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Rebecca Johnson
The first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) Meeting for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) took place in Vienna, April 30 to May 11, 2007. It came close to disaster, but was pulled back from the brink by the assiduous efforts of the softly-spoken Chair, Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan, and a more-than-usually effective Secretariat team, who were supported by many constructive non-aligned and 'Western' states and the active engagement of civil society.
The meeting opened with many optimistic references to "the Vienna spirit", but by the beginning of the second week the prognosis was grim. There was no agenda, and the PrepCom was looking as if it might end up like the 2005 Review Conference - with deadlock, frustration and no useful or substantive outcome. In one corner, blocking first the adoption of the agenda and then of the PrepCom report, was Iran, supported (kind of) by Cuba, Venezuela and Syria. In the other was the Chair, backed by practically everyone else, including most of the Movement of Non-Aligned States (NAM) and the Arab League.
Iran's large delegation, clearly under immense pressure from Tehran (especially in light of the shock arrest of former nuclear negotiator Ambassador Mohammad Hoseyn Moussavian on May 1), was determined not to allow formal condemnation of its nuclear programme go onto the NPT record. Since the US and others clearly intended to criticise Iran over its safeguards record and uranium enrichment programme, Tehran appears to have decided it would be better to stymie the meeting and either prevent or marginalise any summary. The Chair was even more determined to put the review process leading to 2010 onto a firm footing, so he wanted to get agreement on an agenda and procedures that would enable the next PrepComs to go forward without the kind of procedural challenges that had bedevilled the review process between 2000 and 2005.
Though the US emphasis on noncompliance, counter-proliferation and Iran were familiar from all PrepComs since 2003, the United States fielded a more constructive delegation than in recent years and provided the 2007 PrepCom Chair with a little more room to manoeuvre than when John Bolton was in power. Though the NAM were divided over Iran's tactics, on issues of substance they were well represented in eight substantive working papers, ably coordinated by one of the NPT's newest states parties, Cuba. As Germany held the EU together despite some significant differences in national positions, the UK was unable to avoid direct and public criticism from delegations and NGOs for planning to renew its Trident nuclear weapon system instead of fulfilling its NPT obligations to eliminate the nuclear arsenals.
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC - Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) showed that they were still a force to be reckoned with. Though individual NAC delegations had more flexibility to make stronger interventions than the collective statements, Ireland coordinated a stronger Coalition than in recent years. Egypt's positions were better integrated and represented, so there was no repetition of its isolation at the 2005 Review Conference. South Africa and New Zealand proved less mealy mouthed than the Coalition's EU-compromised statements on disarmament, especially with regard to Britain's plans to renew and upgrade the Trident nuclear weapon system. And, yet again, it was South Africa that came up with bridging solutions to enable the PrepCom process to overcome the agenda impasse and start work.
Though the substantive debates were squeezed into less than half their allotted time, the Chair - and, it is to be hoped, nuclear non-proliferation - won the stand-off with Iran. As discussed in more detail below, with the help of South Africa and an asterisk, Amano finally brought the gavel down on a workable agenda on Tuesday May 8. He faced another challenge on Friday, when Iran tried to block the PrepCom report in an attempt either to prevent the criticisms in the Chair's summary from going forward or, possibly, as a last ditch attempt to undo the agreement on the agenda.
The Chair's factual summary is a much-contested aspect of the current review process, as it is meant to be a representative 'snapshot' of the meeting rather than a negotiated final document. This is not an easy task: some 47 statements were delivered in the general debate, from groupings and individual states, and many more during the six substantive sessions. The delay in adopting the agenda meant that only half a day could be spent on each of the cluster debates - nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy - and sessions on practical nuclear disarmament steps and security assurances; regional issues, including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East; and 'other provisions of the Treaty including Article X', the euphemism for addressing withdrawal and procedures to strengthen the NPT. The prospect of losing the time for substantive issues prompted many more than usual to put their thoughts into working papers. The tight schedule required speeches to be kept short, and the Chair even managed to encourage some 'interactive debate', with questions and responses relating to some of the statements and working papers.
Given the procedural and political difficulties that beset this PrepCom, it had been anticipated that the Chair would produce a bland summary couched in generalities, as some PrepCom chairs had done during the previous review cycle. Instead, as can be read from the text, reproduced in full at the end of this article, Amano produced 51 paragraphs that covered most if not all of the priority issues of substance that arose during the general debate, cluster debates and special time sessions. He tended to balance conflicting positions by referencing critiques and responses in the same paragraph, but did not shy away from issues that certain states wanted to be omitted, such as Iran's nuclear programme and the concerns raised about new nuclear weapons and doctrines.
There were inevitably some objections, but it was widely applauded, especially in the way that Amano had characterised the debates on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East. Since it was more hard-hitting than previous summaries about the lack of effective progress towards the elimination of the nuclear arsenals, some of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) were clearly unhappy with elements, though only France explicitly complained that its positions had not been properly reflected in the summary. The United States' main stated objection was that the summary had not reflected the full weight of the criticisms levelled at Iran. In addition, Austria, Norway and New Zealand felt that the Chair had leaned too close to Japan's own enthusiastic support for nuclear energy, and had represented it as a solution to climate change without sufficiently reflecting the serious criticisms several countries had made regarding environmental dangers and its unsustainability as an energy source.
Though very happy with some parts, the NAM took the view that Amano had not sufficiently reflected NAM positions on several issues, including the Additional Protocol and export controls, as presented in their numerous statements and working papers. They therefore opposed annexing the summary to the report. When Amano showed his willingness to turn the summary into a working paper instead of annexing it formally, Iran blocked this compromise and threatened to veto the PrepCom Report as a whole if the Chair's summary were reflected in the report in any way, even just as a working paper. Though the NAM had agreed the summary should not be annexed, they were almost all willing to see it turned into a working paper. After hours of wrangling, during which many countries, including significant NAM partners, leaned on Iran to accept a compromise, the report was adopted without the Chair's summary being attached. This means that decisions such as the agenda and dates and Chair of the next PrepCom go forward. The hope is that this will avoid further fights and delays over the agenda and arrangements for subsequent PrepComs and the review conference. With time running out on the final day, pragmatism prevailed, and Iran withdrew its veto on the summary being issued as a Chair's working paper. The procedural report, including the agenda and arrangements for future PrepComs was then adopted.[1] Therefore, though not a formal document of the conference, the Chair's view of the key issues in 2007 will stand as a document of record under his personal authority, but without implying any particular agreement on the part of all the states parties.
Though in the end Amano achieved most of his objectives for the PrepCom, there are worrying signals in the meeting's political dynamic, the negative echoes from the 2005 review conference and vulnerability of NPT procedures and meetings to tactics of delay and obstruction. And there are deeper questions about how well the NPT regime can continue to meet the nuclear challenges and security needs of its parties. Even if the review process is made to work better, the NPT regime has to be judged rather on its effectiveness in the real world than on the running of its meetings.
The Vienna PrepCom was the first after the debacle of the 2005 Review Conference, so much was riding on it. Of the 189 states parties to the NPT, 106 participated in the first PrepCom, as did some 66 nongovernmental organizations (NGO). The meeting opened in an atmosphere of cautious optimism, even though the Chair's efforts to get the agenda agreed to before the meeting had been thwarted by Iran.
