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Back to the Contents of News Review Special Edition
Despite the concerted diplomatic activity detailed below, by mid-July the crisis over North Korea's nuclear programme appeared to be drifting into ever more-dangerous waters. Seemingly endemic confusion about the exact status and direction of that programme continues to complicate matters and aggravate the search for a political solution. Having declared its withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January, North Korea - formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) - now seems to be asserting both that it already possesses a small number of nuclear weapons and that it has moved decisively to produce a significant quantity of weapons-grade fissile material (plutonium) by reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods stored at its Yongbyon graphite-moderated nuclear reactor complex. If fully reprocessed, the rods are reportedly capable of yielding sufficient plutonium for between 6-12 nuclear warheads.
All operations at the Yongbyon facility, which houses both a reactor and a reprocessing plant, were suspended under the terms of the October 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework specifying the construction of replacement, proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs) by an international consortium, the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Since October 2002, when the United States reported an apparent (never confirmed) admission by North Korea that it had been running a uranium-enrichment programme, the Agreed Framework process has been in ghostly limbo, seemingly doomed by the implosion of trust between the two main sides in the dispute. In December 2002, North Korea removed a core confidence-building component of the Agreed Framework process by expelling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from Yongbyon and removing monitoring equipment in place to detect reprocessing activity at the plant.
A radical difference of approach to the crisis has itself become part of the negative, escalatory dynamic between Washington and Pyongyang. For North Korea, the core issue is the perceived and growing threat to its national security posed by the Bush administration's agenda of pre-emptive strikes and regime-change to remove 'outlaw regimes'. Faced with such a threat, the nuclear 'deterrent' becomes a legitimate option - hence its invocation of 'supreme national interests' in its decision to withdraw from the NPT. From such a perspective, the dominant focus of crisis resolution efforts has to be bilateral negotiations aimed at the US provision of security assurances - a non-aggression pact - allowing Pyongyang sufficient leeway to return to the NPT fold as a non-nuclear-weapon state. For the United States, blame for the collapse of the Agreed Framework rests entirely on North Korean shoulders, and the prime political lesson of that unhappy experience is the folly of trusting to bilateral arrangements. Given the grave threat a nuclear-armed North Korea would pose to the region, as well as internationally, the post-Framework approach has thus to be multilateralised, notably including the key regional players, China, South Korea and Japan. With respect to security assurances, the White House - despite increasingly urgent promptings from both Democrats and Republicans - continues to refuse to countenance discussion of a bilateral non-aggression pact. This position, senior administration officials stress, does not imply any intention to seek a military solution to the crisis, either by attacking key nuclear sites or launching a more general offensive. Instead, Washington seems resigned to playing a waiting-game, making clear to North Korea over time that its agenda of blackmail and bluster will get it nowhere. As other states and commentators point out, however, North Korea does appear to be going somewhere, straight towards a de facto nuclear-weapon status likely to traumatise and retard both the regional security environment and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The greatest effort to bridge this alarming gulf in perception and tactics has thus far been made by China. As reported in the last issue, late April saw three days of trilateral, China-US-DPRK talks in Beijing. The meeting ended in a familiar cloud of claim, counterclaim and confusion, and with a resurgent polarity in the demands of Washington - for an expanded, authentically multilateral format - and Pyongyang - for central, face-to-face talks tackling the fundamental, existential issue at hand.
May 7: South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan argues that North Korea's desire for security assurances from Washington is only likely to be satisfied following a de-escalation of the nuclear crisis - "It is very important for North Korea to take a bold step and provide momentum which would lead to what it wants from the United States: economic assistance and a security guarantee. The scrapping of the nuclear programme in a verifiable and irreversible manner would lead to the security guarantee that North Korea wants." Yoon adds: "At this moment...it is very important for us to accelerate the momentum for dialogue and give a boon to those in the United States who support dialogue".
May 9: US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher tells reporters that Washington is still reflecting on the lessons of the Beijing talks in April for future US strategy. Puzzling some commentators - though perhaps designed to present an unflustered front to Pyongyang - Boucher exudes a lack of urgency: "There is no decision at this point [on how to proceed]. We wanted to analyze what happened in Beijing, we have been looking at all the information including what the North Koreans may or may not be doing... We want to talk to friends and allies, including the Chinese but also the Japanese and South Koreans... We will go through that process at our own pace, we will analyze things carefully, and then decide." In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing repeats that his government "is willing to promote the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue at an early date with joint efforts of all sides".
May 12: addressing the Korea Society in New York at the start of his first visit to the US as South Korean leader, President Roh Moo-hyun argues - "North Korea has two alternatives: it can go down a blind alley, or it can open up. ... Pyongyang must give up its nuclear project and come forward as a responsible member of the international community. When the North takes this route, the Republic of Korea and the international community will extend the necessary support and cooperation." In an interview with the Washington Times, Roh states his intent to urge President Bush to withdraw any threat of military action to forcibly resolve the dispute: "I would like to discuss with President Bush that the circumstances on the Korean Peninsular may not be appropriate for applying this principle [of pre-emptive action] from the very beginning..." Sean McCormack, a spokesperson for the US National Security Council, responds: "As we've said, of course, we seek a peaceful diplomatic resolution to the issues involving North Korea. While we're not taking any options off the table, we're working very hard toward that goal - a multilateral solution."
