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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 69, February - March 2003

News Review

UK Moves to Support US Missile Defence Programme

In a statement to the House of Commons on January 15, Defence Minister Geoff Hoon announced that the British government had reached a "preliminary conclusion" to agree to a request from the United States to upgrade the Royal Air Force's early-warning radar base at Fylingdales, North Yorkshire. The base is considered a crucial technical component of the Bush administration's missile defence plans. The Secretary of State first set out the context of the decision:

"On 17 December, I informed the House of the receipt of a request from the United States Government to upgrade the early warning radar at Fylingdales for missile defence purposes. ... The Government recognise[s] that missile defence raises important strategic issues, as well as local concerns in North Yorkshire. Following the release of the discussion paper in December, with its invitation to all interested parties to contribute their views, we have had around 300 responses. In addition, I visited North Yorkshire last week, and heard the views of local people and their elected representatives, as well as meeting representatives from the planning authorities. We have taken those views into account as we have considered the central question, which is the key test that the Government will apply to the US request: would agreeing to the upgrade of Fylingdales ultimately enhance the security of the UK and the NATO Alliance?"

The answer to that question, Hoon argued, was resoundingly in the affirmative: "The background to the US request is the marked increase in the threat to our security from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. ... The hard fact is that a number of states of concern are making major investments in developing ever-longer range ballistic missiles. ... These ballistic missile programmes are being developed solely in order to threaten the delivery of weapons of mass destruction - nerve gas, toxins, biological agents or even nuclear warheads. It is the combination of ballistic missiles and the possession of these weapons of mass destruction, together with the demonstrated willingness to use those capabilities, that makes Iraq the most immediate state threat to global security. Elsewhere, if North Korea ends its moratorium on flight testing, it could flight test a missile with the potential to reach Europe and the United States within weeks. Other countries may acquire similar missile systems, not least through the proliferation of missile technology from North Korea. ... Missile defence is a defensive system that threatens no one. We see no reason to believe fears that the development of missile defences will be strategically destabilising. Reactions from Russia and China have been measured. Missile defence would need to be used only if a ballistic missile has actually been fired. At that point, no matter how much we emphasise our other means of addressing the threat - non-proliferation, intelligence, law enforcement, conflict prevention, diplomacy and deterrence - those means will have failed and cannot be of further help. There would be no way of preventing a devastating impact without intercepting and destroying the missile. Once the missile is in the air, it is unthinkable that anyone could not want us to be in a position to shoot it down. ... Based on the analysis and discussion that we have undertaken so far, I have therefore come to the preliminary conclusion that the answer to the US request must be yes, and that we should agree to the upgrade as proposed."

The upgrade decision, Hoon insisted, "can and should be considered as a discrete proposition. It does not commit us in any way to any deeper involvement in missile defence, although it gives us options to do so, should we decide on that at a later date."

Mr. Hoon received support from Bernard Jenkin MP, the Conservative Party's defence spokesperson, together with encouragement to take the logical next step and embrace "deeper involvement in missile defence". Jenkin asked: "What is the government's policy on the possibility of having ground-based interceptor missiles on British soil, or sea-based interceptors on British ships?"

Many MPs from the ruling Labour Party, however, expressed dismay and disappointment at the decision. Former Foreign Office Minister Tony Lloyd stressed the possible global ramifications of the issue: "Does my Right Honourable Friend agree that China's rational response to the development of missile defence would be to increase the number of its missiles and warheads - possibly including dummy missiles - to get through an American missile defence system? If that is China's rational response - I believe that it will be - does my Right Honourable Friend accept that that could have a serious knock-on effect on other regional neighbours such as India and Pakistan, and on into the Middle East? Does he also accept that that is why these systems are potentially so destabilising for the whole world?" Peter Kilfoyle, a former junior Minister of Defence, was more scornful: "This slavish devotion to American policy in this area adds further to global destabilisation..." Jeremy Corbyn, a long-time advocate of British nuclear disarmament, argued that the upgrade was "not an interim or technical decision; it is a fundamental departure from the process of disarmament of the past 30 years in the direction of rearmament, and it is being done in a very dangerous way, which can only resulting a similar response from China and other nuclear powers."

On January 17, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement was sharply critical of the move: "As has become known, the British Defence Ministry quietly gave consent for the United States to use the Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station located on its territory on Fylingdales Moor in the structure of a futuristic 'global missile defense'. That step of the British military is unlikely to bolster international security and, quite certainly, will complicate the multilateral process of the limitation and reduction of arms, including nuclear weapons. It has already been indicated, inter alia in the British Parliament, that the creation of a strategic missile defense system is bound to entail a weakening of global stability, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, and the siphoning off of resources from countering the real threats of the present day, above all international terrorism."

Related material on Acronym website:

Reports: US asks to use British spy base, BBC News Online, December 17; Missile Defence, Hansard (UK Parliament Official Record), House of Commons, Columns 696-713, January 15; Britain says 'yes' to US on missile defense, Reuters, January 15; On Britain's consent to use by United States of Fylingdales Moor radar station, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 107-17-01-2003, January 17.

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