It was opened by the Austrian Foreign Minister, Ursula Plassnik[2] , who made a substantive statement that was critical of nuclear power, referred to the "misuse of peaceful nuclear programmes" and "disregard for disarmament programmes". Though she proposed a dual track approach encompassing a 'nuclear fuel bank' instead of national enrichment and reprocessing, and greater transparency and safeguards obligations, going beyond those currently administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr Plassnik made clear that "Austria does not consider nuclear power as a sustainable source of energy". Nor did she mince her words about the NPT being in "serious crisis", noting that "The last review conference in 2005 was an utter failure. The task ahead of us in enormous, the prospects for progress are minimal."
The new Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon sent a short message (delivered by Hannelore Hoppe, the Officer in Charge of the controversially down-graded UN Office for Disarmament Affairs). He too referred to "a persisting crisis of confidence" in the NPT, attributing it to "insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament, as well as a lack of universal adherence to IAEA safeguards agreements, and case of non-compliance". Saying that the Treaty was "worth reinforcing", the Secretary-General urged "creative responses... looking both backward and forward... to keep the treaty in step with changing times [and] strengthen accountability." Notably, he also called for the review process "to promote constructive engagement with civil society". Under the auspices of the Chair and Secretariat, the PrepCom set new standards for NGO participation. Though informal in that they did not require verbatim records, the cluster debates and special time sessions were kept as open to observers and NGOs as the general debates, thereby increasing the level of exchange and interaction in positive ways.
Soon after the meeting opened and the general debate got underway, it became clear that only Iran continued to withhold agreement on the compromise agenda text, claiming that it did not have instructions from the key officials back home in Tehran.
At issue, yet again, was Paragraph 6, which frames the work of the PrepCom. In 2004-5, the United States had blocked consensus on an agenda that placed the review in the context of the consensus agreements from 1995 and 2000, some of which the Bush administration had subsequently rejected. The US manoeuvre (supported tacitly by some of the other nuclear powers) was intended to negate the substantive decisions and outcomes of the review conferences of 1995 and 2000, especially those that strengthened the obligations relating to disarmament. The 2005 conference then suffered almost 3 weeks of deadlock over the agenda and work programme because Egypt (supported by a silent majority) refused to accept the negation of hard-won commitments on disarmament and the Middle East.
Wanting to adopt an agenda that would serve as a basis for the review process meetings up to and including the 2010 Conference, Amano had engaged in several rounds of consultations with the major groups (the Western Group and NAM in particular) and several key states, including Egypt and the United States, which had been at opposite ends of the disagreements in 2005, and spent weeks trying out different variations and versions of recent PrepCom agendas. The compromise that seemed to command the most widespread agreement was clumsy and inelegant, but it was a step forward from the minimalist agenda forced through in 2005:
Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of the 1975, 1985, 2000, and 2005 Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty, and thereby considering approaches and measures to realize its purpose, reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty.
It is understood that the US (and France, which had shown enthusiasm for the Bush administration's desire to marginalise the 2000 programme of action on nuclear disarmament) agreed early on to reference the 1995 Conference (at which the NPT had been extended), but they still wanted to diminish the significance of the 2000 Review Conference by inserting it in a list that included the outcomes of the 1975, 1985, 2000 and 2005 Review Conference. The review conferences of 1975, 1985 and 2000 had some logic, as they had adopted substantive final documents. For the US to insist on adding 2005, which was a dismal failure, struck many as bizarre, but for the sake of getting the 2010 review process off to a constructive start, Amano and the majority of states decided to accommodate these contortions. However, the United States had also insisted on referencing other developments and the need for full compliance. It was this that Tehran balked at, viewing the language as targeted against Iran. In turn, Iran proposed that the reference to compliance should specify "with all articles of the Treaty". This was understood as a way to reinforce its position that attempts to constrain its "right" to its own uranium enrichment programme and the full nuclear fuel cycle constitute a violation of Article IV (on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes).
After closed-door consultations throughout the first day, which revealed that the vast majority of Non-Aligned States were unwilling to support or provide cover for Iran, the Chair tried again at the end of the day to get agreement. But Iran's position had apparently hardened during the day, reportedly in reaction to the first statements in the general debate, many of which referred to "noncompliance" and criticized Iran's nuclear programme. By the end of the week there was still no agreement on the agenda, though the Chair had suspended work after the general debate and NGO statements had all been heard. Late on Friday, South Africa's Ambassador Abdul Minty proposed that the meeting should adopt the Chair's agenda together with the following explanation: "The meeting decides that it understands the reference in the agenda to 'reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty' to mean that it will consider compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty".
Tuesday morning was 'showdown' time. Having waited all day Monday for the Iranian delegation to get instructions from Tehran on whether to accept the agenda when linked with a written understanding referring to compliance with all provisions of the treaty, as South Africa had proposed on Friday, delegations and NGOs gathered anxiously on Tuesday. Ambassador Ali Soltanieh kept everyone guessing before announcing that Iran would accept South Africa's language "as a footnote on the first page of the agenda referring back to an asterisk appearing at the end of item 6 on the agenda". No-one spoke against, and the gavel was finally brought down on adoption of the agenda on the 7th working day of the ten day PrepCom.
Delegations that had begun turning their statements of position into working papers in order to get them on the record scrambled to put their names down to speak as Amano allocated half a day each to the three main 'pillars' of the treaty, traditionally seen as nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy, and three agreed sessions on practical nuclear disarmament steps and security assurances; regional issues, including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East; and 'other provisions of the Treaty including Article X'.
Amano closed the substantive exchange of statements at noon on Friday, May 11, and issued his Chair's Factual Summary before 14.30 pm. As delegates absorbed the 51 paragraphs, the initial response was that it was a good and remarkably fair representation of the substance put forward during the PrepCom. It was also more specific than previous summaries about the range of concerns - and responses - that had been raised by states parties, giving an honest and representative overview that could serve as a snapshot of the major issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in May 2007. Of course, that also meant that some states were offended to see that the Chair had reflected that their nuclear programmes or weapons modernizations had been criticized in the meeting.
Though some paragraphs were thought too strong and others too weak, only Iran seemed to want the summary to be jettisoned altogether. As the interpreters went into overtime at the end of the day, the pressure intensified. The Chair was not the only one unwilling to have his summary consigned to the dustbin, but the stakes were high. Adoption of the procedural report was vitally important because it recorded the agenda that was finally adopted and the dates and other arrangements for future PrepComs.
Suddenly there was a bustle at the door and Amano strode to the podium with a deal that all were finally willing to accept. He deleted references to the Chair's Factual Summary from the PrepCom report, renamed the summary a "Chairman's Paper" and gave it a working paper number instead of annexing it to the report.
After adopting the report, there were expressions of heartfelt thanks and appreciation. Cuba spoke of a "felicitous result" that would pave the way for success in 2010, and reiterated the priority the NAM attaches to these important issues. Iran also spoke graciously, "at this late hour to express sincere appreciation" to the Chair. Iran commented that the decisions were "not perfect" but commended the openness and flexibility shown by many. Iran concluded by expressing the desire for "collective efforts for peace in the world". The UK, as coordinator of the Western Group, also thanked the Chair warmly for his "excellent work and report" and expressed appreciation to "our colleagues in other regional groups for the collegial and practical approach which has laid the foundations for constructively going forward in this review cycle."
