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Back to the Contents of News Review Special Edition
On May 20, the White House issued a Fact Sheet outlining its latest plans for deploying a missile defence system. Describing such a system as "an essential; component" of the post-9/11 "restructuring" of US "defense and deterrence capabilities", the Fact Sheet also notes an enthusiastic support for the 'missile shield' predating the trauma of those terrorist attacks: "At the outset of this administration, the President directed his administration to examine the full range of available technologies and basing modes for missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies. Our policy is to develop and deploy, at the earliest possible date, ballistic missile defenses drawing on the best technologies available."
On December 17, 2002, President George W. Bush identified that "earliest possible date" as 2004-2005, when, in the words of the May 20 Fact Sheet, "we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will evolve to meet the changing threat and take advantage of technological developments". Specifically, the "capabilities planned for operational use in 2004 and 2005 will include ground-based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, additional Patriot (PAC-3) units, and sensors based on land, at sea, and in space. In addition, the United States will work with allies to upgrade key early-warning radars as part of our capabilities". In terms of the key system locations, 16 ground-based missile-interceptors - designed to destroy missiles in midcourse or midflight - are scheduled for deployment at Fort Greely, Alaska, with a further 4 to be based at Vandenburg Air Force Base in California. In addition, up to 20 sea-based interceptors - designed to destroy missiles in the early stages of flight (boost- and ascent-phase) - are scheduled for deployment on three AEGIS ships.
An apparently minor change in terminology between the President's December 17 statement and the May 20 Fact Sheet caused some controversy. In his statement, Bush referred to his intention to "field" initial missile defence systems in 2004/2005; as quoted above, the Fact Sheet refers explicitly to deployment. According to analysts, a new weapon can be 'fielded' prior to its 'deployment' as a fully developed and adequately tested system. The commitment to 2004-2005 'deployments', therefore, could result in substandard and unproven systems entering full operational service with no further certification required - even though the administration continues to describes the "initial set of capabilities" as a "test bed" intended to consolidate the missile defence development programme.
President Bush's formal order to the Pentagon was issued in the form of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-23), dated December 16. The Directive - leaked to The Washington Times following the release of the May 20 Fact Sheet - states: "In light of the changed security environment and progress made to date in our development efforts, the United States plans to begin deployment of a set of missile defense capabilities in 2004." As Washington Times journalist Bill Gertz pointed out, breaking the story on May 27, the December 16 Directive, unlike either the December 17 statement or May 20 Fact Sheet, explicitly mentions North Korea as a possible source of ballistic missile attack.
On June 23, two senior Democratic Senators - Carl Levin and Jack Reed, both members of the Armed Services Committee - voiced their concern about the apparent attempt to 'cloak' a pre-determined plan to begin full missile defence deployments as early as 2004. According to Levin: "Any decision to deploy missile defence prior to conducting operational testing would be contrary to current law, fiscally irresponsible and would also call into serious question the effectiveness of the defence". Reed urged the Pentagon "to conduct realistic operational testing on the 2004 missile defence systems as early as possible, prior to asserting that the systems are deployed and proven". Reed added: "In December 2002, President Bush issued a statement announcing his intention to 'proceed with fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities' in 2004. During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing...on March 18, 2003, Department of Defense officials...told the committee that the missile defenses to be fielded in 2004 will be used to conduct more realistic operational tests..." Joseph Circincione, a senior analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the Global Security Newswire (June 23): "It's clear to me that they're [the administration] trying to slip something past the Congress and the American people... The administration laid down a smokescreen to prevent Congressional objections to actually deploying a weapons system that hasn't been tested. And when they clearly got Congress' OK for this, they pulled back the curtain and revealed that this is a deployment after all, establishing the precedent of deploying the system without testing it." However, Rick Lehner, a spokesperson for the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency (MDA), told the newswire (June 23): "Fielding is deployment, deployment is fielding. It's just whatever word you want to use".
The broader context of the semantic dispute is the persistence of technical problems dogging the build-up to the 'test bed' deployments.
