News Review Special Edition

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International Developments, February 1 - April 1, 2003

US Insists Iran Poses Gathering Nuclear Proliferation Threat

As reported in the last issue, on February 9 the President of Iran, Mohamed Khatami, announced on state television that uranium mining had begun in the central Savand region. The President declared: "Iran has discovered reserves and extracted uranium. We are determined to use nuclear technology for civilian purposes... If we need to produce electricity from our nuclear power plants, we need to complete the circle from discovering uranium to managing remaining spent fuel. The government is determined to complete that circle." The development followed US allegations in mid-December (see last issue) that Iran was secretly building two facilities designed to produce weapons-grade fissile materials: a suspected uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, and a heavy-water facility near the town of Arak.

The US has also long expressed unhappiness about Russia's intent to fulfil its contract with Iran to construct a light-water nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Although Tehran and Moscow reached an agreement last September stipulating the return of all spent nuclear fuel at Bushehr to Russia, the official acknowledgement by Iran of its determination to operate a full nuclear fuel cycle was bound to raise US concerns to a new pitch.

On February 10, State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher told reporters: "Iran's admission that it's been mining uranium when Russia has agreed to provide all the uranium fuel for the lifetime of the Bushehr [reactor] raises serious questions about Iran's supposedly peaceful nuclear programme." Boucher added that international response to the news had to be swift and concerted: "President Khatami's admission of Iranian uranium mining only two weeks before the February 25 visit to Iran of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General, Dr. ElBaradei, and the [team of] IAEA team of experts. ... We urge Iran to make good on its claim of transparency by accepting and fully implementing the IAEA's safeguard-strengthening Additional Protocol. We expect the IAEA will vigorously investigate Iran's nuclear programme, particularly in light of the two previously secret nuclear-related facilities that came to light recently... Some of the press suggested that President Khatami has claimed that Iran will reprocess spent fuel, presumably from the Bushehr reactor. If accurate, that would presumably contradict Iran's agreement with Russia to return all of the spent fuel to Russia. That would cause us further concern as it would lay bare Iran's ambitious desire to develop the capability to produce weapons-useable fissile material under its own control." Asked to comment on whether the motivation for mining the uranium might simply be economic, Boucher replied that mining "is not necessarily cheaper and it puts a goodly part of the nuclear fuel cycle outside of the control of whoever's providing the reactor and the fuel. ... If you have Iran pursuing a complete nuclear fuel cycle, that would only make sense in the context of a weapons programme." In a written statement on February 11, the State Department insisted bluntly: "Iran uses Bushehr as a cover and a pretext for obtaining sensitive technologies to develop its nuclear weapons program."

On February 10, Gholamreza Aqazadeh, Director of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, confirmed that the government did have plans to open a uranium-enrichment plant in Kashan. According to Aqazadeh, the uranium ore would be transferred from a Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Isfahan. While the UCF plant is nearing entry into service, Aqazadeh added, "we still have a long way to go" before the enrichment facility could "come onstream".

Also on February 10, IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming stressed that President Khatami's February 9 announcement had not caught the Agency unawares: "This comes as no surprise to us as we have been aware of this uranium exploration effort for several years now. In fact, a senior IAEA official visited this mine in 1992. And the Iranians announced to us officially in September their plans to develop an ambitious nuclear power programme that would include the entire nuclear fuel cycle."

The IAEA team, led by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, arrived in Iran on February 21 and promptly conducted the Agency's first ever inspection of the Natanz site. ElBaradei told reporters: "New facilities have been set up in Iran and I need to visit them to have a clear understanding of Iran's nuclear programme in order to determine the fields the IAEA can help Iran in". The following day, the Director General told a press conference in Tehran: "The Iranian government has agreed to provide us, as of now, with early design information on any of its facilities... It is a sign of greater transparency from Iran regarding its nuclear programs..."

