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See also: 2006 First Committee Resolutions: Summary and Explanations
The 61st United Nations First Committee (FC) on Disarmament and International Security, chaired by Ambassador Mona Juul of Norway, voted on 53 resolutions and 2 draft decisions, which were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly on December 6, 2006.
Though the FC voting patterns continue to show serious divisions on many issues, there appeared to be a more cooperative and optimistic spirit in the room this year. Though nuclear issues continue to be of great concern for many states, the greatest excitement in this year's Committee was around conventional weapons, notably the arms trade. In a bold new initiative, the Committee followed up on the disappointing review conference on small arms and light weapons (SALW), held earlier in the year, by passing a break-through resolution to curb weapons sales. Entitled "Towards an Arms Trade Treaty", this begins the process towards regulating trade in all conventional weapons - from tanks to guns - for the first time.
Three resolutions condemned the nuclear test conducted by North Korea on October 9, and the Committee voted to provide support to the upcoming nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process, starting with the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting, which will be held in Vienna from April 30-May 11, 2007.
Causing disappointment to those who had hoped that the more constructive atmosphere in Geneva this year might facilitate progress in 2007 towards negotiations on a fissile materials treaty (fissban), opposition from some members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) compelled Canada to withdraw its draft fissban resolution before a vote could be taken.
On a wide range of issues, the voting patterns were similar to years past. The European Union (EU) and NATO continued to oppose or abstain on the most far-reaching nuclear disarmament resolutions, as well as anything aiming to limit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Some countries, including most if not all of the Arab League, prevaricated on conventional arms constraints, for example by abstaining on the Transparency in Armaments (TIA) resolution. And most states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty abstained on the resolution calling for its universality.
There were also, however, some significant shifts. In the wake of the disastrous review conference for the NPT in 2005, a handful of governments moved from abstaining to supporting the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and Non-Aligned Movement's nuclear disarmament resolutions. By contrast, Iran for the first time abstained on Japan's NPT-based resolution on 'Renewed Determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons', arguing that it was "not appropriately balanced".
The Bush Administration's isolation was underscored by further votes against widely-supported resolutions, including several that had previously enjoyed consensus. In addition to opposing the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the United States voted against the resolutions on negative security assurances for the first time this year and also opposed the resolution calling for a fourth Special Session on Disarmament. It reinforced last year's unilateral opposition to preventing an arms race in outer space and also constituted the sole vote against the SALW resolution, though this time without offering concerns about the budget as its excuse.
The US gave the sole opposition vote on five other resolutions. It was joined by Israel in opposing a resolution upholding the 1925 Geneva Protocol; and for a further five its opposition was bolstered by a tiny minority. In addition to Israel, cover tended to come from Britain and/or France; or the tiny Pacific-island dependencies of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau. Significantly, North Korea this year joined the United States in opposing the CTBT resolution, as well as voting against two other resolutions that condemned its nuclear test.
The First Committee made some progress on procedural questions, regarded as important because process may facilitate or impede substantive outcomes. More states - including some that are often rather quiet - participated in the general and thematic debates, as well as the inter-active informal sessions. While most of the first week's general debate statements lamented recent international disarmament failures - the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the World Summit, the CD impasse, the Disarmament Commission, and the SALW Review Conference - several governments put forward suggestions for what to do to overcome the problems.
Responding to the encouraging openness of the Chair, presentations were received from a handful of experts. Dr Hans Blix, the Chair of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which published its long-awaited report in June, presented on its key findings; and Dr Patricia Lewis, a member of the WMD Commission and director of UNIDIR, gave a fascinating talk about how disarmament negotiations are affected by "the community of practice" in which they occur and the capacity of the human brain to handle complexity.
