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Issue No. 68, December 2002 - January 2003
As reported in the last issue, on October 16 the US State Department made public an admission it claimed to have received from North Korea during a visit to Pyongyang by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly two weeks earlier (October 3-5). Kelly's visit was the highest-level contact between the two sides since President Bush took office, raising hopes - particularly in the context of rapidly improving relations between Pyongyang and both South Korea and Japan - that concerns over North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes might soon be satisfactorily addressed as part of a general movement towards durable peace and security in the region. Those hopes were seemingly dashed by the State Department's revelations:
"Earlier this month, senior US officials traveled to North Korea to begin talks on a wide range of issues. During those talks, Assistant Secretary James A. Kelly and his delegation advised the North Koreans that we had recently acquired information that indicates that North Korea has a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements. North Korean officials acknowledged that they have such a program. The North Koreans attempted to blame the United States and said that they considered the Agreed Framework nullified. ... Over the summer, President Bush - in consultation with our allies and friends - had developed a bold approach to improve relations with North Korea. The United States was prepared to offer economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people, provided the North were dramatically to alter its behavior across a range of issues, including its weapons of mass destruction programs, development and export of ballistic missiles, threats to its neighbors, support for terrorism, and the deplorable treatment of the North Korean people. In light of our concerns about the North's nuclear weapons program, however, we are unable to pursue this approach. North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program is a serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework as well as under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. ... The United States and our allies call on North Korea to comply with its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to eliminate its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner. We seek a peaceful resolution of this situation. Everyone in the region has a stake in this issue and no peaceful nation wants to see a nuclear-armed North Korea."
The period since the October 16 announcement has been marked by confusion over the exact nature of North Korea's admission, consternation at the bewilderingly sudden turn of events, and anxiety over the long-term ramifications of any collapse of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework, under which the North is to be provided with proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs) in return for fully honouring its NPT obligations.
Initial confusion was compounded by the decision of the Bush administration to wait for nearly two weeks before issuing a statement. Speaking on CBS Television on October 20, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice responded to questions about the delay by observing: "Well, it's a peculiar notion that the moment you find out something like this you need to make it public, before the President has had a chance to review his options. There were members of Congress who were briefed prior to this going public...and there were a number of congressional committees and staff that had been briefed over a longer period of time about our suspicions of a highly-enriched uranium programme in North Korea." The following day, however, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov, speaking after a meeting in Moscow with US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, commented: "This is an unusual practice - they wait two weeks after the confidential contacts ended and then all of a sudden they drop that information bombshell."
Pyongyang's official line on the status of its nuclear programme appears to be deliberately, even menacingly, ambiguous, claiming an 'entitlement' to nuclear weapons without acknowledging possession. In Beijing on November 1, for example, North Korea's ambassador to China, Choe Jin Su, held a rare press conference to repeat a chilling formula first used by his government on October 25 (see below): "We told the special envoy of the US President that we were entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that in order to protect our sovereignty and right to subsistence from an ever-growing US nuclear threat." The Ambassador added that Washington's designation of his country as a member of the 'axis of evil' was "obviously a declaration of war against the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]".
The same day, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei told Reuters he had yet to receive a reply from Pyongyang to repeated requests for clarification, including an October 18 letter confirming, in the words of an Agency press release, the IAEA's "readiness to dispatch a senior team to the DPRK, or to receive a DPRK team in Vienna, to discuss this matter and the general question of the implementation of IAEA safeguards". ElBaradei noted: "The new revelations or reports that they have, in addition to plutonium, also a uranium-enrichment programme were quite shocking to us... They have been in violation of their [safeguards] agreement with us since 1993, when we came to the conclusion that they have developed more plutonium than was declared to us... We have received no response..."
