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In mid-April, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) - a deliberative body open to all member states - concluded its annual substantive session (March 31-April 17) without agreement on any proposals concerning its two agenda items: ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament (Working Group I); and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms (Working Group II). Customarily, the Commission considers two agenda items over a three-year period before adopting, by consensus, guidelines and recommendations for achieving and measuring progress. The present items were debated in 2000 and 2001; no substantive session was held in 2002, an unprecedented failure - officially ascribed to logistical pressures on the UN agenda (see Disarmament Diplomacy No. 64, May/June 2002) - unhappily coinciding with the Commission's 50th anniversary.
Addressing delegates on March 31, Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, noted the inauspicious backdrop to the session: "It is undeniable...that the Commission - in common with other parts of the multilateral disarmament machinery - has faced some difficult times in recent years. Its inability to schedule a substantive session in 2002...was especially regrettable. I hope the Commission never again has to cancel a substantive session. Today, disagreements over the role of force in international relations, the contributions of multilateralism to international peace and security, and indeed the relevance and role of the United Nations in serving a full gamut of global norms, are presenting new challenges for the consensus-building process in the Commission. These hardships are coinciding with the recent trend of rising global military expenditures, which this year will likely exceed $1 trillion - an unconscionable statistic reminiscent of spending levels during the Cold War."
Dhanapala added: "Yet when times are difficult, the deliberative function of the Commission is all the more important to sustain. This is particularly true with respect to the two issues now on its agenda relating to nuclear disarmament and confidence-building in the area of conventional arms. This year - which marks the 25th anniversary of that grand consensus in multilateral disarmament at the General Assembly's first Special Session on Disarmament - the Commission has a unique opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to rise to new challenges, overcome obstacles, and reach common understandings on matters of great importance to all member states."
Initial reaction to the Commission's failure to reach agreement was outlined in a UN Press Release (April 17):
"Following the Commission's adoption of its draft report...delegations debated the reasons for the session's disappointing outcome.
The representative of Côte d'Ivoire highlighted the need for political will, without which the disarmament debates would remain mere academic gatherings, and United Nations resolutions would remain a 'dead letter'. Empty talk would enshrine a global strategic imbalance and foster nuclear proliferation. Delaying tactics, if continued, would lead many countries to believe that nuclear proliferation was the way forward. Perhaps, only that threat of proliferation - sadly - will ever prompt the nuclear powers to advance total nuclear disarmament. ...
The United States representative said that the nuclear disarmament topic had been too broad. He had expected the Commission to pick out a few ways and means that might be ripe for attention and command consensus. Instead, it had adopted a catch-all approach. He had also hoped that the Commission would devote more time to the immediate and urgent threats to international peace and security, such as preventing States and terrorists from acquiring mass destruction weapons. Had Working Group I started with the prospect of a real convergence of views, it might have been successful. The failure of Working Group II was much more difficult to comprehend, he said. He, along with most of the other delegations, could have accepted the draft as it was presented on the first day. All of the contentious points on which that paper had foundered were introduced last week. Why were issues of such fundamental disagreement not raised until the final week of a three-year process? Confidence-building measures were extremely useful in reducing tensions and preventing conflict, but instead of sending a strong message acknowledging that fact, the Commission had produced nothing.
Committee Chairman Mario Maiolini (Italy) suggested that the unsatisfactory conclusion of the proceedings should draw attention in the coming days to the reasons why consensus had been elusive. Progress had been made, but it had not been possible to draw positive conclusions. He heard expressions of regret for the missed opportunity, as well as a willingness to continue to seek results. Members should ask themselves why, despite the call to advance the proposals, that had not been possible."
Reports: 'Creeping retreat' from nuclear disarmament, increased proliferation risk among issues stressed, as Disarmament Commission opens session', UN Press Release DC/2859, March 31; Disarmament Commission concludes session without proposals to advance nuclear disarmament, confidence-building, UN Press Release DC/2861, April 17; UN disarmament commission fails to reach consensus in 2003 session, UN News Service, April 21.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.