Slovenia, on behalf of the rump Eastern European Group and China (whose ambassador caused a chuckle by saying he spoke on behalf of the Chinese group), thanked and congratulated the Chair. China also expressed "appreciation to all the delegations for their flexibility and constructive approaches". By contrast, Germany, for the EU, lamented that "the agenda had been blocked by one delegation for so long" and regretted "that we could not conclude on time due to that same delegation". However, Germany said this should "not overshadow the substantive and effective work we have conducted" and pointedly thanked the Chair for his effective leadership and his factual summary.
Dr Christopher Ford, US Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, said his delegation shared the EU's frustration and also expressed disappointment "that the Chair's summary inadequately expresses the heavy criticism Iran received in this meeting for its violations of safeguards..." France thanked the Chair for his hard work but said "regrettably we do not recognise our position in some of the language of your summary and want that recorded." With a completely unrelated commercial function knocking at the doors of the Austria Centre, Ambassador Amano thanked everyone, dropped the rest of his prepared statement, and closed the PrepCom.
Substantive issues were raised in debates and issued in 74 working papers and other documents. Some 47 statements were delivered in the general debate, some of which represented regional or political groupings rather than individual states. Before the Conference was suspended to sort out the agenda, a half-day session was provided for civil society representatives to address the Conference. Once the agenda was agreed, there was just time for six sessions, divided equally among three cluster debates, which traditionally follow the Main Committees of review conferences in covering the treaty articles and 1995 Principles and Objectives broadly addressing the "three pillars" of nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy.
In addition, the review process has developed the custom of providing special time - usually a half-day session - for addressing areas of specific concern or importance, which may change from one meeting to the next, usually following consultations between the Chair and the group leaders. At the 2007 PrepCom, special time was allocated to practical nuclear disarmament steps and security assurances; regional issues, including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East; and 'other provisions of the Treaty including Article X'.
Though the next section will try to represent key concerns and ideas using the words of some of the key states and groupings, it does not purport to be a summary of more than two hundred different interventions and documents. As the Chair's summary indicates, many more issues were raised about specific developments, particular regional problems, connecting issues such as disarmament education, terrorism and nuclear weapons, verification of nuclear disarmament and so on. If there is little new to say on these issues, states have not been quoted in detail.
Since there was also a lot of duplication, with many statements reiterating their agreement with group positions or repeating very familiar national positions, not everyone gets a mention. Important though they are, no attempt is made to summarise the reports issued by various states, including the nuclear weapon states' explanations of the actions they have taken towards complying with their Article VI obligations. These reports, the 78 working papers and the NGO presentations are available from the UNODA website or Reaching Critical Will.
While the first session on nuclear disarmament tended more to general exhortations and complaints, the second session was meant to address practical nuclear disarmament steps and security assurances. Though there were inevitable duplications, and the nuclear weapon states used both sessions to talk about their weapons reductions, policies and intentions, some interesting practical ideas were put forward. While most of these focussed on short and medium-term steps such as further cuts in strategic and non-strategic arsenals, that could be taken or at least recommended to the 2010 PrepCom, a few such as Costa Rica took a longer view, arguing that now is the time to consider a nuclear weapon convention that would map the way to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Because there was less time than usual, statements had to be kept short, with states encouraged to put in more detailed working papers. Proving that necessity is indeed the mother of invention, this actually improved the cluster debates, as statements were crisper and clearer, giving priority to the key ideas rather than sending listeners to sleep with long wish-lists. Significantly, when the Chair encouraged some "interactive debate", several delegations this time took up the challenge and gave off the cuff questions and responses to each others' arguments and ideas. Though nothing earth-shatteringly different emerged, these exchanges - combined with the more open and accountable attitude towards the presence of NGOS - were one of the unsung positive achievements of the 2007 PrepCom.
Despite receiving long statements, background documents and/or substantial working papers from the nuclear weapon states, there was clearly considerable frustration over the slow progress and even reversals in fulfilling the Treaty's nuclear disarmament obligations. Differing levels of appreciation and assessment were given of the efforts by the NWS to comply with their obligations under Article VI: while welcoming nuclear arms reductions accomplished so far, a large number of statements expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of nuclear disarmament, and many raised concerns about the counterproductive steps taken by some nuclear governments to modernise arsenals or find new justifications for retaining or using nuclear weapons.
Cuba, on behalf of over 110 non-aligned states parties, was clear where the primary responsibilities lay: "The nuclear weapon states and those states remaining outside the NPT continue to develop and modernize their nuclear arsenals, threatening international peace and security. We must all call for an end to this madness and seek the elimination and ban on all forms of nuclear weapons and testing as well as the rejection of the doctrine of deterrence."[3]
In a later NAM statement, Indonesia castigated those who treat the elimination of nuclear weapons as "simply a Utopian dream" and called on the NWS to "exercise leadership" in "an intensive coordinated work... required to turn the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons into a joint effort". The NAM reiterated its long-held position to have a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD and "negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame" and said that this, "including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without delay". The NAM also wanted substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on preventing an arms race in outer space, and raised concerns that "the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons."
Almost all the interventions spoke of the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and of getting negotiations on a fissile materials ban underway in the CD. While most presentations alluded to the UK decision to renew the Trident nuclear weapon system only obliquely, many criticised modernisation and further developments, and a few explicitly expressed their disappointment and asked the UK to reconsider the decision taken on March 14.
Among the many statements in favour of the CTBT, the strongest came from the New Agenda Coalition and the G-10 Vienna group (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) made direct appeals to the "Annex II" states who need to ratify (and in three cases sign) the CTBT before it can enter into force. These are: two nuclear weapon states party to the NPT that have signed but not ratified (the United States and China); three countries which have not even signed, so need to be engaged to sign and ratify (India, North Korea and Pakistan); one (Israel), which has remained outside the NPT but signed the CTBT; and four non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties that have signed but not yet ratified the CTBT (Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia and Iran).
The NAM was more explicit than most in accusing the United States of undermining the Treaty, not only by failing to ratify, but "by not supporting the preparatory commission of the CTBTO through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime", a reference to the US withholding a proportion of the funding for on-site inspections. In reiterating support for the CTBT, the NAM underscored its purpose "to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons that would pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons".[4]
Though prevented from formally addressing the NPT PrepCom by a past Bush administration objection, the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) was very visible around the PrepCom. In the aftermath of the October 9, 2006 North Korean nuclear test, the CTBTO's comprehensive materials and demonstrations of its verification capabilities and institutional reach were particularly pertinent. As noted in several interventions, they strengthened the arguments by a majority of the states about the importance of CTBT entry into force for national, regional and international security, and as an indispensable part of reinforcing the credibility and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime.
New opportunities are now coming to the fore to exert greater pressure on the 10 'hold-outs', and many states argued for efforts on entry into force to be accelerated through national, collective and multilateral action.
Austria, which called directly for the remaining hold-outs to accede to the CTBT and "finally take this decisive step forward", was not the only one to relate the importance of the CTBT with capping vertical proliferation. Austria condemned recent developments from the nuclear weapon states, saying: "All plans to modernise, to undertake research to produce a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons are diametrically in opposition to Article 6 of the NPT and the commitments undertaken in 2000."
The New Agenda Coalition, collectively and individually, made some of the strongest nuclear disarmament speeches. Speaking on the Coalition's behalf, Ambassador Paul Kavanagh (Ireland) said that he was "concerned at the emergence in recent years of new military doctrines emphasising the importance of nuclear weapons not only to defence but also to the offensive capabilities of States. Plans to modernize nuclear forces have reinforced these doctrines. Moreover, certain policies have broadened the scope of potential use of nuclear weapons, for example as a preventive measure or in retaliation against the use of other WMD. We believe that if the nuclear weapon states continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, there is real danger that other states will start pondering whether they should do the same."
