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Rebecca Johnson
In 2004, the third Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has to do what its name implies: it has to prepare for 2005. For this it has two kinds of task:
1) To produce a consensus report with recommendations to the Review Conference1; and
2) To finalise the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference2.
The first task can, in turn, be divided between procedural recommendations on issues such as allocating special time or establishing subsidiary bodies for certain issues in 2005, and substantive recommendations, i.e. recommended text on the NPT's articles, objectives and substance.
While the Chairs of the first and second PrepComs3 developed summaries of the debate under the own auspices, not requiring consensus, the Chair of the third PrepCom, Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadinigrat of Indonesia, does not have that option: he must aim for a consensus document. In view of the significant political differences, consensus on substance will not be easy. Most believe it will not be possible, as few states will want to compromise on seriously-held positions before they have to, i.e. before the endgame stages of negotiations on the final document in 2005. Similarly, while it would be useful to have discussion in 2004 about what 'products' (documents and agreements) states would like to see in 2005 and the issues for which they are most interested in getting subsidiary bodies or special time, it is highly unlikely that agreement will be achieved on these now. Nor, from past experience, are such decisions necessary or particularly important.
Much could change in the intervening year, so it is more useful to have states lay out their proposals and expectations in 2004, but without hardening positions by forcing premature negotiations. The positions can be considered at this PrepCom, but it will be most productive if the President designate (expected to be Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil) then carries out consultations over the coming year, which will improve the chances of getting such substance-related procedures and mechanisms agreed so that the Review Conference can move forward effectively.
While providing a mechanism for airing and discussing the priorities and challenges facing the Review Conference, the 2004 PrepCom should principally aim to get the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference agreed. That is the practical and necessary task. All else is rehearsal.
The major themes likely to dominate the PrepCom in 2004 and the Review Conference in 2005 are noncompliance and implementation. In her statement to the CD on March 25, the United States' new ambassador, Jackie Sanders, who is also 'Special Representative of the President for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', gave a preview of US intentions. Referring to President Bush's speech of February 11 on non-proliferation4, Sanders gave positive mention to Libya's decision to forego its nuclear weapons ambition, and negative attention to North Korea. A single sentence that managed to avoid mentioning Pakistan linked two other concerns: "the startling revelations about nuclear black market activities and Iran's continued unwillingness to cooperate fully with the IAEA"5.
Sanders devoted the greater part of the statement to emphasising what the US has done to comply with its Article VI obligations, though she avoided mentioning the concerns raised by many non-nuclear weapon states about US intentions with regard to the multilaterally negotiated comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), a cornerstone of the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT. Nor did she take the opportunity to deny persistent rumours that the Pentagon wants to develop new nuclear weapons, including 'mini-nukes' and bunker busters.
So we can expect the weapon states, led by the United States, to cry 'violation' and point fingers at Iran and North Korea, while many non-nuclear weapon countries will cry 'noncompliance' as they point at the weapon states.
States parties and civil society have to consider what they want to happen in the world and what they want to achieve in the 2005 Review Conference, and then build towards these objectives, using the PrepCom as a stepping stone.
The challenges for the nonproliferation regime are familiar:
A further, important challenge is the failure of some or all of the nuclear weapon states to comply with their article VI obligations on nuclear disarmament, especially with regard to: the CTBT and the 13 Steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Since 2000 we have witnessed negative developments and trends inconsistent with the NPT undertakings from the nuclear weapon states.
The Bush Administration has modernised United States nuclear policy and strategy, as enunciated in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy. As part of this, the United States is moving away from the high yield city-obliterators of the cold war and seeks to develop smaller, tactical nuclear weapons, such as deep penetrating bunker busters or mini-nukes, which are regarded as more flexible and usable.
