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Issue No. 67, October - November 2002
The period under review saw the highest-level contact thus far between the Bush administration and North Korea - a three-day visit (October 3-5) to Pyongyang by James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Kelly held talks with Kim Gye-gwan, Vice Foreign Minister, and Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and reputedly second-in-command to Communist Party leader Kim Jong-il. The visit was applauded by Fred Eckhart, spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, on October 7: "The Secretary-General is hopeful that this important development is the beginning of more regular exchanges by both sides with a view to resolving their differences, however serious. It is the view of the Secretary-General that the international community should continue its efforts to facilitate the encouraging trends in the Korean peninsular."
Although reporters were not allowed to accompany the Assistant Secretary on his mission, discussions were clearly dominated by security issues: from the American side, concerns over North Korea's ballistic missile development programme and exports policy, its continued refusal to allow full IAEA inspections, and its conventional force posture; from the North Korean side, specific concern over delays to the 1994 Agreed Framework, stipulating the provision of new nuclear reactors, and general unease about the departure of the current White House from the agenda of the Clinton administration, focused more narrowly on missile and nuclear issues.
In a statement issued after briefing South Korean officials in Seoul on October 5, Kelly described his talks as "frank, as befits the seriousness of our differences, and...useful too". Making clear that "no decisions on additional meetings" had been taken or were expected soon, the statement noted: "I expressed our serious concerns about these matters and raised the implications of North Korean conduct for regional and global peace and security, and for the North's relations with the United States and also its neighbours and for its own future".
Such comments, particularly reference to North Korea's 'future', are precisely the kind guaranteed to ring alarm bells in Pyongyang. In its first official comment on the visit (October 7), a Foreign Ministry statement accused Kelly of displaying a "high-handed and arrogant attitude" in issuing what amounted to a series of ultimatums: "The special envoy's explanation made it clear that the Bush administration is pursuing not a policy of dialogue but a hardline policy of hostility to bring...[North Korea] to its knees by force and high-handed practice... [Kelly told us that outstanding issues] would be smoothly settled only when [our government] first meets US unilateral demands...on nuclear and missile and conventional armed forces and human rights..." The visit "confirmed that the Bush administration refuses to delist" North Korea "as a member of the 'axis of evil' and a target of pre-emptive nuclear attack". The statement concluded: "Such unchanged policy...compels [North Korea] to take all necessary countermeasures, pursuant to the army-based policy whose validity has been proven".
On October 11, Han Song Ryol, North Korean Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, told the Reuters news agency: "As far as I am informed, the US special envoy didn't have negotiations or talks on future dialogue. The DPRK understood that the United States would not pursue dialogue, that they are refusing dialogue with us... The US side only emphasised that the DPRK should move faster to solve the US security concerns, including the nuclear suspicion. Then the United States could have talks with our country - in other words, a forced DPRK move and then the United States would have the talks... Those [in power] in Pyongyang interpret those actions as a certain kind of war proclamation. ... If they want to solve the issues through a dialogue, then the DPRK is prepared to do so. However, if the United States wants to solve the issues by force, the DPRK also is ready to face the use of force. In other words, we are prepared not only for dialogue but for war."
The United States, of course, is far from alone in harbouring its 'nuclear suspicion' about North Korea. The basis of international concern was set out succinctly by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, addressing the Agency's Annual General Conference in Vienna on September 16:
"Since 1993, the Agency has been unable to implement fully its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Agency continues to be unable to verify the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration - specifically, that the DPRK has declared all the nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards under its NPT safeguards agreement. Despite many rounds of technical discussions, no tangible progress has been made. In accordance with the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the USA, however, the Agency since November 1994 has been monitoring the 'freeze' of the DPRK's graphite moderated reactor and related facilities. As I have made well known for a number of years now, our estimation is that the work required to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration could take about three to four years, assuming full co-operation by the DPRK. This verification work is a basic obligation under the DPRK's safeguards agreement, as well as a prerequisite for the delivery of key nuclear components under the Agreed Framework. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has informed the Agency that it has provided the DPRK with a construction schedule for the light water reactor project, according to which the delivery of the key nuclear components for the first reactor would occur by 2005. Further delays in the start of the Agency's activities to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial DPRK declaration could lead therefore to a delay in the KEDO project. I would urge the DPRK to agree to the initiation of this long overdue verification process without further delay, and to that end start soon the necessary dialogue with the Agency on this as well as on other issues relevant to the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the Agency."
