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Back to the main article: Time for a Fissban - or Farewell? by Jenni Rissanen
1. The Conference decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a "Ban on the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices."
2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
3. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before (DATE).
The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as the "Parties"), have agreed as follows:
Article I
No Party shall, after the entry into force of the Treaty for that Party, produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or use any fissile material produced thereafter in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article II
For the purposes of this Treaty:
1. "Fissile material" means
(a) Plutonium except plutonium whose isotopic composition includes 80 percent or greater plutonium- 238.
(b) Uranium containing a 20 percent or greater enrichment in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235, separately or in combination; or
(c) Any material that contains the material defined in (a) or (b) above.
2. "Produce fissile material" means:
(a) To separate any fissile material from fission products in irradiated nuclear material;
(b) To enrich plutonium-239 in plutonium by any isotopic separation process; or
(c) To enrich uranium-233 or uranium-235 in uranium to an enrichment of 20 percent or greater in those isotopes, separately or in combination, by any isotopic separation process.
3. The term "produce fissile material" does not include activities involving fissile material produced prior to entry into force of the Treaty, provided that such activities do not increase the total quantity of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 in such fissile material.
Article III
1. Each Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that all persons and entities anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control do not produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and do not use fissile material produced after entry into force of this Treaty for that Party in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
2. For the purposes of this Treaty, no Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national means and methods in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States.
3. Any questions that arise regarding the implementation by a Party of the provisions of this Treaty shall be addressed through consultations between that Party and the Party or Parties seeking clarification.
4. In addition, any Party may bring to the attention of the Parties to this Treaty concerns regarding compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by another Party or Parties and may request the depositary to convene the Parties to this Treaty to consider the matter.
5. If, in connection with the implementation of this Treaty, any Party believes that questions have arisen that are within the competence of the Security Council of the United nations as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, that Party may request consideration of such questions by the Security Council. The requesting Party should provide evidence related to the matter.
Article IV
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature until its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article VI.
2. After its entry into force, this Treaty shall remain open for accession by States that have not signed it.
3. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article V
1. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with [___________].
2. The depositary shall inform all States Signatories and acceding States promptly of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices.
3. The depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States.
Article VI
1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which an instrument of ratification has been deposited by all of the following States: the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
2. For a State that deposits an instrument of ratification or accession after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 above for entry into force have been fulfilled, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit by that State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article VII
1. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests. A Party shall deliver notice of such withdrawal in writing to the depositary no less than three months in advance of the date of withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of 15 years from the date of its entry into force. No later than six months before the expiration of the Treaty, the Parties shall meet to consider whether it will be extended. By consensus of the Parties, this Treaty may be extended.
Article VIII
This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish language texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by the depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Treaty opened for signature at [___________] on [date].
May 18, 2006, CD/1782
The United States believes strongly that achieving a legally binding ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is a desirable goal. One way to accomplish this goal would be through the negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We aim to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) as soon as possible.
The United States has given considerable thought to what an FMCT should look like. The draft treaty that we have put forward sets forth the essentials needed for an FMCT that would meet the objective of ending expeditiously the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The basic obligation under such a treaty, effective at entry into force, would be a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Stocks of already existing fissile material would be unaffected by the FMCT. The production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes, such as fuel for naval propulsion, also would be unaffected by the treaty.
The definitions set forth in the U.S. draft treaty on "fissile material" and "production" represent the outgrowth of the decade-long international discussion regarding what an FMCT should encompass. We believe that the definitions set forth in that text are appropriate for the purposes of an FMCT without any provision for verification.
The U.S. draft treaty omits verification provisions, consistent with the U.S. position that so-called "effective verification" of an FMCT cannot be achieved. The ability to determine compliance with a high level of confidence is a requirement for effective verification. The United States has concluded that, even with extensive verification mechanisms and provisions -- so extensive that they could compromise the core national security interests of key signatories, and so costly that many countries would be hesitant to implement them --, we still would not have high confidence in our ability to monitor compliance with an FMCT.
Furthermore, mechanisms and provisions that provide the appearance of effective verification without supplying its reality could be more dangerous than having no explicit provisions for verification. Such mechanisms and provisions could provide a false sense of security, encouraging countries to assume that, because such mechanisms and provisions existed, there would be no need for governments themselves - individually or collectively - to be wary and vigilant against possible violations.
Negotiating an international ban on the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons will be a difficult enough task, in and of itself. Avoiding time-consuming and, we believe, futile efforts to negotiate "effective" verification measures will expedite action by the CD to conclude a legally binding ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.
The United States believes that only by focusing on realistic objectives can the CD create the conditions necessary for negotiating an FMCT. The successful negotiation of an FCMT in the CD will be both a significant contribution to the global non-proliferation regime and an example of truly effective multilateralism.
The United States hopes that negotiations in Geneva on an FMCT can begin and conclude in the very near future. We also reiterate our view that, pending the conclusion of a Cutoff Treaty and the Treaty's entry into force, all states should declare publicly and observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, such as the United States has maintained since 1988.
Back to the main article: Time for a Fissban - or Farewell? by Jenni Rissanen
© 2006 The Acronym Institute.