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By Mark Smith
The subscriber states to the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation, known as the HCoC, held their Intersessional Meeting on 23-25 June, their first formal meeting since the launch of the initiative last November.1 Since the launch, a further six states had signed up, taking the number of subscribing states to 106. The problems noted by so many signatories at the launch, however, remained. Specifically, no non-member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) with significant missile capability has signed, and the text of the HCoC remains tentative to say the least. The shortcomings of the initiative are widely acknowledged by its signatories and advocates: no one has tried to pretend it is anything other than a cautious first step. It should also be pointed out that there are very good reasons for regarding the lack of substance in the text as both unavoidable and necessary in light of the global distribution of missiles, the multiplicity of motivations behind proliferation, and the provenance of the HCoC in the MTCR.2
Moreover, the fact that many of the Code's provisions, especially its confidence-building measures (CBMs), are so tentative also means that subscribing to the HCoC hardly places any onerous or inequitable burdens on member states, and in fact some non-signatories such as India and Pakistan already follow some HCoC measures as part of their national policy. This does suggest that a more meaningful list of subscriber states is not out of the question, although it is unlikely to happen in the near future.
This paper provides a summary of the Intersessional Meeting, setting the deliberations in the context of mounting concern over the dangers posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, particularly those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Code, of course, should itself be viewed as but one element in a range of international efforts to address those concerns. For a comprehensive survey, readers are referred to the paper by W. Pal S. Sidhu and Christophe Carle in this issue of Disarmament Diplomacy.
Missile issues, of course, were largely overshadowed in the months after the HCoC's launch by the run-up to the war on Iraq. Initially, concerns over Iraq's missile capabilities tended to focus on the al-Hussein missiles that were believed to have been concealed from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) regime after the first Gulf War. The numbers of suspected hidden missiles varied from six to up to 20, but to date no trace of the weapons have been found by the occupying forces. However, working briefly but intensively in Iraq from November 2002 to March 2003, the inspection teams of UNSCOM's successor organisation, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), did uncover some proscribed missile activity. In February, it was announced that the al-Samoud, a liquid-fuelled ballistic missile, had been tested beyond the maximum permitted limit of 150 kilometres. After customary brinkmanship and prevarication, Iraq reluctantly agreed to the phased destruction of the system. UNMOVIC immediately began the process of tagging the missiles, but was unable to make much headway in their destruction before the invasion. A total of 25 deployed missiles, 38 warheads, 6 launchers and no less than 326 engines remained to be destroyed when hostilities commenced.3
Elsewhere, the trends of the last few years continued. Most missile programmes outside the MTCR are import-dependent to a greater or lesser extent, and cutting supply lines is therefore a potentially highly effective way to impede proliferation. The MTCR has been noticeably successful in this regard, as the unsophisticated Scud-based character of most missile development outside the regime testifies. One of the principal sources of exports continues to be North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK), which reportedly generates as much as $100 million per year from the trade, a colossal sum for a state in such economic turgidity.4 A US official recently put the figure at $560 million, although this may be a hangover figure from the 1980s when the Iran-Iraq war produced a high demand for Scud missiles.5
Whatever the true figure, US intelligence has cited sales of the DPRK's Nodong system as the prime driver of medium-range ballistic missile proliferation, and in 2002 Robert Walpole, a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official, testified that "North Korea has assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing technology source for many programs".6 Late last year, Pyongyang's export of 15 Scud missiles, bound for Yemen complete with warheads and 23 barrels of oxidiser for fuel, was intercepted by the Spanish navy in collaboration with the US, but the cargo was released after Washington admitted that "there is no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea".7
Of greater concern was the DPRK's export of longer-range missile technology to Iran. After the interception of the Yemen cargo, it was reported that transfers of Nodong technology for the Iranian Shahab programme were now taking place by air.8 Shortly before that news emerged, the US had slapped sanctions on the Chinese industrial conglomerate Norinco for assistance to the Iranian missile programme. The exact nature of the exported materials was unclear, but some reports suggested that maraging steel was involved. Maraging steel has very high tensile strength and is used for casings and propellant tanks for solid fuel missiles. As such, it is an MTCR Category II item, exports of which are subject to "case-by-case review", which means that exporters make judgements about the character of the recipient state when deciding whether to grant a licence. Iran's activities in the missile and nuclear fields, both of which can find uses for maraging steel, make it a cause for serious concern, and the US was acting correctly in flagging up the exports.