If significantly new designs are employed, such weapons would require to be tested, and pressure has continued to mount from some sectors of the Bush administration for the United States to revoke its signature on the CTBT and resume nuclear testing in Nevada. Therefore, although the SORT (Moscow) Treaty and revised nuclear posture together imply a reduction in sole reliance on nuclear weapons for US strategic offence and deterrence, there appears to be an attempt to lower the threshold for use - the shifts in the language for explaining the doctrine of use are more than just linguistic gymnastics. The aim of some key officials is to make nuclear weapons more useful, a tool in the defence arsenal rather than a concept for deterrence that they do not really trust. An example of the 'John Bolton' approach to the NPT was revealed in Geneva, when Ambassador Jackie Sanders resurrected the apparent Article VI link between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament that the 2000 Review Conference had severed: "we must also not forget that Article VI further requires NPT parties to negotiate a 'Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control'."6
Russia retains a sprawling nuclear arsenal comprising enough strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to destroy the world several times over. Nevertheless, press reports from Xinhuanet dated February 18 quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin saying that the military will be equipped with new strategic weapons and Russia may begin building its own missile defence system. Putin reportedly said the new strategic weapons would be "capable to hit targets deep inside continents at hypersonic speed and change the altitude and direction of their flight".7
This was followed by an Associated Press report that Russia had successfully tested a hypersonic anti-Star Wars weapon capable of penetrating any prospective missile shield. Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky, the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, told a news conference that the prototype weapon proved it could manoeuvre quickly enough to make "any missile defence useless".8 No doubt such reports are part of Russia's diplomatic judo with the United States over ballistic missile defence (BMD), but the implications are nonetheless worrying and, if carried out, would contravene Russia's NPT undertakings.
China is known to be proceeding with an ambitious modernisation programme started in the last decade, including MIRVing its warheads and building more sophisticated nuclear weapons delivery systems. Joining the NPT in 1992 was useful in bringing China closer to the international community, as epitomised by its difficult decision to sign the CTBT in 1996, but the NPT has had little or no influence on the pace of China's development of its nuclear forces.
France reportedly anticipates its current nuclear systems remaining robust for at least the next three decades. It is safe to say that France is not planning to dismantle those systems early to comply with the 13 steps of the NPT Plan of Action for nuclear disarmament in a timely manner. The full implementation of Article VI, by French calculations, seems to exist in a very far distant future, if at all.
Britain9 is now the smallest of the NWS, having brought its nuclear arsenal down to one system (Trident submarines) and no more than 200 warheads. Her Majesty's Government also directed the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston to conduct research into verifying nuclear disarmament, the fruits of which have been presented at various meetings since 2000, including past NPT PrepComs.
A problem arises, however, if we look more closely at the December 2003 White Papers on Defence and Foreign Policy.10 The December 2003 Defence White Paper, entitled "Delivering Security in a Changed World" states that Britain is "committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons". It then undermines this laudable commitment by citing a "continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals" as grounds for asserting that Trident "is likely to remain a necessary element of our security". Moreover, the White Paper notes: "Decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed this Parliament but are likely to be required in the next one. We will therefore continue to take appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability is kept open until that decision point."
In view of these worrying developments, it is important to keep pushing for full implementation of the 13 steps and for the Article VI obligation to be taken as seriously as the treaty's other provisions. At the very least, in 2004 and 2005, we must reject any attempts to let these important undertakings be ignored or dropped, and we must refuse to allow them to be rolled back under the pretext of being updated. There is no longer a question of working out or agreeing what the disarmament obligations mean in practice. The review conferences of 1995 and 2000 addressed such questions. We all know what ought to be done, but key states lack the political will to implement their undertakings. The NPT is too convenient for the nuclear weapon states, and the treaty's history teaches us that diplomacy and reviews, though helpful, are too limited to bring about the political changes necessary for nuclear disarmament to be achieved.
Therefore we must pursue nuclear disarmament through the NPT and also in parallel with it, in our capitals and defence ministries as well as in the international treaty meetings. Not just because Article VI was part of the Treaty's grand bargain or because nuclear disarmament is an end in itself, but because international security requires nuclear nonproliferation, and nonproliferation is inherently unachievable, unstable and unsustainable without the elimination of nuclear weapons from all the world's arsenals. This requires of course that the existing regime be strengthened and adapted, but it necessitates far more direct engagement and action by civil society and the non-nuclear nations as well, including those still clinging doctrinally to the outdated nuclear umbrella, when it undermines their arguments that nuclear weapons are weapons of terror that should be banned.
I concluded in my report of the 2003 PrepCom11, that faced with these serious challenges, the NPT's focus is narrowing at the very time it needs to grow. To retain respect and utility as an important tool of nonproliferation and disarmament, a serious overhaul, in four fundamental areas, is now required:
Reduce incentives to acquire nuclear technology and weapons: The NWS must stop treating nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, which means that nuclear disarmament must be restored at the heart of the non-proliferation regime; and the problematic contradiction of Article IV's promotion of nuclear fuel will finally have to be dealt with.
