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The Future of NATO: How Valuable an Asset? House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, June 22, 2007.
June 22, 2007, Verbatim, as delivered
The Committee will come to order.
NATO was the great military alliance of the 20th Century. The question before the committee today is whether it will retain this distinction in the 21st century.
For decades NATO was the powerful military defensive line against the ambitions of the Soviet Union, a show of Western solidarity against the totalitarianism and depredations of the Communist East, and a tripwire for the use nuclear weapons by the United States.
Without NATO, tanks could have rolled from Moscow to the Mediterranean or to the Atlantic. Today, had there been no NATO would be discussing the Soviet Socialist Republic of Belgium or the Soviet Socialist Republic of Portugal.
Not only did NATO prevent a European red tide, but it has actually reclaimed much of the Soviet bloc. NATO's founders 58 years ago never could have dreamed that some of the alliance's most stalwart and enthusiastic members in 2007 would be those same Central and Eastern European nations the Soviets had dominated and occupied, and that the alliance would have grown organically from 12 members to 26.
But for all its success, NATO was never actually tested in battle - a true blessing given the devastating consequences of a possible thermonuclear conflict. Now, in the early 21st Century, the world has thrust an entirely new identity upon NATO - one that many of its members seem reluctant in the extreme to assume. The alliance is involved in its first real combat in the mountains of Afghanistan, a real shooting war.
While soldiers of some NATO countries are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, many more countries are doing little more than hunkering down in their secure bases, marking time while their brothers and sisters-in-arms confront the real battle. But some European governments ought to wake up and realize that the moment of truth is at hand for the entire enterprise of NATO.
NATO and its member nations face a stark choice: the alliance could evolve into a reliable global military alliance, halting terrorism and rogue regimes that threaten both Europe and the United States and democracies everywhere. Or it could devolve into an agglomeration of governments that are only rhetorically committed to the common defense, a coalition of the partially or feebly willing, whose individual nations may or may not tackle the security challenges of a post-9/11 planet. The grand NATO alliance, once a bright light for freedom and democracy, either will flicker and then fade into the dark night or it will shine brighter than ever.
The results in Afghanistan are an early indicator of which road NATO will take. NATO's efforts there since 2001 demonstrate that the U.S. and the Europeans are willing to conduct tough combat operations - and do so in a country outside of Europe.
But the treadmill in Afghanistan is going faster and faster under our feet, demanding more and more of every country's efforts. The Taliban is back, and is organized, and it is bearing down on the southern part of the country. To allow a resurgence of the Taliban would be to allow a state-sponsored launching pad for terror and a state sponsor of narco-trafficking. The twin threat of a terror state and a narco state - wrapped into one - would be disastrous for the people of Afghanistan, for the fight against terror, and for the entire world. But it would also be a devastating blow to the future of NATO because it would represent the failure of NATO's most ambitious mission since its founding in 1949.
We will not let Afghanistan fail. But the question is whether the United States will prevent its failure with only some some of our allies or with the full concert with all NATO members. Europe must be our full partner in this mission if NATO is to be redeemed.
So far, European nations have only partially fulfilled their part of the bargain. Dutch, British, Danish, and Canadian troops have been among the most brave, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. troops fighting the Taliban daily. But we need German and French and other European troops - whose grandparents we freed from Nazi tyranny in World War II - to fight on the frontlines too. Mothers in Nebraska and New Jersey are no more eager to have their sons die in Kabul than mothers in Berlin and Bordeaux. If NATO had a more robust commitment in Afghanistan, the Taliban would be defeated in a short time, particularly if the civilian infrastructure would move along as capably as NATO is.
That brings me to the future of NATO after Afghanistan. If NATO is to be revitalized, its member nations must come to grips with the expanding definition of the term "invaded," whereby terror groups can invade a country without a standing army. It must come to grips with the expanding geographic reach of dangerous countries developing weapons of mass destruction, like Iran, the greatest planetary threat today. NATO and its member nations must define what role the alliance is able, or willing, to perform in military conflicts outside of the relatively peaceful confines of Europe.
We should consider seriously NATO's own expansion beyond the borders of Europe and North Africa. Why not allow firmly democratic nations, such as South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, and Israel, to join the world's greatest military alliance? Their interests and their ideals are joined with ours.
When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed here in Washington in April of 1949, its founder and the great Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson marked out the crucial condition of NATO that echoes forcefully today. And I quote - "This Treaty, though born of fear and frustration, must lead to positive social, economic, and political achievements if it is to live."
Indeed, if NATO is to live, if we are to rejuvenate it, if it is to fulfill its promise in this century, all its partners must be committed steadfastly to the social and economic, and political principles this great democratic military alliance symbolizes.
I now turn to my distinguished colleague, the ranking member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, to make any remarks she wishes to at this time.
Chairman Lantos, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, members of the Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to share with you our thoughts on NATO's value to international security and defense.