On October 30, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov expressed his frustration at a "certain ambiguity in the statements made by North Korean representatives." Losyukov told the Interfax news agency: "We think this ambiguity is very dangerous as it leads to mutual suspicion and will have a negative impact on the situation on the Korean Peninsula". The Minister then made clear that his frustration was not directed at Pyongyang alone: "There has been no public admission that North Korea is pursuing its programme to enrich uranium, and it is not even clear such an admission was made in talks with the Americans... It sounded more like there was neither admission nor denial. We would like both sides to try to act in a way to clarify the issue... I also mean the United States, because the Russian side has received no convincing evidence that the programme exists after all." On October 24, similar doubts had been voiced by South Korean Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun: "It is said that North Korea declared in very strong terms the [1994] Geneva agreement invalid. I wonder whether North Korea actually said it that way. I think something important might have been omitted in the course of communication..." On October 26, speaking at a joint press conference with President Bush in Crawford, Texas, Chinese President Jiang Zemin noted: "We're completely in the dark as far as the recent development [goes]". Jiang added that China had "always held the position that the Korean Peninsula should be nuclear-weapon free... [T]oday President Bush and I agreed that the problem should be resolved peacefully."
On November 6, Donald Gregg, former US Ambassador to South Korea, told reporters in Seoul that, during a private visit to Pyongyang from November 2-5, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju had told him the Agreed Framework was "'hanging by a thread', meaning that it was in a very tenuous state, but that the North Koreans were still supporting it". Commenting that "I think they want the US to give them some assurance that we don't want to blow them out of the water", Gregg added: "The North Koreans said they adopted an NCND - neither confirm nor deny - policy toward the highly-enriched uranium issue, although some comments that we heard were very close to [an] admission that they had such a programme under way..."
On November 17, a broadcast on North Korean radio was reported by the Yonhap news agency in Seoul to have stated that the DPRK "has come to have nuclear and other strong military weapons to deal with increased nuclear threats by the US imperialists". The following day, an unnamed official at the South Korean Unification Ministry was quoted by Yonhap as casting doubt on the accuracy of the translation; a few hours later, another North Korean radio broadcast repeated the customary 'entitlement' formula: "To safeguard our sovereignty and right to exist, we are entitled to have powerful military countermeasures, including nuclear weapons".
Whatever the truth regarding its nuclear programme, on October 25 a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement proposed a sweeping political solution to the crisis: "The DPRK considers that it is a reasonable and realistic solution to the nuclear issue to conclude a non-aggression treaty between the DPRK and the US if the grave situation of the Korean Peninsula is to be bridged over. If the US legally assures the DPRK of non-aggression, including the non-use of nuclear weapons against it, by concluding such a treaty, the DPRK will be ready to clear the former of its security concerns." The statement conspicuously failed to clarify the nature of those 'security concerns', commenting with regard to Kelly's visit to Pyongyang: "Producing no evidence, he asserted that the DPRK has been actively engaged in the enriched uranium program in pursuit of possessing nuclear weapons in violation of the DPRK-US agreed framework. He even intimidated the DPRK side by saying that there would be no dialogue with the US unless the DPRK halts it, and the DPRK-Japan, and North-South relations, would be jeopardized. The US attitude was so unilateral and high-handed that the DPRK was stunned by it. ... Nobody would be so naive as to think that the DPRK would sit idle under such [a] situation. That was why the DPRK made itself very clear to the special envoy of the US President that the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty..."
As part of the Agreed Framework, North Korea is to be compensated for the loss of power generation entailed in the suspension of its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors by regular supplies of fuel oil. In New York on November 14, after much debate, the Executive Board of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) - the international organisation entrusted with implementation of the Framework - announced the suspension of future oil shipments in protest at North Korea's apparent violation of the basic provisions of the agreement. In the words of a KEDO statement, the Board, "consisting of the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the European Union, agreed" that "heavy fuel deliveries will be suspended beginning with the December shipment. Future shipments will depend on North Korea's concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly-enriched uranium program."
The suspension was seen as a victory for the US position, countering concerns from other Board members, particularly South Korea, that it might further accelerate the breakdown of diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. On November 15, President Bush stressed the unity of response demonstrated by the move: "I welcome yesterday's strong statement by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization... North Korea has acknowledged that it is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on enriched uranium. ... North Korea's clear violation of its international commitments will not be ignored. ... In June 2001, we offered to pursue a comprehensive dialogue with North Korea. We developed a bold approach under which, if the North addressed our long-standing concerns, the United States was prepared to take important steps that would have significantly improved the lives of the North Korean people. Now that North Korea's covert nuclear weapons program has come to light, we are unable to pursue this approach. North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a challenge to all responsible nations. The leaders of the Asia-Pacific region made clear in a unanimous statement in October that North Korea's potential to benefit from participation in the international community rests upon the prompt and visible dismantlement of this program. We are united in our desire for a peaceful resolution of this situation. We are also united in our resolve that the only option for addressing this situation is for North Korea to completely and visibly eliminate its nuclear weapons program."