The Bush administration has always been critical of Chinese export controls policy, although most criticisms concern Beijing's willingness or ability to properly enforce controls, rather than any deliberate exporting of sensitive technology. In a recent testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Leonard Spector of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies testified that a significant part of the problem arose from the pace of radical economic reform in China, generating a rapid increase in export activity outstripping an export control system designed for a different politico-economic climate.9
Washington was cautiously welcoming when China announced it was strengthening its export control list to bring it more in line with the MTCR Annex, but there was a detectable 'actions speak louder than words' undertone to official remarks. The Chinese export control list, published after a long delay in August 200210, follows the MTCR list reasonably closely, but does not include maraging steel in its equivalent of the MTCR's Category II Item 8 (where maraging steel is listed). It does, however, mention restrictions on the applications of maraging steel, like casings. In short, the list mentions the purpose but not the material.
This, in fact, appears to be a significant part of the problem. US impatience with China's commitment to properly-enforced export controls was recently underlined by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, Paula DeSutter, who stated that, "the Chinese government appears to view missile non-proliferation...not as a goal in and of itself but as an issue that needs merely to be managed as part of its overall bilateral relationship with the United States". Border controls were not being properly enhanced, DeSutter charged, and end-use verification checks were not being implemented. Of particular concern was "business-as-usual proliferation by Chinese companies dubbed 'serial proliferators'". Norinco was cited here as a prime example, and DeSutter pointed out that the Beijing government had a pronounced tendency to make "forward movement in non-proliferation" after the US had imposed sanctions or threatened to do so.11
The sanctions, and the interception of the Yemeni cargo, indicate a 'zero tolerance' attitude on the part of the Bush administration, and the message is doubly clear when we consider that Norinco has significant links with US companies, meaning that sanctions hit home hard. The same month as the sanctioning of Norinco, companies in Moldova were also sanctioned by the US, again for exporting unspecified Category II items to Iran, and in June Japan (an MTCR member) arrested employees of one of its companies for unlicensed export of industrial grinders usable for solid fuel production to Iran.
The frustration may have influenced the setting up of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which comprises Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and the US (all MTCR members). The PSI's focus is on "pre-emptive interdiction" of land, sea and air transport of WMD and missile materials. Having conceded the lack of any legal justification for interdiction in international waters, the US has looked towards "inventive use of national laws" to intercept transfers in and over national territory.12 An inaugural meeting of participating states in Madrid on June 12 reviewed the preparedness of existing national authorities to confront - and, before that, adequately monitor and assess - suspicious shipments. A second meeting, in Brisbane on July 9-10, began to define "actions necessary to collectively or individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles". The type of action referred to is not specified, but "robust and creative" steps appear to be regarded as necessary.13
As these attempts to staunch exports continued, missile development proceeded along similar lines to previous years. In Northeast Asia, the DPRK had agreed in September 2002 to indefinitely extend its missile flight test moratorium, but within weeks, and with depressing predictability, was threatening to end the moratorium unless it was granted concessions in aid and security assurances. Despite some cruise missile tests this year, and sporadic rumours of an impending Nodong test (or even a test of the more advanced, longer-range Taepodong system) in February and March, Pyongyang's ballistic missile development programme currently still appears to be confined to static engine testing. Elsewhere in Northeast Asia, China tested an 1,800 km range missile with multiple warheads in early February.
In the Middle East, the Iranian Shahab-III now appears to be entering deployment. This was not an entirely new development, since Tehran has been thought to have an emergency capability for some time now. On July 7, however, this was taken further by an Iranian announcement that a "delivery test", apparently referring to the final test before delivery, had taken place a few weeks previously. The Shahab is a single-stage ballistic missile thought to be heavily reliant on Russian expertise and the DPRK's Nodong exports. With a range of 1,300 km, and the capacity to carry a 700 kg payload, the missile could target Israel with a nuclear warhead - provided Iran can construct such a weapon and make it small enough for delivery by the Shahab. Reports of a two-stage extended range Shahab-IV continue to circulate.