On June 16, a test of the planned AEGIS sea-based interceptor ended in failure. According to a June 18 statement issued by the MDA, "preliminary indications are that the SM [Standard Missile]-3 interceptor missile deployed its Kinetic Warhead, but an intercept was not achieved. The primary objective of this test was to evaluate the SM-3 Kinetic Warhead's guidance, navigation and control operation in space using an upgraded solid divert and attitude control system (SDACS). Government and industry officials will conduct an extensive analysis of the flight test, and the results will be used to improve the AEGIS BMD development and testing program. This was the fourth flight test of the AEGIS BMDS System against an Aries target, with the first three tests resulting in successful intercepts of the target missile."
Also on June 19, MDA spokesperson Chris Taylor told reporters that such setbacks were both minor and predictable: "You test a little, you learn a lot and you continue to go forward. This is rocket science."
As detailed in recent issues, problems have also been mounting in the testing programme for the ground-based midcourse missile defence (GMD) system. The last intercept test - the eighth, and the third failure - took place in December 2002. According to reports, nine of the remaining eleven tests scheduled to precede the initial deployments have been cancelled. (See the online version of the last News Review for details and reaction.)
On May 8, responding to an inquiry from Senator Bill Nelson (Democrat), the independent US General Accounting Office (GAO) expressed concern over the Pentagon's decision to cancel one of these tests - Integrated Flight Test (IFT)-16 - purported to contain important new technical elements. In a letter to Senator Nelson, the Ranking Minority Member on the Committee on Armed Services' Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Robert E. Levin, GAO Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, stated:
"This test was planned for the third quarter of fiscal year 2004... We found that the primary objective of IFT-16 was similar to that of past flight tests. The test was planned to assess the ability of GMD components to work together as an integrated element, capable of engaging and destroying a mock warhead. However...IFT-16 engagement conditions and components differ from those of earlier tests. Had the Missile Defense Agency conducted IFT-16, it would have accomplished the following:
Additionally, with the cancellation of IFT-16, MDA expects to have a 13-month gap between IFT-15, planned for January 2004, and IFT-17, scheduled for February 2005."
On June 4, the GAO issued a report outlining more general reservations about the MDA's handling of the missile defence programme. Entitled Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks Remain, the Report Abstract reads:
"The Department of Defense (DoD) would like to build a capable missile defense system that paces an ever-evolving threat. This is an expensive and risky endeavor because it requires a diverse set of technologies to be quickly developed, integrated, and deployed across an array of platforms. DoD estimates that it will need $50 billion for missile defense research and development over the next 6 years and likely additional funds in subsequent years. ... MDA is taking an evolutionary approach to developing the missile defense system by developing capabilities in spirals or 'blocks' rather than attempting to deliver all desired capabilities at one time. The agency intends to facilitate this approach by keeping requirements flexible before beginning activities to integrate technologies into a planned block, following a knowledge-based development plan, and demonstrating that technologies work as intended before beginning system integration of a block. ... However, MDA has not adopted some knowledge-based practices regarding long-term investment decision-making and, as a result, the missile defense program's success could be hampered. First, MDA is not making an early determination of the full cost of a capability. ... Second, DOD is not allocating a 'wedge' of funds in its Future Years Defense Plan for system production and operations. Without this wedge, DOD may not have the funds needed to procure and maintain the missile defense system. In addition, the President's directive to begin fielding a missile defense capability by 2004 places MDA in danger of getting off track early and impairing the effort over the long term. This danger is highlighted by MDA's decision to not follow some of its knowledge-based practices as it develops the first block of the system. For example, MDA is beginning system integration of its first block with immature technology and limited testing. While doing so may help MDA meet the President's deadline, it also increases the potential that some elements may not work as intended."
With regard to the long-term direction of the US missile defence programme, many in Congress fear the possible development of nuclear-armed interceptor missiles. Although no funding for such a system is currently being sought by the Pentagon, on May 21 the Senate unanimously adopted a bipartisan amendment to the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Authorization Bill prohibiting the "research, development, test and evaluation, procurement or deployment of nuclear armed interceptors in a missile defense system". The amendment was sponsored by Dianne Feinstein (Democrat) and Ted Stevens (Republican). Introducing the measure, Feinstein stated: "A nuclear armed interceptor is a defensive missile that uses a nuclear...explosive tip to destroy its target. It is based on the premise that a large blast will overwhelm all of the components of an enemy missile. This approach overlooks a laundry-list of catastrophic side-effects that would accompany a nuclear blast in the atmosphere. In my view, the development of these nuclear-tipped interceptors would be a major mistake, and I believe that this amendment is needed to prevent us from going down this path. As a Senator from a state that could feel the brunt of radiological, chemical or biological fall-out in the event of a missile defense activation, I am compelled to act. But make no mistake about it - every state in the Union faces the spectre of contamination. It is critical the senate take a leadership role by preventing such research and development."
