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The period under review saw no progress in resolving the enormous challenge to the international nuclear arms control regime posed by North Korea's declared withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on January 10. North Korea - known formally as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) - claims its decision was justified by threats to its national security from the United States; by the need, in the vivid phrase of a ruling party commentary on March 29 (see below), to avoid "the miserable fate of Iraq". Although the NPT stipulates a three-month withdrawal period - producing a trigger-date in this case of April 10 - Pyongyang argues that its decision took effect almost immediately (January 11) due to the three-months-less-a-day it spent serving an earlier notice of withdrawal in 1993. As detailed below, the apparent April 10 threshold passed not with a diplomatic bang but a whimper, after US-led efforts to agree a UN Security Council statement were blocked by China and Russia. Confusion, however, continued to surround the exact status of North Korea in the NPT.
In 1993, Pyongyang moved back from the brink after the Clinton administration made clear both that it would not tolerate North Korea crossing the 'nuclear threshold' and operating unsafeguarded facilities, and that it was prepared to enter into negotiations to address the country's security and economic concerns.
The result of the US intervention was the October 1994 Framework Agreement specifying the suspension of North Korea's existing facilities - the Yongbyon graphite-moderated reactor complex, capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium - in return for the provision of replacement, proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs) and the interim supply of heavy fuel oil. For its part, Pyongyang pledged to come back into full compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. The incoming Bush administration pledged to abide by the Framework Agreement while expressing scepticism over the degree of North Korea's commitment. In October last year, following a visit to Pyongyang by Assistant Secretary of State Kelly - the highest-level contact between the two sides since the Clinton presidency - the US announced that North Korea had admitted operating a clandestine uranium-enrichment programme. Neither confirming nor denying the report, Pyongyang reacted to the disclosure, and the subsequent suspension of heavy fuel shipments, with a series of escalatory measures, including expelling IAEA inspectors from Yongbyon, culminating in the January 10 NPT-withdrawal announcement.
As the following detailed chronology and selection of comment makes clear, international diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis remain stuck between the 'rock' of North Korea's insistence on direct talks with the US and the 'hard place' of Washington's insistence on a regional and multilateral route out of the impasse. Pyongyang's basic contention - that only the US is threatening its survival, and that only US security assurances can unlock the door to a wider solution - has almost certainly been confirmed in the minds of the North Korean leadership in recent months, both by the persistent US refusal to discuss a bilateral non-aggression pact, and by the dramatic new evidence from the Middle East of the Bush administration's willingness and ability to destroy 'rogue states' incapable of mounting a massively destructive response.
February 6/10: the build-up to a meeting of the 35-member IAEA Board of Governors - called for February 12 to discuss a referral of the North Korea crisis to the UN Security Council - proves tense and uneasy. As reported in the last issue, a number of states - most vociferously, Russia - regard such a referral as premature and more likely to exacerbate than accelerate the search for a solution. The US seeks to reassure Moscow and other worried nations that a referral to the Council should not be interpreted as a prelude to the introduction of a resolution seeking to impose sanctions on North Korea - at least not in the immediate future. Rather, American officials explain, the referral would be intended to signal to Pyongyang that North Korean non-compliance with, and withdrawal from, the NPT is primarily a matter of international peace and security, not the bilateral US-DPRK relationship. As Howard Baker, the US Ambassador to Japan, notes in Tokyo on February 10: "No peaceful nation wants to see a North Korea bristling with nuclear missiles. This is not a bilateral issue between that country and the United States, but an issue between that country and the entire world." In terms of US policy, Baker strikes a conciliatory tone, though one again falling short of agreement to consider a formal non-aggression pact: "We have stated publicly that we have no intention of invading the North, and that we are prepared to have direct talks with them provided they modify their threatening behaviour. We are willing to build a new relationship with Pyongyang..." US President George W. Bush sounds a somewhat harsher tone in comments to reporters at the White House on February 7. Asked if he was "willing to use military force if you can't resolve the crisis diplomatically", Bush replies: "All options are on the table, but I believe we can solve this diplomatically. I spoke to [Chinese President] Jiang Zemin today about this very subject. And I will continue working diplomatically to convince Kim Jong-il that he will be further isolated if he continues to develop a nuclear programme. ... [W]e will continue to work...to make it very clear to Kim Jong-il that, should he expect any kind of aid and help for his people, that he must comply with the world's demand that he not develop a nuclear weapon." The President's remark to 'any aid' reportedly caused some eyebrows to be raised, as US officials are generally studious in insisting that US food aid to North Korea will not be used as leverage or a bargaining chip.
On February 6, Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, identifies the 'key formula' for unlocking the deadlock: "[W]e are dealing with a regime that is desperate to survive. And the key to that survival, they have to recognize, has got to come from solving the increasingly failed, desperate economic situation that they face. And the President said that the North Korean regime will find respect in the world and revival for its people only when it turns away from its nuclear ambitions. I think that is the key formula that has to be put in front of the North Koreans. I think it's the key formula for resolving this conflict without the kind of terrible war we all want to avoid." Wolfowitz adds that a recent decision by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to place a total of 24 B-52 and B-1 nuclear bombers on alert for possible deployment to Guam as a prudent bolstering of America's "deterrent posture", designed "to make sure that North Korea doesn't do anything adventurous or dangerous of a military kind" under cover of the Iraq crisis.
Russia's rising anxiety level is expressed most clearly by Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, who tells a security conference in Munich (February 9): "My personal judgment is that the potential threat stemming from that part of the world [the Korean Peninsular] can potentially outweigh what we are witnessing in Iraq... We want, as a minimum, for the situation to revert to the status quo as it was a few months ago... We are convinced that these problems can be resolved through political, diplomatic and economic means."
The divergence of opinion over the status of North Korea's nuclear programme is illustrated on February 9. Speaking in Seoul, US Secretary of State Colin Powell comments: "We think they may have one or two weapons. We have every reason to believe that." Addressing parliament, Prime Minister Suk-soo is less sure: "It's been said that North Korea had as much plutonium as to make one or two nuclear weapons before 1994, but it has never been confirmed that they have produced or owned any nuclear weapons". All sides agree, however, that if North Korea were to restart its Yongbyon reactor - and begin reprocessing the spent fuel rods (some 8,000) already at the plant but no longer under IAEA surveillance - sufficient plutonium for nuclear weapons could be produced in a timespan of months.