I want to make two key points. First, I will describe how NATO is critically important in meeting the security challenges North America and Europe face today. Second, I will highlight the significant transformation that NATO has undergone and which it will continue to undergo. NATO is perhaps halfway through this transformation, in terms both of policies and capabilities. Some Allies could be doing more to support NATO operations. But the trend over the past several years is good: we see an Alliance effectively transforming itself and taking on the security challenges of the twenty-first century.
Meeting Security Challenges
Consider at the outset where we started. During the Cold War, NATO focused almost exclusively on Europe - recovering from WWII, building democracy in its aftermath, and defending freedom against Soviet aggression. While NATO has not abandoned its core missions and is aware of concerns from some of its new members, NATO increasingly looks outward - because the challenges to our common security are global, with their roots far beyond Europe. These dangers include violent extremism that preys on fragile societies, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, failed states, cyber attacks, and insecurity of energy resources, to name a few. Effectively protecting the security of NATO members in the face of these global challenges requires NATO to take on operations far afield, build partnerships with others who share NATO's values and can contribute to common goals, and develop new capabilities to meet these new kinds of challenges.
We should consider the magnitude of this historic shift. Europe's western half has now been at peace since 1945, the longest general peace since the Pax Romana, and this peace is now extended throughout Europe. Eleven states once behind the Iron Curtain are now democratic nations contributing to common security within NATO. There is still critical work to be done in Europe - for example, helping the nations of the Balkans maintain security while building democratic, prosperous societies and joining the European mainstream. We are aware of security challenges in Europe's East. But the most critical security challenges NATO faces today have their roots outside of Europe. And so NATO today is focused on how the United States and Europe can work together to deal with challenges in the rest of the world.
NATO's missions have spanned a wide geography - from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Darfur and Louisiana. And they can span a wide array of activities: from high-intensity peacekeeping, with combat as necessary, to airlift in support of other humanitarian or peacekeeping goals, to counter-terrorist naval operations. We expect that this trend is only going to continue. Because when faced with daunting security problems, our leaders always ask, "Who can help deliver a solution?" The answer often is NATO.
Clearly, there were differences within Europe, and between much of Europe and the United States, over the war in Iraq. Yet these differences never paralyzed NATO. In 2003, NATO established air defenses for Turkey against a possible Iraqi response to coalition operations. In August 2003, as differences over Iraq flared, NATO took over the ISAF operation in Kabul, and began the long process of expanding that operation to cover the entire country of Afghanistan. Though their role is different, there are now more forces under NATO command in Afghanistan than under Operation Enduring Freedom. And in 2004, Allies agreed to establish a NATO Training Mission inside Iraq, charged with the critical role of training and mentoring Iraqi security forces officers. All 26 Allies contribute to NATO's mission in Iraq, either through personnel or funding.
Critics may argue that the United States does not believe in NATO, and instead prefers coalitions of the willing. Others charge that Europeans are not assuming their share of the hard military burden. Neither accusation is true today, and it is the job of Allied leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to make sure they never become true.
In fact, the United States and Europe are working together, through NATO, dealing effectively with the real security challenges we face as a democratic community. This cooperation is demonstrated by NATO's two largest operations today: Kosovo and Afghanistan.
Kosovo
It has been eight years since NATO intervened to stop Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Starting from a bombing campaign to drive out Milosevic's killers and then an initial Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployment of approximately 40,000, the Alliance currently has over 15,500 personnel deployed. Twenty-four of 26 NATO nations contribute forces to KFOR, along with 11 non-NATO contributing countries.
Just over 1,500 of these are American: U.S. National Guard soldiers, currently led by the Virginia-based 29th Infantry Division. Our Guardsmen and women have played an important role in community building in both Serb and Albanian areas and are viewed by both groups as vital to the success of NATO's operations.
NATO is in Kosovo with the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and others - providing basic security, while the work of building a society goes on in many other ways. NATO's role is critical, but it is only part of the picture.
When Kosovo's status is resolved, which we believe will be through supervised independence, KFOR will continue to maintain a safe and secure environment during this critical time, by providing a robust security presence throughout its area of operations. Every poll taken in Kosovo shows NATO to be the single most respected institution there.
After status resolution, KFOR will supervise the establishment of a small, lightly armed, multiethnic Kosovo Security Force and oversee the creation of a civilian institution to provide civilian control over it. Development of these structures will hasten the day when Kosovo can provide its own security and NATO can successfully conclude its deployment in the region. Kosovo's provisional government has already signaled that it will wish to join NATO's Partnership for Peace when possible, and begin contributing to NATO operations itself.
I also want to note, that as we implement Kosovo's final status, we must not leave Serbia behind. Serbia deserves a European future. As Serbia takes the steps it must take - reforms at home and cooperation with the ICTY war crimes tribunal at The Hague, the transatlantic community must take clear, strong steps to bring Serbia into our family and institutions. For that reason, I was pleased that Serbia and the European Union have re-opened talks aimed at Serbia's closer integration into Europe.
Kosovo has been a success story for the Alliance. By proceeding with the resolution of its status, we can move toward ending our post-conflict military involvement and put the Balkan region on the road to becoming an exporter, rather than a consumer, of security.
