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On March 8, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported Iran to the UN Security Council. On March 29, the President of the Security Council issued a statement giving Iran thirty days to halt its uranium enrichment activities or risk - what? Sanctions? Bombing? Barring from the World Cup? Another visit from the EU-3 Foreign Ministers? The heat under the Iranian nuclear programme has clearly been turned up, but it remains to be seen whether the result will be a diplomatic resolution or conflagration.
On March 30, Iran's Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, delivered a combative speech to the Conference on Disarmament, putting Iran's side of the argument. In addition to restating familiar positions, Mottaki made one new proposal: "establishment of regional consortiums on fuel cycle development with the participation of regional countries which have already developed fuel cycle programs at the national level and intend to develop further their program for civilian purposes." This bears superficial similarities to ideas floated by others and develops the proposal President Ahmadinejad put forward at the UN General Assembly, but it is now clear that Iran envisages itself as a nuclear fuel supplier in such a regional consortium, not as a recipient, which isn't quite what Bush or the EU-3 had in mind. Iran has also threatened sanctions of its own and carried on testing missiles. On April 3 it test fired "the world's fastest underwater missile", capable of destroying large ships or submarines.
The Iranian nuclear stand-off bears many of the hallmarks of a no-win situation, and yet the stakes are so high that for the sake of both international security and the Iranian people, a diplomatic solution needs urgently to be found. Arrogance, mistakes and miscalculation abound on all sides. The Presidents of Iran and the United States and their respective spokespeople are guilty of escalating the crisis with bellicose rhetoric, moralistic preaching and scarce-veiled threats of 'harm and pain'. More sophisticated thinkers in both camps know that there are rights and wrongs on both sides. In demanding to exercise its 'right' to enrich uranium, Iran has knowingly utilised the irreconcilable contradiction and hypocrisy at the core of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The use of military force, such as rash talk of "surgical strikes" by the United States or Israel, would be disastrous. The international community must avoid such counterproductive seductions of a 'quick fix', including sanctions that would harm Iran's people and unite them behind the nuclear pushers. Innovative approaches need to be developed instead, to prevent new nuclear weapons programmes and provide developing countries with better assistance to meet their energy needs. The present crisis needs careful handling, or Iran's feeding of its uranium enrichment cascades will precipitate a proliferation cascade that will spin out of control until nuclear weapons are used.
The chronology that follows features substantial excerpts from various IAEA and UN documents and the speech by the Iranian Foreign Minister to the CD.
September 24, 2005: IAEA Board adopts resolution on "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", (GOV/2005/77). Led by the United States, there were 22 votes in favour, including the EU-3 and India, and one (Venezuela) against, with 12 abstentions, including China and Russia.
The resolution deplored that "Iran's policy of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement". In seven operative paragraphs, the resolution found: "that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute;" and "that the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities referred to in the Director General's report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". It requested the IAEA Director General to "continue his efforts to implement this and previous Resolutions and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his report of 2 September 2005 (GOV/2005/67) to the Board." The resolution also called on Iran "to observe fully its commitments and to return to the negotiating process that has made good progress in the last two years" but stopped short of referring Iran to the UN Security Council, despite pressure from the United States. Although the resolution intended to send a strong signal to Iran, it also provided more time for Iran, the IAEA and the EU-3 to try to resolve the impasse.
November 18, 2005: IAEA Director General's report required Iran to provide additional information on its enrichment programme. Questions were particularly raised about particles of high enriched uranium (HEU); the acquisition of P-1 and P-2 centrifuge technology from "a foreign intermediary" (believed to be Pakistan's A.Q.Khan network); Iran's experiments with uranium metal, including a document describing "casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres"; and experiments with plutonium.
December 5, 2005: IAEA questions Iran about alleged studies on the conversion of uranium dioxide into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4, known as 'green salt'). Iran claims that allegations about the Green Salt Project are "baseless", and that the documents were false and fabricated.
January 3, 2006: Iran informs the IAEA that it will resume its uranium conversion and enrichment activities suspended as part of the November 2004 Paris Agreement with the EU-3.
January 10-11: In the presence of IAEA inspectors, Iran removes seals from facilities at Farayand Technique and Pars Trash, and subsequently engages in "substantial renovation" and other R&D work that the IAEA is "unable effectively to monitor".
February 4: IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution entitled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (GOV/2006/14) which raises a number of outstanding concerns and calls on Iran to "reconsider its position" and "to understand that there is a lack of confidence in Iran's intentions... against the background of Iran's record on safeguards..." The report identifies five steps, stating that it is "necessary for Iran to:
For the first time, this resolution requires a report to go to the UN Security Council that "these steps are required of Iran by the Board". This significant step was taken after months of pressure, notably from the United States and, this time, from the EU-3, which had been frustrated by the impasse in its negotiations with Iran since Iran rejected its 'incentives package' in Summer 2005. However, the actual reporting to the Security Council is delayed for a month, until after the IAEA Board's March meeting.