February 12: by 31 votes to 0, with Russia and Cuba abstaining, the IAEA Board of Governors votes to refer the crisis to the Security Council. The resolution declares "that the DPRK is in further non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency;" calls upon North Korea "to remedy urgently its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency;" and decides "to report...the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations; and in parallel stresses its desire for a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and its support for diplomatic means to that end". Before voting, the Board hears a report on the present depth of the breakdown in Agency-DPRK relations - and a powerful summary of the wider issues involved - from Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei:
First the context - "[T]he DPRK has been in chronic non-compliance with its safeguards agreement since 1993 when the Agency was unable to verify that the DPRK had declared to the Agency all nuclear material that is subject to safeguards. And since 1994 the DPRK has sought shelter behind the US-DPRK 'Agreed Framework,' claiming a legally untenable 'unique status' under the NPT to circumvent compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. This status claimed by the DPRK has been rejected by the Board of Governors and the General Conference, which unequivocally declared the safeguards agreement to be binding and in force."
Then the recent escalation - "The events of December of last year further aggravated this situation. Not only did the DPRK fail to respond to the repeated requests of the Secretariat and the Board for clarification of reports concerning an alleged undeclared enrichment programme, but it displayed complete disregard for its obligations under the safeguards agreement by cutting all seals and impeding the functioning of all surveillance cameras that were in place in its nuclear facilities. These actions culminated in an order for the immediate departure of Agency inspectors at a time when the DPRK announced its intention to restart its nuclear facilities and when the presence of inspectors would have been critical. These unilateral acts by the DPRK took place against a backdrop of repeated requests by the Secretariat to the Government of the DPRK to work with the Agency to maintain the required continuity of safeguards by ensuring an orderly transition from a situation where activities in the facilities were frozen to one in which the facilities became operational. In other words, while the Secretariat took note of the decision by the DPRK to restart the operation of the facilities, it also made it clear that this should only take place in full compliance with the DPRK's safeguards obligations to ensure that the facilities, and the nuclear material contained therein, are dedicated exclusively to peaceful purposes. The result of this series of events...was that the Agency was rendered unable to exercise its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement, namely to verify that the DPRK is not diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and also unable to verify that the DPRK has declared to the Agency all the nuclear material that is subject to safeguards."
Then the move to the brink - "On 6 January...the Board adopted a resolution that considered the DPRK's actions to be of great non-proliferation concern, and reiterated its call to the DPRK to comply promptly and fully with its safeguards agreement. The Board also stressed its desire for a peaceful resolution of the issue. The resolution affirmed, however, that unless the DPRK took all necessary steps to allow the Agency to implement all required safeguards measures, the DPRK would be in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Board in addition requested that I pursue urgently all efforts aimed at having the DPRK come into full compliance with its safeguards obligations, and to report again to the Board as a matter of urgency. Regrettably, since the adoption of the Board resolution, my numerous and repeated efforts to engage the DPRK have been in vain. On 10 January, the DPRK declared the resolution to be 'unjust,' and announced that, as of 11 January, it was withdrawing from the NPT. The Secretariat remains unable to verify, in accordance with the NPT safeguards agreement - which in our view remains binding and in force - that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK. Furthermore, the DPRK's actions and statements do not indicate readiness to enable the Agency to perform its safeguards responsibilities. In my view, as stated in the report, the DPRK's actions at this time constitute further non-compliance with the NPT safeguards agreement."
Then the big picture - "The current situation clearly sets a dangerous precedent. If we aim to maintain and preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, then it must be incumbent on all parties to that regime to fully meet their respective obligations, and all cases of non-compliance must be consistently addressed by the international community in a uniform fashion. Needless to say, the Secretariat remains committed to continuing to work with the DPRK and all concerned parties, with a view to securing full compliance by the DPRK with its safeguards agreement through peaceful means. I am naturally aware of the security, humanitarian and other issues relevant to the DPRK that must be addressed in addition to the question of compliance by the DPRK with its safeguards obligations. However, in my view, the key to the resolution of all outstanding issues, both multilateral and bilateral, is a clear commitment by the DPRK to comply fully and promptly with its safeguards and non-proliferation obligations. This is a matter of grave concern and with broad international implications, and the resolution of this issue is a prerequisite to the resolution of other issues. Co-operation between the DPRK and the Agency is therefore an essential ingredient of any comprehensive solution."
Russia's decision to abstain is set out in a Foreign Ministry statement: "In his statement the representative of Russia...stressed that referring this issue to the UN Security Council right now was, in the Russian side's view, a premature and counterproductive step unhelpful towards a constructive and confidential dialogue of the parties concerned with a view to a peaceful resolution of the prevailing situation around the Korean Peninsula, including the DPRK 'nuclear problem'. Russia proceeds from the necessity to ensure observance by the DPRK of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and stands up firmly for resolving the crisis around the DPRK nuclear program solely by politico-diplomatic means. We had been prepared to support the draft resolution in the case of the establishment of a direct dialogue between the United States and the DPRK in New York, it was noted. Russia will be ready to work actively in the United Nations Security Council in favor of a diplomatic settlement of this problem and participation by the DPRK in the NPT and in favor of providing guarantees for its national security."
February 13: Richard Williamson, US Deputy Ambassador to the UN, repeats the view of the Bush administration that sanctions against North Korea are "not an issue right now". North Korean UN Ambassador Pak Gil Yon retorts: "I don't want to trust his remarks, because the next day another remark will come out from the White House or the State Department." The difficulty, of course, lies in translating phrases such as Williamson's 'right now'. Or 'grace period', the term adopted by Mohamed ElBaradei in an interview with Reuters: "Many countries have made it clear that this grace period [before the Security Council takes definite action] is not forever, and if there is no movement...certainly people will start thinking of other options."
