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Daily Press Briefing Statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson (excerpts), Paris, January 31, 2006.
Q - The chief Iranian negotiator on the nuclear issue said this morning that any effort, any attempt, to refer the Iranian nuclear dossier to the United Nations would bring an end to any diplomatic initiative to resolve the dispute. What's France's reaction?
With regard to that specific statement, like the others from the Iranian side, I've no reaction to give. I call your attention to what was decided in London yesterday, which is very important. A common position was adopted by the six ministers who attended the dinner, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. You saw the communiqué, which was issued after the dinner. It is very important. Of course, the sequence isn't complete since there's the meeting of the IAEA board of governors, composed of its 35 members, on February 2 and 3. We'll be working in the days ahead with all the members of the board-I'm thinking of the non-aligned and others, to ensure that the position of the six is very broadly shared at the board meeting on February 2 and 3.
With that said, your question calls for one remark. The idea is not to transfer the dossier to the Security Council but to make a report to the Security Council so that it can then reinforce the IAEA's authority. The dossier is not going to leave the IAEA to go to the Security Council. It's an interactive, progressive process that is also reversible if Iran does what is expected of it.
Q - In light of the comments by the chief Iranian negotiator, can we now consider any diplomatic process completely over?
I refer you to what the minister said in London yesterday. He said that everything which is being done has, in our minds, only one objective, namely to increase the probability of a diplomatic outcome. As far as we are concerned, the diplomatic route is not closed. We've noted the fact that at this point discussions are at an impasse. The minister said so yesterday because the Iranians have not agreed to suspend enrichment activities and because yesterday's meeting with Mr. Vaidi did not produce anything new in relation to what the Iranians have said so far. Being at an impasse, we're going to the board of governors which will make a report to the Security Council. The Security Council will then see how to strengthen the authority of the AIEA and how to increase pressure to bring about a return to the diplomatic path, but with better chances for success.
Q - On the technical level, if there's a report to the Security Council, does that allow for sanctions to be determined, if need be?
That will be for the Security Council to assess when the time comes. It is preferable at this time not to prejudge what the Security Council does. If you refer to the communiqué issued last night it says "before deciding to take action to reinforce the authority of the IAEA process." The Security Council has its own rules of operating, its own capacity for decision-making. Once again, I don't wish to prejudge what the Security Council does in March. The idea tabled yesterday is to do the report in February in the hope that by March the thinking will have evolved on the Iranian side and that we'll be able to return to the negotiating table.
Q - How did you opt for a report rather than a transfer, as you explained? I'd like to be sure that this simple measure doesn't eliminate eventual sanctions on the basis of a report to the Security Council. Even if the dossier remains at the IAEA, can the Security Council, if it considers it necessary, decree sanctions?
I think we should avoid too much legalism in this matter. We'll see what the IAEA board decides and what grounds are adopted in the board's resolution. The move is political first. After the report to the Security Council there'll be a hiatus between now and March in order to see how things evolve on the Iranian side. The Security Council will then decide what action to take to reinforce the IAEA's authority.
Q - One question which isn't legal at all: among the Security Council P5 do you have an estimate of the time it'll take, if things continue as they are, for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon? How far advanced is the work? Is Iran still at the preparatory stage? What's your estimation?
I don't have an estimate to give. The question is more one for the specialized services than my personal analysis. You can read some of the literature on it. The important point is to have objective guarantees that Iran will not embark on that path. That's why we wanted a united response from the international community. From that point of view, the fact that the P5 are on the same line, are reacting firmly with a report to the Security Council all goes in the desired direction. Moreover it's a rapid response since the Security Council will get the report in February and examine in March the possible actions, if nothing has evolved on the Iranian side between now and then.
The three objectives set by the minister--a firm, united and swift response-were achieved, subject to what the IAEA board says. May I remind you that it is composed of 35 members and that we have the utmost respect for each of them.
Q - As far as the EU3 are concerned, what are the redlines that mustn't be crossed at the risk of bringing an end to diplomacy?
Everything which is being done there and everything we're going to be doing now is designed for one thing--to do everything possible to return to the diplomatic path. There's a period opening up between February 2 and March which the Iranians will have to capitalize on to return to the negotiating table. This is the very clear message that we wish to send to the Iranians after the IAEA board meeting./.
Source: French Foreign Ministry website, http://www.diplomatie.fr.
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