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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 71, June - July 2003

Editorial

Beware Intelligence Intimidation In Defence Debates

By Rebecca Johnson

Honourable deception, Clare Short called it. In occupation, unhampered by Saddam, but still unable to find anything resembling operational WMD, when will President Bush and Prime Minister Blair admit that the United Nations, through the inspectors of the IAEA, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, had actually done a pretty good job since 1991 of ferreting out Iraq's clandestine programmes and ensuring their dismantlement and the containment (at least) of further ambitions. Far from having the wool pulled over his eyes, as implied by the war lobby, Hans Blix was successful in uncovering some remnants, including a handful of undeclared missiles. Yet those calling for more time for inspections were castigated as ignorant, naïve, or apologists for Saddam's appalling regime.

In view of widespread domestic and international scepticism regarding their motives and intentions, the minority driving the push to invade Iraq deliberately exaggerated the imminence of the threat in order to frighten people into accepting that war was necessary. For nothing terrifies quite like the mysterious poisonings and apocalyptic destruction associated with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Such deliberate distortion of enemy capabilities and intentions to justify an unnecessary war has many ignoble precedents. Used to silence those who seek political solutions and whip up jingoistic hysteria in others, it is the modern version of 'eyewitness' stories of enemy barbarity, like the baby-bayoneting German soldiers in World War I.

The advocates of war used and abused not only the United Nations but also their democratic bodies, Congress and Parliament. They evoked privileged intelligence - "if you knew what we know (but of course you can't because it's classified) then you would understand and support". They played the loyalty card - "you're either with us or with Saddam (and the terrorists)". These tactics were intended to make us feel inadequate and insecure so that we'd go along with the 'experts' and their special knowledge. As the dishonourable deceptions become clearer, have we learned enough not to be intimidated and hoodwinked again? Beware: the same tactics are being employed to reel in support for missile defence, where the grounds are similarly unconvincing.

Like Iraq's 'imminent' threat, putative missile threats and proposed missile defence technologies are being dangerously exaggerated, at the expense of regional and multilateral diplomacy. Putting more effective resources into strengthening the disarmament, control and verification mechanisms under international law would do more to prevent the development and acquisition of missiles and also of the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons that we are understandably afraid of (and which, if acquired, could be delivered by a range of means more accessible to terrorists than missiles).

To garner support for putting US weapons into space, the hoary spectre of a "Space Pearl Harbour" was dramatically evoked by Donald Rumsfeld in January 2001 (shortly before the US made pre-emption a central tenet of its national security strategy). Missile defences and weapons to control the 'high ground' of space are presented as solutions, when such high-tech fixes are more likely to fuel a new arms race and breed greater insecurities. Yet again, militarists are trying to intimidate us by claiming privileged intelligence and demanding loyalty, riding roughshod over the misgivings of large numbers of sensible, concerned people.

Take, for example, the upgrading of US radar facilities in Fylingdales, Yorkshire, and Thule, Greenland, as part of the initial phase of Bush's multi-tiered, open-ended missile defence plans. In Britain, where permission, once sought, was given with unseemly haste and minimal discussion, the upgrades are generally presented as a technical updating of the current detection and tracking (early warning) roles. In fact, the enhancements constitute a significant change of function, contributing to guidance and targeting capabilities for America's intercepting warheads. People living near Fylingdales have raised concerns that the plans could make them more vulnerable to attack. As the millions of marchers were ignored before the war on Iraq, such concerns are dismissed by missile defence advocates and the objectors patronised as if they were, yes, ignorant or naive. Didn't the UK officials at a high level international conference in 2001 hear the American defence expert who quipped that if missile defences were deployed, the US's real early warning would be when 'its' stations at Thule and Fylingdales were attacked and destroyed? I did.

Like the Iraq war, missile defence is being made a test of alliance solidarity with the United States. The risk of getting into another deadly arms race, this time reaching into space, on the basis of hyped threats is great. We should distrust all attempts to dismiss public discussion with calls for loyalty and retreats behind privileged intelligence.

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© 2003 The Acronym Institute.