South Korea gave full public backing to the suspension. Park Sun-sook, chief spokesperson for President Kim Dae-jung, told reporters (November 15): "We think the three allies - the United States, Japan and South Korea - along with the European Union, have come to the best possible agreement... North Korea must give up its nuclear weapons programme immediately so that it can get the assistance it wants from the international community".
A full week after the announcement, North Korea gave its first official response. Arguing that "it is high time to decide...who is to blame for the collapse of the Framework", and describing KEDO's decision as "a wanton violation" of the accord, a November 21 Foreign Ministry statement railed:
"With a view to playing down the responsibility for breaking its international commitment, the US described the decision as 'collective will' of KEDO member nations. It is as clear as noonday that in actuality the US government made a decision to stop supplying heavy oil before forcing it upon KEDO... It is well known to the world that the US has violated the Framework and boycotted the implementation of its commitments. The US has drastically delayed the construction of LWRs, worked out a plan for a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the DPRK and listed the latter as part of an 'axis of evil'. ... The US outcries for disarming the DPRK are, in essence, little short of calling upon the DPRK to abandon its system. This was more clearly evidenced by the statement of the US President issued on November 15. The US gravely insulted the spirit of the UN Charter by listing a UN member nation as part of an 'axis of evil'... It also wantonly transgressed the basic spirit of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by singling out nuclear-free states as the targets of its pre-emptive nuclear attack. The DPRK has exercised its forbearance to the full. ... The US assertion that the DPRK violated the framework is a burglary logic of America-style superpower chauvinism that a big country may threaten a small country as it wishes but a small country should not try to cope with such threat. The US is seriously mistaken if it thinks this logic will work on the Korean Peninsula."
The statement concluded with a renewed appeal for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty, which it described as "the only realistic solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula": "The US President and all other authorities said that the US has no intention to invade the DPRK. So, if they are sincere in their remarks, there is no reason whatsoever for them not to give legal assurances of non-aggression to the DPRK. But the US responded to the DPRK proposal for concluding a non-aggression treaty with a decision to stop supplying heavy oil to the DPRK."
While Washington was dismissive of the statement, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement issued on November 25 observed: "We have taken note of the...comment by...the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 21 expressing the position of Pyongyang on the 1994 Framework Agreement... We welcome the confirmation made by the DPRK...of its adherence to observance of the agreement and sincerely hope that Washington and Pyongyang will be able via a constructive dialogue to find a mutually acceptable way out of the prevailing situation and will completely fulfil their commitments under the Framework Agreement. This is necessary to preserve the nuclear non-proliferation regime in Korea and normalise American-North Korean relations."
Notes: the crisis over North Korea's nuclear programme has also raised doubts over the continuation of the country's moratorium on ballistic missile test flights. The moratorium was declared by President Kim Jong-il in 1999. On September 17, the 'Pyongyang Declaration' issued by President Kim and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi after their historic summit meeting (see last issue) stated: "The DPRK expressed its will to extend its moratorium on missile tests beyond 2003". However, on November 5 a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement noted that the leadership in Pyongyang was "of the view that the DPRK should reconsider the moratorium" in the event that "the talks on normalising the relations between the DPRK and Japan get prolonged without making any progress, as was the case with the recent talks". The last remark refers to discussions held between the two sides in Kuala Lumpur in late October - talks understandably overshadowed by Japanese dismay at the apparent duplicity of North Korea at the September summit, seen at the time as a major foreign policy victory for Prime Minister Koizumi. In fact, Koizumi's judgment in signing the Pyongyang Declaration was called into question by a report in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun newspaper on October 27 alleging that the Prime Minister had been informed by US officials in late August of a possible uranium enrichment programme in North Korea. Speaking in Kuala Lumpur on October 29, a senior Japanese official told reporters that the two sides were now set "on a collision course" over the nuclear issue.
On November 17, a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement repeated the November 5 warning, noting that that the people and leadership of the country "strongly assert that it is necessary to reconsider a moratorium on the missile test-firing".