In Tokyo, Japan's Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo states that aggressive economic rather than military steps may prove necessary at some point: "Discussions about economic sanctions are a natural topic of conversation. Although Japan is not considering this at the moment, every option should be open as a matter of course". As reported in recent issues, North Korea has made plain that it will regard the imposition of sanctions as tantamount to a declaration of war. Shinzo is speaking at a seminar on the crisis in Tokyo. The seminar hears even more bellicose language from Katsumari Suzuki, a senior official involved in efforts in 2002 to stabilise diplomatic relations between Japan and the DPRK. "For negotiations to be stringent", Suzuki argues, "it would make sense only if we say all options are open, including the use of weapons".
In Pyongyang, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) issues a report detailing the historical and recent development of the crisis, claiming that the Bush administration had "systematically torpedoed the process of denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsular". US hostility, the reports adds, has "reduced" the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, signed by the divided neighbours in January 1992, "to a dead letter". The report concludes: "The Iraqi war taught the lesson that 'nuclear suspicion', 'suspected development of weapons of mass destruction' and suspected 'sponsorship of terrorism' touted by the US were all aimed to find a pretext for war, and [thus we can predict that] one would fall victim to a war when one meekly responds to the IAEA's inspection-for-disarmament. ... It is a serious lesson the world has drawn from the Iraqi war that a war can be averted and sovereignty of the...nation can be protected only when a country has a physical deterrent force, a strong military deterrent force capable of decisively repelling any attack to be made by any types of sophisticated weapons."
May 14: at the White House, Presidents Bush and Roh issue a joint statement reaffirming "that they will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea", noting "with serious concern North Korea's statements about reprocessing, possession of nuclear weapons, and its threat to demonstrate or transfer these weapons", and stressing "that escalatory moves by North Korea will only lead to its greater isolation and a more desperate situation in the North". The statement continues: "Both leaders reiterated their strong commitment to work for the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on international cooperation. They welcomed the role played by China at the April 23-25 trilateral talks in Beijing. They agreed that the Republic of Korea and Japan are essential for a successful and comprehensive settlement and that Russia and other nations can also play a constructive role in multilateral diplomacy. While noting that increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require consideration of further steps, they expressed confidence that a peaceful resolution can be achieved. Noting that the United States and the Republic of Korea are the two leading donors of humanitarian food assistance to North Korea, the two Presidents reaffirmed that humanitarian assistance is provided without linkage to political developments and noted the need to ensure that the assistance goes to those in need. President Bush stressed that North Korea's nuclear programs stand in the way of the bold approach and the ability of the international community to consider comprehensive steps to assist the many needs of the North Korean people."
May 20: in testimony to the Senate Governmental Affairs' Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Andre Hollis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, flags an issue of emerging concern for the Bush administration - "Over the past several years, there have been numerous reports of drug seizures linked to North Korea, primarily of methamphetamine and heroin destined for Japan, Taiwan, China, and Russia. The Australians' April 2003 seizure of 50 kilograms of heroin transported by the North Korean merchant ship Pong Su, demonstrates that elements within North Korea are extending their illicit activities... This incident underscores the need for multilateral efforts to stop North Korea's drug trafficking. The Pong Su seizure heightens concerns that North Korean officials may be using illicit trading activities to provide much needed hard currency to fund its army and weapons of mass destruction programmes. North Korea is a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction to nations that support terrorism. It is clear that any illicit trafficking involving North Korea is a potential threat to the security of the US and its friends and allies in Asia and elsewhere."
May 23: President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi discuss the crisis at the President's ranch in Crawford, Texas. Bush tells reporters: "The Prime Minister and I see the problem exactly the same way. We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea. We will not give in to blackmail. We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme." According to a senior US administration official, the two leaders agreed on the priority need to expand the talks format: "We can't enter into real negotiations as long as the Japanese and the South Koreans aren't there." Koizumi states: "Continuation of the multilateral talks is important, and participation by Japan and the Republic of Korea is essential."
May 24: a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement observes that Pyongyang's stated preference for bilateral negotiations with the United States should not be interpreted as a rejection of broader, subsequent and supplementary, talks: "As there are issues to be settled between the DPRK and the US, the two sides are required to sit face-to-face for a candid discussion on each other's policies. Only then it is possible to have multilateral talks and make them fruitful... It is the DPRK's stand that the DPRK-US talks should be held first and [that] they may be followed by the US-proposed multilateral talks".
May 30-June 2: in a remarkable initiative, US Republican Representative Curt Weldon, vice chair of the Armed services Committee, visits Pyongyang together with five of his colleagues from the House: Eliot Engel (Democrat), Jeff Miller (Republican), Solomon Ortiz (Democrat), Silvestre Reyes (Democrat) and Joe Wilson (Republican). On June 12, Weldon briefs a somewhat wary Secretary of State Powell on the trip, the centrepiece of which was the presentation to DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun of a 10-point plan to resolve the crisis. After his meeting with Powell, Weldon issued a statement outlining North Korea's enthusiastic reception of the plan: "I believe we have an excellent opportunity to resolve this situation peacefully. We can either continue down the same path and hope for the best, or we can begin discussions that will bring a speedy end to the current tensions. ... Foreign Minister Paek...was not only pleased with my recommendations, but he stated that this plan was 'exactly what we are looking for'... Following a bold statement like that, the United States must continue to engage this nation. I truly believe they wish to avert a war, and I feel we are quickly approaching an exciting turning point in our relationship."
