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Introduced by Jordan.
Introduced annually since 1999, the current resolution, drafted by Australia, Jordan, and Switzerland, includes minor and technical updates to resolution 62/41. The resolution supports the Convention and its meetings. The resolution continues to call for full and effective implementation of the Convention, inviting all remaining states to accede without delay. It further calls for all states and relevant parties to work to remove and destroy anti-personnel mines throughout the world, help mine victims in all necessary ways, and to undertake mine risk education programmes. It also invites and encourages all interested parties, including relevant non-governmental organizations, to participate in the programme of intersessional work and in the next Review Conference. The resolution directs the Secretary-General to convene the next Review Conference and to invite relevant intergovernmental, regional, and non-governmental organizations to participate in the Conference and annual meeting as observers.
First Committee: 151-0-19
General Assembly: 163-0-18
This resolution serves as an ongoing tribute to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the courage of the core group of states that brought this treaty to fruition in 1994-97. The Convention was the outcome of independent negotiations and government/civil-society partnership, the so-called Ottawa Process. The vote on this resolution, reflecting the status of efforts to universalize the Convention, has been static in recent years as a hold-out group of mine-possessing states continue to abstain. Following tradition, a number of the abstainers continued to justify their positions in terms of: security needs required to protect long borders (Iran) and the unavailability of technologically advanced alternatives (India and Pakistan); unique security situations (the Republic of Korea); legitimate self defense (Cuba and Lebanon); and the Convention's lack of universality and imbalance between humanitarian and military considerations (Egypt). Acknowledging their cognizance of humanitarian concerns, a number of these delegations emphasized their adherence to Protocol II or its amended version of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps, and similar devices), including Cuba, India, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea. Pakistan and the Republic of Korea expressed support for CCW Protocol V on the use and clearance of explosive remnants of war.
Introduced by Argentina.
This resolution, first introduced in 2004 on the initiative of Argentina, acts in conviction of the connection between confidence-building and international security and disarmament. Argentina decided to introduce the resolution on a biennial basis after 2006. Unchanged from resolution 61/79, its key paragraphs continue to encourage states to discuss and adopt confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms and to provide information on adopted measures to the Secretariat. It welcomes the establishment of a database by the Secretariat, containing the information submitted by states pursuant to the resolution.
First Committee: without a vote
General Assembly: without a vote
Since the adoption of resolution 61/79 in 2006, 23 states submitted information as requested by the resolution, an improvement over the eight states that submitted information in response to the 2005 resolution, 60/82. States regularly submitting reports have primarily come from Europe and Latin America.
Introduced by Sweden.
This annual resolution supports the meetings of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and urges the universality of the Convention and its protocols on non-detectable fragments, restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices, prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons, and the explosive remnants of war. The current resolution has been revised to reflect the outcomes of various CCW meetings and to welcome the adoption by the Third Review Conference of a Plan of Action to promote its universality. A new paragraph expresses support for the work of the Group of Government Experts to negotiate a "proposal" to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions "while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations". The resolution continues its procedural function to direct the Secretary-General to render necessary assistance to the Convention's upcoming meetings.
First Committee: without a vote
General Assembly: without a vote
This year, this largely procedural resolution reflects the views of those cluster munition-possessing states that prefer to deal with the issue inside the CCW without acknowledging the Oslo Process (see the report and below for information on the discussion of cluster munitions and General Assembly action on the conclusion and opening for signature of the Cluster Munitions Convention).
Introduced by Germany.
First introduced in 2005, drafted by France and Germany, and in its third year, the current resolution follows up on the report of the Group of Government Experts, convened pursuant to resolution 61/72 to make recommendations on enhancing cooperation on the issue. Recognizing the need to consider appropriate controls over the safety and security of stockpiles, the key provisions of the resolution continue to encourage state to voluntarily assess whether parts of their ammunition stocks should be considered surplus. It appeals to states to determine the size of their excess stocks, determine if they pose a security risk, and assess if international assistance is required to eliminate the risk. The current resolution welcomes the expert group's report, encourages states to implement its recommendations, and notes the views submitted by states as requested in resolution 61/72. A new paragraph encourages states to contribute voluntarily to the development within the UN of technical guidelines for stockpile management.
First Committee: 172-0-0
General Assembly: without a vote
In 2006, the General Assembly had voted to convene the Group of Government Experts over the sole objection of the United States. The present resolution takes forward the recommendations of the expert group's report, A/63/182, completed in July 2008 and presented to the current session of the General Assembly. A recorded vote had been inadvertently called on this draft in the First Committee, which otherwise would have been adopted without a vote.
