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Issue No. 67, October - November 2002
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), seeking to ban all nuclear test explosions, was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. Although a lack of key ratifications means the treaty has yet to enter into force, the anniversary was greeted with a resiliently positive statement from the CTBTO Organisation's (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna:
"Seventy-one states signed the Treaty on that [opening] day, and today it is steadily approaching universality, with 166 signatures and 94 ratifications. In the year since the fifth anniversary of its opening for signature, the Treaty has gained five additional signatures and 13 ratifications. To enter into force, however, the Treaty must be ratified by 44 named states, listed in its Annex 2. These states possess either nuclear power or nuclear research reactors, and participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Forty-one of the Annex 2 states have signed the Treaty, and 31 have ratified it.
Under the terms of the Treaty, a global verification regime to monitor compliance with the Treaty must be operational at the time of entry into force. This verification regime, based on an International Monitoring System (IMS) of 337 monitoring facilities around the world and the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, provides for a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures. The data collected by the IMS and analysed in the IDC will be used by states, upon entry into force, to monitor Treaty adherence and, if necessary, to reach a decision as to whether or not the Treaty has been contravened. Excellent progress has been made in establishing the global verification regime over the six years. Out of the 337 IMS facilities provided for in the Treaty, site surveys for 280 stations, equivalent to 87% of the total number of sites, are now complete. Altogether 135 stations have been completed or substantially meet specifications, and 104 additional stations are under construction or in contract negotiations. Some 70 facilities are contributing data to the IDC.
Today, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is recognized as a cornerstone in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It has the firm backing of the international community, and is supported by cutting edge verification technology. States which sign and ratify the Treaty join a global community committed to ensuring that the world is a safer and more secure place."
The 13 Annex 2 states yet to ratify the treaty are: Algeria, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, the United States, and Vietnam. Of these, three have yet to sign the accord: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Pakistan.
On September 14, the Foreign Ministers of 18 states issued a 'Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT', attempting to maintain the political pressure for entry-into-force of the treaty. The Statement - an initiative jointly organised by Australia, Japan, and the Netherlands - reads:
"1. We, the Foreign Ministers who have issued this statement, join together to reaffirm the vision which was the basis for the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. That vision was for a treaty which would rid the world of nuclear weapons test explosions and would contribute to systematic and progressive reduction of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation, as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
2. The early entry into force of the CTBT, which would bring about the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, has been identified by the UN General Assembly as being central to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. The last Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also emphasised the importance of the CTBT, listing its entry into force as the first of a series of practical steps needed to achieve NPT nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
3. The prevention of the proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge which can be used for weapons of mass destruction is one of the most important challenges the world is facing today. Additional international tensions have developed since the CTBT was negotiated, which make entry into force of the Treaty, within the broader framework of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation efforts, even more urgent today. We affirm that the CTBT has an essential role to play in strengthening global peace and security. This role should be recognised by all of us.
4. We call upon all states that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force. To help bring this about, we will make representations as appropriate, individually or together, including at regional and multilateral meetings, in order to make the Treaty a focus of attention at the highest political levels. The scientific community, non-governmental organisations and other elements of civil society also have a role to play, in raising awareness of and in strengthening support for the Treaty.
5. We call upon all states to continue a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. Voluntary adherence to such a moratorium is of the highest importance, but cannot serve as a substitute for entry into force of the Treaty. Only the CTBT offers to the global community the prospect of a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear testing.
6. We consider that it is vital to maintain momentum in building the verification machinery, so that it is ready to guarantee compliance with the Treaty. We appeal to all states signatories to make available the financial resources needed to build and operate the verification system as soon as possible, through full and timely payment of assessed contributions. Completing the verification system foreseen in the Treaty by entry into force will ensure a high level of confidence that states are maintaining their treaty commitments.
7. The verification system will be unprecedented in its global reach. In addition to its primary function, it will bring scientific and civil benefits, particularly to developing countries, through technology transfer and exchange of scientific know-how, as a result of the installation and use of seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic networks. Moreover, technical cooperation between states can help to enhance the already impressive verification capabilities under the CTBT. We will be seeking ways to ensure that co-operation among states Signatories allows for effective technical assistance, and we call upon other states to join us in this endeavour.
8. We will spare no effort in seeking to realise the vision of a ban on nuclear weapons test explosions which culminated in conclusion of the CTBT in 1996, and invite our fellow Foreign Ministers to join us in this task."
The Statement was signed by: Alexander Downer (Australia), Bill Graham (Canada), Maria Soledad Alvear Valenzuela (Chile), Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin (France), Laszlo Kovacs (Hungary), Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan), Marwan Al Muasher (Jordan), Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Netherlands), Phil Goff (New Zealand), Choi Sung-hong (Republic of Korea), Alhaji Sule Lamido (Nigeria), Allan Wagner Tizon (Peru), Blas F. Ople (Philippines), Igor Ivanov (Russia), Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini-Zuma (South Africa), Anna Lindh (Sweden), Sukru Sina Gurel (Turkey), Jack Straw (United Kingdom).
The initiative was warmly welcomed in a September 14 statement from Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs. Dhanapala noted: "The Treaty has long been regarded as the litmus test of commitment to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and one of the key steps for the systematic and progressive efforts toward nuclear disarmament. By signing the Treaty in 1996, states showed their determination to put an end to over 50 years of nuclear testing - a period that witnessed over 2,000 test explosions. Since the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT convened in New York in November 2001, the number of signatures and ratifications has increased steadily. As of today it has been signed by 165 states, 94 of which have ratified the Treaty. As you know the treaty names 44 states whose ratifications are essential for the Treaty to enter into force. 31 states have already done so. The Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Treaty, consistently appealed to all states that have to sign or ratify the Treaty to do so, in order that this important norm against nuclear proliferation and further development of nuclear weapons will become operational. ... Today more than ever there is a need to jointly consolidate and build upon existing disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and to collectively commit to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving our common objectives in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation."
Notes: on September 27, Georgia and Samoa deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT, raising the total number of ratifications to 96.
On August 29, the United States conducted its eighteenth subcritical nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site. Subcritical tests involve no nuclear explosion and so are not prohibited by the CTBT. The first US subcritical test was conducted in July 1997. The latest test - codenamed Mario - was the first since June 7 this year, and the fifth since President George W. Bush assumed office. Details of the test were provided in advance (August 27) in a statement from the Department of Energy's Nevada Operations Press Office: "Mario, a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) subcritical experiment, is designed to answer questions about ejecta and spall associated with plutonium. Ejecta is a forceful spray of particles propelled from a material's surface when it is compressed by a powerful shock wave. Spall is the break-up of material from the explosive shock wave reflected back from the surface. Subcritical experiments are conducted at the Nevada Test Site's U1a Complex located 85 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The U1a Complex is designed to contain these experiments in a safe and secure environment in an underground laboratory of horizontal tunnels with small excavated experiment alcoves mined at the base of a vertical shaft, approximately 960 feet beneath the surface."
Reports: National Nuclear Security Administration scientists to conduct Mario subcritical experiment, US National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office Press Release NV-02-37, August 27; US conducts subcritical nuclear test, Kyodo, August 30; Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT, New York, September 14; Statement on the occasion of the launching of the Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala, September 14, United Nations website (http://disarmament.un.org); Holdout nations urged to ratify nuclear test ban, Reuters, September 14; Six years after the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty opens for signature, 166 states have signed and 94 have ratified, CTBTO Press Release, September 24; Georgia and Samoa ratify treaty, CTBTO Press Release, October 1.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.