The Chair built on the initiatives of her immediate predecessors, and increased substantive civil society participation further by inviting non-governmental representatives to address the Committee on some of the most controversial current issues, including nuclear disarmament and the iniquities of the international arms trade. A significant, interactive debate followed the presentations, which were delivered on behalf of diverse civil society perspectives by Merav Datan (Greenpeace International), Zia Mian (Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, Princeton University), Rebecca Peters (International Action Network on Small Arms) and Tom Mason (World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities). The positive engagement indicated the willingness of Member States and civil society to engage in substantive discussions if offered appropriate opportunities.
Presentations were also received from the Chair of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Verification, Dr John Barrett of Canada, and the Chair of the Secretary-General's Disarmament Advisory Board, Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs U. Joy Ogwu.
North Korea's Nuclear Test
On October 9, Ambassador Juul opened the Committee's session with a short, terse condemnation of North Korea's nuclear test, conducted in the early hours of that morning. Since the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, there have been no further nuclear tests, and it had been hoped that the ban on testing enshrined in the CTBT would be upheld, despite the political barriers in a handful of countries - notably the United States and India - that continue to impede the treaty's entry into force. Her statement was followed by the head of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, Tibor Tóth, and many other states, who expressed their outrage and determination to prevent further nuclear tests. Many also underlined the importance of bringing the CTBT into force before the norm against testing could be further undermined.
Responding to the widespread criticism, the DPRK's ambassador explained that the nuclear test was the result of North Korean perception that the law of the jungle now prevails, and that it needs the threat of excessive force to deter a powerful enemy [the United States]. Rejecting this justification, the Netherlands summed up the view of many when it pointed out that threat perceptions are about economies as well as militaries, and to avoid such negative developments, it is imperative that the international community create a multilateral system based on the rule of law, not the rule of force. We can either work to build a collective security system in the interests of all, or face more tragic and destructive instances of people and states taking their national security into their own hands. Underscoring that collective security requires negotiation and compromise, and the political will to implement all decisions reached, the Netherlands called on the First Committee, as the only global body charged with deliberating and adopting resolutions pertaining to international security, to take the lead.
The CTBT resolution won 172 GA votes with only North Korea and the United States voting against, and just 4 abstentions, including India and Pakistan, which have not yet signed the Treaty.
As in past years, many of the First Committee's most controversial resolutions dealt with nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Japan's detailed, NPT-focussed resolution, "Renewed Determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", again garnered the most votes in favour: 169 in the FC, which shrank to 167 in the General Assembly, probably due to the UN practice of not recording the votes of states whose financial contributions are in serious arrears.
Similar to last year, Japan's resolution emphasises the importance of the 13 steps agreed by the 2000 Review Conference and calls on states parties to engage constructively in the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee, which Japan's Vienna ambassador, Yukiya Amano, will chair. It also includes a preambular paragraph condemning the North Korean nuclear test, and a new operative paragraph (OP) calling on the CD to resume substantive work "considering the developments of this year in the Conference". Significantly, it bows to the US position by omitting mention of the Shannon mandate or verification in OP 11, which calls for immediate negotiations on an FMCT, but retains a strong paragraph (OP9) on the CTBT and elsewhere (OP4) refers to "the importance of applying irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency".
Although US representatives supported the resolution's condemnation of North Korea's nuclear test, calling it the "most balanced and realistic" of the nuclear disarmament resolutions, and undoubtedly welcoming the compromises made by Japan in its FMCT, they still voted against, largely because of the explicit support for the CTBT. In its opposition, the US was partnered by North Korea and India. Pakistan and Iran, both of which abstained, argued that the draft contained too much emphasis on nonproliferation, and not enough on disarmament.
Japan's resolution was closely followed by the New Agenda Coalition's statement of basic objectives, "Towards a nuclear-free world: Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", which won 157 votes in the General Assembly, up from 148 in the FC. Updated slightly from last year, the NAC resolution underlines the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals", reaffirms the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, and incorporates a new paragraph condemning North Korea's nuclear test and "all nuclear-weapon tests by States that are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and any further nuclear-weapon test by any State whatsoever". The product of several revisions, this language drew objections from India and Pakistan, as well as North Korea. As they did in 2005, France, India, Israel, the UK and US opposed the NAC resolution, to be joined this year by North Korea and Pakistan, who objected to the way in which it condemned nuclear testing. There were 12 abstentions, down from previous years.