The key concerns related to the management of stockpiles identified by the expert group report included the risk to public safety through explosions and contamination and the risk of diversion to illicit use, which can affect a wide range of international security concerns. Toward addressing these concerns, the expert group recommended a number of measures related to comprehensive and effective stockpile management, including: categorization and accounting systems; physical security; surveillance and testing of aging stocks; and national and regional measures. At the global level, the expert group recommended development of voluntary technical guidelines for stockpile management to assist states in improving national capacity, preventing surplus stockpile growth, and mitigating risks.
Introduced by Argentina.
The purpose of this resolution is to further the process leading to the conclusion of a legally-binding treaty regulating the import, export, and transfer of conventional arms. Toward this end, following on aspects of the report of the Group of Government Experts, the current resolution includes a decision to establish an open-ended working group, open to all states, to meet in six one-week sessions in 2009 to consider where consensus can be found on a prospective treaty. The preamble of this resolution follows directly from resolution 61/89, though it notably no longer recognizes that the support for such a treaty is widespread across "all" regions. It continues to include provisions aimed at assuaging states' concerns over the possible scope of the proposed treaty, reaffirming the right to self-defense under the UN Charter and the right of all states to produce, transfer, and retain conventional arms for self-defense and to participate in peacekeeping operations. The preamble also notes the views of states submitted to the Secretary-General as requested in resolution 61/89. The key elements of the operative portion explicitly endorse the report of the Group of Government Experts and encourage states to implement the recommendations contained in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the report.
First Committee: 147-2-18; OP3: 141-1-19; OP4: 142-1-18; OP5:
141-1-19
General Assembly: 133-1-19; OP3: 129-1-19; OP4: 131-1-19; OP5:
130-1-20
Testament to the growing momentum of the arms trade treaty initiative, 114 states co-sponsored the current resolution in the First Committee. For those seeking quick action on a strong arms trade treaty, the present circumstances possibly merit only cautious optimism. Following from the outcome of the First Committee's work on the issue, significant difficulties still lie ahead.
At the outset, the first hurdle to progressing this effort was the Secretary-General's finding that his office could not fully absorb the costs for the meetings of the open-ended working group as called for in the resolution and that it would have to draw upon emergency funds. The Secretariat further indicated the matter would be referred to the Fifth Committee, hence delaying its adoption by the General Assembly. Key arms trade treaty proponents and perennial UN budget hawks, Japan and the United Kingdom, along with Australia and Mexico, expressed the understanding that the Secretariat would be able to absorb the costs and that no additional expenses will be incurred. The Nigerian delegation argued, however, that in light of the humanitarian concerns, no sacrifice would be too great in order to adopt such a resolution, referring to the miniscule nature of the budget shortfall relative to the costs of failing to stem the flow of illicit arms.
Despite the budget issue and lingering substantive disagreements, the First Committee easily adopted the text by a larger margin than in 2006, picking up more than half a dozen votes in favour while shedding some abstentions. On the resolution as a whole, only the United States and Zimbabwe cast no votes in the First Committee-Zimbabwe switched to a vote in favour in the General Assembly. The Arab states continued to abstain, but not as a unified bloc, along with China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia.
Various concerns prompted the US delegation to request separate votes on paragraphs 3-5, dealing with the open-ended working group, which the Committee opted to retain despite the solitary opposition of the United States. The same states that abstained from the resolution as a whole also abstained from the votes on each paragraph. Russia did not participate on the vote on paragraph 4, which deals with the organizational aspects of the open-ended working group established in paragraph 3.
Most abstaining states expressed similar objections to the text of resolution, accusing the sponsors of deviating from the expert group report and selectively emphasizing certain recommendations at the expense of others, pointing specifically to operative paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. These delegations questioned the feasibility of the initiative and charged that the resolution did not take into account the complexity of the issue. A number of these delegations expressed concern that the present path of the initiative might risk loosing support from certain arms-producing states, which would undermine the purpose of the initiative. Many further argued that it prejudged the outcome of the open-ended working group to be a single, unified treaty, which they claim is beyond the scope of the step-by-step process referred to in paragraph 27 of the consensus expert group.
A number of the abstaining delegations expressed other specific concerns. Arguing against the feasibility of the initiative, the US delegation expressed scepticism that key arms producing states would join a global treaty. In justification of its continued opposition, the US delegation further argued that such a treaty would be ineffective without the participation of such states and that, in order to secure their support, any treaty would have to be weakened to the point of irrelevance.