The NAC criticised keeping nuclear weapons on high alert, which "only serves to exacerbate the danger posed by the existence of these weapons". In addition "States should not develop new nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions, or undertake the replacement or modernisation of their nuclear weapon systems, which runs counter to the agreement reached at the 2000 Review Conference on a diminishing role for nuclear weapons and on the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate these weapons."
Ambassador Abdul Minty said that South Africa was "disappointed to learn about the decision of the UK on [renewing] Trident". Referring to the NPT as "the legal commitment" for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Minty spoke of the "core bargain" struck in the NPT, "that the overwhelming majority of States have entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the corresponding legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the bases of the corresponding legally-binding commitments by the nuclear weapon States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament." Noting that "as long as some countries have nuclear weapons, there will be others who will also aspire to possess them", he argued that South Africa abandoned the nuclear weapons option because "it is obvious that the only absolute guarantee against the use of such weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be produced again." South Africa referred to concerns that after the end of the cold war, "several NWS now speak about their actual use and in pursuit of this objective new nuclear weapons are being planned and old ones are being modernised."[5]
Egypt accused the nuclear weapon states of having "deliberately aimed at further development of new generations of nuclear weapons" rather than reducing the role nuclear weapons play in their security and military strategies in accordance with their obligations and undertakings.[6] New Zealand said there was an "inherent contradiction between some states arguing a unique security benefit from the possession of nuclear weapons while insisting that no more states should be allowed to acquire them". This undermined the basis of the NPT and was tantamount to saying that "it would be irresponsible for some states to relinquish nuclear weapons in the current geo-political environment."[7]
The UK delegation made a valiant effort to defend the policy. First it tried to reassure by explaining that the vote in March was only "to begin the concept and design work required to make possible a replacement for our current submarine fleet" together with a decision "to participate in a programme to extend the life of the Trident D5 missile system". This, said Ambassador John Duncan, "does not mean that we have taken an irreversible decision that commits us irrevocably to possessing nuclear weapons in 40 or 50 years' time." He then stated, "Any suggestion that the UK is further developing its nuclear weapons is a misunderstanding. The UK is retaining not modernising its deterrent. There is no change in the capabilities of the system, no move to produce more useable weapons and no change in nuclear posture or doctrine. The UK's nuclear weapon system will not be designed for war-fighting use in military campaigns. It is a strategic deterrent that we would only ever contemplate using in extreme circumstances or self defence."[8] These statements were challenged in detail by NGOs who provided delegations with information and statements from government ministers and representatives that contradict these assurances.
By comparison with past NPT meetings, there were unprecedented expressions of grave concern about a "renaissance" of nuclear weapons (as one senior European diplomat put it), in which new missions and doctrines for use were being developed even as actual numbers were being reduced. Therefore more references than usual were made to the commitment in the 2000 NPT Final Document to a "diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination". States put forward different kinds of recommendations, including calls for nuclear weapons to be de-alerted and binding commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons first (which applies to conflicts between nuclear weapon possessors but also incorporates not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states).
For the NAM, Ambassador Triyono Wibowo (Indonesia) underscored the unanimous opinion of the International Court of Justice that there is an international legal obligation to pursue in good faith and bring nuclear disarmament negotiations to conclusion. He reiterated the NAM's call for the NWS to demonstrate their "full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals... through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear weapon free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference."
The NAM put the issue of nuclear sharing back on the agenda: "Nuclear-weapon states, in cooperation among themselves and with non-nuclear weapons States, and with States not Parties to the Treaty, must refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements."[9] This timely reiteration of a long-held position is understood to refer not only to NATO, which has to reconsider and review its Strategic Concept by 2009; the NAM is also signalling its concerns about the controversial renewal of the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, a collaboration pact for sharing nuclear weapons technology and components, including Trident missiles.
Cuba's Ambassador Norma Goicochea Estenoz continued, "There should also be total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific and technological fields to States that are not Parties to the Treaty, without exception." Though a familiar position with regard to Israel, this strong statement of principle must also be seen as a condemnation of the US-India nuclear deal and any nuclear collaboration between Pakistan and others, including past benefactor, China.
Iran's statement on cluster I also raised concerns about nuclear sharing between weapon states and their allies. Iran criticised vertical proliferation and criticised that "the US Nuclear Posture Review and UK's Trident project provide for new nuclear doctrines".
Though there remain deep divisions about whether verification is possible, essential or, indeed, dispensable with regard to the fissban, all sides of the PrepCom called for negotiations on some form of fissile material treaty to get started in the CD without further delay. The European Union argued that in today's security environment, a fissban would "have beneficial consequences beyond those that pertain to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including reducing the risk of theft or diversion to terrorist groups or activities" and contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.[10]
Fissban and the P6 initiative for adopting a CD work programme
Connected with their desire to get fissban negotiations underway, many statements referred to efforts to break the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament. Many delegations publicly backed the 'P6 initiative' to get work going in the Conference on Disarmament.[11] Some NPT delegations wanted the PrepCom to send a strong message to CD delegations to encourage them to adopt this work programme and start fissile material negotiations.
While many delegations welcomed that the US and Russia were continuing to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons under START and the bilateral Moscow Treaty (SORT), some put on the table the need for follow on steps, especially in light of the ending of START in 2009 (and SORT in 2012). Several states shared the NAC's view that all nuclear weapons should be taken off alert, and a number quoted the steps outlined in the Wall Street Journal op-ed written by Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn.[12]
Saying that its nuclear weapon stockpiles had been reduced "more than fivefold", Russia said that bilateral talks on a follow on to START had commenced. However, Ambassador Anatoly Antonov drew attention "to the obvious link between the strategic offensive and defensive arms." He warned, "The Global Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence [proposed by the Bush administration] could provoke other states into building up their own missile armaments and thus propel their spread throughout the world, as well as affect the process of actual nuclear disarmament. Placing weapons in space, including anti-missile ones, could become a key factor triggering a new spiral in the arms race."[13]
Concerns about tactical nuclear weapons have come from several quarters. Some have raised deep worries about the thousands of Russian tactical weapons still in deployment, noting that they increase vulnerability, insecurity and instability. Japan called on both Russia and the United States to reduce their non-strategic nuclear weapons, saying this was "critically important for regional and international security, as well as for non-proliferation and counter-terrorism".[14] Others have pointed at the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and, as noted above, raised concerns about the policy and practice of NATO's nuclear sharing. Ignoring the criticisms on this, Germany said that at the very least the NPT states should be given an accountable report from the US and Russia on their implementation of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives on non-strategic nuclear weapons, and urged consideration of further reductions.
This year saw Costa Rica, supported by Malaysia, put down an updated text of a 'model Nuclear Weapons Convention' (NWC) as a working paper of the NPT, in large part because the NGOs were out in force at this PrepCom to rally support for initiating steps towards a legal instrument or convention that would abolish and eliminate nuclear weapons comprehensively. To demonstrate the feasibility and achievability of this goal, NGOs have updated their model NWC text and held various meetings and discussions, notably with launch of ICAN (the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons). Though more countries have begun to speak about the need for a nuclear weapon convention, the NAM are still more inclined to reiterate their long-held rhetoric about a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament, and the Western states are more likely to speak of specific steps or a step-by-step process.