Testifying before the House International Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, applauding the IAEA resolution, spells out the full spectrum of policy issues the US would like to see addressed by North Korea as part of a comprehensive solution to underlying security tensions on the Peninsular: "North Korea in the past has said it wanted to transform its relations with its former enemies. The President is holding out an unmistakable opportunity to do so. But, the North will need to eliminate its nuclear weapons program and to change its behaviour on other important matters such as human rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the State Department list of states sponsoring terrorism, its weapons of mass destruction programs, the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology, and its conventional force disposition in order to realize that opportunity. Channels of communication remain open. For its part, the North must be willing to act in a manner that builds trust. While we will not dole out 'rewards' to convince North Korea to live up to its existing obligations, we remain prepared to pursue a comprehensive dialogue about a fundamentally different relationship with that country, once it eliminates its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner and comes into compliance with its international obligations."
Kelly also addresses the uncertain future of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Corporation (KEDO), the international consortium responsible for replacing North Korea's nuclear facilities under the terms of the Agreed Framework: "We are also consulting with our KEDO partners - South Korea, Japan and the EU - about KEDO's future, including the fate of the light water reactor project. In the meantime, the administration has asked Congress to appropriate $3.5 million in FY 03 to fund the US contribution to KEDO's administrative account, should we decide it is in our national interest to do so. No part of that funding would go to heavy fuel oil shipments, which the KEDO Executive Board suspended in November, or to light water reactor construction. But the ability to make our contribution to the administrative account will give us flexibility in working with our KEDO allies to achieve our shared non-proliferation goals. Given the fluidity and seriousness of the current situation, this flexibility is important."
Other senior US officials take pains to stress the central role of China in resolving the dispute. Secretary of State Powell tells the House International Relations Committee: "We are pressing China with this case." Undersecretary of State John Bolton remarks bluntly: "We don't see any way in which we can get the North Koreans to move without China's help." Throughout the period under review, China continues to insist that it will play its part, while urging the US and North Korea to promptly open direct talks.
The enormous pressure of the crisis on Japan is clear from remarks by Shigeru Ishiba, Director General of the Defence Agency: "Our nation will use military force as a self-defence measure if North Korea starts to resort to arms against Japan... It is too late if...[a nuclear missile] flies towards Japan... We differentiate this [act of self-defence] from the concept of a 'pre-emptive strike'..." Ishiba adds that the development of a regional ballistic missile defence system is Japan's preferred option, together with a diplomatic resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue.
February 14: North Korea's first official reaction comes in a strident government statement on February 14 - "If the IAEA wishes to fulfil its mission as a UN body it should file a suit against the illegal US nuclear threat to the Korean Peninsular, not against our exercise of legitimate rights and measures".
In a remarkable interview in Izvestia, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov vents his frustration at the course of events: "In January I made a visit to Pyongyang. ... The Koreans assured us that they had no nuclear weapons and that they, under certain conditions, were even prepared to let international inspectors into their territory, in order to prove all the suspicions of the Americans were groundless. In exchange, they asked the United States to give them security guarantees. Whereupon we returned to Moscow, and informed Washington. The US refuses to settle the matter 'amicably'. It feels this problem has to be discussed in a broader international context, and demands creating a verification mechanism. And Pyongyang is convinced that this mechanism will be created in order to bring the Koreans to their knees. Neither Pyongyang nor Washington has enough wisdom. Such a state of affairs hinders them from getting out of the crisis. The DPRK has no nuclear [weapons] programme, and the United States in the final analysis is not going to attack North Korea. So there is no theme over which to clash."
February 18: North Korea threatens to withdraw from the terms of the armistice agreed at the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. An Army spokesperson states: "At a time when the situation on the Korean Peninsular is getting extremely tense due to the US nuclear racket...[we may soon] be left with no option but to take a decisive step to abandon its commitment to implement the armistice agreement...and free itself from the binding force of all its provisions..." Similar threats have reportedly been made, without being carried out, in previous crises. A Russian Foreign Ministry statement, however, complains that the "escalating military rhetoric can hardly help solve the situation that is unfolding on the Korean Peninsular..."
February 19: the UN Security Council receives a written report on the crisis from the IAEA. After a brief meeting behind closed doors, the Council, in the words of its president, Ambassador Gunter Pleuger of Germany, decides to refer the subject to "experts for further consultation". Pleuger continues: "As it is an important and very complicated issue, the Council wanted to refer this to the expert consultations first before discussing this in the Council itself." The experts, drawn from the 15 members of the Council, "will study this report and draw their substantive and legal conclusions and make their recommendations... On that basis, the Council will take the matter up." A translation of Pleuger's remarks is provided anonymously by a Council diplomat, quoted by Reuters: "We'll say we've received the ball and are studying the ball and will continue to study the ball and that we'll pass the ball to experts because we've never seen a ball like this before..." Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Alexander Yakovenko (February 20) has a different interpretation, arguing that the referral to the experts' group shows "the prevailing disposition of the Security Council members to consider the 'North Korean dossier' in a non-confrontational manner." Yakovenko adds: "Exerting sanctions pressure or taking any other restrictive measures against the DOPRK was not at issue. We are convinced that this question in the present circumstances should not be on the agenda of the UN Security Council." China's UN Ambassador, Wang Yingfan, agrees (February 19) that "the Security Council should be very cautious on what to do... If the Council takes any action that would complicate [matters], then that will not serve the interests of so many concerned nations..." Wang adds that China is "working very hard on the two parties... We wish to see the parties meet". US Deputy Ambassador James Cunningham (February 19) says his government is looking forward "to working with our colleagues on the Council on finding a way to achieve a verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear programme... This kind of violation is something that we should all be concerned about."
February 24/25: on February 24, North Korea fires a short-range, ground-to-sea anti-ship missile into the sea between Japan and the Korean peninsular. The test-flight comes hours before the inauguration of the new South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (February 25), and takes place during the summit of heads of state and government of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Kuala Lumpur. In Washington, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer (February 25) describes the missile test as "North Korea's way of saying 'please pay me'". Fleischer adds: "North Korea has a history of engaging in rather bizarre actions and then expecting the world to pay them or negotiate with them or give them something in exchange for them stopping doing what they shouldn't have done in the first place." Incoming President Roh makes no reference to the incident during his inauguration speech. Referring to options for resolving the crisis, Roh argues that it is fundamentally "up to Pyongyang whether to go ahead and obtain nuclear weapons or to get guarantees for the security of its regime and international economic support." Outgoing President Kim Dae-jung tells the nation (February 24): "More than anything, dialogue between the North Korea and the United States is the important key to a solution..."