Afghanistan
NATO's largest and most challenging mission today is in Afghanistan, a mission that says a lot about NATO today, and where it is going. The fact that NATO is in Afghanistan at all is a reflection of the changing security environment facing our Alliance. Events thousands of miles from NATO territory have a direct impact on the security of NATO members. The strengthening of a stable, democratic society in Afghanistan is likewise a critical national interest for all Allies. The tools that NATO needs to succeed in Afghanistan - from combat forces, to peacekeeping, to global partners, to coordination with civilian donors and institutions largely define the directions in which NATO must grow in the future.
Afghanistan provided the training ground for the September 11, 2001 armed attack on a NATO member - the United States. The Alliance reacted with speed and unity in invoking Article 5 for the first time. Europe recognizes that global jihadist ideology and organizations threaten not only the United States, but also either inspired or directly coordinated attacks on NATO Allies in Madrid, London, and Istanbul. While NATO did not immediately engage militarily, it began consultations about Afghanistan, individual Allies gradually joined coalition operations, and in 2003 NATO took the first step by taking over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Kabul.
Many were concerned that this spring would bring a Taliban offensive of greater strength and severity than 2006. Reports on this enemy campaign were all the rage for months. That offensive never materialized thanks largely to the efforts and sacrifices of Afghan, U.S. and Allied forces.
Instead, NATO has taken the initiative this spring with our own civil and military efforts: NATO and Afghan forces have increasingly denied the Taliban safe haven in Afghanistan, and the Government of Pakistan has done same across the border. We have taken many mid- and senior-level Taliban leaders out of the fight; and we have more closely linked military operations with follow-on reconstruction efforts to help the civilian population.
Our "comprehensive approach" in Afghanistan, where soldiers and reconstruction experts work hand-in-hand, where NATO security efforts support the priorities of Afghanistan's democratic leadership, shows how NATO is likely to operate in coming decades.
Today, 37 countries - 26 Allies and 11 non-NATO partners - participate in NATO's UN-mandated International Security Assistance Forces, providing over 40,000 troops. About 24,000 of these troops - nearly 60 percent - are from our Allies and partners, and (since October 2006) serve throughout all of Afghanistan. Many of our allies also continue to contribute to the separate Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan, spearheaded by the United States.
At a time when our own military is stretched, it is important to recognize the tremendous impact that Allied contributions have on our own security. Together with growing Afghan forces, Allied forces are fighting off the Taliban, securing Afghan territory, protecting Afghan counternarcotics teams, helping extend the authority of the democratically elected Afghan government, and enabling reconstruction and development that is improving the lives of the Afghan people.
At the NATO Summit in Riga in November 2006, as well as at four Foreign and Defense Ministerial meetings since January, NATO Allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Afghanistan mission. We have continued to press Allies to fill force shortfalls in ISAF, and since last fall Allies and partners have pledged well over 7,000 new troops to the mission - half of them U.S., and half European - and most without caveats. Although some caveats restricting operations of longstanding deployed forces remain a concern, Allies have expressed a willingness to come to each others' aid, should the need arise, and new forces are providing commanders with increased flexibility.
NATO forces increasingly serve side-by-side with Afghan National Security Forces. The United States, along with its NATO Allies and partners, are doing everything possible to train and equip Afghan National Army and Police forces so they can take an ever increasing role in providing for Afghanistan's security. Allies and partners are adding new embedded training teams and sending much needed arms and equipment. The recent supplemental passed by Congress, which provided funding to better train and equip Afghan forces, has helped us leverage even more from other contributors.
We are also grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly $1.3 billion over the last year in new multi-year assistance. Afghanistan deserves our full effort and we believe the international community can and should do still more. Europe recognizes that Afghanistan matters for its own security and European partners have provided, individually or through the European Commission, over $2.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction since 2002.
It's important to underline the scope and scale of the changes over the past five years in Afghanistan, due in large part to the combined efforts of the United States and its Allies. Afghanistan has a democratically elected President and Parliament. Five million Afghans have returned to their country. The number of children attending school has increased five-fold since 2001 to six million, two million of those girls - who had no access to schools under the Taliban. Over 80 percent of Afghans have access to basic healthcare and approximately 6,000 kilometers of new roads are expanding commerce and opportunity. However, the challenges that remain are real and our commitment must not waiver.
NATO and Missile Defense
A final example of how Europe is working together with the United States to address security challenges is through missile defense.
Today, NATO faces the possibility that some of the world's most threatening and unstable regimes can develop nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to Europe and even the United States. Iran already possesses hundreds of medium range Shahab-3 and short-range ballistic missiles. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iran could develop long-range missiles capable of reaching all of Europe and the United States by 2015 if it continues on its present course.
NATO has also begun to explore options to protect the Alliance against ballistic missile threats. NATO's work on missile defense has focused on three activities: the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, technical work to support decisions on possible missile defense for the protection of NATO territory and population centers, and cooperation with Russia on Theater Missile Defense.
In 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved the ALTBMD program, a NATO-funded Command and Control structure to integrate member states' sensors and missile defense interceptors. This system is focused on protecting of NATO deployed forces against ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km (shorter-to-medium range missile defense). NATO plans to achieve by 2010 an initial capability to defend NATO forces; a fully operational system capable of protecting defined areas against missiles up to 3,000 km is tentatively planned for the 2015-2016 timeframe.