The IAEA visit failed, however, to secure an Iranian commitment to signing the Additional Protocol. On March 11, US National Security Council spokesperson Sean McCormack repeated Washington's "call upon them to sign up to the [protocol]...which would subject their sites to more rigorous accountability and inspections." Speaking on CNN on March 9, Secretary of State Colin Powell came near to suggesting that, without such a bolstering of safeguards, IAEA supervision was virtually worthless: "Here we suddenly discover that Iran is much further along, with a far more robust nuclear weapons development programme than anyone said it had... It shows you how a determined nation that has the intent to develop nuclear weapons can keep that development process secret from inspectors and outsiders, if they really are determined to do it."

Asked to amplify Powell's remarks, State Department spokesperson Boucher noted (March 10): "I would say there is no economic justification for a state that is so rich in oil and gas, like Iran, to build these hugely expensive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Iran flares off more gas every year than they would ever get from these reactors that they're talking about building." Boucher added: "States with peaceful nuclear energy programmes have nothing to hide... Iran has done its best to hide these other nuclear fuel cycle activities. Iran has been the only state that did not accept the IAEA's call in 1992 for states to declare new nuclear facilities before construction. If it has now agreed to do so, that would only be because of intense pressure. Iran has also refused for several years to sign what's called the Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and this is a document that most countries in the world have signed that greatly increases the IAEA's insight into its nuclear activities."

The IAEA would dearly love Boucher's description of the support enjoyed by the Additional Protocol to be nearer the mark than it actually is. Addressing the Agency's Board of Governors in Vienna on March 17, Director General ElBaradei lamented the fact that "additional protocols have entered into force for only 29 states," a figure which he unsurprisingly referred to as "well below expectations". ElBaradei's statement also included a report on the February visit to Iran:

"Last month I visited the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the invitation of the government, to discuss its plans for the use of nuclear power as well as information that came to our knowledge last September concerning the development of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Iran. My colleagues and I were able to visit a number of facilities - including a gas centrifuge enrichment pilot plant at Natanz that is nearly ready for operation, and a much larger enrichment facility still under construction at the same site. During my visit, I emphasized to the Iranian authorities that it is important for all states, and particularly those with sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities, to be fully transparent in their use of nuclear technology. In this connection I stressed the value of bringing an additional protocol into force as an important tool for enabling the Agency to provide comprehensive assurances. During my meetings with President Khatami and other officials, Iran affirmed its obligations under the NPT to use all nuclear technology in the country exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to follow a policy of transparency. To this end it agreed to amend the Subsidiary Arrangements of its safeguards agreement, thereby committing Iran to provide design information on all new nuclear facilities at a much earlier date. And I was assured that the conclusion of an additional protocol will be actively considered. The Secretariat is currently discussing with the Iranian authorities a number of safeguards issues that need to be clarified, and actions that need to be taken."

The Iranian position with regard to the Additional Protocol seems to be one of preparedness in principle to sign, coupled with reluctance in practice in the absence of reciprocal moves from the United States. On March 12, for example, Atomic Energy Organization Director Gholamreza Aqazadeh told Le Monde: "We don't have anything against it [the protocol], but we have some conditions. As signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we expect some benefits, but the westerners have imposed sanctions on us... We're waiting for the sanctions to be lifted before we sign." Aqazadeh added that the international community had nothing to fear from Iran's dedication to peaceful nuclear power generation. Developing nuclear weapons, he insisted, "requires other technologies, which Iran does not have and does not seek to acquire. Anyway, it is impossible to build nuclear weapons without it being known."

The same day, Assadollah Sabori, the Atomic Energy Organizations' Deputy Director, ridiculed the suggestion that Iran had no legitimate energy requirement for nuclear power: "We want to produce 6,000 megawatts of power through nuclear energy by 2020, and we are intent on accomplishing it... The United States has more oil, and Russia has more gas, than Iran. Yet the United States has 104, and Russia 30, operating nuclear plants... So, why [do] they operate nuclear plants despite rich energy resources?" Sabori was speaking to reporters during a media tour of the Bushehr facility, which he described as "nearing completion" with "over 70 percent of the work...accomplished... The main thing [left] is shipping nuclear fuel from Russia, which is expected to take place in May..."