Following a lukewarm and cautious reaction from the administration, Weldon publishes the 10-point plan in an article in the Philadelphia Inquirer on June 30. By way of preface, Weldon writes: "During our trip, the North Koreans confirmed that their nation possesses nuclear weapons, is reprocessing spent fuel and that the fuel is being used for additional weapons. In fact, during one of our dinners the vice minister of foreign affairs, Kim Gue Gwan, looked me in the eye and confidently stated, 'We have them...and they are not dirty bombs.' It was apparent to the entire delegation that the North is terrified of a US invasion and that they are convinced that we are intent on such an attack. As a result, they believe their only hope is to continue their nuclear program and build more weapons to deter a US invasion. They repeatedly referenced our invasion of Iraq, statements from Pentagon hawks, and President Bush's 'axis of evil' speech as evidence of our intentions. Despite their boastful rhetoric, our counterparts were eager to discuss our differences and possible solutions. With that eagerness came a window of opportunity. On the second day of our visit, I presented a 10-point plan, drafted in my hotel room the previous evening, to Vice Minister Kim that could end this conflict. The plan includes bilateral agreements between the United States and North Korea within an overarching multilateral framework consistent with the demands of President Bush." The plan is then unveiled:
"Stage one requires the following five actions simultaneously:
US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher refuses to be drawn into comment on the specifics of the plan, noting only: "We have made very, very clear our position. We are not going to pay the North Koreans not to do something that they shouldn't have been doing to begin with".
May 31: Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and Chinese President Hu Jintao discuss the crisis on the fringes of a regional security conference in Singapore. After the meeting, Koizumi tells reporters: "We share a common understanding that a diplomatic and peaceful solution should be sought. But the discussions were not about stricter measures or anything specific." Also attending the conference, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz comments that just such 'stricter measures' may soon be in order: "Countries of the region that are helping to keep North Korea afloat need to send a message to North Korea that they're not going to continue doing that if North Korea continues down the road it's on." Wolfowitz adds: "I do not really see a solution. Military action isn't going to solve the short-term problem. Large-scale bribery isn't going to solve the short-term problem. This is a case that requires long-term Asian patience. ... If together we accept the challenge by Pyongyang...and confront North Korea with a way forward and verifiable alternatives, which are acceptable to countries of the region, we at least have a chance."
June 1: meeting in Evian, France, leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8) states - Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US - declare: "North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution."
In a break from summit discussions, President Bush and Chinese President Hu hold a private meeting on the North Korean crisis. According to an unnamed senior US official, Bush repeats his view that "we cannot let this drift too long". The official continues: "The question, though, is how do we address that effectively. The Chinese made it clear that they think it's urgent to get North Korea back to the table, and we agree with that. ... What they say to the North Koreans is, 'look, you're going to have to find a way to meet - you cannot just hold out and say you're only going to meet in a bilateral setting'."
June 2: Wolfowitz holds talks with President Roh in Seoul. At a press conference, Wolfowitz concedes the high, dangerous degree of uncertainty dogging the issue: "We know what they [the North Koreans] say. We have some things that can verify what they say. We don't know everything... Certainly, what we know suggests that we should take what they're saying very seriously". Addressing the same theme, Roh cautions: "There has been no change in the official position that our intelligence agencies do not have definite, decisive proof... We must be very careful in making that determination based on North Korean statements that it has nuclear weapons..."
June 5: US and South Korean military officials agree the outlines of a significant reorganisation of American forces in the country. Under the plan, the majority of the 37,000 US troops in the South will be withdrawn from the range of North Korean artillery massed on the DPRK side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The political signals sent by the changes provoke some concern. Former US Defense Secretary William Perry, an architect of the Agreed Framework, tells Reuters (June 3): "A few years ago, I thought we were on [the verge of a resolution of our principal problem with North Korea, which is its nuclear weapons programme... Had that trend continued, I think a major realignment of our military forces would have been in order. Now we are in a new nuclear crisis, and I myself would be reluctant to do anything that could be considered to be weakening our deterrence at this time." Speaking in Tokyo (June 3), Wolfowitz argues that the reorganisation is "not something that should wait until the nuclear problem is solved, as though somehow it's going to weaken our posture... To the contrary, it's part of an effort to strengthen our overall posture..."
June 7: in Tokyo, Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh issue a joint statement stressing their commitment to a multilateral, peaceful solution to the crisis - "The two leaders agreed that the North Korean nuclear issue is a serious threat not only to the Korean peninsular but also for the peace and stability of East Asia and the international nuclear non-proliferation system. The two leaders agreed that North Korea's nuclear weapons and any form of development programme will not be tolerated and [that] this problem must be solved in a peaceful, diplomatic manner."