The US announced the imminent dispatch of a senior official to Pyongyang on September 26, after intensive consultations with South Korea and Japan. On September 24, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi told reporters: "Kim Jong-il has left open the door to dialogue with the United States... I have discussed this with President Bush... The United States should also get down to opening a dialogue as soon as possible". Koizumi was speaking in the wake of a highly successful summit meeting with Kim Jong-il, culminating in the 'Pyongyang Declaration' of September 17 in which both sides "affirmed the pledge to observe all international agreements for a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean issue". The Declaration continued: "They also underscored the need to facilitate the settlement of problems by promoting dialogue among the countries concerned as regards all security matters, including nuclear and missiles. ... The DPRK side expressed its will to extend its moratorium on missile tests beyond 2003 in the spirit of the Declaration." Speaking in Tokyo on September 19, Koizumi claimed: "North Korea...said it would allow inspections, including by the International Atomic Energy Agency". It was not clear, however, whether such preparedness was unconditional or related to progress on implementation of the Agreed Framework.
A thorough survey of US policy towards North Korea was provided in an August 29 speech in Seoul by John Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Addressing the Korean-American Association, Bolton stated:
"The North must also begin implementing military confidence building and tension reduction measures. Some 30 kilometers from where I stand lies one of the most dangerous places on Earth - the demilitarized zone. ... The brave forces of our two countries stand ready to defend against an evil regime that is armed to the teeth, including with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. It is a regime that has just a few miles from Seoul the most massive concentration of tubed artillery and rocketry on earth. We in America must always be cognizant of this enormous conventional threat to the South and especially to the people of your thriving capital. Change in the North's diplomatic, economic, and security posture is necessary, but not sufficient, for it to join the community of nations. Today, perhaps our gravest concern is Pyongyang's continuing development of weapons of mass destruction and exporting the means to deliver them. I must say personally that this administration has repeatedly put the North on notice that it must get out of the business of proliferation. Nonetheless, we see few, if any, signs of change on this front. Too frequently North Korea acts as if the world will keep looking the other way. Unfortunately, the global consequences of its proliferation activities are impossible to ignore."
With regard to the Agreed Framework, the Undersecretary commented: "Pyongyang's record of the past 8 years does not inspire confidence. It has gone so far as to demand compensation for lost power generation, when its self-constructed barriers are largely to blame for construction delays. If the North has nothing to hide, then full cooperation with the IAEA, as required by its Safeguards Agreement and under the Agreed Framework, should be an easy task. Opening up to IAEA inspectors is the best way to remove suspicions and ensure the delivery of the light water reactors in a timely fashion. ... Continued intransigence on the part of Pyongyang only begs the question: What is North Korea hiding? ... If the North's IAEA declarations were accurate, then why not allow verification to occur?" Speaking to reporters after the speech, Bolton said he knew "of no support in the United States for the proposition that the Agreed Framework has eternal life".
The build-up to Bolton's speech was dominated by rumours of pressure within the Bush administration for a draft reference to North Korea's membership in the "axis of evil" - famously defined by President Bush in his State of the Union address in January - to be dropped. Bolton commented on August 26: "I personally think it's OK for a senior American official to quote the President of the United States." The speech itself contained the following passage: "President Bush's use of the term 'axis of evil' to describe Iran, Iraq, and North Korea was more than a rhetorical flourish - it was factually correct. First, the characteristics of the three countries' leadership are much the same: the leaders feel only they are important, not the people. Indeed, in North Korea, the people can starve as long as the leadership is well fed. Second, there is a hard connection between these regimes - an 'axis' - along which flow dangerous weapons and dangerous technology. Let us use the case of Iran. For some years now, North Korea has provided Iran - arguably the most egregious state sponsor of terror-with medium-range ballistic missiles known as No Dongs. Iran has used this assistance and technology to strengthen its Shahab-3 program. The proliferation relationship may work in reverse, and the fruits of this cooperation could be offered for sale on the international market. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development and production."
