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Back to the Contents of News Review Special Edition
As reported in recent issues, the Bush administration is pressing ahead with a vigorous campaign - involving political, diplomatic and perhaps financial inducements - to persuade Russia to drop all forms of military and civil nuclear cooperation with two states, Iran and Syria, regarded by Washington as posing a grave proliferation and security threat to regional stability and US interests.
With regard to Iran, on October 23 the State Department issued a written answer to a question received at its press briefing the day before:
"Question: 'What can we say about reports that we [the US] have offered economic incentives to Russia in return for their stopping work on the [Bushehr] nuclear reactor in Iran?'
Answer: 'Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles and advanced conventional weapons. The US position is clear: a weapons of mass destruction-armed Iran would be a major threat, to Russia as well as to the United States and our friends and allies in the region. We are deeply concerned that Russian entities continue to provide important assistance to Iran's weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery programs. President Putin has said that he shares our concerns but the Russians have denied that they are helping Iran... We will continue to intensively work this issue closely at senior levels with Russia. An end to Russian proliferation to Iran would allow the United States and Russia to reap the full promise of our new strategic relationship. That would benefit Russia economically, politically and strategically far more than any short-term gain from sensitive transfers to Iran. One example is the potential transfer to Russia for storage of spent reactor fuel currently held by third countries, much of which requires US approval for such transfer because the US originally supplied the fresh fuel to those countries. If the Russians end their sensitive cooperation with Iran, we have indicated we would be prepared to favourably consider such transfers, an arrangement potentially worth over $10 billion to Moscow.'"
Speaking in Moscow on October 22, John Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security took exception to media suggestions of a "kind of quid-pro-quo trade-off" with regard to a possible Russian re-evaluation of its relationship with Iran. Bolton described such an "idea" as "simply an inaccurate representation of the nature of the relationship between Russia and America today. We wouldn't offer such an arrangement and the Russian government wouldn't accept it."
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 9, Bolton stated: "We remain very concerned that the nuclear and missile programs of Iran and others, including Syria, continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and expertise." On October 13, the Syrian Foreign Ministry announced it had "requested a formal explanation" of the comments from the US Ambassador in Damascus, Theodore Kattouf. In an angry statement, the Foreign Ministry noted that numerous inspections of Syrian nuclear facilities by the IAEA "have demonstrated that the Syrian nuclear program is dedicated for peaceful purposes". The statement also contrasted Syria's record with that of Israel, "the only country in the region that has nuclear weapons".
On October 11, a State Department written answer, submitted in response to an October 10 request for clarification of Bolton's remarks, noted: "It is a matter of public record that the United States is concerned about Russian cooperation with Syria's nuclear and missile programs. Broader access to the expertise of Russian entities could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons."
On November 1 - in the midst of final US negotiations with other UN Security Council members, including Syria, on a tough new resolution on Iraq (see above) - Bolton failed to mention Syria's nuclear programme in a wide-ranging speech on non-proliferation issues in Washington. The relevant passage reads: "Syria, through foreign assistance, is seeking to expand its chemical weapons program, which includes a stockpile of nerve agent. We believe that it is developing biological weapons and is able to produce at least small amounts of biological warfare agents. Syria is also pursuing assistance from North Korea and firms in Russia for its missile development programmes. The country has become a major transhipment point for goods and technology going to Iraq."
Mention of Syria's nuclear programme was also absent from a speech by Bolton delivered in Warsaw on October 3, again stating explicit concern over the country's chemical, biological and missile ambitions.
Reports: John R. Bolton, US Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, Keynote address to the Fourth International Conference on Export Controls, Warsaw, October 3, 2002, US State Department transcript; Text - Bolton calls G-8 initiative significant step against proliferation, Washington File, October 9; Text - US concerned about Russian aid to Syrian weapons programs, Washington File, October 11; Syria angry about US stance on nuclear program, Reuters, October 13; Syria protests US nuke allegations, Associated Press, October 13; Senior US diplomat focuses on North Korea's nuclear program during talks in Moscow, Associated Press, October 22; Text - US 'deeply concerned' about Russian assistance to Iran, Washington File, October 23; Transcript - Bolton says rogue states seek WMD capabilities, Washington File, November 1; US official omits disputed charge against Syria, Reuters, November 1.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.