June 9: KCNA broadcasts another chilling government statement. Declaring that, "quite contrary to Washington's noisy propaganda", the "DPRK has no intention to have a nuclear deterrent force without any reason" - i.e. without the existence of a grave threat to its survival - the message reads: "The DPRK is willing to clear up the US concern as regards the nuclear issue if it drops its hostile policy towards Pyongyang and addresses its concern. But if the US keeps threatening the DPRK with nukes instead of abandoning its hostile policy toward Pyongyang, the DPRK will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force." The statement also takes issue with the frequently repeated assertion that North Korea cannot afford the economic burden of a nuclear weapons programme: "The DPRK's intention to build up a nuclear deterrent force is not aimed to threaten or blackmail others but [rather to] reduce conventional weapons under a long-term plan and channel manpower resources and funds into economic construction and the betterment of people's living. The DPRK will build up a powerful physical deterrent force, capable of neutralising any sophisticated [conventional] and nuclear weapons with less spending, unless the US gives up its hostile policy towards the DPRK."
June 12: eleven countries gather in Madrid for the inaugural meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), first announced by President Bush in a speech in Krakow on May 31. The aim of the Initiative is to elaborate procedures and mechanisms for detecting, preventing and if necessary intercepting illegal shipments of WMD and WMD-related material and equipment. The participating states are: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US.
For coverage of the meeting, and consideration of the overall rationale of the PSI, please see our website and elsewhere in this Review. Concern over illegal North Korean WMD-shipments, backed by drugs trafficking activities, was acknowledged as a specific and major motivation for the launch of the programme. In the words of Australian Prime Minister John Howard: "Certainly, the idea of being involved in such an interdiction [arrangement] is something that we've looked at in a very proactive fashion... I think the countries not only of the region but more broadly speaking of the world have got to look at different ways of handling the North Korean problem... Everything about North Korea is a bit dangerous, to put it mildly, and we hope that with different responses and different strategies we can persuade North Korea to see the wisdom of coming back into the non-proliferation tent". Asked if the proposal might encompass military strikes against non-cooperative intercepted vehicles, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer states: "No, not as simply as that. ... What we're looking at is something slightly more sophisticated - looking for ways of being able to interdict trade in drugs as well as in nuclear materials, weapons of mass destruction materials". Conceding a range of possible legal implications of moving towards such an interdiction/blockade regime, Downer adds: "It would be very difficult to deal with that. But that is why we are having meetings...in order to address those difficult legal issues."
June 13: meeting in Honolulu, the US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) issues a statement appealing to North Korea "not to exacerbate" the current, already-precarious situation. The statement continues: "The three delegations shared the view that the three-party talks in Beijing April 23-25 were useful, and they expressed appreciation for the PRC's [People's Republic of China] hosting of the talks and its full participation in them. They also exchanged views on the issues discussed at the Beijing talks. Regarding the format of talks to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the three delegations agreed on the necessity of multilateral talks expanded to include other interested parties. In particular, they agreed that the ROK and Japan have vital interests at stake and that their participation in multilateral talks is indispensable. The three delegations explained their respective positions on bilateral issues with North Korea. ... They reiterated that North Korea's relations with them and with the international community as a whole hinge on its taking prompt and verifiable action to end its nuclear weapons program fully and in a verifiable manner. They also reiterated that doing so would provide an opportunity for North Korea to improve its relations with the international community and the livelihood of its people. They reaffirmed their confidence that diplomacy will result in an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, which, in turn, will contribute to increased security and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the region."
The TCOG delegations are headed by James Kelly, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lee Soo-hyuck, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister.
June 17: a North Korean government commentary, broadcast on KCNA, reacts angrily to the Madrid PSI discussions, describing the envisaged interdiction system as an effort to "lay an international siege". The commentary complains: "All these disturbing developments clearly indicate what the 'further steps' and 'stronger measures' peddled by South Korea and Japan under the manipulation of the Bush administration really mean. ... The DPRK will take an immediate physical retaliatory step against the US once it judges that its sovereignty is infringed upon by Washington's blockade operation... There is no guarantee that this blockade will not lead to such a serious condition as a full-scale war."
June 18: attending the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, US Secretary of State Powell holds a rapid exchange with the head of the North Korean delegation, Ho Jong. According to a senior US official accompanying Powell: "Briefly, at the end of lunch, they bumped into each other, they shook hands and exchanged a few words... The Secretary said basically what he said in the meeting - we want multilateral discussions and that it's important to proceed in that fashion because the issues are of interest to everybody." The Forum, consisting of the 10 ASEAN and 12 other states, issues a statement calling for a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsular and a reversal of North Korea's recent steps away from the non-proliferation regime. A DPRK Foreign Ministry statement rebuffs the call, declaring that North Korea "will put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force...as a just self-defence measure..." The statement concludes: "It has become clear that the US insistence on multilateral talks is not [designed] to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully but to camouflage its act of isolating and stifling our country... We can no longer expect anything from [the] multilateral talks that the United States is proposing... Dialogue and pressure are not compatible."