In South Asia, the depressingly concerted missile race between India and Pakistan continued. On January 8, production of Pakistan's 1,300 km range Ghauri missile began and the missile entered service with the army. Within 24 hours, India had tested its 700 km range Agni-I missile. The test was reported as successful, unlike the previous year's test of the same system, and also differed in that it used a mobile launcher. On March 6, Pakistan's 600 km range Shaheen missile entered service, followed on April 29 by another Indian test, this time of its short-range Prithvi system. India's programme hit a peak the following month, when its space-launch vehicle (SLV) successfully put an 1825 kg satellite into geosynchronous orbit.
Missile testing had therefore continued at roughly the same pace as in previous years, with - ironically enough, given its otherwise open defiance of non-proliferation obligations - the DPRK as the only significant player to forego testing. There had been no genuinely new developments, and certainly nothing to match the great shock of North Korea's 1998 Taepodong test, and the basic pattern remained the same: vertical proliferation among an identifiable group of states using mostly Scud-based technology, with missile parts and/or expertise circulating among them, together with some leakage from Russia and China. It was therefore against a familiar background that the HCoC held its first Intersessional in Vienna.
Sixty of the subscribing states attended the meeting. Discussions focused almost entirely on the technical details of implementing the HCoC, rather than its further development: this was, so to speak, a 'house-keeping' meeting, discussing implementation of CBMs, options for increasing the number of subscribing states, and the relationship between the HCoC and the UN.
The principal CBMs of the HCoC are the annual declarations on missile policy and the pre-launch notifications (PLNs) of missile test launches. Declarations are submitted to the Point of Contact in Vienna, which then circulates them to subscriber states. Progress on the annual declarations, which all subscribing states are supposed to make, appears to be slow. Only a limited number of subscribing states have thus far submitted such statements, intended to provide an outline of ballistic missile and SLV policies, and it was urged that all submissions should be in by the end of September. Little should be read into this slow pace, however, since many HCoC members do not have any missiles about which to declare a policy. The text of the Code is extremely non-committal on the content of the declarations, and contains little of substance on the issue. The Intersessional decided that no "prescriptive format" was yet required, although it was also acknowledged that this might change in the future.
PLN submissions have been received from only two states, but again little should be read into that number, since PLN are only submitted by subscriber states planning a missile test. As noted, many subscribers are non-missile states, and fewer still are regular testers, and so PLN submissions are likely to be sporadic at best. As with the annual declarations, the content and format of PLN is undefined and the Intersessional appears to have decided to keep it that way. The text of the HCoC states only that PLNs "should include such information as the generic class of the ballistic missile or space launch vehicle, the planned launch notification window, the launch area and the planned direction". Other information, such as the type and purpose of the launch and the areas affected, may be added at the discretion of the submitting state.
The practicalities of PLNs were discussed in some detail at the Intersessional, but it was concluded that the format and content should both be flexible, within certain parameters, and some basic requirements were drawn up. As well as the very basic requirements of the HCoC text, it was urged that PLNs should give as short a launch-window as possible, and should also provide as much detail about launch purpose and direction as was commensurate with national security considerations. A minimum period of notice of one week was urged but not stipulated. The format and medium of submission was similarly left open. Russia and the US already have an extensive and sophisticated test-launch monitoring system developed over the last 30 years (see below), and will be keen to see that system multilateralised, but other subscriber states apparently have doubts about this medium. The Dutch Chair of the Intersessional drew up a model PLN based on the discussions, but it was stressed that this was non-prescriptive.
