| Acronym Institute Home Page | Calendar | UN/CD | NPT/IAEA | UK | US | Space/BMD |
| CTBT | BWC | CWC | WMD Possessors | About Acronym | Links | Glossary |
Back to the Contents of News Review Special Edition
On March 4, the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme - also known as the 'Nunn-Lugar' programme after its Congressional founders and champions Richard Lugar (Republican), now Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and now-retired Democratic Senator Sam Nunn. The hearing opened with a statement from Committee Chair Duncan Hunter (Republican) critical of the recent direction taken by the CTR effort:
"Today, the committee will receive testimony on the Department of Defense US Cooperative Threat Reduction and Department of Energy Nuclear Non-Proliferation programs. These programs combined comprise about $1.75 billion of the national defense budget being requested by the President for Fiscal Year 2004. In 1991, following the dramatic end of the former Soviet empire, the world...faced an unprecedented historical opportunity to directly reduce the threats posed by the vast arsenal of strategic weapons the Soviet Union left behind. Using imagination and persuasion, a key group of members of Congress gave birth to a series of initiatives designed to capitalize on this opportunity. By engaging the emerging former Soviet states with a novel bargain, we entered into new strategic partnerships designed to reduce this dangerous arsenal of strategic weapons by diverting US defense dollars for this purpose. Looking just at the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction or CTR program, now twelve years and $7 billion later, it is without dispute that this program has accomplished a great deal to live up to its objectives. However, it also clear that...the CTR program has strayed from its original purpose at the same time that deeply disturbing instances of mismanagement and negligence are emerging. The purpose of this hearing today is to review the state of these programs by examining how they have evolved from the initial focus on the short-term high-priority elimination of former Soviet-era strategic nuclear systems, to today's constantly expanding scope which includes all manner of weapons of mass destruction-related activities, sometimes only tangentially related to the original purpose or to the principle of reducing direct military threats to the United States. We shall also review how it is that the DOD CTR program bankrolled two hugely expensive building projects in Russia that have led to almost $200 million of US defense dollars being wasted without achieving an ounce of threat reduction as intended. Finally, we will examine the $1.75 billion budget request for fiscal year 2004 which calls for an overall increase of 24 percent over the previous fiscal year, while at the same time reducing the funds proposed for the elimination of former Soviet nuclear strategic systems. These questions and others deserve the careful attention of the Committee and this Congress. If we are to continue to support diverting billions of dollars from the US defense budget for these activities, we must ensure that the investment can be directly traced to an actual tangible reduction in military threats. This is the context which we must use to evaluate this program, as we have an obligation to ensure that the original 'novel bargain' of 1991 still passes muster today."
Speaking for the administration, Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch admitted that the "year since I last testified to Congress on CTR has been a difficult one for the program". Crouch described the fiasco of one of the 'hugely expensive building projects' mentioned by Hunter - $100 million for a facility in Krasnoyarsk to store missile fuel (heptyl) already transferred for use in the Russian space programme - as a "major wake-up call for us all".
Hunter's broadside can be seen as reflecting widespread and mounting Republican unease about the evolution of the CTR programme in recent years - a disquiet reportedly shared by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and other senior administration officials, evidently including Mr. Crouch.
Such concerns were doubtless increased with the release on March 24 of a US General Accounting Office (GOA) report entitled Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to facilitate US Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. The report's Abstract reads:
"Terrorists and countries of concern may be able to gain access to poorly secured weapons of mass destruction at sites throughout Russia. To address this threat to US national security, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) have obligated more than $1.8 billion since 1992. GAO was asked to report on US programs to help improve security at sites where Russia stores (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, GAO assessed US plans to address security threats at sites in Russia, US progress in implementing those plans, and the primary challenges facing DOD and DOE. The Departments of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in helping improve the security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass destruction against the threat of theft or diversion because Russia is not providing needed access to many sites. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future. DOE plans to help secure Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008; however, the department lacks access to many sites. As a result, most of DOE's expenditures in the past 2 years went to functions other than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously installed equipment and developing nuclear security regulations. While important, these efforts do not advance DOE's objective of protecting all buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. DOD and DOE have pursued different approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites. DOE recently scaled back its plans, and the two agencies will face coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will secure sites in both of their plans. DOD has made little progress in securing dangerous pathogens at the 49 sites where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs. Russia has consistently refused DOD access to sites and has closed some sites to US security programs. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement to implement this assistance have also stalled. DOD's efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on a destruction facility that will not be complete until 2006. It may be 40 years before Russia's nerve agent stockpile can be destroyed. DOD has improved security at two sites, but two thirds of Russia's stockpile remains vulnerable to theft."