At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government noted the conclusions of the Missile Defense Feasibility Study, which found that missile defense for all NATO territory is technically feasible within the assumptions and limitations of the study. At April's meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo there was near unanimity in support of missile defense from our NATO allies. Minister after minister acknowledged that a genuine threat exists. Now that the United States is proposing a long-range missile defense system in Europe, Allies have agreed to assess the implications for the Alliance of the U.S. system and the possibility of integrating NATO's short- to midrange system to ensure all allied territory is protected. Allies also expressed support for our offers to increase cooperation with the Russians in the field of missile defense.
During his press statement on April 26, Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer noted that U.S. missile defense plans do not upset the strategic balance of Europe. He stated, "It is clear that there is a full understanding between the Allies that the plans in the framework of the third site cannot, and will not, and do not upset the strategic balance in Europe. There was a lot of support for the wide-ranging United States proposals vis-à-vis our Russia partners for closer cooperation on missile defense."
Transatlantic security is indivisible. As we learned the hard way in the twentieth century, if Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure. We cannot have U.S. security decoupled from that of our NATO allies. We cannot take a unilateral or isolationist approach to security. Our goal is to see NATO bolt its own missile defense efforts onto the burgeoning U.S.-led long range missile defense system, thus helping ensure full spectrum coverage for the entire Alliance. We need a common level of protection from threats for the United States and for our European allies, and with our NATO Allies we are working to develop that. We welcome the chance to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Putin's proposal at the G8 Summit for cooperation using the Russian radar in Azerbaijan may be an opening. Ideally, NATO, U.S. national efforts, and U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation could all work together to provide more general and comprehensive security from this challenge.
Transformation
NATO is going through its own transformation to develop its capacities and intellectual horizons to deal with these new challenges. Much more needs to be done, but much has been done already.
Consider 1994: NATO was an alliance of 16 countries. It had never conducted a military operation. It had no partners. Now consider NATO just 11 years later, at the end of 2005: the Alliance was running eight military operations simultaneously; had 26 members, and partnership relationships with another 20 countries in Eurasia, seven in the Mediterranean, a growing number in the Persian Gulf, and a number of Contact Countries.
Many of us hoped that NATO's transformation would happen faster. We set transformational goals at the Prague Summit in 2002. We refined them at the Istanbul Summit in 2004. But transformation does not end - not because we fail, but because, in a changing world, the challenges facing NATO change. And this requires new approaches to meeting them.
Developing the capabilities so that NATO can launch and sustain these missions takes political will and money. So far, the will has been in the hand-off to NATO - but not necessarily in the will to give NATO more resources to do the job.
NATO Capabilities
The Riga Summit last November marked an important step forward in NATO's transformation to meet twenty-first century challenges.
At Riga, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was declared to have reached full operational capability. The NRF is a prime example of NATO's transformation to meet global challenges. Twenty-five thousand strong land, air, and sea elements when at full strength, the NRF can act as a quick reaction expeditionary force capable of beginning deployment of elements with as little as five days notice. NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s showed that NATO needed a scalable option for dealing with operations that required limited number of troops and special capabilities, different from the Cold War era force structure. The NRF concept, launched at the 2002 Prague Summit, emerged in response to this perceived need.
Even before it was declared fully operationally capable, NATO needed to mobilize the NRF. Elements of the NRF were used to provide additional security to the 2005 Afghanistan elections and to provide air transport and medical assistance to refugees from the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and to the U.S. Gulf region after Hurricane Katrina. Important lessons have been learned from these operational deployments, as well as from the joint training exercise in Cape Verde.
The NRF construct has served well as a catalyst for the transformation of Allied forces and capabilities but much work needs to be done to make it a viable option for the range of missions to which NATO may need to respond. More analysis on its composition, deployability, potential uses in extremis, and as a reserve force, as well as approval of common funding for short notice deployments, will improve the utility of this key capability.
The Strategic Airlift Initiative marks an important step forward in addressing one of NATO's chronic weaknesses - a lack of dedicated strategic airlift. Airlift has become increasingly important over the last five years as NATO operations have taken the Alliance thousands of miles from Europe. Fifteen Allies and two Partner nations formed a consortium to operate a small fleet of C-17 aircraft that could be used by consortium nations to provide airlift when needed. Participating Allies would proportionally share ownership of the fleet based on their projected annual airlift requirements. The aircraft will be nationally owned but operated by the contributing nations from a European airfield. All ten of the newest NATO members are participating. The initiative also offers to coordinate support structures for A-400M strategic airlift.
The Strategic Airlift Initiative will greatly increase NATO's capabilities to fight expeditionary warfare. Authorization and appropriation of the U.S. in-kind contribution of one aircraft is still underway. Allies who are not participating have expressed concerns on ownership issues, but seem closer to endorsing the NAMO Charter which will formalize the consortium. This initiative is important because it also sets an important precedent for voluntary, shared Allied investment in high priority strategic assets that are needed for NATO-led operations. UAVs and Air Refueling strategic assets are two examples that may follow this model.