France again sought to overturn (or reinterpret) the important decision of NPT parties in 2000 to explicitly delink nuclear disarmament from the broader objective of general and complete disarmament (GCD) but was soundly taken to task by several states from different regions, including New Zealand, South Africa and Brazil, which pointed out that work needed to be accelerated on both objectives, but that nuclear disarmament could not be made conditional on GCD. Though both must be worked on in tandem, as civil society and many governments now recognise as they oppose not only nuclear weapons but cluster munitions and the corrupt and lucrative trade in arms, general and complete disarmament could logically and politically only be achieved after nuclear disarmament had been accomplished.
Verification, of course, is important in building confidence that nuclear weapons can be safely dispensed with and disposed of. In this regard, New Zealand spoke about "scientific engineering advances in support of nuclear disarmament efforts". Commending the "useful technical work" conducted by the UK into verification for nuclear disarmament [between 2000 and 2005], New Zealand asked "whether there are any plans to integrate this work into the current review cycle?"[15]
Negative security assurances (NSA) from the nuclear weapon states (guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states) remain an issue of high priority for many states, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is regarded as the only "absolute guarantee" that nuclear weapons will not be used. On the grounds that states that have given up the nuclear-weapon option have a "legitimate right" to receive security assurances, the non-aligned states continue to lobby for "a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances" as an NPT (and CD) priority.[16]
In light of concerns about changes in the nuclear policies and doctrines of some of the nuclear weapon states, and that these could increase insecurity and lower the threshold for nuclear weapon use, a number of Western countries also joined calls for security assurances to be taken more seriously, though generally stopping short of prioritising negotiations on a treaty. Arguing that security assurances have an important role to play "as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and as a deterrent", Italy put forward five recommendations: i) that "the five NPT nuclear-weapon States should reiterate their commitment and affirm or reaffirm its legally binding nature"; ii) noting that legally binding NSA are envisaged in the existing NWFZ treaties, "entry into force of these treaties and finalization of negative security assurance provisions contained therein should be achieved as a matter of priority after appropriate consultations"; iii) "a numerical survey could be made on countries that: (a) already enjoy security assurances; and (b) are susceptible to receiving security assurances"; iv) "further efforts should be made to explore the possibility that existing security assurances may be complemented by a multilateral legally binding instrument"; and v) it would be useful to explore the possibility of establishing legally binding security assurances on a unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral or regional basis".[17] With regard to the third recommendation, Italy had stated "Since not all NPT non-nuclear-weapon States have the same status".
Four of the NWS reiterated their adherence to UNSC Resolution 984 (1995), which contains conditional security assurances. China went further, offering unconditional assurances to non-nuclear weapon states and calling for a treaty on the no first use of nuclear weapons. Stating that "In order to free the world from the threat of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war, all nuclear weapons should be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed," China considered that "before this objective is achieved, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time and under any circumstances." China also called on the NWS to "diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies and not list any countries as targets of nuclear strike."[18]
A few referred to the need for new approaches to positive as well as negative security assurances. Canada, among others, argued that it would be necessary to "clarify whether there is a distinction to be made among NPT non-nuclear weapon states", for example, whether it is "in good standing..."[19] The question of countries in nuclear alliances is also pertinent here, though not directly mentioned by Canada, a NATO member. However, Canada questioned whether the unilateral assurances made by the NWS in 1995 were still valid "despite new doctrines".
The cluster II sessions focussed not only on safeguards, but on broader aspects of compliance and implementation of the nonproliferation regime as a whole. Many states raised concerns about Iran's nuclear programme and North Korea's nuclear test, though in light of the Denuclearization Agreement, criticism of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was more muted than it would otherwise have been. Though there were ritualistic expressions of support for nuclear weapon free zones, most attention was on the Middle East. Several western countries joined the NAM and League of Arab States in calling for more progress towards eliminating nuclear dangers from the region and implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. In one significant shift, past disputes over export controls have been largely overtaken by debates over UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004).
The US stall was set out in its opening speech, titled "A Work Plan for the 2010 Review Cycle", which put "nonproliferation compliance" first and foremost. In the cluster II session Dr Ford elaborated: "Given the staggering potential cost of nonproliferation noncompliance... States Party must place at the top of their agenda for this review cycle the development and implementation of vigorous and sustained efforts to detect violations of nonproliferation obligations, to return violators to compliance, and to deter other would-be violators from following such a path." Ford referred to the first three articles of the NPT as its 'core obligations' and argued that "noncompliance imperils the NPT's most important benefit: enhanced international security through greater assurance against nuclear proliferation and the reduced likelihood of new nuclear arms races and of nuclear war itself. Second, nonproliferation noncompliance compromises efforts to bring about universal adherence to the NPT, a goal that we all share. Third, nonproliferation noncompliance undermines the foundation of safety and trust upon which peaceful nuclear cooperation is necessarily built. And fourth, nonproliferation noncompliance undercuts the international community's aspirations for nuclear and general disarmament, as expressed in the Treaty's Preamble and in Article VI."[20] The US argued for full implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 as well as "universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol as the new standard for international nuclear safeguards".
While many Western states went along with the US position, with nuanced differences, the NAM emphasized that "it is fundamental to make the distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations."[21]
Of course no-one spoke against the safeguards system, but there were significant differences in how the Additional Protocol was characterised. The EU called for all states that have not yet done so to bring in force their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and also the Additional Protocol, saying that the Additional Protocol is "an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system and adherence to them should be considered an essential means of verifying the fulfilment of states parties obligations under article III of the NPT."[22]
In a more nuanced approach than usual, the NAM highlighted those of its members that have ratified or signed the Additional Protocol. In an obviously coded reference to Iran's travails, the working paper reiterated its view of the IAEA as an "independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization in the United Nations system, which serves as the sole verification agency for nuclear safeguards and the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation". In this regard it emphasized the importance of confidentiality and that the implementation of safeguards should be "factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements".[23]
France, which shared the enthusiastic support for nuclear energy and Article IV expressed also in various NAM interventions, referred to the importance of the principle of universalisation and development of "an integrated system of safeguards". Commending the work done by the Consultative Committee on Safeguards and Verification, France said it supported all steps taken by the IAEA to put in pace new safeguards approaches, modernize the equipment and introduce a new information management system.[24]
Like the United States, the EU placed great emphasis on UNSCR 1540, which "complements our efforts to tackle proliferation by explicitly addressing illicit trafficking and procurement networks and, in particular, the involvement of non-state actors in the proliferation of WMD technology." The EU also gave strong support to various conventions and resolutions on physical protection and terrorism.
No longer expressing open opposition to UNSCR 1540 or the Proliferation Security Initiative, in which a number of nonaligned countries now participate, the NAM's opening statement stressed that "any effort to stem proliferation should be transparent and open to participation by all States".
Though some NAM states are strongly opposed to export controls, which they regard as discriminatory and unfairly (and often politically) applied, there was not enough consensus in the group for a working paper. Making positive reference to European countries' active role in the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group", the EU introduced a working paper calling for "maximum transparency in all nuclear related exports". In the EU view, "coordination of national export control policies contributes significantly" to the NPT regime. Japan agreed, noting that the Zangger Committee and NSG have engaged in outreach to help other States Parties to understand the role of these regimes and also establish domestic export control laws and regulations. Similarly, Japan said it had "taken a lead in ensuring the effective implementation of Resolution 1540 in the international community".[25]
Australia, a major supplier of uranium, said there was a "strategic significance which distinguishes uranium from other energy commodities" and commended itself for being the first country to make the Additional Protocol "a condition of supply of Australian uranium to non-nuclear-weapon states". Australia also spoke on behalf of the G-10, which submitted 8 working papers on various aspects of the Treaty, particularly nuclear safety and Articles III and IV.[26]
With the exception of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, signed in Semipalatinsk on September 8, 2006, there was little new to note in the general interventions on nuclear-weapon-free zones: positive updates were given on existing NWFZ, states in Africa and South-East Asia were encouraged to ratify their respective Treaties (Pelindaba and Bangkok), the weapon states were exhorted to ratify and respect the various protocols, as applicable, and so on.