Responding to press comment on the study, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev told reporters on March 26 that total freedom of access to foreign officials was neither realistic nor necessary: "As for access by representatives of our countries to our sites where nuclear materials are located, we will not show all sites. And where the arrangement of these installations is confidential, we will not display them for international observation. It is a question linked to our defensive capability... So in those places where we are cooperating, we will show everything, but if it is a sensitive zone for our strategic stability and defence, we will not show it. This is all in strict accordance with international laws."
Notes: on March 5, Minister Rumyantsev told deputies in the Duma that 6.5 billion roubles ($203 million) in additional funding was required to secure radioactive materials across the country. Rumyantsev was speaking following the submission to Parliament of an unsettling report on the subject by the Federal Nuclear and Radioactive Supervisory Board. The report detailed "serious flaws in the physical protection of risky nuclear facilities", and concluded that the "system of accounting, control, storage and transportation of radioactive materials is not yet fully operational. As a result, the unauthorised use of radioactive materials and their theft cannot be ruled out."
On March 12, researchers from Harvard University's the Project on Managing the Atom released a comprehensive study entitled Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Material: A Report Card and Action Plan. The report - commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in Washington - makes six main recommendations: 1) focus "intensive, sustained leadership from the highest levels of the US government on an integrated, prioritized plan for blocking the terrorist pathway to the bomb"; 2) build the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in June 2002, "into an effective working partnership that will take rapid action to keep nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials from being stolen and falling into the hands of terrorists or hostile states"; 3) establish "a focused program with the authority, resources, and expertise needed to remove all nuclear material from the world's most vulnerable sites as rapidly as possible, negotiating tailored incentives to facilities to convince them to give up their material"; 4) agree with Moscow "a target of completing rapid security upgrades for all Russian nuclear warheads and materials within two years and comprehensive upgrades within four years"; 5) forge "security relationships with other key states - such as Pakistan - whose nuclear weapons or materials might be threatened by terrorists"; 6) build "effective global standards for nuclear security for each nation with nuclear weapons and materials to meet, combined with an offer of assistance to any state willing to commit to those standards but unable to do so alone".
Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, both Board members of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, praised the study and urged prompt action towards its implementation. Lugar stated (March 12): "We are calling for an acceleration and reprioritization of US threat reduction efforts to ensure that the most urgent threats are addressed first. The scope of the [current] effort does not match the scale of the threat at a time when these programs are more essential than ever." Nunn warned (March 12): "Terrorist groups are racing to get weapons of mass destruction - we should be racing to stop them. The threat cannot be made to fit the programs; the programs must be remade to fit the threat." One of the report's authors, Matthew Bunn, also pointed (March 12) to a gap between word and deed in US policy: "While President Bush has said that 'we will do everything in our power' to make sure that terrorists never use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, there remains an enormous gap between the seriousness and urgency of the threat and the scope of the US, Russian and international response." The report itself concludes by laying emphasis on the responsibility of the President to become the commander in chief of the US WMD threat reduction campaign: "The lesson from the history of US arms control and non-proliferation efforts is very clear. When the President is personally and actively engaged in making the hard choices, and overcoming obstacles that arise, these efforts succeed. When that is not the case, they fail."
Reports: Opening remarks of Chairman Duncan Hunter, full Committee hearing on US Cooperative Threat Reduction and Non-Proliferation Programs, US House of Representatives Armed Services Press Release, March 4; Russian - funds needed for nuke security, Associated Press, March 5; Officials say security at Russian nuclear facilities flawed, more money needed, Associated Press, March 5; US response - US official acknowledges threat reduction problems, defends program, Global Security Newswire, March 5; Report - crude nuke terrorism a threat, Associated Press, March 12; Nunn, Lugar - programs to secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and materials must be accelerated and reshaped to meet terrorist threat, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Press Release, March 12; Report says plan to safeguard nuclear material is lacking, New York Times, March 13; Weapons of mass destruction - additional Russian cooperation needed to facilitate US efforts to improve security at Russian sites, GAO Report, GAO-03-482, March 24; Russian restrictions hampering programs to help safeguard nuclear, biological material, report says, Associated Press, March 25; Russian minister - some sites must remain closed to outsiders, Associated Press, March 26.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.