The Special Operations Force (SOF) Initiative will improve the coordination and interoperability of Allies' special operations forces. The complex and challenging environments in which today's military operations take place differ greatly from the Cold War realities NATO's military structure was originally designed to address. SOF will possess the ability to span the operational continuum and are uniquely suited for operations in unconventional environments. The SOF initiative will enable NATO to respond to the rapidly growing need for increased SOF capabilities in its operations. The initiative will facilitate SOF interoperability between nations, disseminate key lessons learned, expand and improve SOF training, and enhance SOF capability among Alliance nations.
The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI) constitutes part of NATO's outreach to new partners in the Broader Middle East. It will deepen cooperation and reciprocal training opportunities with NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners. NTCI seeks to promote the ability of NATO and the MD and ICI nations to work together; strengthen regional security relationships; promote durable, democratic civil-military defense structures; and enhance military-to-military cooperation. To start this effort, NATO is working to establish a Middle East faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome and to possibly bring NATO-supported Mobile Training Teams visiting interested regional partners to make this training more accessible by bringing it to the region. And as interest and demand grow, NATO could also support developing a Strategic Cooperation Center in the region.
NATO Enlargement
In addition to building its capabilities, a second significant transformation has been the growth in NATO's membership.
It is easy to forget that, back in 1989 and 1991, people spoke of a "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe, and debated how it could be filled. Many argued that the newly free countries of Europe should have been relegated to a "gray zone" of Russian influence. But the Bush and Clinton Administrations rejected that course, and, today, the growth of democracy and prosperity in Central Europe, and the integration of Central European nations into NATO and the European Union, is a fact, so successful it is taken for granted.
This was a great success of three U.S. Presidents. NATO acted boldly and invited ten countries to become members - three at the Madrid Summit in 1997, and seven more at the Prague Summit in 2002. These actions, along with the expansion of the European Union, secured a future of freedom, democracy, market economy, human rights, and the rule of law for over 100 million people. We rejected a gray zone, and helped the people of Central Europe consolidate the freedom they had gained.
To be clear - it was not NATO and EU membership itself that made the difference, but the realistic prospect of membership that convinced nations to make hard decisions about political, economic and defense reform. In the pursuit of NATO (and EU) membership, countries pursued reforms that improved the lives and opportunities of their citizens in ways far beyond basic security and defense. These reforms strengthened individual rights and freedoms, institutionalized democratic systems, fostered market economies, resolved border disputes, and protected minorities. All were challenging; many were hard; none could have been accomplished without political will.
Today, this process continues as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine pursue reforms and seek eventual NATO and possibly EU membership. Others, such as Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia, may also choose this path.
NATO enlargement is still playing this transformative role. European countries still seek to join NATO, strengthening their democracies, their economies, and their militaries through reform and through working together with NATO. They believe that NATO membership is in their interest. But it is also in NATO's interest to add new members that meet NATO's performance-based standards. Democratic, market economies strengthen the Alliance with their commitment to share values and their determination to contribute to common security - whether by reducing tensions among neighbors or deploying troops as part of NATO operations.
Despite recent rhetoric on this topic, gone are the days when security in these regions was a cold calculus. Zero-sum thinking when it comes to security is an anachronism. NATO's history demonstrates the ability not only of nations, but of entire regions to transform fundamentally. Every state has the right to choose its own security orientation, its own future, for its own people. And by building strong, stable, democratic, prosperous societies, everyone's security is strengthened. A more secure Europe means a more a secure United States and, though they would disagree, it means ultimately a more secure Russia as well.
As was agreed at the November 2006 Riga Summit, NATO should issue new invitations for membership to qualified candidates at its next Summit in Bucharest in 2008. NATO is prepared to do its part, and they must do theirs by putting in place the reforms and policies necessary to meet NATO standards and contribute to the Alliance.
The Way Ahead
The April 2008 Bucharest Summit will address many, if not all, of these issues. For us, Bucharest is about using NATO effectively to deal with today's security challenges, and strengthening NATO, with new capabilities and new members, so it is prepared to face the challenges of tomorrow. At the fourth major NATO Summit in this Administration, our goal is to consolidate and strengthen what we launched in Prague, refined in Istanbul, and built upon at Riga.
Thank you for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look forward to your questions.
Before providing you my thoughts on the Future of NATO, I would like to highlight current operations in which the Alliance is involved and by doing so, provide you with the strategic context through which NATO's future is entwined.
NATO Operations
The 50,000 deployed NATO military forces currently under my command in my other role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) are a visible demonstration of NATO's resolve to collectively meet security challenges. While political consultations among nations help sustain unity of purpose, men and women of the Alliance, plus 17 other troop-contributing nations, are essentially redefining the role of NATO by their actions in operations across Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq, the Baltics, and Africa.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains NATO's most important and challenging mission. With over 40,000 forces from 37 nations, nearly 39,000 of which are contributed by the 26 NATO member nations, the Alliance has responsibility for ISAF security and stability operations throughout Afghanistan. Working alongside U.S.-led coalition forces of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and other international actors, ISAF's approach is to provide a secure and stable environment in which Afghan institutions can develop and expand their influence, while simultaneously supporting the development of an enduring Afghan capability to provide for their own security. The 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) under ISAF leadership are at the forefront of NATO's efforts for reconstruction and stability.