The US announces it is restarting discussions on the crisis in the UN Security Council. According to US Ambassador John Negroponte: "We're...providing the idea of a Presidential Statement on North Korea, and we're exploring that with other delegations at this time." Asked what the US hoped to see included in such a statement, Negroponte states: "Well, fundamentally [we want] a statement to the effect that North Korea is out of compliance with its international obligations with respect to non-proliferation, and a calling on North Korea to rejoin the international community in this area and place its facilities under safeguards and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and with its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty". The issue was first referred to the Council by the IAEA in February. In response, the Council has held two private meetings (February 19 & April 9), both of which shied away from issuing a statement or making any formal demands of North Korea.
South Korea quickly signalled its opposition to the US initiative. A Foreign Ministry statement (June 19) observed: "In view of the fact that efforts to get multilateral talks under way are proceeding, our position is that it is not the desirable time to discuss a schedule for UN Security Council debate".
Addressing the National Press Club in Canberra, UK Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon expresses "every expectation" that the interdiction initiative launched in Madrid will "lead in time to action within the United Nations, because it is important that the international community work together in dealing with the kind of threats posed by countries like North Korea". Hoon then defends the merits of an 'isolate-and-pressurise' approach to the DPRK crisis: "We do need internationally to work together to isolate North Korea and to demonstrate that we will not tolerate the way in which they both develop and proliferate weapons of mass destruction."
June 20: European Union (EU) heads of state and government, meeting in Thessaloniki, Greece, issue a wide-ranging declaration on non-proliferation and international security issues. The leaders note that the EU "remains seriously concerned at North Korea's nuclear programme and its failure to comply with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement... [The EU] calls on North Korea to refrain from any action that would further aggravate the problem. It also urges North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programme, as a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution, and to return to full compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations. The European Union reaffirms its readiness to contribute to a multilateral diplomatic solution to the crisis and expresses support for the Peace and Prosperity Policy followed by the Republic of Korea..."
Quoting unnamed Japanese and US sources, the Sankei Shimbun newspaper reports that the Bush administration had notified the Japanese government in March that it believed the DPRK was in possession of "not just one or two" nuclear warheads, weighing between 1,650-2,200 pounds, capable of delivery by North Korean missiles. Reacting to the report, Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda tells reporters: "We don't have firm evidence, and I believe that the United States probably does not either... Considering [the matter] from various angles, we can't assert [our conclusion] clearly..." Prime Minister Koizumi stresses: "I think what is needed is efforts by the international community as a whole to make North Korea understand how meaningless its current provocative speech and behaviour are..."
June 23: State Department spokesperson Philip Reeker elaborates on the administration's UN initiative - "We have talked about this for some time, since the IAEA referred the matter to the Security Council, I believe in February... One of the...possible ways forward we have looked at is a Presidential Statement. This is a format where the UN Security Council, through its [rotating] Presidency...can make a statement that expresses the views of the Security Council on behalf of the international community. We have circulated with the Permanent Five members and shared with other...concerned countries like Japan and South Korea a possible draft of a text of a possible statement. There is nothing formal in that sense yet..." As quoted by Reuters (June 19), this 'possible draft' calls on North Korea "to immediately and completely dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a verifiable and irreversible manner", and "condemns" both "North Korea's nuclear weapons programme" and "the DPRK's breach of its international obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty".
June 25: in Washington, the annual EU-US summit issues a statement 'On the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', signed by President Bush, European Commission President Romano Prodi and European Council President Konstantinos Simitis. Promising to "cooperate actively to address specific proliferation challenges", the statement reproduces the language used by EU heads of state on June 20, condemning "North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and its failure to comply with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement," calling "on North Korea to refrain from any action that would further aggravate the problem", and strongly urging the DPRK "to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle that programme...as a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution".
June 27: North Korea's Foreign Minister, Paek Nam-sun, writes to the UN Security Council strongly advising against the adoption of the statement sought by Washington. Paek states: "It can be said that now the United States is at the crossroads of whether it will maintain the international order led by the United Nations or give way to the establishment of [a] dangerous world order led by an individual country". The letter warns the Council to heed the lessons of the Iraq crisis: "The war in Iraq constitutes a well-proven example that the intelligence information of the United States may be abused for political purposes". With regard to the best way forward, Paek states: "Since there were tripartite talks in Beijing in April, it would be productive that next we have DPRK-USA talks and then tripartite or further expanded talks".
July 1: the New York Times reports that US intelligence officials have identified, based on satellite evidence, a conventional explosive testing range at Youngdoktong possibly related to the development of sophisticated, miniaturised nuclear warheads. According to the article, explosions apparently intended to simulate a nuclear explosion have been observed. The paper quotes a senior administration official familiar with the intelligence, as stating: "What we are told us that it would take perhaps six months [after the fissile material had been prepared]...to produce a miniaturised warhead and put it into one of the[ir] missiles. But after Iraq, who know how good those estimates are?"
A statement from the Korean People's Army (KPA) in Pyongyang warns that the establishment of any interdiction regime against the DPRK will be interpreted and responded to as a breach of 1953 Armistice Agreement (AA) in place since the end of the Korean War. The statement reads: "If the US applies sanctions against the DPRK and conducts sea and air blockades against it anywhere, and starts bolstering troops in and around the Korean Peninsular, the KPA side will promptly regard it as a complete breach of the AA by the US side... A touch-and-go situation is now prevailing on the Korean Peninsular owing to the undisguised US policy to stifle the DPRK... Korea is at the crossroads of war or peace."