The senior North Korean official attending the NAM summit, Kim Yong Nam, tells delegates from the 116-state organisation that his government's "nuclear activities at this stage" will be "confined only to peaceful purposes". The North Korean delegation reportedly succeeds in persuading the summit to drop a reference in the February 25 Final Declaration calling on North Korea to reverse its decision to withdraw from the NPT. The relevant section (paragraph 83) reads: "The heads of state or government of the states parties to the NPT noted the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the NPT. They expressed the view that the parties directly concerned resolve, through dialogue and negotiations, all issues related to the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT as an expression of their goodwill."
February 26: a US official tells reporters that "North Korea started its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon" during the preceding 24 hours. The official continues: "This is certainly less provocative than starting up the reprocessing facility, but it is significant nonetheless..." US National Security Council spokesperson Sean McCormack comments: "I think this is another example of the regime of North Korea taking escalatory actions in order to gain concessions. We seek a peaceful diplomatic solution, but all options remain on the table." State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher (February 28) argues that "the only reason to operate a reactor like this is to produce spent fuel that can then be turned into plutonium for weapons." North Korea's reprocessing facility is housed alongside the reactor at Yongbyon.
A South Korean Foreign Ministry statement (February 27) notes: "Our government voices deep worry and regret at the North Korean reactivation of the five-megawatt reactor, which is not only unhelpful to Korean Peninsular peace and stability but also violates the nuclear non-proliferation efforts of the international community". IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming (February 27) stated: "We have observed through satellite imagery indications [of resumed activity] at the reactor. However, without the presence of inspectors, the IAEA is not in a position to verify whether North Korea has restarted its reactor. If this is true, the IAEA deplores the operation of North Korea's nuclear facilities without the presence of safeguards inspectors. ... Restarting this now-unsafeguarded nuclear facility will further demonstrate the DPRK's disregard for its nuclear non-proliferation commitments."
March 2: in the first incident of its kind since 1969, four North Korean fighter jets briefly intercept an unarmed, unescorted US reconnaissance aircraft (a RC-135S Cobra Ball) in international airspace over the Sea of Japan. The incident is vigorously denounced by US officials. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer warns: "As North Korea continues to push the envelope, they also continue to push the willingness and the tolerance of regional relations... Reckless actions like the actions North Korea took in intercepting an American aircraft only drive greater wedges between these regional nations and North Korea." Reconnaissance flights resume on March 13.
March 4: President Bush tells reporters that if US efforts to dismantle the North Korean nuclear programme "don't work diplomatically, they'll have to work militarily..." Bush stressed, however, that the "military option is our last choice... I believe we can deal with this diplomatically." Presumably responding in part to the President's remarks, a Russian Foreign Ministry (March 6) notes "with concern the statements that have been issued recently by official American representatives that the United States doesn't exclude military means of solving the so-called North Korean 'nuclear problem'... [T]here is no alternative to the peaceful settlement of problems on the Korean Peninsular."
March 5: US Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle releases a report on the North Korea crisis by the National Security Advisory Group, formed earlier this year to advise the Democratic leadership in Congress. The group includes three key figures from the Clinton administration, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Defense Secretary William Perry and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. In a memorandum entitled 'A Rapidly Unfolding Crisis', the group argues that "North Korea's move to unfreeze its plutonium program at Yongbyon presents profound dangers to US security. It poses the specter of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups and rogue nations. It is a massive failure for US counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism policies. This crisis will unfold within the next few months. It can only be forestalled by US leadership."
In terms of prioritising critical issues, the report notes that the spent "fuel rods apparently being moved at Yongbyon contain 5-6 nuclear weapons' worth of weapons-grade plutonium. They are now being put out of reach of both IAEA inspectors and the possibility of US airstrikes - for the first time since the Agreed Framework of 1994. North Korea is also restarting its reactor, allowing it to produce plutonium for several more bombs within a year. The plutonium program is the most urgent problem; the uranium enrichment program that North Korea recently admitted to conducting in violation of several international agreements will not result in significant quantities of fissile material for years." In terms of policy recommendations, the panel urges the Bush administration to grasp the nettle and "propose direct US talks with North Korea...in parallel with efforts at the United Nations to raise international concern over North Korea's nuclear moves". The memorandum continues: "[I]ssues at the very heart of American security cannot simply be outsourced to China, Russia, or the United Nations. North Korea itself maintains that only the United States, as the leading power in the region and the world, can address its security concerns, and that these concerns are the source of its nuclear program. Our allies and friends in the region also urge direct talks." As part of such talks, the administration should "articulate a red line": "The United States should make it clear to North Korea that it cannot tolerate North Korean progression to reprocessing or any other steps to obtain fissile material for nuclear weapons, and that we are prepared to take all measures of coercion, including military force, to prevent this threat to US security." In return for a North Korean commitment to "the complete and verifiable elimination of its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs", the US should "pledge" that it will "not seek to eliminate the North Korean regime by force".
Praising the report and embracing its recommendations, Senator Daschle tells reporters: "For the past several months, we have watched North Korea take one dangerous step after another. Each step brings North Korea closer to possessing scores of nuclear weapons. Each step brings the region closer to a nuclear arms race. And each step brings us closer to a world where terrorist groups like Al Qaeda get their hands on nuclear weapons. And while Democrats and Republicans stand united in our opposition to North Korea's provocative acts, I and many of my colleagues have argued this is not enough. Given the magnitude of the stakes, we have repeatedly urged the administration to get off the sidelines and face up to this developing crisis."
US media reports suggest the White House may have accepted the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea. The Los Angeles Times quotes a Senate staff member as claiming, on the basis of administration briefings on Capitol Hill, that senior officials are "preparing people up here for a de facto, if not declared, North Korean nuclear state and saying that this is something we can deal with through isolation, sanctions, deterrence and national missile defense". The same report, however, quoted a senior administration official as exclaiming: "Resigned? Throwing up our hands? Working out how to accept them as a nuclear power? No, that's not what we're doing..." The following day, Secretary of State Powell tells members of Congress: "I read that report and I don't know of any basis for the report that we have decided to live with a nuclearised North Korea..."