Also on March 12, Iran's UN Ambassador Javad Zarif argued that US policy was compelling Tehran to take steps to ensure the long-term viability of its civil nuclear sector. 'You don't expect Iran to sit still?" Zarif asked reporters at the Iranian Mission in New York: "We don't have any confidence that two years down the road, three years down the road, the pressure by the United States may or not work on our suppliers. We have to create a source of self-sufficiency, which will include a fuel cycle programme." The Ambassador continued: "We have nothing to hide; we played a very straightforward, transparent game with the IAEA. If the United States did not follow this policy of simply trying to deny Iran access to nuclear technology for any purpose, I don't think you would have had all these scenarios that we are confronting. Unless the United States changes its behaviour, we will see more of the same. ... The United States does not believe in the IAEA. The United States wants Iran not to have nuclear power, period."

While unshaken in its commitment to fulfilling the Bushehr contract, Russia is urging a proactive policy from Iran to soothe US and international unease about its programme and intentions. A March 14 Foreign Ministry statement, issued after a meeting between Deputy Foreign Minster Georgy Mamedov and Gholamreza Shafei, Iran's Ambassador to Moscow, stressed "the importance of the swiftest possible signing by Iran of an additional protocol to the agreement on safeguards with the IAEA".

If accession to the Additional Protocol is dependent on the lifting of sanctions, however, the prospect remains remote. On March 13, President Bush renewed the state of 'national emergency with respect to Iran' first declared by President Clinton eight year ago. Under US law - the International Emergency Economic Powers Act - such a status automatically entails the application of comprehensive sanctions. The continuation notice stated:

"On March 15, 1995...the President declared a national emergency with respect to Iran...to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of the government of Iran, including its support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process, and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. ... Because the actions and policies of the government of Iran continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, the national emergency...must continue in effect beyond March 15, 2003."

Reports: Khatami says Iran mines uranium for nuclear plant, Reuters, February 9; Iran discovers uranium reserves, Associated Press, February 9; Iran mining uranium for fuel, BBC News Online, February 9; Iran's plans to mine uranium are no surprise to UN nuclear agency, Associated Press, February 10; Iran says enriched uranium plant under way, Reuters, February 10; US gravely concerned at Iranian nuclear program, Reuters, February 10; Excerpt - Boucher says Iran's uranium mining raises 'serious questions', Washington File, February 10; Iran mines uranium, plans nuclear plant, Associated Press, February 11; Text - plans for Bushehr reactor indicate Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions, Washington File, February 11; UN inspects Iranian nuclear facility, Associated Press, February 21; UN inspects Iranian nuclear facility, Associated Press, February 21; Iran agrees to provide early information on new nuclear facilities, Associated Press, February 22; Excerpt - Iran's secret nuclear development belies 'peaceful purposes' claim, Washington File, March 10; Iran's nuclear program speeds ahead, Washington Post, March 10; Iran to receive Russian uranium for reactor in May, Reuters, March 11; US urges Iran to OK stricter nuclear inspections, Reuters, March 11; Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant nears completion, Associated Press, March 11; Report - Iran puts conditions on nuclear inspections, Reuters, March 12; Report - Iran would agree to nuclear treaty if sanctions lifted, Associated Press, March 12; Iran vows to pursue transparent but ambitious nuclear program, Associated Press, March 12; Text - Bush orders continuation of national emergency with respect to Iran, Washington File, March 13; Envoy - Iran to continue its nuclear power effort, Washington Post, March 13; Russia urges Iran to allow inspection of more nuclear facilities, Associated Press, March 14; Introductory statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, March 17, 2003, IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org; Russian - nuclear cooperation will go on, Associated Press, March 21.

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