Note: the FY 2004 Defense Authorization Bill, passed by the House and Senate on May 22, includes $9.1 billion for ballistic missile defence, exactly the sum requested by the administration. By far the most expensive item within this total is the ground-based midcourse defense 'segment', receiving $3.6 billion.
Maximising international cooperation and participation in a wide range of missile defence projects forms a key Bush administration priority. In the words of the May 20 Fact Sheet: "Because the threats of the 21st Century also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against these threats. Missile defense cooperation will be a feature of US relations with close, long-standing allies, and an important means to build relationships with new friends like Russia. Consistent with these goals:
As part of our efforts to deepen missile defense cooperation with friends and allies, the United States will seek to eliminate impediments to such cooperation. We will review existing policies and practices governing technology sharing and cooperation on missile defense, including US export control regulations and statutes, with this aim in mind. The goal of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is to help reduce the global missile threat by curbing the flow of missiles and related technology to proliferators. The MTCR and missile defenses play complementary roles in countering the global missile threat. The United States intends to implement the MTCR in a manner that does not impede missile defense cooperation with friends and allies."
Meeting in St. Petersburg on June 1, President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a statement on the 'New Strategic Relationship' between the two countries. The statement declared: "We will intensify efforts to confront the global threats of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, that threaten our peoples and freedom-loving peoples around the world. In this regard, we declare our intention to advance joint concrete proposals in the area of missile defense which will help deepen relations between the United States and Russia."
On June 12, a NATO Press Release announced that the Alliance's "new Missile Defence Feasibility Study (MDFS) has cleared a major funding hurdle and with this has achieved a key milestone in...efforts to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces, and population centres against the full range of missile threats. The Defence Ministers noted at their meeting on June 12, 2003 at NATO HQ [in Brussels] the excellent progress and expressed their confidence that the new study will be under contract by October 2003 to coincide with their informal meeting in Colorado Springs, United States." According to the release, the study - expected to last 18 months following the award of a contract - will undertake three main tasks: 1) examining options with regard to defence against the "full range" of missile threats, and in the process defining NATO "consultation" and "command-and-control architectures and systems"; 2) determining "the best mix of systems and capabilities to obtain a NATO missile defence architecture to meet the Military Operational requirement, considering performance, cost and risk"; 3) recommending "options and configurations for system elements, including sensors and command-and-control, that are consistent with NATO and national missile defence capabilities, both planned and existing".
Joint work between NATO and Russia on countering sub-strategic (theatre- or battlefield-range) missile threats is already underway. In Madrid on June 4, meeting at the foreign ministerial level, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) issued a statement welcoming "the progress that has been made in developing a common terminology and conceptual basis for potential future TMD [theatre missile defence] deployments to support a Crisis Response Operation (CRO) involving NATO and Russian forces. The statement continued: "We noted an agreement on the first phase of a detailed interoperability study addressing technical requirements and possibilities for cooperation in joint, combined operations. The study, coupled with the agreement to plan and conduct a NATO-Russia TMD Command Post Exercise in the United States, confirms the commitment of the 20 nations to develop practical approaches to working together and enhancing interoperability between Allied and Russian systems."
Speaking to reporters in Tokyo on June 3, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was asked: "I understand that you talked about missile defence with the [Japanese] Defence Minister [Shigeru Ishiba] last night. When do you expect Japan to make a decision, and do you see any real obstacles to them participating in the programme?" Wolfowitz replied: "They have much greater interest in the whole area than they did even a few years ago. I think the successful application of [Patriot] missile defence in the recent war in Iraq, and the lives that were saved by our ability to literally shoot the bullet with a bullet, has further reinforced the impetus here to apply some of Japan's remarkable technology to that problem. ... The head of the Defence Agency [Mr. Ishiba] last night was very interested in getting more information about technical details so that they can hopefully at least make some decisions in the next budget that's coming up."