March 6: the long-range US bombers placed on deployment alert in February (see above) arrive in Guam. Lt. Kim Melchor, a Defense Department spokesperson at Andersen Air Force base in Guam, assures reporters: "These moves are not aggressive in nature. It's a prudent measure to bolster our defence posture".
March 9: the Asahi newspaper in Japan reports that US and North Korean diplomats held unofficial talks at the North Korean Embassy in Berlin on February 20-21. According to the report, the US side requested the prompt readmission of IAEA inspectors into North Korea to investigate both the situation at Yongbyon and the status of the purported uranium-enrichment programme supposedly by Pyongyang last October. The North Korean diplomats apparently rejected the demand, proposing instead a visit by US experts.
Officially, the US again insists direct talks with North Korea would be inappropriate and premature. Secretary of State Powell tells CNN: "I think eventually we will be talking to North Korea, but we're not going to simply fall into what I believe is bad practice of saying the only way you can talk to us is directly, when it affects other nations in the region". National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice tells NBC that, while the administration isn't "afraid" of talking to Pyongyang, "we need to do so in a way that will bring maximum pressure on North Korea to actually, this time, not just freeze its weapons of mass destruction, but begin to dismantle them".
March 10: North Korea fires another short-range ground-to-sea anti-ship missile, reportedly similar to the weapon tested on February 24. As with that earlier test flight, the missile is launched towards, but falls short of, the Sea of Japan. Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hatsuhisa Takashima observes: "[W]e understand it is not a ballistic missile and not considered a direct threat to Japan... We do not think that this is very favourable in light of the rather unstable situation created by North Korea's nuclear development."
Note: the Reuters news agency reported on March 31 that China cut off oil supplies to North Korea for three days after the March 10 missile test in order to signal its unhappiness at the consistently provocative stance of the Pyongyang leadership. According to an unnamed 'western diplomat', "the tough message was: get straight". Officially, the diplomat added, China described the pipeline interruption as "unintentional". In terms of the broader and more conventional Chinese approach, the diplomat remarked: "The Chinese are trying hard, but it's not working. The Chinese are tremendously worried... This is not exactly headed in the direction of negotiation... North Korea doesn't believe the United States will negotiate in good faith. It's about regime survival."
March 17: the IAEA Director General provides a gloomy update to the Agency's Board of Directors. "I transmitted," ElBaradei recalls, the Board's February 12 resolution "to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. I also sent letters to the Presidents of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly to inform both organs of the Board's resolution. Since that time, my letter to the DPRK has elicited no response, and no positive developments have been reported as a result of the various diplomatic initiatives that have taken place. Regrettably, recent reports indicate that the DPRK has restarted its 5 MW reactor at Nyongbyong. Clearly, the operation of this facility without the appropriate safeguards is in violation of the DPRK's safeguards agreement. At this stage, the Agency cannot provide any assurance about the DPRK's nuclear activities, and we are unable to verify that its nuclear material has not been diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I continue to urge all parties to the NPT and in particular the parties directly concerned to accelerate their efforts to bring the DPRK into full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations."
March 21: as Operation Iraqi Freedom gets under way, the Russian Foreign Ministry warns of a negative impact on the Korean crisis: "The flouting of international law in the Persian Gulf, the turning from a multilateral political to a unilateral military scenario, can [only] complicate the [ongoing efforts at] actively advancing a diplomatic resolution of the Korean problem... The continuing US military attack on Iraq...can have the most serious consequences for the prospects of resolving regional crises around the world, including the rapidly-complicating situation around the Korean Peninsular..." A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson comments: "The violation of Iraq's sovereignty already started with demanding disarmament by inspection, and gradually led to war... The high-handed action of the US against Iraq, and the war preparations now being made by the US and its followers in the Korean Peninsular, compel [North Korea] to do all it can to defend itself..."
March 22: North Korea cancels upcoming talks with South Korea on economic and maritime issues due, according to a statement from senior official Pak Chang-Ryon, to a heightened state of military alert in the South "under the pretext of the Iraqi war". State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher comments: "We have always supported North-South dialogue. ... It's a good channel to make clear to the North Koreans that they must end their nuclear arms programme. So we find the North's cancellation...regrettable".
Speaking in Beijing after a visit to North Korea as the Special Envoy of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Maurice Strong tells reporters that the danger of war is real, but the logic of a peaceful solution is stronger: "There is no need for war and yet war could occur if the parties cannot find a way of resolving the differences across the table diplomatically. I know they [North Korea and the US] wish to do this. It is simply the method of doing it that now divides them. ... The message I get is that the DPRK wants very much a peaceful resolution, but at the same time it must retain its sovereignty... Fear I do not believe is in their [the North Koreans'] vocabulary. Concern, yes. There is a real desire to seek [a] peaceful settlement, but they are preparing for war if necessary. ... It should not be surprising if they continue these actions which are often interpreted as provocative, and do indeed have a provocative element, but the purposes as they describe them are simply to continue their process of preparation for conflict should conflict arise..." From Strong's perspective, direct US-DPRK talks were urgently required: "I can only say that the longer the delay, the greater the risk of escalation, the greater the risk of deepening the differences and the hostility and the hardening of attitudes..."
Meeting in Borneo, the Foreign Ministers of the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) decide to send a senior Cambodian official to Pyongyang to explore options for a diplomatic breakthrough. According to ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong: "The Cambodians will go to North Korea now... Once the war [in Iraq] is over, it will be impossible for North Korea to climb down."
March 25: North Korea breaks off its routine military contact with the United Nations Command monitoring the armistice on the Peninsular. The North sends a message to the Command, arguing it "is meaningless to sit together with the US forces' side to discuss any issue as long as it remains arrogant". (Note: the liaison meetings between US and DPRK military officials, held under the auspices of the UN Command, are held in the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom.)
March 28: Japan launches its first two spy satellites. The satellites are designed, as officials openly acknowledge, to provide surveillance of North Korea. A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement, claiming that the launches are evidence of Tokyo's intent to deploy ballistic missiles, remarks that "Japan will be held wholly responsible for sparking a new arms race in Northeast Asia... The DPRK has already warned Japan that the launch would be a hostile act against the DPRK and a serious threat to it". In 1998, North Korea fired a ballistic missile over Japanese territory. Since that time, Pyongyang has observed a moratorium on such tests.