NATO continues its mission in the Balkans, notably in Kosovo, whose future status is currently under discussion in the United Nations. Today NATO has over 15,000 well-trained and capable forces in Kosovo providing for a safe and secure environment. These forces maintain close coordination with the international and local authorities in Kosovo and are prepared to continue their military responsibilities in a post-status environment. They are equally prepared to address a broad range of contingencies or potential unrest associated with the determination of Kosovo's future status.
Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE) is NATO's only on-going mission under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the key article of the Treaty which considers an attack against one nation as an attack against all member nations. The OAE mission, launched in the aftermath of the attack on America in September 2001, aims to disrupt, deter, and defend against terrorism in the Mediterranean. Maritime forces of OAE are patrolling sea lines of communication, sharing relevant intelligence and information with littoral nations, and conducting compliant boarding of suspect ships, when required.
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR is important for not only its anti-terrorism activities, but also as a catalyst for transformation as it works to implement a network-centric maritime monitoring capability, which provides for real-time tracking of maritime vessels and notification to national authorities. This network will make our operation more effective, and ultimately, should reduce the requirement for a physical maritime security presence.
In Iraq, the Alliance continues to provide essential training to the Iraqi security forces. Recently, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand the Iraqi training mission to include providing gendarmerie-type training for the leadership of the Iraqi National Police. The Alliance continues to provide training opportunities for Iraqi Security Force personnel outside of Iraq, at national training facilities or NATO institutions such as the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy and the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. We are on track to turn over command and control of the senior and midlevel officer training programs at the Iraqi Military Academy to the Iraqi Army in July. The second aspect of the Iraq mission includes assisting in the provision of equipment to the Iraqi armed forces. To date, NATO nations have provided arms and equipment ranging from small arms ammunition to T-72 tanks.
NATO has also assisted the African Union (AU) with its African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peacekeeping mission. It has provided airlift for troop rotations of peacekeepers, provided staff capacity building activities at key AU headquarters in Ethiopia and Darfur, and deployed mobile training teams to work with our AU counterparts. NATO's capacity building approach to increase stability and security on the continent intends to deliver long-term effects with minimal, focused resources.
NATO-EU
The strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union (EU) has never been more important. With 21 of the 26 nations of the Alliance also members of the EU, it is absolutely vital that we take a broad approach to the security challenges we collectively face, where both military and civilian instruments are employed. The goal is to use the respective strengths of each organization to achieve the intended effects.
In implementing the Berlin Plus arrangements for NATO-EU cooperation, an EU liaison cell was activated within my headquarters in Belgium, communicating and coordinating with my staff on a daily basis those operational issues that affect both organizations. Our NATO commanders on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan have developed practical mechanisms to communicate and coordinate their respective mandates with EU representatives on a routine basis.
Despite this pragmatic approach by our soldiers in the field, the institutional NATO-EU relationship still needs to adapt, with more robust, flexible and enduring arrangements to promote more efficient, practical cooperation for our increasingly interdependent efforts. The ongoing operations in Afghanistan and anticipated roles in supporting the outcome of status talks for Kosovo should not be held hostage to institutional bureaucracy. Both organizations must focus on operations vice competition.
NATO's Future
With respect to NATO's future, Heads of State and Government endorsed "The Comprehensive Political Guidance" at the 2006 Riga Summit, laying out broad parameters for how NATO should develop in response to the challenges of the 21st Century. I believe the document accurately captures the future direction of the Alliance and I highlight for the committee the following key points from the document:
-The Alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, and partnership.
-The Alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including non-Article 5 crisis response operations. NATO needs to focus on ensuring that its own crisis management instruments are effectively drawn together. It also needs to improve its ability to cooperate with partners, relevant international organizations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organizations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations.
-The Alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defense and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance.
-Among qualitative force requirements, the following have been identified as NATO's top priorities:
--joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them;
--high-readiness forces;
--the ability to deal with asymmetric threats;
--information superiority; and
--the ability to draw together the various instruments of the Alliance brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well as the ability to coordinate with other actors.
Transformation
While the focus for the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) is on successful execution of NATO's military operations on three continents, these operations are simultaneously helping NATO to achieve a more enduring goal for the Alliance, that of transformation.
NATO is embracing an ambitious transformation agenda to develop more agile, flexible, and expeditionary military forces. Allied Command Transformation (ACT), NATO's strategic headquarters based in Norfolk, Virginia, has the lead role in developing concepts and managing NATO transformation programs. It is in our nation's interests to ensure that our collective efforts are complementary and contribute to joint and multinational interoperability.