A sub-plot to the main drama is the question of the potential embarrassment caused to states accused or suspected of aiding and abetting North Korea's nuclear, and particularly its uranium-enrichment, programme. As an unnamed senior US official told reporters on October 17: "It's fair to say that the questions and concerns that we've had about enrichment capabilities in other states support a conclusion that this has never been done indigenously - that these programmes are dependent on support from the outside." In Washington's view, the states with the most to account for in this case appear to be Pakistan, China and Russia. In the context of Pakistan's vital role in the war against terrorism, however, the Islamabad connection is itself an embarrassment for the White House. In an interview with Reuters on November 13, an unnamed senior US official observed rather feebly: "There's no evidence...the [Pakistan] government was helping [North Korea] within the last three months or before... That's not to say they might not have... I'm not saying we are convinced there is no Pakistani government involvement". On October 17, another unnamed official told the New York Times that there had clearly been a post-1994 proliferation relationship between Islamabad and Pyongyang: "What you have here is a perfect meeting of interests - the North had what the Pakistanis needed [in terms of ballistic missile technology] and the Pakistanis had a way for Kim Jong-il to restart a nuclear programme we had stopped [in 1994]..." On October 18, Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf told reporters "there is absolutely no such thing" as a connection between the Pakistan and North Korean nuclear and missile programmes: "This is absolutely baseless. There is no such thing as collaboration with North Korea in the nuclear arena. Pakistan has several times said, and I have said personally, that Pakistan will never proliferate its nuclear technology and we stand by this commitment." The same day, General Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, insisted that "no exchange of any sort was done with North Korea." Gul added: "North Korea's technology has always been ahead of ours... North Korea has always been close to China and Russia... We are in no position to help them."
On October 18, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Alexander Yakovenko stated that any suggestion of Russian support "absolutely does not conform to the truth". Yakovenko added: "We even suspended our cooperation with the DPRK in peaceful uses of atomic energy in 1993 after Pyongyang's statement of its withdrawal from the NPT Treaty and have had no contacts with the DPRK in this area since." On October 21, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry dismissed the "absolutely unfounded rumour" of Beijing's nuclear support for Pyongyang.
Statement by spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, October 17: "The Secretary-General is extremely concerned by the reported existence in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of a programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, as announced by the United States State Department, following the recent DPRK-United States discussions in Pyongyang. If confirmed, the programme would not be in conformity with the DPRK's international obligations, including under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It would also be contrary to international efforts to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary-General welcomes the consultations that have already begun among interested countries - issues related to weapons of mass destruction must be accorded highest priority."
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, speaking in Baghdad, November 18: "If they [North Korea] now come and make it clear that they have [nuclear weapons], this is original sin... This runs contrary to the whole very purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and if that's true the international community would have to react."
Joint North-South Korea Ministerial Statement, Seoul, October 23: "South and North Korea will make joint efforts to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsular, and will actively pursue dialogue to resolve the nuclear issue and other problems."
Ri To Sop, North Korean Consul-General in Hong Kong, November 13: "US pressure to scrap or dismantle our nuclear weapons...is completely absurd logic. Now we have our defensive capabilities to defend our sovereignty and our right to existence... The US assertion that the DPRK should halt first the nuclear programme means a surrender... Since a surrender means a death, it can only lead to a confrontation... Now, we are ready for war or dialogue. We prefer dialogue but we will not move first. We will not beg for recognition from the hostile side."
Han Song Ryol, North Korean Ambassador to the UN, interviewed by the New York Times, November 3: "There must be a continuing dialogue. If both sides sit together the matter can be resolved peacefully and quickly. ... Everything will be negotiable... Our government will resolve all US security concerns through the talks, if your government has a will to end its hostile policy..."
US President George W. Bush, asked to explain the different approaches of his administration to Iraq and North Korea, November 7: "[E]ach threat requires a different type of response. You've heard my strategy on dealing with Iraq. ... With North Korea, we're taking a different strategy initially, and it's this - we're going to work with countries in the neighbourhood to convince North Korea that it is not in the world's interests that they develop a nuclear weapon through highly-enriched uranium."