The HCoC's institutional links were a further topic of discussion. At the moment, it is run on the MTCR model of a point of contact in a subscriber state's Foreign Ministry (Austria) and a rotating Chair. Subscriber states appear to want to move the HCoC closer to the UN, perhaps by a General Assembly resolution in the first instance. Such links would have the advantage of associating the initiative with the global multilateral disarmament debates. It would also, more pertinently, help to distance the HCoC from its provenance in the MTCR, which is regarded with suspicion and sometimes hostility by HCoC 'target states' such as India, Pakistan, and Iran. India, for example, declined to join the HCoC on the grounds that the Code's covert purpose was to reinforce "the existing discriminatory non-proliferation and technology denial regimes... We find the political thrust of [the HCoC text] is analogous to that of these regimes'.14
This, and the fact that the European Union (EU) members which represent the HCoC's most prominent advocates all abstained on last year's General Assembly vote to continue the work of the UN Study Group on missiles15, means that a resolution on the Code will have to be cautious. It may be that a simple recognition of the HCoC would be most acceptable in the first instance. Despite the EU abstention and US opposition, last year's vote on the Study Group does indicate the existence of a constituency that is in favour of the HCoC's purpose if not its provenance, and closer links with the UN would perhaps enable to HCoC to make the most of that constituency.
Although regional or bilateral agreements may produce genuine caps or cuts in missile development, it is unlikely that a global regime will be able to make serious headway beyond the CBM level in the foreseeable future. This does not mean, however, that such efforts are fruitless. Rather, it must be recognised that attempts to persuade states such as India, Iran and Pakistan to sign up to a regime that aims to ban or roll back missile programmes will be ineffectual as long as states in the developed world still possess long military reach, including missiles, of their own, and as long as the chronic regional insecurity that is the principal driver of proliferation remains unchanged. One of the HCoC's most pressing problems during its drafting process was the persistent suspicion among some states that the initiative represented the first step in an attempt to create a missile version of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) famous Article VI, locking technological and military inequalities into place under the guise of non-proliferation.16
Instead of trying to establish caps or rollbacks, any global initiatives on missile non-proliferation must work on the basis of the lowest common denominator. That is to say, they must contain only those commitments that any missile-possessor state can sign up to. The text of the HCoC represents a disheartening indication of just how low that lowest common denominator really is. Nonetheless, there are at least some indications of what next steps may be possible. Some of the states, for example, that conspicuously declined to participate in the Code already routinely issue PLNs on missile test launches, notably India and Pakistan. Moreover, it is difficult to test a ballistic missile of significant range without detection, so PLNs in many respects are little more than provision of information that would be gathered anyway. There are potentially greater problems with the annual declaration, since many states are uneasy with what they regard as excessive transparency of their missile possessions.
The PLN provisions of the HCoC therefore represent an area for development, and in fact a substantial amount of experience in how such regimes work has already been built-up by the US-Russian test launch-monitoring regime over the last 30 years. The regime began with the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, known as the Accidents Measures agreement, which required notification of missile tests outside national territory and in the direction of the other party, as well as notification of unidentified objects detected by missile warning systems. The following year, the Incidents at Sea Agreement required advance warning of dangers to shipping in sea regions where missiles might launch or land.
The Accidents Measures agreement was designed to reduce the risk of misinterpretation of a missile test, although it was limited in its impact by the fact that most Soviet missile tests went across its land territory towards the Kamchatka peninsula, with very few flights carrying outside its state borders. In contrast, nearly all US tests were conducted at sea and outside American territory. Although the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) II Treaty called for PLNs in any direction outside national territory, it was not until the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement that a more comprehensive PLN regime was settled. This agreement required notification of the date and launch area for ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) and SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) test launches, together with the geographical coordinates of the impact area. This information was to be transmitted through the newly established Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres.
The US and the Soviet Union monitored each other's launches through radar (such as the US BMEWS system, Soviet intelligence trawler ships, satellite monitoring, and some limited aircraft surveillance). The first suggestion that the PLN regime might be multilateralised came with the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) proposal, which included a joint missile surveillance system. In 1999, in the midst of fears over the potential effect of the Y2K 'millennium bug' on command-and-control computers, the US and Russia set up a temporary Joint Early Warning Centre from October through to January 2000, and the following June Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to share data from their respective early-warning systems.