In a joint working paper, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan recommended several paragraphs for the PrepCom to take forward in support of the Semipalatinsk Treaty. In an oblique reference to some of the difficulties encountered during negotiations with the nuclear weapon states, two of which (China and Russia) border this land-locked, Northern Hemisphere NWFZ, the working paper on Central Asia asked the PrepCom to welcome "the readiness of the Central Asian States, in accordance with paragraph 25 of the principles and guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999, to continue consultations with nuclear-weapon States on a range of provisions" of the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty.[27]
In the intense special-time session on regional issues, the majority of states focussed on the Middle East, with only a few interventions addressing the Korean nuclear situation, probably to avoid any adverse effect on the delicate but very welcome North Korea Denuclearization Agreement.
Indonesia on behalf of the NAM opened the debate on the Middle East, noting "with regret that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, extension of full-scope safeguards to all its nuclear facilities or establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East." This echoed the view of almost all the speakers (with the notable exception of the United States), most of whom called for Israel to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and accede without further delay to the NPT [as a non-nuclear weapon State].
The NAM statement proposed the following steps, detailed in their working paper:
i) The allocation of specific time at Preparatory Committee meetings of the 2010 Review Conference to review the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference;
ii) The establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and
iii) The establishment of a "Standing Committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East, in particular Israel's prompt accession" to the NPT and the "placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards" and to report on this to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.[28]
Oman, on behalf of the League of Arab States, endorsed these NAM proposals, in some cases with nuanced differences, and added five more recommendations. Referring to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East as part of the "package deal" for extending the NPT, Oman noted that in response, by 2000 all Arab states had become parties to the NPT. that "Owing to the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the outcomes of the 2000 NPT Review Conference... represent the point of departure for the discussions at the 2010 Review Conference and at the meetings of its Preparatory Committee."
The League's eight "practical steps to start real actions towards achieving the Resolution" included adopting effective mechanisms to implement the Resolution, a subsidiary body within Main Committee II on this; a standing committee of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference "to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East"; convening of an international conference on establishment of NWFZ in the Middle East; a clear commitment from all the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or devices etc to Israel or to assist or contribute to Israel's nuclear programme; monitoring, reporting and follow-up of commitments; and circulation of these reports by the UN Secretariat.[29]
Egypt and other Arab statements and working papers supported and reinforced these League recommendations. Some pointed to "double standards" being applied in the region, i.e. punishing Iran whilst turning a blind eye or assisting Israel with its "illegal" nuclear programme. Iran also put in a working paper on the Middle East in which it that all its nuclear facilities are "devoted to peaceful purposes and are under the full scope of IAEA safeguards" and heaped calumny on what it persistently referred to as "the Zionist regime".
The United States devoted most of its statement in this session to condemning Iran for violating its safeguards agreements. Instead of a nuclear weapon free zone, Dr Ford was more inclined to talk of the objective of a "Middle East verifiably free of weapons of mass destruction", putting this into the context of a stable, "comprehensive regional peace". Stating that "all States Party should work to ensure that all states in the region are in full compliance with their NPT obligations, and the international community should strive for full compliance in the region with other nonproliferation commitments," the United States said that "Iran's noncompliance and ongoing pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability severely undercuts prospects for a WMD-free region". The US encouraged all non-Parties to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states as soon as possible, and said it was "seeking to establish an environment of mutual respect and trust, by encouraging the three parties which have not joined the NPT to exercise nuclear restraint, and by insisting that NPT Parties comply with their NPT obligations."[30]
The EU and various other interventions echoed calls for all states in the region to accede to all of the relevant WMD treaties and emphasised the need for political approaches: "The best solution to the problem of WMD proliferation is that countries should no longer feel they need them... the more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon programmes: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race."[31]
In an unusual development, Palestine, which attends the NPT meetings as an Observer, put in a working paper. Endorsing the recommendations of the League of Arab States, Palestine made explicit reference to information it said that Greenpeace had revealed, notably "the existence of an Israeli nuclear weapons installation close to the village of Aylabun in Lower Galilee in the north of Israel, in addition to two nuclear bases one in Dimona and one in Sourik in the south of Israel... and... a naval base in the city of Haifa in the north of Israel in which there are 20 missiles with nuclear warheads." These installations, the working paper asserted, represent "a perpetual threat to us, the Palestinians, first of all, particularly in view of the risk of earthquakes or radiation leakage from the Dimona reactors, specifically, which are well past their useful life and are so cracked as to cause concern to the Israelis themselves." Palestine also emphasized "that the peace sought in the Middle East will be achieved only when the Palestinian people obtains its freedom and independence and an independent Palestinian State is established with Jerusalem as its eternal capital and the vision of President Bush of the United States of America, of the existence of two neighbouring States for the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples, is realized."[32]
Many states condemned the nuclear test conducted by North Korea in October 2006, but expressed the hope that diplomacy was now resolving that particular nuclear crisis and that the DPRK would soon be brought back into full compliance with the NPT. Ambassador Chang Dong-hee updated the NPT parties on progress towards implementing the February 13 Denuclearization Agreement, saying "The importance of the Six Party Talks process as the only viable mechanism for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be overemphasized." Optimistically, he continued, "when the Six Party Talks achieve denuclearization and succeed in incorporating the DPRK into the global community, the mechanism of the Six Party Talks will serve as a good basis for future multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, the experience of having resolved the greatest security issue in Northeast Asia through cooperation and dialogue will prove to be a major asset in responding to new security challenges."
Japan said that "the development, acquisition, possession, test or transfer of nuclear weapons [by the DPRK] can in no way be tolerated." Japan evoked UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006), saying it "created a wide range of new obligations and requirements on UN Member States to take necessary measures" to prevent any future proliferation activities by the DPRK. Japan urged full implementation of the North Korean Denuclearization Agreement and stressed that the whole of the Korean Peninsula should be made nuclear free."[33]
The vast majority of statements extolled the virtues of Article IV and the "inalienable right" to nuclear energy that they thought was promised in the NPT.[34] Many, however, focussed on ways to ensure that "peaceful" nuclear programmes would not be turned into military nuclear programmes, with much discussion of multinational approaches to ensure the supply of low enriched uranium for nuclear fuel and to prevent (or restrict) new developments in uranium enrichment or plutonium separation.