MDA Director Ronald Kadish visited Tokyo on June 13. According to reports, he discussed with Ishiba the possible deployment of AEGIS sea-based interceptors (the SM-3 missile) by Japan, supplemented by Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) ground-to-air missiles. On June 21, the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper reported that the Cabinet and Security Council had decided to seek funds for the purchase of SM-3 and PAC-3 systems.
According to a June 23 article in the Japan Times, the Defence Agency recently concluded that intercepting missiles flying over Japanese territory, even if not targeted at Japan, would not violate the country's constitution. According to the paper, referring to sources in the Agency, the risk of such a missile accidentally striking Japanese territory would justify an intercept. The constitution would clearly prohibit the interception of any missile outside the nation's airspace in defence of a third country.
In Washington on June 18, US and Canadian officials held a first round of discussions on possible missile defence cooperation between the two neighbours - notably, integrating the joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) into the system's early-warning infrastructure. As reported in the online version of the last News Review, the Canadian Cabinet, and more broadly the ruling Liberal Party, is split over the wisdom of such a move, although the political momentum seems to be gathering behind some form of participation. According to an unnamed Canadian defence official, speaking to Reuters on June 18: "I think there would have to be some pretty extreme conditions for us to back right out". However, another official, quoted in the same report, commented: "Since when have we rolled over and played dead for the United States? They may put things on the table we don't like. It has to look good for us... We must make things clear to them about our point of view. We're dealing with a practical security challenge, not something out of science fiction." Presumably, the discussions will dwell in part on the deep Canadian opposition to any development or deployment of either nuclear-armed missile interceptors or the basing of any weapons, offensive or defensive, in space.
Note: on May 22, the US Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) released a report entitled Chinese Military Power, exploring the ongoing, systematic modernisation of the country's armed forces, including its strategic nuclear arsenal. According to the report, while the United States "will continue to possess overwhelming dominance over China's nuclear forces for the foreseeable future", Beijing "will do whatever it can to ensure that a US missile defense system cannot negate its ability to launch and deliver a retaliatory second strike".
Reports: US National Security Presidential Directive 23, signed by President George W. Bush, December 16, 2002 - full text available on the website of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm; Pentagon would have gained knowledge from cancelled test, Global Security Newswire, May 13; National policy on ballistic missile defense, White House Fact Sheet, May 20; Senate approves Feinstein/Stevens measure to prohibit the development or use of nuclear armed interceptors, Press Release from Senator Dianne Feinstein, May 22; US arsenal will continue to dominate Beijing's, Council on Foreign Relations says, Global Security Newswire, May 23; Bush case on defense plan cites N. Korea, Washington Times, May 27; Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic partnership, White House text, June 1; US missile defense chief to hold talks with Japan, Reuters, June 2; Transcript - Wolfowitz says US concerns over proliferation are global, Washington File, June 3; Statement - Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, Spain, Wednesday 4 June, 2003, NATO website, http://www.nato.int; Missile defense - knowledge-based practices are being adopted, but risks remain, US General Accounting Office (GAO) report, GAO-03-442, released June 4; US agency faults rush to deploy missile defense, Reuters, June 4, http://www.gao.gov; Analysis of 2004 Senate Defense Authorization Bill, Council for a Livable World, June 6; NATO missile defence advances, NATO Press Release, June 12; US prods Japan over missile defense systems, Reuters, June 13; Canada walks tightrope in US missile defense talks, Reuters, June 17; Aegis ballistic missile defense flight test conducted, US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) News Release, June 18; US sea-based missile defense fails test, Reuters, June 18; Sea-based missile misses target in test, Associated Press, June 19; Japan to deploy missile defense system against N. Korean threat, Agence France Presse, June 21; Critics say administration misled Congress on missile defense deployment order, Global Security Newswire, June 23; Tokyo allows ballistic missile intercepts over Japan, Global Security Newswire, June 23; Japan claims right to hit missiles flying past nation, Japan Times, June 23.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.