July 2: an unnamed UN Security Council diplomat tells the New York Times that a Presidential Statement on the crisis was looking unlikely, at least in the near term: "The Chinese have been saying, 'the time isn't right'", while the US, France and UK "are saying there is contradiction" between increasing pressure on Pyongyang in this way and continuing the search for a political solution.
July 3: the Asahi Shimbun newspaper reports that North Korea was prepared to consider 4-way talks involving itself, the United States, South Korea and China. Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yasuo Fukuda, comments: "Our country's stance is that Japan and South Korea must take part... We hope an arrangement in which we can participate will be created as soon as possible."
Japan's Senior Vice Foreign Minister, Tishimitsu Motegi, tells reporters that the implementation of the Agreed Framework should now be officially put on hold: "I personally think it appropriate to suspend the construction of light-water reactors."
July 4: in an interview with Radio Free Asia in Beijing, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage acknowledges that the US drive for a Security Council statement has become bogged down. Both Russia and China, he notes, "have some concerns about this", adding that "I think they're not the only ones who have some concerns." Armitage describes the situation as ironic: "We, who are often accused of being unilateralists, are interested in trying to resolve these issues in multilateral forums like the United Nations, but we're taking into consideration the views of others such as China and Russia." Asked if the US was seeking to implement a policy of 'regime change' in North Korea, Armitage responds: "No. The desired goal is a government in Pyongyang that eschews the possession of nuclear weapons - that is, a denuclearised peninsular - and a country which is not a threat to our friends in the Republic of Korea."
July 7: in Beijing, Chinese President Hu and South Korean Prime Minister Roh consider options for reviving dialogue. Roh tells a press conference: "President Hu Jintao and I agreed to make efforts for the early resumption of direct talks among concerned parties in the North Korean nuclear issue". While urging the DPRK to abandon its nuclear programme, Roh adds: "We also think it is important to address North Korea's security concerns".
July 12: the Kyodo news agency in Tokyo reports that US intelligence had now concluded that North Korea had begun to reprocess spent fuel rods at Yongbyon. According to the agency, the determination was reached in part due to the detection of Krypton-85, a signature gas by-product of reprocessing activity.
Deputy Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe expresses concern while urging caution: "North Korea is playing a really dangerous game. But we think that the country has yet to cross the line it is not supposed to cross. In negotiations with North Korea, we should stay patient so that we will not be intimidated into giving in or shrink back after being struck with fear."
After three days of ministerial-level talks in Seoul, North and South Korea issue a statement pledging to "resolve the nuclear issue peacefully through an appropriate way of dialogue". According to Kim Ching-ro, a spokesperson for South Korea's Unification Ministry: "This is a step forward. We can interpret the expression 'appropriate' talks as the possibility that North Korea is titling toward the acceptance of multilateral talks."
July 13: the Yonhap news agency in Seoul reports that North Korean diplomats had informed US State Department officials on July 8 that the reprocessing of the 8,000 fuel rods at Yongbyon had recently (June 30) been completed. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld comments: "They have told us they have nuclear weapons, they have also made assertions with respect to the pace at which they're reprocessing. Some people believe what they are saying, other people don't believe what they are saying..."
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, article entitled 'No Nuclear Blackmail', Wall Street Journal, May 22: "The standoff over North Korea's alleged nuclear-weapons programme adds stress to a nuclear-arms-control regime already in a delicate state. More than 30 years have passed since the...[NPT] was put in place, but we have yet to achieve its objectives fully. Several thousand nuclear weapons, armed and ready, continue to exist. More countries - at least eight by the last count - possess nuclear weapons, and other countries, as well as subnational terrorist groups, are suspected of working to acquire them. Projected onto this scenario, we have the defiance of North Korea - which surely has the capability to produce fissile material and launch nuclear weapons, whether or not we accept the intelligence estimates that it has already produced enough plutonium for one or two weapons, or the on-again, off-again reports of its admission of actually possessing such weapons. After a decade of non-compliance, North Korea has simply walked away from the NPT, and now, it is obvious, believes that its alleged weapons capability can be used as a bargaining chip - for security guarantees, for humanitarian aid, and possibly for raising its stature as a regional power. But at this bargaining table, the stakes are high. In seeking to defuse a volatile situation, the international community must not inadvertently legitimise the possession of nuclear weapons as a currency of power for would-be proliferators - a precedent that could jeopardize the future of the nuclear-arms-control regime."
US Secretary of State Colin Powell. addressing the ASEAN Regional Forum, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, June 18: "This is not a bilateral matter between the United States and North Korea. It affects every nation in the region that would fall under the arc of a North Korean missile."
US Deputy of State Richard Armitage, Beijing, July 4: "There are many people who are interested in rushing the international community along on this issue of North Korea... This is one that's going to require dialogue. It's going to require, I think, a lot of patience. And although it may be somewhere considered that patience is an Asian virtue, it's something that the United States [also] has."