In a speech to the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan remarks: "In the early 1970s, the Nixon government took a bold diplomatic initiative with China... The same approach could be applied to North Korea." A few hours later, after meeting with Yoon, US Secretary of State Powell politely distanced himself from the proposal: "[T]he kind of ideas and options the minister mentioned in his speech this morning are on the table, it seems to me - once we deal with the issue of nuclear proliferation, proliferation of missiles, and some of the other activities that are ongoing in North Korea..." Returning to Seoul, Yoon tells reporters (March 29): "I said we needed to be more positive and flexible to induce North Korea to talks... We offered item-by-item steps we can take toward multilateral talks, and the US side said they will study them."
March 29: a commentary in the main ruling party newspaper Rodong Sinmun claims that the "DPRK would have already met the same miserable fate as Iraq had it comprised its revolutionary principles and accepted the demand raised by the imperialists and their followers for 'nuclear inspection' and disarmament". The commentary continues: "The DPRK will increase its self-defensive capability and fully demonstrate its might under the uplifted banner of the Army-based policy... No one should expect the DPRK to make any slightest concession or compromise. Those who stage sabre-rattling against it had better stop..."
April 1: confusion surrounds a claim by Japan that it had detected another North Korean test flight of a short-range ground-to-sea anti-ship missile. The announcement, presumably based in data from the spy satellites launched on March 28, is quickly questioned by South Korean officials. Later in the day, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yasuo Fukuda, tells reporters: "We have information about the missile, but we have no confirmation".
April 2: the President of the UN Security Council, Ambassador Adolfo Aguilar Zinser of Mexico, announces that the Council will meet to discuss the crisis on April 9, the day before Pyongyang's three-month NPT-withdrawal period expires. Zinser declines to elaborate on his expectations for the meeting.
April 6: the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement suggesting a significant hardening of its position in advance of the Security Council meeting, and in the wake of the invasion of Iraq. Suggesting for the first time that the pursuit of binding security guarantees from Washington may no longer be an attainable objective, the statement reads:
"The United States forced the UN Security Council to call a meeting on April 9 to discuss the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT. As pointed out in the January 10 statement of the DPRK government, its withdrawal from the NPT has already taken effect. The US and some countries insist on a "legal argument" that the DPRK's withdrawal takes effect after April 10... [S[uch assertions are meaningless. ... The projected discussion of the DPRK's issue at the UNSC meeting in spite of this is undisguised pressure on the DPRK and a grave provocative act intended to scuttle all its efforts for dialogue and aggravate the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The UNSC's handling of the nuclear issue on the peninsula itself is precisely a prelude to war. The UNSC's discussion of the Iraqi issue was misused by the US as an excuse for war. The US intends to force the DPRK to disarm itself. The Iraqi war shows that to allow disarming through inspection does not help avert a war but rather sparks it. Neither international public opinion nor the UN Charter could prevent the US from mounting an attack on Iraq. This suggests that even the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the US would not help avert a war. Only the physical deterrent force, tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the country and the nation. This is a lesson drawn from the Iraqi war. The US is seriously mistaken if it thinks that the DPRK will accept the demand for disarming while watching one of the three countries the US listed as part of an 'axis of evil' already subject to the barbarous military attack. The DPRK will not recognize any resolution to be adopted at the UNSC meeting to be called by the US, which launched the war defying the UN. If the UNSC is abused for [the purpose of advancing] US hostile policy to stifle the DPRK, it [the DPRK] will...have no other option but to beef up the deterrent force for war by mobilizing all the potentials."
April 9: on the eve of North Korea's apparent withdrawal from the NPT, the Security Council, meets in private to discuss the crisis. Council President Zinser tells reporters that all members "expressed their concern and the Council will continue to follow up on this matter." A US-led push for a public statement criticising North Korea was reportedly blocked at a meeting of the P-5 on April 8, principally at the insistence of China, with strong backing from Moscow. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao tells reporters in Beijing (April 8): "We think intervention by the UN Security Council now cannot help resolve the North Korean nuclear issue". In New York, Russia's UN Ambassador Sergei Lavrov (April 8) agrees: "I think it's a bad idea to condemn... We are convinced that the only way you can solve North Koran peninsular problems is through direct dialogue between the United States and North Korea."
Speaking after the April 9 meeting, US Ambassador John Negroponte stresses Washington's commitment to "a peaceful resolution so that North Korea can come into compliance with its international obligations." Negroponte adds: "it's not just a matter of getting the North to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions. North Korea must also accept a reliable verification regime." In terms of future Council action, the Ambassador comments: "We don't rule out further consultations...although we have not set any particular timetable or date for further consultations amongst us. ... We haven't taken any option off the table. But at this stage of diplomatic contacts that have been ongoing in the region, we viewed this as an acceptable outcome of this particular consultation." Secretary-General Annan observes: "I think the next step really is to get the parties talking and to find a format that will be acceptable to both parties and bring them to the table".
April 10: Japan makes clear it does not recognize North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda tells reporters: "We do not think there is an international consensus that [the DPRK] withdrew... There is no change to our stance that we will continue to ask [the DPRK] to abandon all nuclear development programmes, to halt the operation of nuclear facilities, and to strictly observe the NPT..." Taku Yamasaki, Secretary-General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and senior aide to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, comments: "If North Korea asserts that it has withdrawn, that would reflect its isolation from the international community. I hope they will not take such a stance..." An IAEA official, speaking anonymously, tells Reuters: "The only body that can determine for certain is the NPT members themselves, and they only meet once every five years." The reference is to the treaty's quinquennial Review Conferences. Although the next such conference will not be held until 2005, the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) preparing the meeting, and reviewing the treaty's operation, is set to meet at the end of April this year.
Note: on April 12, an unnamed DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesperson, quoted by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang, observes that, "if the US is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue, the DPRK will not stick to any particular dialogue format". See the next issue, and the Disarmament Documentation section of our website, for more details and reaction.
US President George W. Bush, March 6: "We've tried bilateral negotiations. The United States honoured its side of the agreement, North Korea didn't. ... This is a regional issue...because there's a lot of countries that have got a direct stake in whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon... [Those nations] must stand up to their responsibility, along with the United States, to convince Kim Jong-il that the development of a nuclear arsenal is not in his nation's interests..."