This was a step forward from the existing system in that, as well as PLNs, the two were now exchanging early-warning data. The new system, referred to as the Joint Data Exchange Centre (JDEC), was to be implemented in three stages. In Phase One, early-warning data on ICBMs and SLBMs from US or Russia or third states would be exchanged, in Phase Two data on all ballistic missile launches with greater than 1,500 km range or maximum altitude of 500 km would be exchanged, and in the final phase data would be exchanged on launches from other states with trajectory above 500 km aimed at Russia or US, or "that could create an ambiguous situation". Although the JDEC has been moribund since 2001, it now appears that the system will finally be up and running from next year.17 A multilateral JDEC would mean a central exchange of information on PLNs, with the pay-off of access to early-warning data on other launches.
The US-Russian launch-monitoring regime developed in parallel to the quantitative system of PLNs. Alongside that path was a developing system of qualitative monitoring in which information on the type of test being conducted was obtained. This system, which included telemetry-monitoring, restrictions and bans on telemetry encryption, and even exchanges of telemetric information, was designed to verify that various arms control measures were being implemented. Close monitoring of missile tests and analysis of telemetric data reveals information on missile characteristics such as throw-weight and MIRVing (multiple warheads). Thus, restrictions on missile development can be reliably verified through test monitoring. This qualitative regime also involved a shift from negative monitoring, or not impeding the collection of information by the other party, to positive monitoring, in which information was actively supplied to the other party.
The regime appears to have worked well, and there are three reasons for this effective operation that have relevance for the JDEC. First, secondary proliferation and imports were not an issue - neither side was using imported or tested technology, and so monitoring launches would necessarily monitor the true path of development. The JDEC would struggle in this aspect, given the circulation of previously-tested technology and the close similarities of, for example, the DPRK's Nodong, Pakistan's Ghauri and Iran's Shahab systems.
Second, both the US and the Soviet Union possessed extensive and sophisticated surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities allowing them to monitor the other's test launches whether this was sanctioned by agreement or not. This meant an easily verified system in which non-compliance would be immediately apparent. While few states have the same capabilities, the JDEC might mean they wouldn't need to.
Third, both the US and the Soviet Union were willing to be open about testing. The JDEC pre-supposes such willingness on the part of signatories and this may be a problem in some cases. China, for example, balked at signing the HCoC because it wanted latitude to choose which CBMs to implement and which to ignore, which was unacceptable to the Code's drafters. PLNs do remove secrecy about launches and, by giving time for monitoring facilities to be put in place by other states, may indirectly give away more information about launches than the testing state would like. This unwillingness to be open about test details in advance may be shared elsewhere, although it is worth repeating that India and Pakistan already give PLNs before testing.
As with almost everything else about the HCoC, the benefits of a global PLN system should not be overstated, and it is in fact quite difficult to understate them. However, that should not be taken to mean that there would be no benefits. It is almost self-evident that two states as geographically close and mutually hostile as India and Pakistan are well served by taking all possible measures to reduce the risk of miscalculation or misinterpretation. PLNs are important in that respect, and not just in South Asia.
As with any CBM, the benefits of PLNs reside in political intangibles. In the case of the HCoC and possible development of the PLN system, the benefits lie in the fact that subscription represents acceptance that anarchic, Hobbesian missile behaviour is in nobody's interest, and that movement towards some basic rules of behaviour, common and open to all, is both necessary and feasible.
Such a regime, of course, would barely scratch the surface of the threats generated by missile proliferation; how much securer, for example, would Japan feel if the DPRK agreed to give advance notice of further Nodong or Taepodong tests? But no-one is pretending that the HCoC or a global PLN regime will substantially reduce threat levels. Rather, the claim is only that continued vertical and horizontal missile proliferation creates more scope for instability and miscalculation, and that there are consequently heightened incentives for predictable behaviour. Worst-case thinking tends to flourish best in the absence of reliable information, and while provision of information such as the HCoC's PLNs and annual declarations is certainly a limited cure for the insecurity generated by missile development, the modest impact of such basic working relationships should not be dismissed. Stopgap solutions, after all, are better than a widening gulf.