February 6-11: Iran responds in a predictably angry way to the IAEA's decision to report it to the Security Council by announcing that it would suspend the voluntary implementation of non-legally binding measures, including the Additional Protocol. Iran subsequently proceeded with its uranium enrichment programme by feeding a P-1 machine with uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for the first time.
February 15-20: Iran accelerates its uranium programme by feeding a 10-machine cascade and starting vacuum testing of its 20-machine cascade.
February 27: Report by the IAEA Director-General entitled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (GOV/2006/15) notes that (para 46) "Iran has made substantial efforts over the past two decades to master an independent nuclear fuel cycle and, to that end, has conducted experiments to acquire the know-how for almost every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. Many aspects of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities and experiments, particularly in the areas of uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium research, had not been declared to the Agency" which Iran is obliged to do in accordance with its safeguards agreements under the NPT. "Iran's policy of concealment continued under October 2003, and resulted in many breaches of its obligations..." Para 47: "Since October 2003, Iran has taken corrective actions with respect to those breaches..." The report (para 53) noted that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for. Although the Agency has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Agency is not at this point in time in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran." It noted that more time was needed, that the IAEA was awaiting further information regarding some key sites, and concluded (para 54): "It is regrettable, and a matter of concern, that the above uncertainties related to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme have not been clarified after three years of intensive Agency verification. In order to clarify these uncertainties, Iran's full transparency is still essential. Without full transparency that extends beyond the formal legal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol - transparency that could only be achieved through Iran's active cooperation - the Agency's ability to reconstruct the history of Iran's past programme and verify the correctness and completeness of the statements made by Iran, particularly with regard to its centrifuge enrichment programme will be limited, and questions about the past and current direction of Iran's nuclear programme will continue to be raised. Such transparency should primarily include access to, and cooperation by, relevant individuals; access to documentation related to procurement and dual use equipment; and access to certain military owned workshops and R&D locations that the Agency may need to visit in the future as part of its investigation.
March 6-8: IAEA Board of Governors meets in Vienna.
March 8: Iran is formally reported to the UN Security Council, in accordance with the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of February 4, 2006.
In his concluding statement, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, in connection with his Report on "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Dr ElBaradei revealed divisions in the IAEA Board, where "some members" regretted Iran's lack of implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures, while "some members" had "reemphasised the distinction between voluntary confidence-building measures and legally-binding safeguards obligations" and recognised that "Iran had taken corrective measures and had been continuing to provide some transparency measures".
In a strong signal to discourage hawks that might wish to use the IAEA's decision to report Iran to the Security Council as a pretext for the use of force, Dr ElBaradei concluded with: "The continued need for diplomatic negotiations and dialogue among all parties, covering all relevant issues was emphasized as the way to reach a peaceful solution of the Iranian nuclear issue. In this regard, appreciation was expressed for all initiatives, such as the EU/Iran dialogue and the Russian proposal on a joint venture, aimed at paving the way to a speedy conclusion of the Iranian nuclear issue. Calls were made for Iran to adopt a responsive attitude towards implementing the confidence-building measures previously called by the Board. The basic and inalienable right of all Member States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their respective legal obligations was reiterated. Some members emphasized the importance of addressing the Iranian nuclear issue within the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East."
March 8: Iran's head of delegation to the IAEA Board, Ambassador Javad Vaeidi gave a combative statement to the press following the decision to report Iran to the Security Council: "In our view the process is still going on. There are two options before us. Either to compromise and cooperate or go for confrontation. We hope and spare no effort that the first option be realized. In any case we will continue to exercise our R&D activities based on our right... For now, we will have to review the situation, adopt our policy and adjust our approach to conform to the new situation." In the paragraph that was most widely shown and quoted in the media, Mr Vaeidi echoed bellicose US remarks when he commented: "The United States may have the power to cause harm and pain but it is also susceptible to harm and pain. So, if the United States wishes to choose that path, let the ball roll."
March 29: Statement on Iran and non-proliferation by the President of the Security Council. At the 5403rd meeting of the Security Council... in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/2006/15):
"The Security Council reaffirms its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and recalls the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.
"The Security Council notes with serious concern the many IAEA reports and resolutions related to Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including the February IAEA Board Resolution (GOV/2006/14).
"The Security Council also notes with serious concern that the Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.
"The Security Council notes with serious concern Iran's decision to resume enrichment-related activities, including research and development, and to suspend cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol.
"The Security Council calls upon Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, notably in the first operative paragraph of its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and underlines, in this regard, the particular importance of re-establishing full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.
"The Security Council expresses the conviction that such suspension and full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, and underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution which will also benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere.
"The Security Council strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors and commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve outstanding issues in Iran, and underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme.
"The Security Council requests in 30 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA Board, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration."
March 30: Iran's Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, delivers a statement to the Conference on Disarmament. The statement first provided a selective overview of recent progress and setbacks on nuclear, chemical and biological disarmament and nonproliferation, highlighting the United States' role as the major obstruction to progress and then addressed the CD's impasse, with repetition of the traditional NAM positions on nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Mottaki then addressed in detail the role of the IAEA and UN Security Council with regard to Iran's nuclear programme.
