Disarmament Documentation

'Attentive Engagement' with North Korea, Representative James A Leach, Chairman Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, February 17, 2005

'Rep. Leach Calls for "Attentive Engagement" with North Korea', Washington File, February 17, 2005.

Statement by Representative James A. Leach
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
Joint Subcommittee Hearing on
The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Is There a Way Forward?
February 17, 2005

On behalf of the Committee, I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses to the first hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for the 109th Congress. I am especially pleased that we are holding this hearing jointly with Chairman Ed Royce and his colleagues on the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation.

At the outset, I would like to express my appreciation to our panel for agreeing on short notice to appear before us this morning. In particular, I would like to extend a word of thanks, or perhaps commiseration, to Mr. Cossa in Honolulu for getting up well before dawn in order to contribute to our discussion of this critical national security issue.

A housekeeping note is also in order. As my colleagues are aware, Secretary of State Rice is scheduled to appear before the Committee in open testimony later this afternoon. In addition, at least one of our witnesses is under some time constraints and must leave before noon. In order to expedite our proceedings today I therefore intend to keep my opening statement brief.

There are few parallels in history in which the U.S. has found itself with a less appealing menu of options than with North Korea. Pyongyang's ongoing nuclear program and the potential export of weapons of mass destruction have profound implications for regional stability, the international nonproliferation regime, United States leadership in Asia and the Pacific, and even terrorist threats to the American homeland.

As we all understand, the North Koreans have lit a firecracker with the Foreign Ministry statement last week that Pyongyang will increase its "nuclear weapons arsenal" and indefinitely suspend its participation in the multilateral six-party talks. It is difficult and usually presumptuous to apply motives to others. A possibility exists that North Korea's intentions are entirely negative and that provocative rhetoric may be followed by provocative actions. On the other hand, a possibility also exists that this is classic North Korean saber rattling to alter what they regard as unfavorable diplomatic dynamics, to increase their leverage, and to seek additional economic "incentives" prior to returning to the negotiating table. Indeed, the last sentence of the announcement, which stated that there is no change in the North's "stance of resolving the issue through dialogue and negotiations" with the "ultimate goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula," suggests that the announcement may well be a negotiating ploy and therefore may provide grounds for cautious optimism.

The judgment call of the day on the Korean Peninsula is the question of time. Whose side is it on? With each passing month, North Korea increases its nuclear weapons capacities. As a consequence, the odds may have increased that Pyongyang could export nuclear weapons or fissile material to foreign governments, shadowy middlemen, or even terrorists. On the other hand, the history of the 20th century has shown that governments which lack democratic legitimacy and fail to give their people the opportunity for a decent life are vulnerable to rapid internal implosion. Military might is simply no substitute for societal attention to human concerns.

In this setting the only prudent approach is to maintain wariness and concomitant preparededness while seeking to de-escalate tension. Given our lack of credible options, there is no alternative to attentive engagement.

The six-party talks as currently configured are a reasonable way to proceed, but there is nothing theological about process approaches. Reasonable questions must be raised whether additional approaches might also be considered. In this context, the Subcommittee has a number of questions for our panelists, including:

-- Is United States strategy for dealing with North Korea consistent and viable?

-- Given the lack of substantive progress to date in the six-party process and the importance of U.S. diplomatic engagement to alliance management, is it time to think "out of the box" about creative ways to demonstrate a commitment to peacefully resolving the nuclear issue?

-- Should our "hard" diplomacy be fine-tuned to include any "softer" cultural elements?

-- For example, despite the abhorrent nature of the DPRK regime, should the United States explore the feasibility of expanding people-to-people and other technical exchanges with elements of North Korean society?

-- In many regards North Korea today politically resembles Stalinist Russia. It is therefore interesting, by analogy, to note the importance during Eisenhower's term of certain non-political exchanges, such as Khrushchev's visit to an Iowa farm. And, bizarrely, ping-pong diplomacy played a role in leading to the normalization of relations with China.

-- Cultural exchanges involve no political content, but at the people-to-people level they betoken the prospect of mutual respect and therefore are at times of more than slight consequence.

-- Hence the question of whether artist or professional exchanges in fields such as medicine or agriculture are in order. Would it not be wise for the U.S. to proffer such options, including the possibility, particularly if progress in the six-party context is made, of North Korean leadership visits to the West coast or heartland?

These are some of the kinds of questions the panel might address. We look forward to your testimony and the discussion to follow.

Source: US Department of State, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov.

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