Among the dissenters, New Zealand gave one of the strongest statements, saying that "nuclear power is not compatible with the concept of sustainable development, given the long term costs, both financial and ecological, of nuclear waste and the risk of nuclear proliferation". New Zealand also reminded states about liability with regard to nuclear programmes: "Having an effective liability regime in place to insure against harm to human health and the environment, as well as possible economic loss due to an accident or incident during the maritime transport of radioactive materials, is a key priority for New Zealand. This has particular significance to our region given the fragility of communities in the South Pacific that are heavily dependent on the environment for their economic livelihoods."[35]
Austria put in a "food-for-thought paper" following the critical analysis of nuclear power given by its Foreign Minister, Ursula Plassnik, when she opened the Conference. This paper noted that there are 435 nuclear power plants worldwide, with about a dozen countries having or pursuing enrichment facilities and approximately 40 countries with the technical expertise to produce nuclear weapons. Though Austria's own position is opposed to nuclear power, it argued that in view of the worsening security and nonproliferation situation, the European Union's own history could provide a useful example of how to move forward. Without going into the details, Austria proposed a dual-track approach to multilaterizing the nuclear fuel cycle and creating an international nuclear fuel bank that would be "operated and controlled by all interested states in an equal and fair manner", thus removing any incentive for national enrichment programmes while assuring the supply of nuclear fuel for energy production.[36]
Norway upheld Article IV but said it was "vital that peaceful uses of nuclear technology do not undermine non-proliferation efforts, nuclear security or safety." Norway called for "renewed international efforts for developing multilateral nuclear fuel-cycle arrangements that are proliferation-resistant" and "reducing the number of vulnerable fuel-cycle facilities and the use of high-risk materials, such as highly enriched uranium, in all types of nuclear facilities" while taking into account the concerns of developing countries. Norway pointed out that while "nuclear safety is a national responsibility, radiation risks can transcend national borders. International cooperation serves to control hazards, prevent accidents, respond to emergencies and mitigate consequences." Norway called for "universal adherence to the Conventions on Nuclear Safety, Early Notification and Assistance, the Joint Convention on Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management and the Codes of Conduct on Radioactive Sources and Research Reactors" and also stressed the importance of States parties themselves continuing to assess their own performance under these conventions and codes.[37]
Russia reiterated President Putin's call for the establishment of "multilateral centres for supplying nuclear fuel cycle services" and said that the first step would be to set up an "international uranium enrichment centre safeguarded by the IAEA in Russia". Russia also said it assisted many NPT states with technology, such as building accelerators and neutron generators and supplying neutron radiography units, gammma-ray treatment equipment.[38]
The NGOs had made criticisms of the US-India nuclear deal a major focus of their activities in Vienna, and concerns were taken up by several states. While some, such as Australia, welcomed the US-India deal because it "...expanded application of IAEA safeguards in India..." others were critical. Norway, for example, said it recognised India's energy needs and recent efforts in bilateral co-operative arrangements, but argued against approaches that could undermine the NPT and global non-proliferation efforts, including the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.
The United States responded, saying that the US-India deal would "strengthen the global non-proliferation regime... [and will help] constitute a dramatic change in moving India into closer conformity with international non-proliferation standards and practices..." The US insisted that its bilateral relations with both Pakistan and India "... continue in every respect to be consistent with our NPT obligations ..."
In its opening statement, Canada again called for NPT parties to address the "institutional weakness" in the Treaty, and argued that the priority in this review cycle should be "ensuring improved accountability via upgrading the Treaty's institutional arrangements." Noting that "At present NPT States Parties lack a provision to meet collectively in a timely fashion to discuss such a critical issue as withdrawal or a nuclear test and to send a clear message on the subject", Canada argued for "at least an annual meeting of [NPT] States Parties fully empowered to take decisions as required in addition to a mechanism to convene promptly in emergency session in the face of a critical threat to the Treaty's integrity." Ambassador Paul Meyer further recommended, "It is high time for this Treaty to possess a small standing bureau to provide stewardship and continuity throughout its five year cycles. Having annual and authoritative meetings of States Parties, ideally in conjunction with annual reports on implementation, will provide a powerful instrument for enhanced accountability of States Parties for their fulfilment of their Treaty commitments. Better accountability is a stimulus for better implementation."[39]
Brazil kicked off a discussion about increasing accountability and facilitating the evaluation of progress in nuclear disarmament by proposing that the Secretariat, "based on the information available" - which could comprise both the reports and information provided by the nuclear weapon states, and by civil society analysts - and "put together a comparative table of the measures undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States to comply with obligations under article VI. This would provide States Parties with the means for a better evaluation of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Such a table, or comparative chart, could then be used at the NPT Review Conference in 2010." This seemed to catch the interest of many states, some of whom endorsed the idea in their own interventions.
Not unsurprisingly, in view of the seven-day deadlock over the agenda that nearly wrecked the PrepCom, there were also discussions of other ways to address the institutional deficits in the NPT, including a Bureau, a standing Secretariat and annual decision-making meetings instead of 'PrepComs' that were limited to preparing for a review conference some years in the future.
The final session, on Friday morning, was a rushed debate on the NPT's withdrawal provision (Article X). Many took the view that suspending the right to withdraw contained in Article X was not feasible or desirable, but a large number of interventions argued that the cost of withdrawal should be raised, so as to make leaving the NPT less attractive and deter states from withdrawing. Some states, especially from the NAM, raised concerns that the right to withdraw was a sovereign right in keeping with the UN charter and that if it were made subject to punitive measures or constraints, this would introduce another discrimination. They pointed out that especially for countries in regions that have states possessing or pursuing nuclear weapons outside the NPT, the right to withdraw must be preserved so as not to place NPT parties at a disadvantage vis-à-vis non parties or violators.
The US characterised the regime's dilemma thus: "The great benefits that the NPT brings to the international community, however, would be dangerously eroded if countries violating the Treaty felt free to withdraw from it, develop nuclear weapons and enjoy the fruits of their violation with impunity. If violation entailed no cost, and withdrawal were perceived as ending international efforts to require corrective action, the Treaty's system of interrelated security and developmental benefits could collapse, undermining the Treaty's basic non-proliferation rules and making universal adherence pointless."[40]
There was general agreement that the Treaty's withdrawal provision should be exercised only as a very solemn and last resort action and that if any state chose to withdraw then any nuclear technology or facilities that had been acquired under article IV for peaceful purposes must remain for peaceful purposes. The US working paper also provided a detailed analysis and recommendations. It concluded, "The right to withdraw from the NPT remains a sovereign right enshrined in the Treaty itself. But nothing in the NPT gives countries the right to benefit from their violation of the Treaty's provisions, or to shield themselves from the consequences of such acts." The US argued for states acting through the UN Security Council, the IAEA and through supply and trading links to "develop and implement prompt and effective measures to deter withdrawal by Treaty violators and to respond vigorously should it occur".
The European Union put in a detailed working paper analysing the legal requirements and implications of withdrawal from the NPT for international security. The EU proposed: "A State should remain internationally liable for violations of the NPT committed prior to withdrawal. On this basis the following principles and measures should be observed in the case of withdrawal:
(a) The premeditation and the preparation of the withdrawal decision with a view to conducting a military nuclear programme constitute a violation of the objectives of the Treaty;
(b) Withdrawal from the Treaty could in a given case constitute a threat to international peace and security;
(c) As a matter of principle all nuclear materials, equipment, technologies and facilities developed for peaceful purposes of a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remain, in case of a withdrawal from the Treaty, restricted to peaceful uses only and as a consequence have to remain subject to safeguards;
(d) Without prejudice to any other measure likely to be decided by the Security Council, a State withdrawing from the Treaty should, as a matter of principle, no longer use nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and technologies acquired from a third country prior to withdrawal and materials produced therewith, and such nuclear facilities, equipment and materials must be frozen, with a view to having them dismantled and/or returned to the supplier State, under IAEA control. Steps to that end should be envisaged as soon as a withdrawal notification is issued;
(e) A clause prohibiting the use of transferred items and materials produced therewith, in the event of a withdrawal, should be included in intergovernmental agreements defining the modalities for transfers of sensitive nuclear goods (enrichment, reprocessing) or for large-scale transfers: a standard clause among State parties would help in this context;
(f) Examination of the possibility for IAEA to continue implementing safeguards and, where relevant, certain Additional Protocol provisions, on all nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and technologies initially developed for peaceful purposes, during an indefinite period following a withdrawal."[41]
Ambassador Amano can be justifiably proud that he achieved his principal objectives: adoption of an workable agenda that should serve for the next NPT meetings and agreement on arrangements for the next PrepCom, which will be held in Geneva, April 28 to May 9, 2008, with Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine) in the Chair.