NATO Response Force (NRF)
The NATO Response Force (NRF) is an initiative proposed by the U.S. and adopted by the Alliance at the 2002 Prague Summit. It is a vital part of the Alliance's ability to rapidly respond to emerging crises and conduct the full-range of military missions, from crisis management to forced entry operations, at strategic distances. The NRF is organized around a brigade-sized force whose units and capabilities are provided collectively by all members of the Alliance. This composite force maintains an increased level of readiness that allows portions of it to deploy on very short notice, with the entire force able to deploy no later than 30 days after notification.
This joint and multinational force further serves as a catalyst for transformation and interoperability, improving NATO's expeditionary capability in key areas such as multinational logistics and deployable communications. Following a comprehensive and successful live exercise (LIVEX) in June 2006, with further contributions of critical capabilities by nations, NATO declared at the Riga Summit the NRF to have attained Full Operational Capability (FOC). At FOC, the NRF is capable of deploying at strategic distance and supporting the full range of potential Alliance missions, to include evacuations and disaster management, counter-terrorism and acting as an initial entry force for a larger, follow-on force. Despite the declaration of FOC at Riga, the future sustainability of the NRF, as it is currently structured, is at risk. For the upcoming NRF rotations, we are seeing repeated shortfalls across the spectrum of key capabilities such as logistics, combat support, strategic lift, and intelligence assets. With the high optempo of NATO operations, coupled with the commitment of forces by nations to other operations such as United Nations and European Union operations, it has become increasingly difficult to secure member nation commitments for the six-month rotations of the NATO Response Force. The financial costs of committing forces to the NRF, coupled with competing demands for our limited pool of military forces, are having a significant impact on nations' willingness to provide the necessary capabilities. NATO authorities are currently working to develop initiatives to improve the implementation of the agreed NRF Concept. These initiatives include a long-term force pledging plan, common NATO funding for strategic lift for short-notice NRF deployments and, potentially, linkages of NRF capabilities with NATO's strategic reserve forces.
Strategic Air Lift
The utility and credibility of the NRF and our deploying forces depends on the quick and assured availability of strategic lift. Unfortunately, the current arrangements for strategic lift of NATO forces are inadequate, depending on assets generated through national contributions or contract arrangements with commercial carriers. With the strategic distances involved, the threat, and austere environment of many of our deployment destinations, charter airlift is often not a viable option.
It is imperative that we have the support of the nations for the two complementary initiatives aimed at providing NATO with strategic airlift capabilities. The first of these initiatives involves a group of 15 NATO nations, plus Sweden, currently involved in negotiations to acquire three C-17 aircraft, to be flown and maintained by multinational crews under multinational command from the participating nations. These planes would be used to support strategic airlift requirements, which could be NATO operations or national in character. The second of these complementary initiatives involves a consortium of 16 nations, led by Germany, to charter AN-124 aircraft to provide strategic lift.
Interoperability
NATO's transformation depends in large measure on the ability of disparate units, headquarters and nations to work together. Interoperability is a key enabler and is recognized as an important force multiplier. Interoperability objectives cover the ability to communicate with each other, to operate with each other from a procedural perspective, and to have equipment that is compatible.
With accelerated advancements in technology, maintaining interoperable equipment is particularly difficult. Recent requirements for equipment to combat improvised explosive devices (IED) and increased needs for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) capabilities highlight NATO's challenge.
Adaptation of NATO forces continues with an entire range of initiatives to increase the capacity of our forces to collectively address contemporary threats and challenges. While these initiatives are welcomed, we also recognize the realization of these projects is hampered by NATO's outdated procurement procedures that do not allow for the rapid purchase of emerging technologies.
Additionally, to completely achieve the transformational goal of providing rapidly deployable, expeditionary forces, there is a requirement for a commonly funded logistics system that has the agility to provide immediate and comprehensive sustainment support.
NATO is currently developing ideas to provide this common logistics support. In the last year, for example, the Alliance expanded its eligibility rules for common funding, to assist in theater-level logistics support of forces involved in deployments. Developing and approving the enduring concepts and procedures for common funding of multi-national logistics is currently on the Alliances' horizon.
Six broad initiatives for multinational logistic development and commitment of military capabilities were developed.
-- Encourage more balance in the development and commitment of military capabilities
-- Identify and reduce barriers to national contributions
-- Further develop and enable multinational support capabilities
-- Enhance logistics training and medical certification
-- Enhance the use of contractor support capabilities to augment or where appropriate, replace military support capabilities
-- Integrate the contributions of smaller nations into an optimized logistics support structure
Optimization of National Force Structures
The cornerstone of NATO security is for Alliance members to maintain military capabilities that can provide mutual support to member nations. Consequently, nations (Iceland, which has no military, is an exception) have established force structures that are similar in design but with major differences in the relative size of each force. However, given the widely varying sizes of each nation's military and military budgets, it is challenging for the smaller nations to maintain a standing military that is modern, and capable of performing all military tasks across the land, sea, and air environments. This situation is currently manifested with the Baltic nations' inability to provide for their own air policing.