Brazil piloted a brief but effective resolution requesting support for the upcoming NPT review cycle, beginning with the 2007 PrepCom meeting. Notably, in view of the procedural obstacles to agreeing an agenda at the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon), the resolution recalls the "outcomes" of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences, and also recalls that the 2005 RevCon was "unable to produce a consensus substantive outcome on the review of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty". The most contentious element related to the venue for the next PrepCom. After months of lobbying by Austria, backed by the EU, the 2007 PrepCom will be held in Vienna rather than New York or Geneva, ostensibly to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some, notably the United States, resisted the move to the very last. Following weeks of negotiations that continued through much of the FC, the US was persuaded to go along with the decision, after being assured by the EU that this would not constitute a precedent. Subsequently, the resolution passed the GA with 175 votes in favour; non NPT-members India, Israel and Pakistan abstained.
The most extensive nuclear disarmament resolution won the least votes. Gaining 115 GA votes in favour, primarily from the NAM, this omnibus resolution's problems are compounded by the fact that it is traditionally led by pariah-state Myanmar (Burma), and puts forward a long NAM wishlist, including the call for nuclear disarmament in a specified time frame, legally-binding negative security assurances, and an international conference on nuclear disarmament. As in past years, NATO members voted against the resolution, China voted in favour, and Russia abstained.
Fissile Materials Treaty
In 2005, to avoid exacerbating the divisions caused by the United States' rejection of verification, Canada did not table its annual fissban resolution, which for nearly ten years endorsed negotiations on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Mandate for a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". This year, following the US tabling in the CD of a short draft treaty without multilateral verification provisions, Canada tried to introduce a revised version of the resolution that omitted specific mention of the Shannon mandate or verification.
Canada's hopes that a consensus resolution would give a boost to the chances of getting work underway in the CD in 2007 were dashed when it encountered opposition to its revisions, especially from NAM countries. On realising that the resolution would not receive consensus, Canada decided to withdraw it. Since the Japanese resolution was also modified to take into account the US-driven alternative now on the CD table, that leaves the NAM omnibus resolution as the only one still to refer to the previously-consensus Shannon Mandate.
On September 8, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan finally adopted a treaty establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ), the first in the Northern Hemisphere. Instead of being endorsed with a consensus resolution, however, the new treaty encountered opposition from the United States, Britain and France, principally because of the treaty's Article 12. US representatives also expressed the fear that the treaty could impede the movement of nuclear-powered or nuclear-capable ships and aircraft through the zone.
The main objection to Article 12 appears to be that it gives precedence to previous security agreements between the five Central Asian states and Russia, which could include nuclear weapons-related commitments. Despite concerted P-3 manoeuvring, the CANWFZ resolution was passed with 128 votes in favour. Raising concerns for the treaty's future credibility, in addition to the opposition votes from Britain, France and the United States, there were 36 abstentions, mainly Western allies.
In a statement delivered by the Netherlands' ambassador, Johannes Landman, a group of 12 NATO countries explained that while they welcomed the initiative towards establishing a CANWFZ in principle, outstanding issues needed to be resolved through further consultations. Canada said that its abstention was due to ambiguity over the impact of Article 12, and hoped that consultations would resolve the issue.
Japan spoke on behalf of a group of western countries (Austria, Ireland, Japan, Malta, New Zealand, Switzerland and Sweden) that had voted in favour of the resolution. It said that the seven delegations saw the treaty as an effort to strengthen regional peace and stability, noted the expressed readiness of the Central Asian states to continue consulting with the nuclear weapon states (NWS), and encouraged consultations to move ahead.