1. For the full text of the Code, a list of the initial subscriber states, and statements and documents from the launching conference in The Hague, see the website of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0211/doc13.htm. For a report on the launching conference, see Mark Smith, 'Stuck on the Launch Pad? The Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct Opens for Business', Disarmament Diplomacy No. 68, December 2002/January 2003, pp. 2-6.
2. Mark Smith, 'On Thin Ice: First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct', Arms Control Today, July/August 2002, pp. 9-13.
3. Thirteenth Quarterly Report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, S/2003/580, 30 May 2003. The engines included the 380 surface-to-air missile engines imported from Ukraine.
4. Marcus Noland, 'North Korea's External Economic Relations', February 2001. Institute for International Economics.
5. The $560 million figure is cited in 'US Accuses North Korea of Narcotics Trade', Financial Times 4 December 2002, p. 11. The possibility that this is reliant on outdated sales patterns is raised by David Wright in 'The Case for Engaging North Korea', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March-April 1999.
6. Statement for the Record to the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Stratgeic and Nuclear Programs, February 9, 2000. See also, statement of Robert Walpole, hearing on 'The CIA National Intelligence Estimate of Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015' before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, March 11, 2002.
7. 'Sailing On, the Ship with a Hold Full of Scud Missiles', Guardian, December 12, 2002, p. 9.
8. 'Iran Importing North Korean Missiles by Air', Global Security Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative,http://www.nti.org, June 16, 2003.
9. Testimony of Leonard S. Spector before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, hearing on China's Proliferation Policies and Practices, July 24, 2003.
10. China first announced its intention to publish such a list on November 21, 2000, as part of a landmark Foreign Ministry statement committing Beijing not "to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers)." The continued: "China will, based on its own missile non-proliferation policy and export control practices, further improve and reinforce its export control system, including by publishing a comprehensive export control list of missile-related items including dual-use items." Publication of this "missile-related export control list and related regulations" was promised "at an early date". (For the full text of the statement and US reaction, see Disarmament Diplomacy No. 52, November 2000, pp. 43/46.) This "early date" turned out to be August 25, 2002, with the release and immediate entry into force of the 'Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies', attached to which was a 'Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies Export Control List." A Foreign Ministry statement described the documents as "another important step taken by the Chinese government in line with its non-proliferation policies". For the text of the regulations and related documentation, see http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0208/doc03.htm.
11. Statement by Paula A. DeSutter, US Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, July 24; available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/doc14.htm.
12. Rebecca Weiner, 'Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD Materiel', Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 16, 2003.
13. 'Chair's Statement, Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting, Brisbane, July 9-10 2003', http://www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/docs/0307/doc04.htm.
14. Transcript of press briefing by the official spokesperson, Shri Navtej Sarna, 15 November 2002, on the Inidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.meadev.nic.in/news/briefing.htm. Rakesh Sood also testified to the UN First Committee in New York that "there has been in recent years an excessive reliance on export controls in the name of non-proliferation by select groups of countries". Rakesh Sood, Representative of India, Statement to the UN First Committee General Debate, October 7, 2002; see Acronym website and website of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, http://www.meadev.nic.in.
15. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 57/71, November 22, 2002. The resolution was adopted by 104 votes to 3 with 60 abstentions. The three votes against were registered by Israel, the Federated States of Micronesia and one MTCT member, the United States. Almost all MTCR states abstained (the two exceptions were Brazil and Russia). For a discussion of the origin and deliberations of the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts (UNPGE) on Missiles, see the paper by Sidhu & Carle in this issue of Disarmament Diplomacy.
16. Article VI of the NPT, of course, places an obligation on the five nuclear-weapon states recognised by the treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". Regardless of the whether this provision has been honoured more in the breach than the observance, the HCoC, as currently constituted, contains no similar commitment to balance missile non-proliferation and missile disarmament objectives.
17. 'Joint Early Warning Centre to Open Next Year', Global Security Newswire, http://www.nti.org, July 17, 2003.
Dr. Mark Smith is a Research Fellow at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, UK.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.