Secretary of State Colin Powell, March 27: "We have tried to make it clear to them that we have no invasion plans for North Korea... [We] recognize that the authorities in Pyongyang are uneasy. They believe that we mean them no good."
Secretary Powell, February 25: "We believe the sensible way is to get the other interested parties involved. Merely because North Korea keeps saying 'no' [to multilateral talks] doesn't mean that suddenly the United States has to say 'yes' [to bilateral talks]. ... We're constantly being accused of being unilateral, now we're accused of being multilateral, but we believe we have a correct position. This isn't the early nineties... I'm not too happy with the results that came out of the Agreed Framework some 8 years later as a result of direct talks between us and the DPRK."
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 12: "In the end...North Korea will have to make a choice. Over the past ten years, Pyongyang has been in pursuit of two mutually exclusive goals. The first is nuclear weapons. The second is redefining its place in the world community - and, incidentally its access to international largesse - by broadening its diplomatic and foreign economic relations. The DPRK needs to accept that it cannot do both. Unfortunately, North Korea's choice to date has been to proceed with nuclear weapons development and to escalate international tensions, while demanding commitments and dialogue. North Korean provocations are disturbing, but they cannot be permitted to yield gains to North Korea. The international community must, and indeed is, impressing on the North that it is in its own best interest to end its nuclear arms program. The North must understand that to choose the path of nuclear weapons will only guarantee further isolation and eventual decline, if not self-generated disaster."
Richard Lugar, Republican Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 12: "Multilateral diplomacy is a key element to any long-term reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsular. But it is vital that the United States be open to bilateral diplomatic opportunities that could be useful in reversing North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and in promoting stability."
North Korean UN Ambassador Pak Gil Yon, February 13: "We are strongly opposed to...[any] kind of multilateral talks, since this is just designed to avoid any responsibility of the US from its international commitments. ... [If the US is not going to attack us,] what is the reason why they are not ready to negotiate [a non-aggression pact]? Negotiation does not mean...any concession, any surrender."
South Korean President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, February 19: "I oppose even considering an armed attack on North Korea [nuclear facilities] at this stage because that can provoke war... We have never had a difference of opinion with the United States on an international level. But we have one now on how we plan to counter North Korea..."
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, March 6: "China has all along adopted an open policy conducive to a peaceful solution. The main issue is for the two main interlocutors - the United States and North Korea - to be flexible. Their attitudes will determine the outcome of the situation."
Shigeru Ishiba, Director General of Japan's Defence Agency, March 29: "The Japanese government said in Parliament in 1958 that when there is no other means, it is not the intention of the constitution [for Japan] to just sit and wait to die... While we don't have ballistic missiles, that response from the government was given [and still stands]... We entrust the necessary attack capabilities to the United States, and there is no change in that policy. We have to inspect, however, how correct that policy is..."
Georgy Mamedov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, March 12: "Russia is definitely against preventive strikes on North Korea and against any military nuclear programmes on the Korean Peninsular... The country has the possibility to create nuclear weapons, but no evidence, except hints, rumours and indirect information, exists that North Korea has such weapons already..."
Alexander Losyukov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, April 1: "Unfortunately, the Iraqi situation is nudging North Korea toward the enhancement of its won defence capabilities... North Korea earlier said that if it feels a threat it would take appropriate steps, possibly including the creation of a certain weapon for its own defence..."
Reports: Transcript - US bomber alert a 'deterrent' against North Korea, Washington File, February 7; Transcript - Bush again urges UN Security Council to prove its relevance, Washington File, February 7; Russia - N. Korea could be bigger threat than Iraq, Reuters, February 9; Text - still room for diplomacy with North Korea, Amb. Baker says, Washington File, February 10; S. Korea says no proof of N. Korea atomic arms, Reuters, February 10; UN nuclear chief says agency committed to peaceful end to North Korea standoff, Associated Press, February 12; IAEA Board of Governors adopts resolution on safeguards in North Korea, IAEA Media Advisory 2003/48, February 12; Introductory statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, February 12, 2003, IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org; In relation to adoption of IAEA Board of Governors resolution on DPRK 'nuclear problem', Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 345-12-02-2003, February 12; North Korea nuclear issue sent to UN Security Council, Washington File, February 12; Text - US would still welcome a new relationship to North Korea, Washington File, February 12; US in no rush to slap sanctions on N. Korea, Reuters, February 13; US pressures China on N. Korea crisis, Associated Press, February 13; Powell says North Korea rejects US proposal for regional talks on its nuclear weapons programs, Associated Press, February 13; Japan says would strike N. Korea if attack imminent, Reuters, February 13; US won't call for UN sanctions against North Korea over its nuclear program now, Associated Press, February 13; N. Korea rejects IAEA decision on nuclear crisis, Reuters, February 14; Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov interview with the newspaper Izvestia, published under the heading 'Neither Pyongyang nor Washington has enough wisdom', February 14, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; North Korea says 'victory is ours' in nuclear dispute as South warns of arms race, Associated Press, February 17; N. Korea threatens to scrap truce - South not alarmed, Reuters, February 18; North Korea threatens to withdraw from Korean war armistice, Associated Press, February 18; Russian Foreign Ministry calls again for dialogue over North Korean crisis, Associated Press, February 18; UN Security Council takes up North Korea nuclear issue, Washington File, February 19; N. Korea and US trade tough talk on nuclear crisis, Reuters, February 19; UN Security Council puts off action on N. Korea, Reuters, February 19; UN experts to study nuclear dispute, Associated Press, February 19; Japan studied, but ruled out, developing nuclear weapons in 1995 defense study, Associated Press, February 19; Security Council refers North Korea nuclear dispute to experts from 15 Council