The debates and votes on the other NWFZ resolutions were routine. Egypt's traditionally moderate resolution supporting the "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" was adopted by consensus; Israel joined, with "substantive reservations", reiterating its well-known position that peace must be achieved before the process for such a zone can begin.
By contrast - but as in previous years - Israel and the United States (joined by Palau and Micronesia) opposed Egypt's related resolution on "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", which specifically calls on Israel to accede to the NPT. The EU voted for this resolution, which garnered 166 GA votes in favour, but expressed concern that it does not mention Iran's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreements. Citing similar concerns, Canada abstained for the first time, joining Australia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, India and Tonga.
As in previous years, the US, UK and France opposed the resolution on a "Nuclear weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", because of fears that it could interfere with their practice of transporting nuclear materials and weapons through Southern Hemisphere oceans. India and Pakistan again objected to the resolution's mention of a NWFZ in South Asia, but it received 167 GA votes nonetheless, with only the P-3 opposed, and 9 abstentions. The periodic resolution on "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status" was again adopted by consensus.
Resolutions supporting the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC and CWC, respectively) were adopted by consensus, as was India's "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction". The only non-consensus resolution in this cluster, "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol", was overwhelmingly passed with 173 votes.
The CWC resolution included a new operative paragraph (OP 5) reaffirming the obligation of states parties to completely destroy their stocks of chemical weapons and facilities by the Convention's deadline. Several states, including Canada, New Zealand, South Korea and Switzerland, spoke against an extension of this deadline, the consideration of which was on the agenda of the Conference of States Parties, December 6-11, 2006.
As states prepared for the Review Conference of the BWC, scheduled for November 2006, they highlighted issues of transparency, confidence-building measures, annual meetings, national implementation, and rapid advancements in biotechnology, and Nigeria and Turkey risked US wrath by calling for a verification mechanism, which had been scuppered in 2001.
With regard to the disagreements over the 1925 Geneva Protocol, France introduced a non-paper during the thematic debate on 'Other Weapons of Mass Destruction', encouraging withdrawal of reservations to the Geneva Protocol. According to France, "[o]nly 22 States still hold reservations that are often incompatible with the commitments made within the framework of the BTWC an CWC." A list of these reservations is available on France's website.
As first occurred last year, there are now two space-related draft resolutions, both of which were adopted with overwhelming majorities. The US provided the sole opposition to "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", traditionally sponsored by Egypt and Sri Lanka, and Russia's new resolution "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities", while Israel abstained from both.
The Bush administration released its new space policy on October 13, which underscored its opposition to "the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space," and declared US intentions to "dissuade or deter others from impeding [our right to operate in space]... and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests". In the First Committee, the US reiterated its belief that there is no arms race in outer space, nor any prospect for one.
Following up on last year's new resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space, Russia's 2006 draft invites all states to submit concrete proposals on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures (CBM) regardless of their space capabilities, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly in which member states' concrete proposals would be annexed.
Although no-one took up the WMD Commission's recommendation that States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty (OST) hold a conference to commemorate its 40th anniversary in 2007, China, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela called for the OST to be strengthened and universalised, and Canada and Japan called for enhanced dialogue within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).
Coming off the major disappointment of the SALW Review Conference's failure less than three months ago, NGOs and governments managed to use the First Committee as an opportunity to continue making progress on curbing small arms. The work to control conventional and small arms and light weapons is greatly needed, both in terms of lost lives and resources. Not only do these weapons kill, they also cost. Last year, the world spent over 1 trillion dollars on the military. As asserted by civil society speakers, such resources would be better spent on improving human lives than destroying them. The Department for Disarmament Affairs' new Under-Secretary General, Nobuaki Tanaka, summed up the situation, noting the powerful economic interests that make large profits from selling weapons.