US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, interview in the Washington Times, May 12: "[The international community] needs better tools to deal with a state like North Korea that appears to be determined to violate its international agreements, and I think we're going to work more aggressively with other states to see what other tools we can build."
Howard Baker, US Ambassador to Japan, June 27: "The threat from North Korea is grave indeed. Their threat to world peace is grave. Their threat to Japan is more immediate. ... I wonder if the North Korean government understands what a deadly serious game they are playing... [S]ooner or later, patience expires. ... No options are off the table. [We are simply saying:] 'Give up your nuclear ambition. Subject yourself to international inspection. Rejoin the international institutions that safeguard nuclear matters. Do these things.'"
Ambassador Baker, commenting on the future of the Agreed Framework, June 27: "It's a little hard for me to understand how you complete those reactors on one hand, and urge the North Koreans to dismantle their nuclear capability on the other hand. My guess is that if...they do not decide to engage in dismantlement of their weapons programme, it is unlikely that the United States would support the completion of those reactors beyond the commitments that we've undertaken in the Framework Agreement..."
William Perry, US Defense Secretary under President Clinton and a senior figure in the negotiation of the Agreed Framework, interview with Reuters, June 3: "The worst-case scenario I see is a major nuclear arms race unfolding in the Pacific. That's not a forecast, that's a logical train of events... We have maybe half a year; the first month or two are more important than the last month or two in that half-year period. We lose leverage each month that we delay. ... Once the reprocessing is completed, our options for how to deal with the problem are considerably narrowed and considerably more unattractive... What is pretty clear is that we will be faced with the spectre of another nuclear power which can use their weapons to threaten South Korea, to threaten Japan...with every prospect that they will sell some of that plutonium and nuclear bombs to the highest bidder so they might end up in American cities as well... The thought that we could head off this problem with economic pressure is optimistic to the point of being naïve. This is the country that has had people starving for years and still proceeded with this programme."
US Democratic Representative Eliot Engel, a member of the Weldon-delegation to North Korea, June 2: "I believe North Korea is willing to end their nuclear programme for some assurances from the United States that we are not seeking a regime change there. They believe the US toppled Saddam Hussein as part of the 'axis of evil' and they could be next."
Jeong Se-hyun, South Korean Unification Minister, June 16: "Various forms of pressure on North Korea - I wouldn't call them sanctions, but rather diplomatic pressure - would get the North to change its mind."
Song Young Gil, member of the South Korean National Assembly and the ruling Millennium Democratic Party, June 23: "If I am North Korea, and the other side has said they want to destroy my system and kill me, I have no choice but to arm."
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, June 30: "China hopes to see a nuclear-weapons-free Korean peninsular which enjoys lasting peace and stability... It is important to address the security concerns of a certain country, but should there be disagreements or even conflicts between certain countries the only way to solve them is through dialogue in a peaceful manner...The Chinese government has made persistent efforts [to facilitate dialogue]...and the Beijing talks represented a good beginning. But they were only a good beginning."
Japanese Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba, May 31: "If North Korea does possess nuclear weapons and has indeed finished its reprocessing...the situation would pose a grave threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia... Such a situation is extremely regrettable and absolutely unacceptable. I am afraid that further escalation of the situation would require tougher measures."
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, June 5: "I am quite sure they do not want to use nuclear weapons... Let's sit down and talk to them and find out why they're doing this."
Philippines' President Gloria Arroyo, June 5: "North Korea should build up its economy and build down its military capability, especially its nuclear weapons capability... We will do our best to help peace and stability, and help North Korea integrate into the regional economy. That is what their people need, and what the region should pledge to do."
Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand, June 5: "I believe they [North Korea] feel a sense of isolation very strongly, with mounting poverty... If any use of force is suggested, it would not bring a good result."
