cooperative verification measures.
Although the continuing failure to agree a CD work programme was a serious disappointment, the 2002 session did see some slight movement in the positions of key CD states. Dropping its previous requirement that the fissban and PAROS must be treated "equally", China now appears willing to accept a mandate for discussions, providing they are characterised as leading towards negotiations. The United States has also moved slightly, accepting the calls for ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament and PAROS. But Washington still adamantly refuses to accept any reference to negotiations in either mandate. It may be argued that since the CD is defined as a "multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", both the US and China are being disingenuous in fighting over the presence or absence of a specific reference to negotiations in an individual mandate. Present or future negotiations are implied, whether they like it or not. But that isn't how the political masters back home want to play it.
Fundamentally, if either country cared enough about getting work underway on the fissban or PAROS, the semantic problems would get resolved. The fundamental blockage is due to politics and perception, and it must be recognised that the impasse is convenient to both. The United States does not care enough about negotiating a cut-off treaty to undergo structured discussions that will inevitably address missile defence, strategic doctrine and future wish lists for space weapons. China, for its part, does not care enough about PAROS to lose the flexibility afforded by the fissban impasse. China halted its fissile materials production some time ago, but faced with US missile defence plans and the consequent, potential erosion of confidence in its second-strike deterrence capabilities, wants to keep its options open. At the same time, Beijing would prefer to avoid having to back down publicly on its formal diplomatic agreement to negotiate a cut-off treaty. In this scenario, China is most often fingered as the main obstacle to adoption of a CD work programme. It would be fairer to acknowledge, however, that the present impasse is equally the responsibility of the United States and China - a strange combination, perhaps, but one more than sufficient to suffocate the CD.
Even as both states seek to keep their options open, a further consideration may be the general suspicion that even if negotiations went ahead for one year, they might then be blocked in the following session. The source of such doubt is obvious: after two years of stagnation, in August 1998 the CD agreed a work programme, but barely three weeks were left for the
Fissban Committee to start work. By January 1999 consensus was again stymied, heralding three more years of unbroken famine.
The fuller reference to the CD from paragraph 120 of UNSSOD I's final document reads: "The Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus." Therein lies one of the problems: consensus offers an institutional veto to all 66 CD member states. The international community should not allow disarmament to be held hostage in the CD, however. As the Ottawa process showed when it moved beyond the CD to achieve the Mine Ban Treaty, it is not necessary to rely on one single multilateral forum.
Suggestions for bypassing the CD or modifying its consensus rule are generally met with howls of dismay from certain CD delegations, even as their governments back home are downgrading resources in frustration at the lack of useful output. At present, setting up a rival forum would be unlikely to take negotiations forward, since the real obstruction is not the CD's procedures so much as the political fears and ambitions of a handful of key states. It appears now that a resolution of the CD's troubles is unlikely to occur unless and until there is overwhelming international demand for negotiations on an issue or issues propelled to the top of the security agenda by catastrophe, crisis or public mobilisation.
1. Rakesh Sood, ambassador of India, speaking to the CD, June 27, 2002, CD/PV.907.
2. The transfer of Eric Javits from Geneva to the Hague was very sudden and appeared to have taken the US delegation by surprise. Some Geneva rumours suggest that Javits, a political appointee and fundraiser for President George W. Bush, was shifted because he had come to see (and put the case for) effective engagement in multilateral arms control, recognising this to be in Washington's best interests. Javits was understood to have become increasingly outspoken in supporting the CTBT as important for US and international security and non-proliferation goals, and to have made serious attempts in Washington to get the necessary policy flexibility on PAROS to give the CD some chance of commencing work. Such rumours have been staunchly denied by US representatives.
3. For analysis of the first few months of deliberations, see Rebecca Johnson, "CD Remains Deadlocked After First Part of 2002 Session", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 64 (May/June 2002). For further background, see also Rebecca Johnson, "CD Writes off 1999", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 39 (July/August 1999); Jenni Rissanen, "NPT Outcome Fails to Kickstart CD", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 47 (June 2000); and Jenni Rissanen "Silence and Stagnation as the CD Concludes Fruitless Year", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 50 (September 2000).
4. CD/1681, August 22, 2002.
5. CD/1682, August 30, 2002.
6. CD/1679, June 28, 2002.
7. See Delegation of China, "Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Weaponisation of Outer Space", 2001, CD/1645. See also Delegation of China, "China's Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament", CD/1606, February 9, 2000.
8. Leonid A. Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, speaking to the CD, June 27, 2002, CD/PV.907.
9. Hu Xiaodi, ambassador of China, speaking to the CD, June 27, 2002, CD/PV.907.
10. Eric Javits, ambassador of the United States of America, speaking to the CD, June 27, 2002, CD/PV.907.
11. Chris Sanders, ambassador of the Netherlands, speaking to the CD, June 13, 2002, CD/PV.905.
12. CD/1671 (and Add.1), May 28, 2002.
13. Tom Markram, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa, speaking to the CD, May 23, CD/PV.902.
14. CD/1671 (and Add.1), May 28, 2002.
Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.
'Proposal of a Programme of Work: Initiative of the Ambassadors Dembri, Lint, Reyes, Salander and Vega', non-paper presented to the Conference on Disarmament, August 29, 2002. [Note: this has not been agreed.]
Taking into account the several proposals tabled since 1999, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the current session, the following programme of work, in respect of the elements of the agenda of the Conference:
1) The Conference establishes for the duration of the current session, an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 4 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument.
The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the current session.
The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee shall be reviewed as appropriate, taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals and the prospects for future work.
2) The Conference establishes, for the duration of the current session, an Ad Hoc Committee, under agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Ad Hoc Committee shall exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this objective, and in doing so shall examine approaches towards potential future work of a multilateral character.
In discharging its functions, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account current efforts and existing proposals and views, as well as proposals that may emerge from the study and discussion.
The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the current session.
The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee shall be reviewed as appropriate, taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals and the prospects for future work.
3) The Conference establishes, for the duration of the current session, an Ad Hoc Committee, under agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the current session.
4) The Conference establishes, for the duration of the current session, an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 3 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" to deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Ad Hoc Committee shall identify and examine, without limitation and without prejudice, any specific topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space. In doing so, the Ad Hoc Committee shall take appropriate account of the need to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race there, while also promoting international stability and respecting the principle of undiminished security for all.
The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the current session.
The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee shall be reviewed as appropriate, taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals and the prospects for future work.
5) The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda item 5 entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate way to deal with this issue.
In implementing this decision, the Special Coordinator shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals, present and future.
The Conference requests the Special Coordinator to present a report before the end of the current session.
6) The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda item 6 entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate way to deal with this issue.
In implementing this decision, the Special Coordinator shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals, present and future.
The Conference requests the Special Coordinator to present a report before the end of the current session.
7) The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda item 7 entitled "Transparency in armaments" to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item.
In implementing this decision, the Special Coordinator shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals, present and future.
The Conference requests the Special Coordinator to present a report before the end of the current session.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.