Moreover, this was no lowest common denominator 'management solution'. In both the agenda and his Chair's summary, Amano sought to reflect a wide range of NPT parties' aspirations and concerns, looking forward as well as back. He succeeded in producing one of the most comprehensive and illuminating summaries in recent history. Of course it didn't please everyone and couldn't cover every significant point that was made. That is the nature of compromise. But it was pretty fair and balanced and gave a good sense of where there was substantial agreement and also the conflicting or contrasting positions.
Though it may appear at first glance that the deadlock over the 2007 agenda resembled the impasse in 2005, the politics and circumstances were very different. Egypt's objections to the agenda imposed in 2005 to comply with US tactics of obstruction in 2004 were substantive; Iran's objections this time round was so obviously a tactic to avoid being tried and possibly condemned in the NPT forum. Egypt had many covert supporters for its objectives if not its strategy; Iran stretched the patience of its friends to breaking point by running through almost every tactic of obstruction and delay in the book, from 'hide and seek' and 'moving the goalposts' to waiting for Godot (the instructions from Capital that take several days despite the electronic age).
Though clumsily worded as many diplomatic compromises are, the agenda is a big improvement over what ended up being adopted in 2005. As Egypt acknowledged in its opening speech, this agenda reinstates the consensus outcomes of 1995 and 2000 as the basis for reviewing compliance with the Treaty, and if some states want to remind themselves of the dire warnings contained in the failure of the 2005 review conference, so be it. Egypt also presaged Iran's final stand over the meaning of "full compliance", a phrase insisted on by the United States, putting its interpretation on the record: "compliance relates to all Articles of the Treaty with no distinction, including the commitments of nuclear-weapon states to achieve nuclear disarmament and the obligations of all states party not to provide states which are not party to the NPT with nuclear material and/or technologies."[42]
The dust is now settling and we need to address both the political causes of Iran's desperate attempt to block the PrepCom and the institutional weaknesses in the NPT that enable obstructive tactics by one or two states to outweigh the intentions, interests and work of the vast majority. Threatening gestures and isolation risk driving Iran out of the Treaty, a possibility that would be even more destabilizing than North Korea's defection - and much more difficult to undo.
While recognising that the review process cannot - and should not - be divorced from the political and nonproliferation challenges in the real world, more must be done to insulate the review process from procedural abuses. During the meeting, as some raised the possibility of voting, some delegations appeared astonished to learn that the NPT does not have a consensus rule like the CD. Rule 28 of the NPT rules of procedure provides for the possibility of voting if consensus is unachievable. As it looked as if Iran would succeed in exercising a veto over the agenda and thus the work of the PrepCom (and then, later, its outcome and report), the case began to be made for exercising the Rule 28 voting mechanism, at least to adopt procedural decisions supported by a large majority and deemed necessary for work to proceed. In the end this proved unnecessary, but it remains an option that should not be dismissed out of hand.
[1] The final report and
other official documents of the 2007 PrepCom can be accessed from
the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.
The report is at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/
357/92/PDF/N0735792.pdf?OpenElement
[2] Almost all the statements and working papers are available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[3] Norma Goicochea Estenoz, Ambassador of Cuba on behalf of NAM, statement in General Debate, April 30, 2007.
[4] NAM working paper on nuclear testing, NPT/CONF2010/PC.1/WP.9.
[5] Abdul Samad Minty, Special Representative for Disarmament for South Africa, General Debate and Cluster I Statements.
[6] Na'ela Gabr, Assistant Foreign Minister for International Organizations, Egypt, General Debate statement.
[7] Don McKay, Ambassador for New Zealand, General Debate and Cluster I Statements.
[8] UK working paper on disarmament, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.59. Emphasis in the original.
[9] Estenoz, op. cit.
[10] European Union working paper on fissile material treaty, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.26
[11] For more detail on the P6 proposal and the CD, see p 68, this issue and Disarmament Diplomacy 84 (Spring 2007).
[12] George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons' Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: January 4, 2007.
[13] Anatoly Antonov, Russia's head of delegation, General Debate Statement, April 30, 2007.
[14] Japan's working paper NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.2.
[15] Don McKay, New Zealand ambassador during interactive session on practical disarmament steps.
[16] NAM working paper on security assurances, NPT/CONF2010/PC.1/WP.10.
[17] Italy's working paper on security assurances, NPT/CONF2010/PC.1/WP.27.
[18] China's working paper on security assurances, NPT/CONF2010/PC.1/WP.43.
[19] Canada's working paper on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances, NPT/CONF2010/PC.1/WP.29.
[20] Christopher A. Ford, US Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, statement on Cluster 2: Implementing Provisions of the NPT Related to the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
[21] NAM working paper on safeguards, NPT/CONF2010/PC.1/WP.12
[22] Rüdiger Lüdeking, Deputy Commissioner of the Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, EU statement on Cluster II.
[23] NPT/CONF2010/PC.1/WP.12.
[24] French statement on Cluster II.
[25] Japanese statement on Cluster II.
[26] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.49 to NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.56.
[27] Working paper by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.57.
[28] NAM working paper on Regional Issues: Middle East, NPT/CONF2010/PC.1/WP.7.
[29] Working Paper on Implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East by Oman on behalf of the League of Arab States, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.28.
[30] US presentation on Nonproliferation and the Middle East.
[31] From notes by Merav Datan of the debate on regional issues, which the author is grateful to her for sharing.
[32] Working paper from the delegation of Palestine, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.74.
[33] Japan's working paper NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.2.
[34] In addition to the working papers, this section draws on notes of the Cluster III debate from Felicity Hill, to whom the author is very grateful for sharing her notes.
[35] New Zealand statement on cluster III.
[36] Austria's food-for-thought paper on Multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/7.
[37] Norway's working paper on Cluster III, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.65.
[38] Anatoly Antonov, Russia's head of delegation, General Debate Statement, April 30, 2007.
[39] Paul Meyer, Ambassador for Canada, Statement in General Debate. Canada's ideas were further developed in NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.42.
[40] US working paper on 'Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: deterring and responding to withdrawal by Treaty violators', NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.22.
[41] EU working paper on Article X, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.25.
[42] Na'ela Gabr, Assistant Foreign Minister for International Organizations, Egypt, General Debate statement.
This report was written by Rebecca Johnson, director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. Dr Johnson has attended and reported on every NPT PrepCom and Review Conference since 1994. On this occasion I would particularly like to thank the Chair, Secretariat and delegates for providing more open access to the debates and documents than at previous PrepComs, thereby righting an institutional wrong dating back to 1997.
See also: 2007 NPT PrepCom Chair's factual summary.
© 2007 The Acronym Institute.