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, November 3: "North Korea in 1994 entered into a quid pro quo, and it's inappropriate for North Korea to say that 'we will walk away from our quid, and ask for more quo'. ... It's not a question of talking. It's a question of action... North Korea gave its word and didn't keep it. North Korea needs to keep it."
Ari Fleischer, October 18: "Since September 11, we've developed a very different relationship with many of the countries on whom North Korea traditionally relies for technology, [and] economic and diplomatic support. These countries want good and improved relations with the United States, and they have no interest in a nuclearised North Korea. We also have close allies to whom North Korea is turning in desperation for economic health. These nations also want a good relationship with the United States. They, too, don't have an interest in a nuclearised peninsular. ... So, taken together, we have an opportunity to begin to address this problem with an international coalition... [The United States] is committed to anti-proliferation and we're going to work to make that case in all regions of the world."
US Secretary of State Colin Powell, commenting on the debate over continuing oil shipments to North Korea, November 7: "It's a little hard to say to our publics that it is a repeat of 1993 and 1994 - we caught them in something and we've compensated them for giving up that something we caught them at, and they've done it again and we're going to compensate them again. That doesn't seem to me to be a policy line that one could follow..."
Secretary Powell, October 29: "[T]hey have to eliminate the programme, give it up, abandon it, destroy it, whatever words you [want to] choose, before they can expect the rest of the world to assist them in their difficulties... No North Korean child can eat enriched uranium. No North Korean peasant can get a job enriching uranium. It's fool's gold for North Korea..."
Secretary Powell, October 20: "An agreement between two parties, one of whom says it's been nullified, makes it sort of a nullified agreement."
US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, October 19: "This is not a replay of 1993 and 1994... The best way to start negotiations is [for North Korea] to end their covert nuclear weapons programmes from the past... [There are still] channels of communication should North Korea wish to give information."
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, October 31: "[In] the case of Iraq, we've got an unrelenting enemy of the United States, her own neighbours, and Israel. We've got a country which is in a rigorous and relentless drive for the full range of weapons of mass destruction. We've got a country which has attacked and invaded her neighbours, Kuwait and Iran, has used weapons of mass destruction in those attacks, and, finally, has used...chemical weapons against her own citizens; and you top that off with a well-known affection for terrorism and identification with terrorist groups, and I think you have, in Iraq, a special case. In North Korea, on the other hand, you've got a country which has had a rough equilibrium on the peninsular for about 50 years. We are engaged with our allies...[in] trying to bring about a betterment of the situation... [A]nd finally, since 1987, in the bombing of the Korea Airline, we have not had a North Korea which has been associated with terrorism for some time, so they're kind of different."
US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, October 20: "We're not going to have a cookie cutter for foreign policy, where we try to apply the same formula to every case. It would be foolhardy to do that... The President put it very well when he said there may be many modalities, but there's only one morality. And the morality is that we are not prepared to allow nuclear powers of this kind to grow up..."
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, October 17: "I have not touched them...but I believe they have a small number of nuclear weapons..."
US Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, November 8: "There is much about the programme that we don't know. I can't answer with precision exactly what they have accomplished with their uranium programme to date. ... This is an authentically difficult subject. ... It's important that the North Koreans understand that there is a price to be paid for violating their commitments and pursuing a capability that threatens the peace and security of the region. The challenge is devising a way of imposing that price so that diplomacy can work."
Unnamed senior US official, quoted by Reuters, October 17: "[We have] evidence of North Korean efforts to procure materials, including specialty metals, that they would need for a massive, production-level [uranium enrichment] programme. ... There is no disagreement within the administration that North Korea was trying to procure tubes for a centrifuge cascade..."
Wendy Sherman, senior State Department official in the Clinton administration, October 17: "It is not clear to me...how early this [uranium enrichment] programme began... It certainly has only become known in the recent past. It is not a program we were aware of during the Clinton years... We were always wary of what North Korea might do, and wary of signals, but we were never aware of such a programme... [The Bush administration needs to handle this crisis] very carefully, very deliberately, very thoughtfully, because the stakes are very high."
James Lilley, former US Ambassador to China and South Korea, interview with the Global Security Newswire, October 28: "It took time for the Bush administration to gather the convincing evidence. They first got indications about two years ago. Gradually, information accumulated and they connected the dots. They decided they would lay it before the North Koreans in a pretty cold way, and got a rather unexpected response. The first day was a pretty typical North Korean response: tantrums, accusations that we were lying, cheating, and fabricating. The second day we got the real surprise. They said; 'OK, it's happening - what are you going to do about it?'"