He castigated "[N]ew nuclear postures and doctrines which are based on development of new types of nuclear weapons, which lower the threshold of resorting to such weapons to the level of conventional confrontation scenarios and which name Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT as the targets of such weapons are in contravention of the unilateral declarations issued just before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference which decided on the indefinite extension of the NPT." Iran supports "the call of the G21 for the establishment of an ad hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention."
With regard to the fissban, Mottaki stated "A treaty on fissile materials should be verifiable in order to be capable of creating confidence. By the term 'verifiable' we mean that the treaty needs to have sufficiently elaborated provisions on its verification mechanism. We believe that the best way to proceed is to remain faithful to the already agreed languages and specifically the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein."
Turning to Iran's troubles, Mottaki argued that "Unilateralists... are particularly threatening the foundations of the Non-proliferation regime and the NPT itself. This regime has devised a very clear path in resolving the issues regarding the implementation of the safeguards agreements within the IAEA framework. The Agency has been established to, inter alia, monitor the nuclear activities of the Member States and has sufficient tools in its hand to handle the job. But the same unilateralist States while possessing and developing at the same time the most destructive and inhumane weapons, are so intolerant to let the Agency to function smoothly. They at the same time, well beyond the legal obligations of the NPT, argue for depriving the developing nations to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They try of course to justify their illegal and discriminatory approach under the guise of non-proliferation concern - a concern that we all share."
Mottaki claimed "exaggerated and unjustified propaganda is being disseminated about the peaceful nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran which has misled the international Community. While the 27 years of illegal sanctions over the implementation of Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy is being neglected, Iran's right to research on and use peaceful nuclear technology is being challenged and undermined... In the course of the past three years, the Islamic Republic of Iran, through voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and its suspension of all enrichment related activities took steps far beyond its contractual obligations in order to help build confidence...
Iran observed a voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment and related activities for three years while reiterating that "permanent cessation" of a peaceful nuclear program, which is totally legitimate and permissible under the NPT and carried out under the comprehensive safeguards of the IAEA, abrogates its inalienable right under the Treaty and therefore does not constitute a realistic prescription. As a member of the NPT Iran is still bound to its safeguard agreement with the IAEA and continues to carry out its peaceful nuclear program under close scrutiny of the Agency,
It should be recalled that the application of over three years of Agency's robust inspections system and extraordinary cooperation made by my country with the Agency is of utmost importance, which the IAEA has not experienced during its entire history. At the same time we negotiated with European, countries for removing ambiguity around Iran's peaceful nuclear program. But three years of negotiations have just added to our mistrust... Several formulations have therefore been presented in this context and... the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 60th Session of the General Assembly initiated a suggestion entailing the involvement of foreign companies in the Iranian fuel cycle program.
Fuel cycle programs have been subject of deliberations and discussions... of paramount importance for countries that have developed nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and this energy continues to have an important share in their energy mix/basket. It is evident that these countries cannot be expected to renounce their legitimate option to develop fuel cycle policies just because of the existence of non-proliferation concerns. In this context, reaching a common understanding on the arrangement to develop fuel cycle policies would be considered an important step to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
In our view one possibility to resolve the issue could be establishment of regional consortiums on fuel cycle development with the participation of regional countries which have already developed fuel cycle programs at the national level and intend to develop further their program for civilian purposes. Such consortiums would be jointly operated by the regional states and the costs and benefits would be shared by the participants. Of course countries outside the region may also participate in such regional arrangements based on the modalities agreed between the parties. The facility would also be jointly owned by the sharing countries and the work could be divided based on the expertise of the participants. The regional consortiums would be placed under IAEA safeguards which would be yet another contribution to strengthening the IAEA safeguards and increasing the scope of international cooperation in the nuclear field.
A hasty decision to involve the Security Council with Iran's case while the technical activities of the Agency are still required is yet another indication of political manoeuvring by some Western countries. It is thus clear that this approach would not serve anybody's purpose in resolving the issue and would only undermine the authority of the IAEA and the international organs which are to maintain peace and security,
I shall announce in no uncertain terms that reporting Iran's file to the Security Council is, in our view, an abuse of the international mechanism, misguided, legally unwarranted and clearly unacceptable to the Islamic Republic of Iran. This can, only be a disservice to law-based conduct of international relations and a concerted attempt to escalate the situation for short-sighted political agenda of certain powerful states.
We are grateful for the deliberations of the last week aimed at retaining this file in the IAEA, where it logically belongs to resolve any remaining question. We believe the outcome of this deliberation which requests the Director-General to report to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council, is nothing short of injustice, double-standard and power politics.
This outcome would make it that much harder for us to actively pursue further initiatives and cooperation...."
Written and compiled by Rebecca Johnson, with thanks to Felicity Hill and William Peden of Greenpeace for their reporting from Vienna and New York. Sources for documents: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org; and United Nations, http://www.un.org.
© 2006 The Acronym Institute.