The speech received a predictable review from North Korea, which noted in a Foreign Ministry statement (September 1): "Known as a standard-bearer among the notorious hardline hawks of the Bush administration, Bolton never opens his mouth without making anti-DPRK remarks, bereft of reason... US hawks are charging the DPRK with deployment and proliferation of missiles. The brigandish charge means that they are free to develop, produce, deploy and proliferate any type of mass destruction weapons but other sovereign states' legitimate policy of increasing their self-defence capacity poses a threat to them."
Notes: on October 16, a dramatic statement by US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher announced that the administration was "unable to pursue" its "bold approach to improve relations with North Korea". The statement claimed that, during the October 3-5 talks, North Korean officials "acknowledged" the existence of "a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements". According to Boucher, the officials "attempted to blame the United States and said that they considered the Agreed Framework nullified". The statement reads in full: "Earlier this month, senior US officials traveled to North Korea to begin talks on a wide range of issues. During those talks, Assistant Secretary James A. Kelly and his delegation advised the North Koreans that we had recently acquired information that indicates that North Korea has a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements. North Korean officials acknowledged that they have such a program. The North Koreans attempted to blame the United States and said that they considered the Agreed Framework nullified. Assistant Secretary Kelly pointed out that North Korea had been embarked on this program for several years. Over the summer, President Bush - in consultation with our allies and friends - had developed a bold approach to improve relations with North Korea. The United States was prepared to offer economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people, provided the North were dramatically to alter its behavior across a range of issues, including its weapons of mass destruction programs, development and export of ballistic missiles, threats to its neighbors, support for terrorism, and the deplorable treatment of the North Korean people. In light of our concerns about the North's nuclear weapons program, however, we are unable to pursue this approach. North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program is a serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework as well as under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The administration is consulting with key members of Congress, and will continue to do so. Undersecretary of State John Bolton and Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly are traveling to the region to confer with friends and allies about this important issue. The United States and our allies call on North Korea to comply with its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to eliminate its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner. We seek a peaceful resolution of this situation. Everyone in the region has a stake in this issue and no peaceful nation wants to see a nuclear-armed North Korea. This is an opportunity for peace loving nations in the region to deal, effectively, with this challenge." See next issue for extensive coverage and reaction.
Reports: US reevaluates speech on North Korea, Washington Times, August 22; Transcript - Under Secretary Bolton fields queries on Iraq, N. Korea, Washington File, August 26; N. Korea arms proliferation worries United States, Reuters, August 26; Text - Bolton says North Korea deserves 'axis of evil' title, Washington File, August 29; North Korea says US hypocritical over weapons, Reuters, September 1; North Korea - Bolton reiterates allegations in Seoul, Global Security Newswire, September 3; Statement by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA General Conference, Vienna, September 16, IAEA website (http://www.iaea.org); Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, BBC News Online, September 17; N. Korea 'agrees' to nuclear inspections, BBC News Online, September 19; N. Korea to allow IAEA inspections - Koizumi, Reuters, September 19; Japan reiterates call to Washington to open talks with North Korea, Associated Press, September 24; Text - White House says Kelly will lead delegation to Pyongyang, Washington File, September 26; In policy shift, US will talk to North Korea, New York Times, September 26; US envoy arrives in North Korea for talks, Reuters, October 3; US envoy meets N. Korea's No. 2, Reuters, October 4; US envoy says N. Korea talks 'frank' and 'useful', Reuters, October 5; US envoy expressed concern over North Korea's weapons program while in Pyongyang, Associated Press, October 5; US envoy Kelly briefs Japan officials, goes home, Reuters, October 6; US plays down talks with N. Korean officials, Washington Post, October 6; N. Korea terms US stance 'hostile policy', Reuters, October 7; North Korea - US envoy 'arrogant', Associated Press, October 7; Annan welcomes high-level dialogue between US and DPR of Korea, UN News Service, October 7; N. Korea says sees US policy as 'war declaration', Reuters, October 11; North Korean nuclear program, Statement by Richard Boucher, US State Department (http://www.state.gov), October 16.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.