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As reported in the last issue, on March 18 the lower house of the Russian parliament, the Duma, postponed consideration of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush in Moscow in May 2002. The Treaty - known most commonly as the Moscow Treaty - sets a maximum range of 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads per side by December 31, 2012. The accord has been much criticised by Russian parliamentarians - and by many Democrats in the US Congress - for failing to include any verification provisions or mandate the destruction of any warheads or delivery systems. The Duma's postponement decision, however, was motivated not by unease at the treaty's scant provisions but rather by concern at the political impact of the then-imminent US-led invasion of Iraq. The US Senate had ratified the Treaty without opposition (95-0) on March 6 - with sceptical Democrats arguing that the measure at least provided a platform for further, much-needed agreements - and both houses of the Russian parliament, the Duma and the Federation Council, were reportedly within days of following suit when the UN weapons inspections process in Iraq collapsed.
On April 5, President Putin told reporters that the war in Iraq "creates a certain unfavourable background for further work in the ratification on this agreement." Putin insisted, though, that "the Russian Federation is interested in this document being ratified. I have already said, and want to stress it once again - we shall be working with the deputies of [both houses of] the Federal Assembly, and I hope we shall arrive at ratification." The day before, the Speaker of the Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, argued that "this is not the time to discuss the ratification", warning that such a debate could develop into "a large political rally" against US policy in Iraq and elsewhere. On April 8 Dimitry Rogozin, chair of the Duma's International Affairs Committee, told reporters he expected the House to debate ratification "as soon as the situation regarding the post-conflict settlement in Iraq is normalised". On May 5, Rogozin declared that "preparations for considering ratification...are in full swing". Reports suggested May 16 as Rogozin's preferred date for the opening of the debate. (Note: in the event - see next issue and our website - the Duma ratified the Treaty, by 294 votes to 134, on May 14.)
Arguments over the merits of the Moscow Treaty, in both Russia and the US, reflect a broader debate over the direction of American nuclear weapons doctrine and policy. As summarised in recent issues of Disarmament Diplomacy, the Bush administration is expressing an interest in exploring options allowing for the development - and possibly the testing - of new nuclear warheads designed to discharge specific battlefield functions. The Department of Energy is already examining ways of modifying two existing warheads - the B61 and the B83 - to perform a role popularly known as 'bunker busting': destroying otherwise invulnerable, deeply-buried and heavily-reinforced facilities housing weapons of mass destruction or forming part of an adversary's WMD command-and-control infrastructure. Known as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), the explosive yield of such a new system - which US officials suggest would not require testing - could be very high, although its supporters maintain that any radioactive contamination would be largely contained underground. In addition, the Departments of Energy and Defense are pressing Congress to lift a prohibition - the Spratt-Furse Amendment, in place since 1993 - on research and development (R&D) into low-yield nuclear weapons, also known as 'mini-nukes'. 'Low-yield' is defined in the legislation as 5 kilotons of TNT or less; as a yardstick, the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima produced a yield of around 15 kilotons. Presumably, final development and certification of any new low-yield warhead would require testing.
Testifying before a Senate Armed Services Committee subcommittee on April 9, Linton Brooks, the Acting Administrator of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), described the low-yield R&D prohibition as an "arbitrary intellectual restraint" which had had "a chilling effect" on US nuclear weapon design work. (Note: on May 8, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to lift the ban. See next issue and our website for coverage and reaction.)
Brooks also told the Senators that an Energy Department study, completed last year, had concluded that the current period of time required to prepare the nation's underground test site in Nevada for a resumption of testing - should the President decide to terminate the unilateral US moratorium declared in 1993 - should be shortened from 24-36 months (as stipulated in a 1993 order issued by President Clinton) to 18 months. Reducing the preparation time to this degree, Brooks added, would take approximately three years.
On April 25, making the obvious connection between the low-yield and testing issues, Nikolai Voloshin, head of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's Department of Nuclear Ammunition Development and Testing, commented: "Where did this talk come from to do away with the five-kiloton threshold? ... The idea is being circulated to do lower yield charges - I question the thought of using such low-yield weapons, which means that nuclear weapons cease to be a deterrent and become combat weapons... We are very concerned about why the US has not yet ratified the CTBT..."
Voloshin was speaking to the Global Security Newswire during an international security conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico, hosted by the Sandia National Laboratories. On April 23, the conference heard a speech on US nuclear weapons policy by Linton Brooks, based on the premise that, principally because of the impact of 9/11 and the threat of international WMD-terrorism, "arms control is largely the agenda of the past". The address summarised the significant shift in American nuclear posture since President Bush came to power: "The administration has re-conceptualized the strategic triad so that, commensurate with our commitments under the Moscow Treaty, we will be able to maintain a deterrent that is effective, and responsive to today's security environment. During the Cold War, conceptualizing the Triad as ICBMs [land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles], SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], and strategic bombers made perfect sense; in today's era, the Triad needed to be broadened and re-oriented, in order to pose a credible deterrent. The administration has done that - we now plan in terms of offensive strike forces, which includes not only our strategic offensive deterrent but precision strike forces; defenses, both active and passive; and the revitalization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure - including, of course, NNSA assets. This approach permits the United States to maintain a credible and responsive deterrent, as we reduce our operationally deployed strategic offensive forces to between 1,700 and 2,200."
By contrast, as detailed by Rebecca Johnson in this issue, the US delegation to the NPT PrepCom in Geneva (April 28-May 9) was keen to downplay the radical nature of the New Triad. On May 5, a US fact sheet offered five key reassurances: (1) the "US is reducing reliance on nuclear weapons" and "placing more emphasis on conventional deterrence and missile defense"; (2) the "US is not developing, testing or producing any nuclear warheads and has not done so in more than a decade"; (3) there "is no current requirement for a new nuclear warhead - the President has not directed such an action"; (4) the "US maintains its moratorium on nuclear testing" and "has no plans to conduct nuclear tests"; (5), the US does "not target any countries with nuclear weapons - there has been no change in US negative security assurances policy toward NPT parties".
Reports: Wrong time for Russia to discuss US treaty ratification - speaker, Agence France Presse, April 4; In further bid to mend US ties, Putin promises to ratify nuclear accord, Agence France Presse, April 5; Replies by Russian President Vladimir Putin to journalists' questions when visiting Space Forces Headquarters, Moscow, April 5, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Putin urges US arms pact backing, BBC News Online, April 5; Duma to resume Moscow Treaty ratification this spring, Global Security Newswire, April 9; Hill told US favors more nonnuclear weapons, Washington Post, April 9; US seeks shortened nuclear test readiness, modified nuclear weapons, Global Security Newswire, April 9; US to bolster its nuclear test readiness, Agence France Presse, April 9; Text - Brooks outlines measures to combat future WMD proliferation, Washington File, April 23; Bush administration ready to strike first to keep US safe, Global Security Newswire, April 24; US 'bunker buster' development worries Russia, Global Security Newswire, April 25; Fact Sheet - Moscow Treaty nuclear cuts tops list of US NPT support, Washington File, May 5; US concerned over Iran nuclear program, Associated Press, May 5; Senior US, Russian officials to discuss Moscow Treaty ratification, Global Security Newswire, May 5; Panel votes to end low-yield nukes ban, Associated Press, May 9; Russia's lower house Oks US arms deal, Associated Press.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.