Libya made a joint statement on behalf of several Arab states, including Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, raising a number of concerns. They argued that the current approach would perpetuate existing military advantages of states that produce arms, specifically singling out Israel, especially if a treaty did not gain universal adherence. They also expressed concern over the potential for the politicization of arms trade decisions, noting that the proposed treaty would allow states to unilaterally judge the human rights records or other humanitarian concerns as criteria for arms transfers.
Introduced by Mali on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States.
The purpose of this annual resolution is to highlight the difficulties facing the Sahelo-Saharan sub-region that are attributable to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and to invite regional and international participation and support in the voluntary moratorium maintained by the Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS) on the import and manufacture of SALW. The resolution notes and recalls a number of international and regional efforts to curb the illicit traffic in SALW. Its key operative provisions, unchanged from resolution 62/55, encourage further regional cooperation and collaboration among governments, civil society, and international organizations, and invites the Secretary-General, states, and organizations to provide assistance in curbing the proliferation and trafficking in SALW and collecting them. It also calls upon the international community to provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of NGOs.
First Committee: without a vote
General Assembly: without a vote
According to the annual report of the Secretary-General requested by resolution 62/55, A/63/261, over the past year the UN provided assistance to a number of small arms control projects in several states, including Sri Lanka, Togo, and Jamaica. This assistance was coordinated through UN regional centres and the UN Coordination Action on Small Arms mechanism with support from the government of Japan.
Introduced by Ireland.
Submitted on behalf of the Core Group of the Oslo Process (Austria, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Peru), this brief, first-time resolution recalls the 30 May 2008 conclusion of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and notes that it will be open for signature on 3 December 2008. The last two of its four paragraphs are procedural, noting the tasks of the Secretary-General under the Convention and requesting the Secretary-General to render necessary assistance and provide such services needed to accomplish them.
First Committee: without a vote
General Assembly: without a vote
The authors of this resolution drafted it to be exclusively procedural in nature in order to ensure its adoption without a vote. In light of this, a number of delegations that do not support the Convention, including China, Egypt, India, and Russia, expressed reservations that their consent to the resolution should not be taken as an endorsement of the Convention. In addition, other delegations, such as Pakistan and Morocco, simply pointed to the resolution's procedural nature as the reason for their support.
Despite the pending opening for signature of the Convention, these hold-out states continued to point to the upcoming negotiation of a proposal within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons as their preferred alternative. A number of these delegations, including Israel and the United States, continued to argue for the issue to be dealt with only within the CCW, as the appropriate forum for balancing humanitarian and military considerations, or as Singapore alternatively characterized it, balancing humanitarian and security and self-defense concerns.
Introduced by Japan.
The annual small arms omnibus, which supports the Programme of Action to Prevent Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument, has been substantially revised from resolution 62/47. An expanded preamble includes new and revised language, including increased emphasis on the need for continued and full implementation of both the PoA and the International Tracing Instrument. Novel language also underlines the need for states to enhance their national capacities, places additional emphasis on the importance of regional efforts, and explicitly recognizes the role of NGOs. The preamble continues to note the importance of national reporting in facilitating international support and cooperation. In the operative portion, other key new elements focus on tightening institutional aspects of the PoA. The resolution endorses the report of the Third Biennial Meeting of States and decides that the next biennial meeting will consider the national, regional, and international implementation of the PoA, as well as the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument-the same mandate as that of the 2008 meeting. In an effort to address institutional issues, the resolution suggests a firm deadline of 2009 for the submission of national reports, encouraging states voluntarily to make use of the reports to communicate assistance needs. The resolution includes decisions to 1. convene a one-week, open-ended meeting of government experts in 2011 to address key implementation challenges and 2. convene a two-week Review Conference in 2012. A new operative paragraph encourages interested parties to convene regional meetings.
First Committee: 168-1-0; OP4: 164-0-2; OP13: 164-1-1
General Assembly: 181-1-0; OP4: 177-0-2; OP13: 176-1-1
The United States again cast the solitary vote against this resolution, which was co-sponsored by 62 delegations. Iran and United States abstained from a separate vote on operative paragraph 4, which welcomed the final report of the third biennial meeting of states (BMS). The United States voted against and Iran abstained from a separate vote on operative paragraph 13, on the 2011 open-ended meeting of experts. Iran had raised objections to the final document of the third BMS, ultimately compelling the parties to adopt it by vote, from which Iran, joined by Zimbabwe, abstained.
The US delegation continued to remain steadfast in its opposition to additional meetings of the PoA, calling for states to undertake practical measures to implement it. The US position is that such measures are best accomplished at the national, regional, and sub-regional levels. Nonetheless, as in past years, the US delegation continued to profess its support for the PoA.
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