Reports: South Korea urges North Korea to move first over nuclear crisis, Agence France Presse, May 7; China willing to help end N. Korea nuclear crisis, Reuters, May 9; US has made 'no decision' on any new talks with North Korea, Agence France Presse, May 9; US to blame for derailing process of denuclearisation on Korean Peninsular, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), http://www.kcna.co.jp, May 12; Top Chinese diplomat urges calm over North Korea, Reuters, May 12; South Korea's Roh to urge Bush not to use force against North's nukes, Agence France Presse, May 12; Seoul seeks Bush accord on diplomacy, Washington Times, May 12; US keeps pre-emption doctrine 'open', Washington Times, May 13; North Korea declares nuclear accord with South Korea 'dead', Agence France Presse, May 13; N. Korea says nuclear pact a 'dead document', Reuters, May 13; Roh warns North Korea against nuclear 'blind alley', Agence France Presse, May 13; Joint statement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, The White House, May 14; Text - US supports international fight against N. Korean narcotics, Washington File, May 21; No nuclear blackmail, by Mohamed ElBaradei, Wall Street Journal, May 22; US, Japan 'will not tolerate' nuclear weapons in North Korea, Agence France Presse, May 23; N. Korea wants US nuclear talks first, Associated Press, May 24; N. Korea softens stance on nuclear talks, Reuters, May 25; US Congressional delegation leaves for North Korea, Agence France Presse, May 28; Text - Congressional delegation to visit North Korea, Washington File, May 29; US lawmakers arrive in Pyongyang, Reuters, May 30; US urges N. Korean aid pressure, China seeks talks, Reuters, May 31; No short-term solution to North Korean nuclear crisis - Wolfowitz, Agence France Presse, May 31; Transcript - Bush, China's Hu Jintao discuss North Korea, SARS, Taiwan, Washington File, June 1; Text - G-8 nations declare support for WMD non-proliferation regime, Washington File, June 2; US takes N. Korea nuclear claims seriously - Wolfowitz, Reuters, June 2; Transcript - Wolfowitz cites deterrence, burden-sharing with Korea, Washington File, June 3; North Korea willing to negotiate nuclear arms - US legislator, Agence France Presse, June 3; US changes won't weaken Asian deterrence - Wolfowitz, Reuters, June 3; Time running out for North Korea solution - Perry, Reuters, June 3; US, South Korea agree to US force pull-back, Agence France Presse, June 5; SE Asian leaders say economy key to N. Korea crisis, Reuters, June 5; Text - US, S. Korean officials explore ways to enhance security, Washington File, June 6; Japan, S. Korea say N. Korea nukes won't be tolerated, Reuters, June 7; KCNA on DPRK's nuclear deterrent force, KCNA, June 9; N. Korea threatens 'nuclear deterrence', Associated Press, June 9; South Korea says no to N. Korean nuclear weapons, Agence France Presse, June 10; Australia in push to stop North Korean illegal trade, Agence France Presse, June 12; Weldon briefs administration officials, House leaders on North Korea trip, Press Release from Representative Curt Weldon, June 12, http://www.house.gov/curtweldon; US, Japan, S. Korea warn N. Korea on nuclear program, missile trade, Agence France Presse, June 13; Text - US, Korea, Japan call for end to North Korea's nuclear weapons, Washington File, June 14; S. Korea - pressure could work on North, Associated Press, June 16; North Korea warns US, Japan against blockade, Reuters, June 17; N. Korea warns against economic blockade, Associated Press, June 17; North Korea denounces plans for blockade, Agence France Presse, June 17; DPRK to put spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force for self-defence, KCNA, June 18; US reviving North Korea nuclear issue in Security Council, Washington File, June 18; Britain says North Korea must be isolated, Reuters, June 18; North Korea opposes multilateral talks - Foreign Ministry, Agence France Presse, June 18; Powell meets face-to-face with N. Korean envoy, Agence France Presse, June 18; N. Korea vows to build nuclear deterrence, Associated Press, June 18; Remarks by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the Security Council Stake-out, June 18, 2003, US Mission to the UN, http://www.un.int/usa; N. Korea's nuclear ambitions are urgent issue, Powell says, Washington Post, June 19; US offers UN text on North Korea nuclear crisis, Reuters, June 19; S. Korea - too early for debate on North, Reuters, June 19; Presidency Conclusions (excerpts), EU Summit, Thessaloniki, June 19-20, 2003, EU Council website, http://ue.eu.int; Japan says no proof of N. Korea nuclear warheads, Reuters, June 20; US focuses on N. Korea's hidden arms, Washington Post, June 23; Transcript - State Department briefing, June 23, 2003, Washington File; Joint statement by European Council President Konstandinos Simitis, European Commission President Romano Prodi and US President George W. Bush on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 25, 2003, European Union website, http://europa.eu.int; North Korea - US ambassador says reactor work probably will stop, Global Security Newswire, June 27; US ambassador tells N. Korea to give up nuclear program now, Agence France Presse, June 27; North Korea warns UN against doing US bidding, Reuters, June 27; A 10-point plan for North Korea, by Representative Curt Weldon, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 30; China wants nuclear-weapons-free Koreas, Reuters, June 30; US lawmaker unveils details of plan to end nuclear standoff with North Korea, Agence France Presse, June 30; Weldon peace plan draws mixed reviews, Global Security Newswire, July 1; CIA said to find North Korean nuclear advances, New York Times, July 1; North Korea threatens 'merciless' retaliation against sanctions, Agence France Presse, July 1; North Korea could be developing compact nuclear weapons, Agence France Presse, July 1; Japan unhappy with N. Korea call for 4-way talks, Reuters, July 3; Japan wants N. Korean nuke project halted, Associated Press, July 3; Delay by UN on rebuking North Korea is urged, New York Times, July 3; Security Council divided over North Korea rebuke, Global Security Newswire, July 3; CIA believes North Korea is producing plutonium - report, Agence France Presse, July 4; US stresses no interest in N. Korea regime change, praises China role, Agence France Presse, July 4;. Korean, Chinese leaders vow to push for talks, Reuters, July 7; Text - Rep. Weldon outlines 10-point peace plan for Korean Peninsular, Washington File, July 7; Koreas agree to 'appropriate' talks on nuclear row, Reuters, July 12; US-N. Korea reprocessing rods, CNN.com, July 13; Rumsfeld noncommittal on North Korea's reprocessing claim, Agence France Presse, July 13; N. Korea 'reprocesses' nuclear rods, BBC News Online, July 13.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.