In this regard, it must be noted that there are two routes for acquiring nuclear weapons: theft or purchase of nuclear devices or materials; or establishing facilities to produce nuclear energy and then nuclear weapons. Nonstate actors will choose the first, but they get them from those who have the second. Two worrying aspects of the revelations about the A.Q. Khan nuclear network are:
i) the confusing messages deriving from the fact that he has not been put on trial and that the major states have collaborated in this decision; and
ii) the interconnections between Khan's nuclear WalMart and business interests in the UK, Malaysia, South Africa, Dubai and no doubt several other choice locations; and that these companies and industries are often part of the wider arms trading networks that exploit loopholes in national and international laws and regulations.
As Britain's 1996 Scott Inquiry into arms trading with Iraq in the late 1980s exposed, the familiar contradiction between the IAEA's roles as nuclear energy promoter and nuclear proliferation preventer is reproduced by governments around the world. While some departments are directed to work on preventing proliferation, trade departments may simultaneously be trying their utmost to promote the products of defence and defence-related industries, some of which purvey proliferation-promoting technologies. This governmental compartmentalisation all too often means that nonproliferation and security lose out to the financial power and influence of commercial and political interests.
Address the security concerns of potential proliferators and their neighbours. Giving rather different meaning to pre-emption and preventive action than the military strikes envisaged in neo-conservative doctrine, this should be done proactively, as a matter of course, not just in reaction to nuclear threat or blackmail (which tends to reinforce proliferation incentives).
Restore the credibility and effectiveness of arms control and the international rule of law. When powerful governments engage in negotiations and then cherry pick the bits they like, they undermine the regime as a whole and steal security from everyone.
Increase verification and enforcement powers: Start by making the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) mandatory. Provide a mechanism for NPT States Parties and not only the IAEA Board of Governors to deliberate on questions of noncompliance and enforcement.
The strengths as well as the limitations of the 2003 PrepCom, as with its predecessor, are making it ever clearer that the NPT review process is inadequate to the task of dealing with the kinds of proliferation challenges now threatening international security.
The Treaty does not now need an enhanced review process; it needs a structure and mechanism for states parties to take responsibility for compliance, implementation and enforcement of its obligations on a continuing and annual basis, with provision for 'emergency meetings' in the event of particular threats to the nonproliferation regime, such as happened when North Korea announced its withdrawal or could happen if any of the nuclear weapon states revoked their signatures on the CTBT or resumed nuclear testing.
If NPT parties are not willing to take responsibility for adapting and strengthening the treaty regime further, they must expect civil society to lose patience and demand more far- reaching and concerted action to bring about a safer, nuclear weapon free world, such as the Mayors for Peace and others will be advocating in New York. We need to convert the NPT to a prohibition regime by ensuring full implementation, including the 13-step plan of action agreed by NPT parties in May 2000. Alternatively, we could construct a purpose-built prohibition regime by negotiating a protocol to the treaty or reviving calls for a nuclear weapons convention.
Such initiatives are still some way into the future, but if we really care about making this world safe from the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction we need to take nuclear as well as biological and chemical weapons out of the security doctrines of all governments and commit to a multi-layered, multi-tiered mix of national and multilateral measures, underpinned by taboo, better intelligence and legal and institutional tools to ensure prevention, detection, disarmament and verification.
1. "At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference." Paragraph 7 of "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the NPT", NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part I).
2. Paragraph 8 of "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the NPT", NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part I).
3. Ambassador Henrik Salander of Sweden in 2002 and Ambassador László Molnár of Hungary in 2003.
4. See Disarmament Diplomacy 75 (January/February 2004).
5. Jackie W. Sanders, Ambassador for the US to the CD, March 25, 2004.
6. Ibid.
7. Xinhuanet, February 18, 2004.
8. Associated Press, February 19, 2004.
9. See updates on British nuclear developments in this issue: Di McDonald, Siân Jones and Rebecca Johnson, 'Why is Britain's Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure being Upgraded?'; and Nicola Butler, 'US-UK Nuclear Weapons Cooperation Up for Renewal', Disarmament Diplomacy 76 (March/April 2004).
10. 'UK International Priorities', Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Cm 6052, December 2003, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FCOStrategyFullFinal.pdf. 'Delivering Security in a Changing World', Ministry of Defence, Cm 6041-I, December, 2003, http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/publications/whitepaper2003/volume1.pdf. See also Nicola Butler, 'UK White Papers on Defence and Foreign Policy', Disarmament Diplomacy 75 (January/February 2004).
11. Rebecca Johnson, "Rogues and Rhetoric: The 2003 NPT PrepCom Slides Backwards", Disarmament Diplomacy 71 (June/July 2003).
Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.