nations, Associated Press, February 19; N. Korea says US avoiding a solution to tension, Reuters, February 19; Remarks by Alexander Yakovenko, official spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 20, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; N. Korea wants non-aligned movement to blame United States for nuclear crisis, official says, Associated Press, February 20; Non-aligned nations urging North Korea to respect nuke pact, Associated Press, February 21; N. Korea, US line up allies on nuclear issue, Reuters, February 21; US faces growing pressure to talk to North Korea, Reuters, February 24; North Korea resists calls from non-aligned nations to return to key nuclear treaty, Associated Press, February 24; Final declaration of the XIII Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Kuala Lumpur, February 24-25, 2003', XIII NAM Summit website, http://www.namkl.org.my; N. Korean missile upstages Seoul inauguration, Reuters, February 25; North Korea says it has no intentions to develop nuclear weapons - China urges restraint, Associated Press, February 25; Restraint urged as North Korea says it has no intentions to develop nuclear weapons, Associated Press, February 25; Transcript - Powell cites Asian support for US proposal on N. Korea, Washington File, February 26; W. House - N. Korea isolates itself with nuclear steps, Reuters, February 26; US says N. Korea restarted nuclear reactor, Reuters, February 26; UN watchdog agency 'deplores' North Korea's reported restart of nuclear reactor, Associated Press, February 27; IAEA deplores alleged restart of nuclear facility in DPR of Korea, UN News Service, February 27; Reactor started in North Korea, US concludes, New York Times, February 27; Pyongyang restarts nuclear reactor, Global Security Newswire, February 27; Starting North Korea reactor sends message, but the real test is the processing, Associated Press, February 28; N. Korea stokes fears on missiles, nuclear plant, Reuters, February 28; Bush says North Korea must be convinced that it is wrong to be threatening US with nuclear program, Associated Press, March 4; White House Report - N. Korea, Washington File, March 4; Text - expert panel urges US to begin direct talks with N. Korea, Washington File, March 5; Foes giving in to N. Korea's nuclear aims, Washington Post, March 5; White House may accept North Korean nukes, Global Security Newswire, March 5; Chinese foreign minister - North Korea, US must talk directly, Associated Press, March 6; Text - Sen. Lugar backs resumption of bilateral talks with N. Korea, Washington File, March 6; US long-range bombers arrive in Guam, Associated Press, March 6; Former officials urge direct talks with N. Korea, Reuters, March 6; Democrats fault White House efforts on North Korea, Washington Post, March 6; Bush eyes Korea diplomacy, S. Korea condemns North, Reuters, March 7; North Korea says Bush's 'military option' remark reveals his plans for strike on nuclear facility, Associated Press, March 7; North Korea accuses Bush of planning pre-emptive strike, South urges Washington not to withdraw troops, Associated Press, March 7; N. Korea fires surface-to-ship missile, Reuters, March 9; Paper - US, N. Korea held talks in February, Associated Press, March 9; Report - US demanded North Korea switch off Yongbyon nuclear plant in unofficial Berlin meeting, Associated Press, March 9; Powell, Rice reject direct N. Korea talks, Associated Press, March 9; North Korea test-fires missile, says interception of US plane was defensive manoeuvre, Associated Press, March 10; N. Korea test-fires short-range missile, Associated Press, March 10; US officials nix direct N. Korea talks, Associated Press, March 10; Bush talks N. Korea diplomacy with Japan, China, Reuters, March 10; North Korea warns of a 'catastrophic' situation, Associated Press, March 11; Russia resumes warnings against threatening North Korea, Associated Press, March 12; S. Korea urges US on N. Korea dispute, Associated Press, March 12; Text - North Korea pursuing mutually exclusive goals, Kelly says, Washington File, March 12; United States could end up pushing for change of government, as well as nuclear disarmament, in North Korea, Associated Press, March 12; US military renews N. Korea flights, Associated Press, March 13; Text - Lugar says don't rule out bilateral talks with North Korea, Washington File, March 13; Introductory statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, March 17, 2003, IAEA website; N. Korea criticizes US-led war on Iraq, Associated Press, March 21; Russia warns US attack on Iraq could complicate North Korean nuclear standoff, Associated Press, March 21; UN envoy says US-Korea war possible, but Pyongyang wants to avoid it, Agence France Presse, March 22; Cambodia to lead mission to N. Korea, official says, Reuters, March 22; US regrets North Korean cancellation of North Korea-South Korea talks, Agence France Presse, March 24; North Korea calls off UN meeting, Associated Press, March 25; Powell - US working with North Korea's neighbors to find peaceful solution to crisis, Associated Press, March 27; Japan launches first spy satellites, Associated Press, March 28; North Korea says Japan satellite launch could trigger arms race, Associated Press, March 28; Powell rejects South Korean proposal, Associated Press, March 28; US rebuffs South Korean call for Nixon-style engagement, Agence France Presse, March 28; South Korea asks US to be more flexible on North Korea - Pyongyang rules out any compromise, Associated Press, March 29; Drawing lessons from Iraq war, North Korea vows to make no concessions, Agence France Presse, March 29; N. Korea vows no nuclear concessions, cites Iraq, Reuters, March 29; Pre-emptive strike on N. Korea won't be unconstitutional - Japan defense chief, Agence France Presse, March 29; S. Korea send envoy to Russia, China on atomic row, Reuters, March 30; China appears to be trying to rein in North Korea, Reuters, March 31; US to keep stealth fighters in South Korea as deterrent - North Korea reported to test-fire missile, Associated Press, April 1; Russia - Iraqi war likely to encourage North Korea to further develop its nuclear program, Associated Press, April 1; Security Council to remain 'deeply involved' with Iraq in April, President says, UN News Service, April 2; Statement of FM spokesman blasts UNSC's discussion of Korean nuclear issue, Korean Central News Agency (http://www.kcna.co.jp), April 6; Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov, interview with ITAR-TASS news agency on the North Korean problem, April 8, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; China blocks UN statement condemning N. Korea, Washington Post, April 9; US tells Iran, Syria, N. Korea 'learn from Iraq', Reuters, April 9; US wants peaceful solution for North Korean nuclear issue, Washington File, April 9; US reassures North Korea on nuclear arms crisis, Reuters, April 9; Security Council holds talks on DPR of Korea nuclear issue, UN News Service, April 9; UN split over North Korea, BBC News Online, April 9; Russia sees Iraq link to N. Korea crisis, Reuters, April 10; Japan considers N. Korea still party to Non-Proliferation Treaty, Agence France Press, April 10; Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on peaceful solution to nuclear issue, KCNA, April 12.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.