Robert Galucci, former senior US official and lead negotiator of the 1994 Agreed Framework, October 21: "I think we should at this point suspend our...steps anticipated under the Agreed Framework...and engage...as soon as politically plausible...[in] negotiations and discussions with the North."
Republican Senator John McCain, October 18: "I'm not ruling out the military, but there are other actions that would have to be tried first. And I believe that strong economic sanctions could bring down that government."
Democratic Senator Bob Graham, Chair of the Intelligence Committee, October 20: "If you put the two, North Korea and Iraq, on the scales and ask the question, 'which today is the greater threat to the people of the United States of America?', I would answer the question 'North Korea'. And I think that needs to be part of the rebalancing of our foreign policy priorities."
Gary Samore, former US State Department official and member of the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiating team, October 24: "The North Koreans have admitted cheating. It's hard to see on what basis one could proceed to negotiate another agreement with them."
Lt. General Daniel Zanini, retiring Commander of US Forces in Korea (USFK), November 5: "It is...clear that North Korea is terminally ill... Its economy and infrastructure are in ruins, yet it remains a closed authoritarian state with an improved military capability and weapons of mass destruction."
Unnamed senior US official, quoted in the New York Times, October 17: "Here they are declaring they have the stuff to make a nuke. Whether they have one, or they are bluffing, we don't know for sure. But the message is, 'don't mess with us.'"
Unnamed senior US official, quoted by Reuters, October 22: "In terms of there being an effective mechanism for garnering greater rewards from us, shredding their previous deal with us is not going to be an effective means of convincing us to enter into a new agreement..."
Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, November 18: "Russia is seriously concerned by the contradictory reports continuing to come in from Pyongyang about the 'right' of the DPRK to possess nuclear weapons. Russia expects from the friendly Korean leadership strict observance of all the provisions of...the cornerstone Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is a guarantee not only of global strategic stability but also of peace and security on the Korean peninsular. The Russian side expects also the other parties concerned, including the participants of the 1994 agreement, to show restraint and to continue to fulfil the international commitments assumed in full."
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, November 11: "We have no concrete information that North Korea has produced any nuclear developments [material?] or nuclear weapons... It is unimportant who provides information about North Korea having such nuclear developments, but we need clear proof."
Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, October 21: "It is hard for me to imagine that they could have the military technology to create nuclear weapons..."
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, October 29: "If they want to generate jobs, if they want to have a greater capacity to feed their own people and develop their own economy, they...have to get back to the Agreed Framework...and they have to abandon uranium enrichment. There will be no reward for bad behaviour. They won't extract more out of us in order to address this problem of the uranium enrichment plant."
Liu Jianchao, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, October 22: "The Geneva 1994 Agreed Framework plays an important role in the denuclearization of, and peace and stability on, the Korean Peninsular. The agreement was hard-earned and relevant parties should earnestly implement it."
Chris Patten, European Union (EU) External Relations Commissioner, October 21: "It is difficult to see how we can in present circumstances simply continue our contributions to KEDO..."
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, November 3: "[The Bush administration is treating Pyongyang differently to Baghdad] first because North Korea has no oil, and second because North Korea is not an enemy to Israel, nor is it near its borders."
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, October 27: "We want to see North Korea keep its promise of abandoning its nuclear weapons programme in a way that we can see with our own eyes."
Prime Minister Koizumi, October 21: "There is no change to our view that KEDO is a means for the international community to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. We plan to work closely with South Korea and the United States to utilize this framework."
Prime Minister Koizumi, October 20: "It's outrageous that North Korea would have nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction when it's people are starving. It should ensure good living standards for its people."
Former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, October 20: "There is a very dangerous country in the neighbourhood that has conducted savage acts, such as abductions [of Japanese citizens], and is aiming its nuclear missiles right at Japan."
Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima, letter to North Korean President Kim Jong-il, October 22: "Nuclear weapons are an absolute evil. I demand that you think deeply about what nuclear weapons hold in store for us, and immediately terminate your nuclear weapons programme."
South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, November 19: "North Korea must make a decision. They don't have much time left."