Arms Trade Treaty
Most of the energy at this year's FC swirled around the first-time resolution calling for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), led by Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the United Kingdom. Promoting the regulation of trade in all conventional weapons, the resolution proposes a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to examine the feasibility of a treaty to establish common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms. Before a crowded room of delegates and civil society, it was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 139, with only the US opposed, and 24 abstentions. Rising to 153 in the GA, this strong vote heralds the official beginning of a process that many hope will soon regulate the trade in conventional weapons - from tanks to shotguns and beyond.
In a further example of constructive partnership between civil society and open-minded governments, support for the resolution was built by consultations with states, bolstered by the facts, arguments and advocacy presented by NGOs coordinated through the Control Arms Campaign (CAC). By the time it was voted on, the resolution enjoyed wide cross-regional co-sponsorship from 116 states, with particularly strong support from Africa, Europe and Latin America. The abstentions came primarily from the Arab League. Libya, on behalf of the Arab League, complained that the resolution did not take into account several considerations that would have made it "non-selective" and "comprehensive". Several major arms exporters, including China, India, and Russia, also abstained. Russia argued that the illegal trade in conventional weapons was the main problem, so they did not see an obvious need for a treaty on the legal trade. Israel, which also abstained, expressed concern that the proposed treaty might inhibit its defence.
Exceeding expectations before the First Committee, the overwhelming support given to this resolution demonstrates that more and more governments are recognising that the lives of billions of people will be enhanced if the arms trade is controlled and reduced.
Small Arms and Light Weapons
Following the failure at the 2006 SALW Review Conference, advocates for controlling small arms used the annual omnibus resolution to create a follow-up mechanism for the Programme of Action (PoA) on SALW. The GA subsequently adopted the resolution entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects" with an overwhelming 176 votes in favour, only 1 opposed (the US), and no abstentions.
A further resolution, entitled "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus", which calls for a GGE in 2008 to "consider further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles," was adopted with 164 votes in favour, 1 opposed (the US), and 1 abstention (Japan). A separate vote on OP7, which calls for the establishment of the GGE (OP7), was similarly successful with 175 votes in favour, 2 opposed (the US and Japan), and no abstentions.
After the vote, Japan explained that it was sceptical of the utility of a GGE at this time, and questioned the judgement of expanding the UN budget to accommodate it. However, many states support the development of a separate process on controlling ammunition, which has had an uncertain place within the existing SALW process. While ammunition was included in the 2001 Programme of Action, it was controversially removed from the scope of the 2005 Tracing Instrument.
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
The annual resolution supporting the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) was again adopted by consensus. During the thematic debate, governments focussed on the upcoming CCW review conference, to be held in Geneva in November 2006, as well as the anticipated entry-into-force of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), the conclusion of the discussion on Mines Other than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM), and negotiating an international, legally binding instrument to address cluster munitions. Although the resolution does not address cluster munitions specifically, a small group of delegations also used the First Committee as an opportunity to urge that a new legal instrument on cluster bombs be developed at the upcoming CCW Review Conference.
Landmines
As the international norm banning the use of anti-personnel landmines continues to grow, discussion and contention regarding the annual resolution supporting the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty have decreased. This year, it was adopted with 161 GA votes in favour, none opposed and 17 abstentions. This indicated that states party to the Mine Ban Treaty voted in favour of the resolution and states not party either abstained from voting or, in the case of a few, supported the resolution anyway.
Despite the burgeoning norm against the use of such indiscriminate weapons, there remain significant challenges before the Treaty can be universalised, since some countries refuse to give up this weapon, which they regard as a relatively cheap form of border defence. Cuba, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, India and South Korea reiterated that they would not stop using landmines because of their security situations, though they said they sympathised with the spirit of the Treaty. According to Pakistan, adhering to the Mine Ban Treaty will not be possible without a replacement defence system.
Transparency in Armaments
The First Committee again required seven separate paragraph (and sub-paragraph) votes on the Netherlands's traditional resolution on the UN Arms Register and "Transparency in Armaments" (TIA). All seven were overwhelmingly accepted and the resolution then received support from 155 states in the GA, with none opposed and 20 abstentions. Like last year, the abstentions were led by the Arab League and Cuba, who said that it needed to be more "balanced". Syria, speaking on behalf of the Arab League, said the resolution did not take into account the special situation in the Middle East. According to its explanation of vote, Cuba did not appreciate the Register's increased emphasis on small arms and light weapons instead of nuclear weapons, which the Register does not include.