President Kim Dae-jung, October 30: "We absolutely will not permit nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsular. For our security, and for North-South coexistence, North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons development."
President Kim Dae-jung, October 23: "We all know how horrible war is, and no one wants it... Economic sanctions would free North Korea from international obligations and help it make nuclear weapons."
Park Sun-sook, chief spokesperson for President Kim Dae-jung, October 31: "There is an agreement [with the United States and others] on the route to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. There is a long road ahead of us..."
Yim Sung-joon, foreign affairs adviser to President Kim Dae-jung, October 17: "The government is paying close attention to this frank confirmation of nuclear suspicions during special envoy Kelly's visit to North Korea, and we regard it as a sign North Korea is willing to resolve this problem through dialogue..."
South Korean Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, speaking in Pyongyang after the first contact between senior North and South Korean officials since the State Department revelations, October 20: "My heart is as gloomy as a cloudy sky... [It is] of paramount importance to wisely resolve the concern recently raised...[while preserving] the agreed-upon agenda for reconciliation and exchange."
New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff, October 22: "North Korea's development of nuclear weapons poses a serious risk to regional stability and to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsular... [If necessary, this issue] can be taken to the United Nations Security Council for resolution."
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Statement, Los Cabos, Mexico, October 27: "We note the potential for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to benefit economically from the greater participation as a member of the Asia-Pacific community. Such a prospect will rest upon a nuclear weapons-free status on the Korean Peninsula. We reiterate our continued support for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We uphold that a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula is important to the peace and stability of the peninsula and northeast Asia, and is also in the interests of all members of the region. We call upon the DPRK to visibly honor its commitment to give up nuclear weapons programs and reaffirm our commitment to ensure a peaceful resolution of this issue."
Reports: North Korean Nuclear Program, Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, US State Department, October 16; Rumsfeld believes North Korea 'has small number of nuclear weapons', Washington File, October 17; Rumsfeld says thinks N. Korea has nuclear weapons, Reuters, October 17; Russia, China said to aid N. Korea nuclear program, Reuters, October 17; No sign of N. Korea nuclear program under Clinton, Reuters, October 17; North Korea says it has a program on nuclear arms, New York Times, October 17; Opportunity, peril seen in N. Korea nuclear admission, Reuters, October 17; IAEA concerned about possible DPRK uranium enrichment programme - seeking clarification from DPRK and USA, IAEA Press Release, PR 2002/16, October 17; IAEA invites DPRK for talks, IAEA Press Release, PR 2002/17, October 18; US believes Pakistan aided N. Korean nuclear program, Reuters, October 18; US says Pakistan gave technology to North Korea, New York Times, October 18; White House says US will work with allies on North Korea nuclear issue, Washington File, October 18; US non-proliferation effort falling on hard times, Associated Press, October 18; Secretary-General 'extremely concerned' by reports of uranium enrichment programme in Democratic People's Republic of Korea, UN Press Release SG/SM/8444, October 18; Remarks by Alexander Yakovenko, the official spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Foreign Ministry Document 2136-18-10-2002, October 18; Rice says international pressure may deter North Korea's nuclear aspirations, Associated Press, October 18; US envoy says campaign to pressure North Korea on nuclear issue is just beginning, Associated Press, October 19; US to withdraw from arms accord with North Korea, New York Times, October 20; Powell - 1994 nuclear pact with N. Korea 'nullified', Reuters, October 20; Koreas spar over nuclear issue, BBC News Online, October 20; Powell says North Koreans 'nullified' nuclear agreement - US consulting allies on response, Associated Press, October 21; China denies helping N. Korean nuclear program, Reuters, October 21; US - Russia concerned about N. Korea nuclear plans, Reuters, October 21; Jolted by North Korea, Japan grows angrier, New York Times, October 21; Powell, Rice say withholding N. Korea information was not political, Washington Post, October 21; US hasn't decided to abandon North Korea nuclear agreement, envoy says, Associated Press, October 21; Negotiator urges suspension of N. Korea nuclear pact, Reuters, October 21; North Korea says it is willing to negotiate on nuclear issue, Associated Press, October 21; Transcript of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign affairs Georgy Mamedov remarks to Russian media following talks with US Undersecretary of State John Bolton, Moscow, October 21, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; United States suspects North Korea of eyeing nuclear attack on Japan, Associated Press, October 22; Koreas agree to cooperate to resolve nuclear issue, Reuters, October 22; New Zealand says North Korea must honor nuclear program commitments, Associated Press, October 22; Ahead of meeting with US leader, South Korean president calls for dialogue to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue, Associated Press, October 23; South Korean official questions US account of North Korea's nuclear intentions, Associated Press, October 24; Uncertainty over North Korea's arsenal could complicate disarmament efforts, Associated Press, October 24; Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and US called for, Korean Central News Agency (http://www.kcna.co.jp), October 25; Transcript - US and China want peaceful resolution to North Korea's nuclear threat, Washington File, October 25; Bush, Jiang oppose nukes in Koreas, Associated Press, October 26; Text of APEC's N. Korea statement, Associated Press, October 27; APEC nations tell N. Korea to scrap nuclear weapons, Reuters, October 27; Japan - no North Korea ties if nukes being developed, Reuters, October 28; Interview - former US Ambassador to China and South Korea James Lilley, Global Security Newswire, October 28; Australia suggests N. Korea return to 1994 arms deal, Reuters, October 29; N. Korea 'will not end nuclear programme', BBC News Online, October 29; North Korea rejects demands to abandon nuclear program, New York Times, October 29; Powell tells North Korea to surrender or face misery, Associated Press, October 29; Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov interview with Interfax news agency, October 30, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; S. Korea tells North to move on nuclear issue, Reuters, October 30; Transcript - Armitage calls differences between Iraq, North Korea 'fundamental', Washington File, October 31; South sees long way to go on North Korea nukes, Reuters, October 31; Russia disappointed by Pyongyang nuclear stance, Reuters, October 31; UN wants talks with N. Korea on nuclear arms reports, Reuters, November 1; North Korea remains defiant on nuclear option, Reuters, November 1; North Korean ambassador reiterates Pyongyang's right to nuclear program, Associated Press, November 1; Report - North Korea willing to negotiate with the United States over its nuclear weapons program, Associated Press, November 3; Saddam warns Arabs on US motives, Associated Press, November 3; US says North Korea must scrap nuclear weapons program before any talks can begin, Associated Press, November 3; North Korea says nuclear program can be negotiated, New York Times, November 3; Retiring US General - N. Korea 'terminally ill', Reuters, November 5; N. Korea may reconsider missile test moratorium, Reuters, November 5; N. Korea may reconsider missile test moratorium, Reuters, November 5; N. Korea sees 1994 pact 'hanging by a thread', Reuters, November 6; US official says Washington engaged in 'intense' debates on North Korean nuclear issue, Associated Press, November 7; Transcript - Bush 'optimistic' that UNSC will vote Nov. 8 on Iraq, Washington File, November 8; Transcript - Powell says continued pressure needed to get Iraq to disarm, Washington File, November 7; US official says North Korea must pay price for nuclear program, Associated Press, November 8; US, allies grapple with N. Korea nuclear issue, Reuters, November 11; Pakistan-N. Korea tie seen as tricky issue for Bush, Reuters, November 13; US, S. Korea disagree ahead of N. Korea meeting, Reuters, November 13; North Korea won't give ground in nuclear flap, Reuters, November 13; KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes, KEDO Press Release (http://www.kedo.org), November 14; Text - Bush backs KEDO suspension of fuel oil to North Korea, Washington File, November 15; South Korea says US decision to halt oil shipments to North Korea 'appropriate', Associated Press, November 15; North Korea admits nuclear arsenal, BBC News Online, November 17; N. Korea threatens missile tests, Associated Press, November 17; Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, the official spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Foreign Ministry Document 2366-18-11-2002, November 18; N. Korean nuclear 'admission' in doubt, BBC News Online, November 18; North Korea clarifies statement on A-Bomb, New York Times, November 19; Last oil shipment before cutoff reaches N. Korea, Reuters, November 19; South Korean President says North Korea is running out of time, Associated Press, November 19; North Korea says 1994 nuclear agreement with Washington has collapsed, Associated Press, November 21; DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman on US decision to stop supplying heavy oil, Korean Central News Agency, November 21; Concerning preservation of US-DPRK Framework Agreement, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 2429-25-11-2002, November 25.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.