Behind the scenes, many governments were engaged in consultations to try to prepare for a more productive CD session in 2007. The annual report from what many continue to describe as "the world's sole multilateral treaty negotiating body" was sponsored by the last CD President of its 2006 session, Slovakia, and adopted by the First Committee without a vote. There were, however, some interesting public exchanges on the future of the CD during the thematic debate on disarmament machinery. South Africa, the first of six states scheduled to hold CD presidencies for four working (sessional) weeks each in 2007, is seeking ways to get the CD back to work, at the very least building on the system of substantive discussions set up jointly by the 2006 presidents.
Dr. Blix rightly noted in his address to the First Committee that the challenges to the disarmament and nonproliferation regime, though significant, are the exception, since the overwhelming majority of states agree on where to go and the first steps that need to be taken to get there. As the international community prepares for the 2007 CD session and NPT Preparatory Committee, it should keep in mind this deep level of agreement and the generally cooperative spirit displayed at the First Committee.
Though votes in the First Committee this year once again illustrated wide international support for nuclear and conventional disarmament, it cannot be ignored that a handful of states appear to be hardening their opposition to practical progress, which does not bode well for next year in the CD and NPT PrepCom.
Even so, it is important to recognise that substantial developments are underway to further restrict conventional armaments, and more governments supported the major nuclear disarmament resolutions this year than in 2005. As the middle moves forward in this process of building international norms, the naysayers, slowly, even begrudgingly, will have to move along too. Moreover, governments and their policies can change, as illustrated by the US mid-term elections that raised hopes just after the Committee had closed.
Thanks to the Committee's cooperation with the able, efficient and progressive Ambassador Juul, remarkably smooth procedures enabled and added value to substantive work instead of impeding it. The institutionalisation of more constructive interactions between NGOs and the First Committee need to be built on, bearing in mind that, as Merav Datan said in her presentation, NGOs are "your ambassadors to civil society" and a direct link to the public that cares abut these issues.
Progress may be difficult but it is far from impossible. Good faith is not created by a few, let alone a single state; it is the responsibility of the entire international community. We must continue inching forward, reinforcing existing norms on disarmament and nonproliferation, negotiating new ones, and refusing to be blocked by the self-centred policies and mistakes of unilateralists or the draining pessimism of the defeatists.
This report was written and compiled by Jennifer Nordstrom, who monitored and reported on the 2006 First Committee for the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. I would like to thank my team of writers on the First Committee Monitor, and my Reaching Critical Will team. This report draws on and is informed by the work in the First Committee Monitor. Some of the reporting in the annex draws directly from the writers in the Monitor, and though I owe thanks to them all, I would like to pay special tribute to: Ray Acheson, Waverly de Bruijn, Beatrice Fihn, Colby Goodman, Mark Marge, Jennifer Schwerer, Michael Spies and Jim Wurst. I would also like to thank Susi Snyder and Rhianna Tyson for their editing and assistance during the First Committee.
This report has also benefited from Ambassador Juul's decision to continue the practice of greater access instituted by Ambassador de Alba and continued by Ambassador Choi, which has enabled NGOs to be present for all the debates, including the thematic debates. I am particularly grateful to Ambassador Juul, in her capacity as Chair, for giving NGOs the opportunity to address the most current controversial issues during the thematic debates. I would also like to thank Mr Jarmo Sareva and the Secretariat for their open and accessible stance towards NGOs, and for all their help throughout the First Committee.
Finally, I would like to thank Rebecca Johnson, for her insightful editing and guidance in this work.
See also: 2006 First Committee Resolutions: Summary and Explanations
© 2006 The Acronym Institute.