Given these conditions, it may be time for NATO to consider developing a more integrated and optimized force structure. The concept for this modified force structure could investigate asking Alliance nations to focus on development of specified military capabilities rather than attempting to provide all elements and organizations traditionally found in a national military. The advantages of this method for developing force structure include: allowing a nation to channel their research and development budget in a more focused manner; improves the ability for NATO to generate the necessary and often scarce niche-capabilities, such as rotary wing assets and medical support; and lastly would facilitate a more consistent security posture across the Alliance.
Missile Defense
Missile Defense is not a new issue within NATO. I believe that there is a shared perception amongst Allies that a threat from ballistic missiles exists, as well as a shared desire that any US system should be complementary to any NATO missile defense system, and visa versa.
The Alliance intends to pursue a three-track approach to missile defense. Firstly, it will continue an ongoing NATO project to develop, by 2010, a "theater missile defense" for protecting deployed troops from short- and medium- range missile threats. Secondly, NATO has committed to fully assessing the implications of the US missile defense system for the Alliance. The objective is to determine the possibility of linking the NATO and US defensive systems to ensure that all Alliance territory would be covered from missile threats. Finally, NATO is committed to continuing existing cooperation with Russia on theater missile defense, as well as consultations on related issues.
Mediterranean Dialogue The Mediterranean Dialogue reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean and is an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation.
Seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) participate in the Dialogue whose overall aim is to contribute to regional security and stability through practical cooperation and political dialogue and to achieve better mutual understanding.
Three of the Mediterranean Dialogue nations, Algeria, Morocco, and Israel, have indicated a willingness to participate at varying degrees in NATO's Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, which focuses on countering terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. Three other nations have contributed military forces and assets to NATO-led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Jordan is currently contributing to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Morocco contributes to the KFOR mission in the Balkans, and Egypt had contributed forces previously to NATO operations in Bosnia. Each of the initiatives strengthens the relationship with NATO, increases our interoperability and contributes to our mutual security.
NATO-Russia
NATO has taken a very open, inclusive approach vis-à-vis Russia, recognizing Russia's legitimate national security interests, while showing a strong determination to build a new European security order together with Russia.
NATO and Russia have come a long way in the ten years since the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the five years since the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. There has been increasingly more cooperation between our respective military forces. We have agreed on a comprehensive Action Plan on Terrorism as well as ambitious programs of technical cooperation in airspace management and theater missile defense. Just last month, the State Duma in Moscow ratified the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and Russia, a step that will allow even closer practical cooperation and facilitate the potential exercise of Alliance and Russian military forces on Russian territory.
We understand that there are Russian concerns - about Missile Defense, about NATO enlargement, and about arms control. These are complex political and legal issues that will not be easy to resolve. But NATO Allies are committed to discussing them, in the NATO-Russia Council as well as in other international fora.
Clearly there is even more that we can do together - in making our forces more interoperable, contributing to peace support missions, in supporting each other in disasters and emergency situations, in fighting terrorism, and in consulting on new challenges such as defense against proliferation.
NATO Enlargement
Now let me turn to the topic of NATO Enlargement. Since the Alliance was created in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founders to today's 26 members - and the door to new membership remains open. At the 2006 Riga Summit, Heads of State and Government declared that the Alliance intends to extend further invitations to nations that meet NATO standards at the next Summit in 2008. Although no decision has been made on the next round of NATO expansion, three nations currently participate in NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) - Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. In addition to the three aspirant countries already noted, two other nations, Ukraine and Georgia, participate in an intensified dialogue with NATO, an important step in the commitment to a closer relationship with the Alliance and its members.
While the Membership Action Plan (MAP) provides specific advice and practical support tailored to the individual needs of nations wishing to join NATO, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has been an important, additional factor in bringing a number of the 23 Partner nations closer to, and more interoperable with, the Alliance. The PfP has been instrumental in helping Partner nations move beyond their Cold War legacy, assisting with a number of initiatives to restructure and reform Partner military institutions, to include disposing of redundant or obsolete weapons and reintegrate military personnel into civilian life. Increasingly, Partner nations are adapting their military forces to Alliance operational norms. PfP training initiatives and joint exercises have helped make Partner forces more interoperable with those of NATO, encouraging and enhancing their contribution to NATO-led operations.
Conclusion
NATO has demonstrated a progressive nature and capability to adjust to the rapid changes confronting European and global security since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance has been confronted with an unstable world, humanitarian crises, regional conflict, and terrorism on a multi-national scale simultaneously as the speed of global change, the impact of new threats and risks to our collective security - and the second and third order effects of these types of threats from events around the world - have increased in this interdependent, interconnected world. This is the reality of the 21st Century. NATO has responded with capabilities at hand and developed new capabilities, new policies, and new partnerships to address these challenges.
NATO is now entering its most challenging period of transformation, adapting not only to the realities of a changed Europe, but facing the multi-faceted demands of constantly adapting to a changing world. It is institutionalizing the Alliance's role as a modern instrument of security and stability for its members. NATO is taking important steps to complete its transformation from a static, reactive Alliance focused on territorial defense to an expeditionary, proactive Alliance working with nations to deter and defeat the spectrum of 21st Century threats confronting our collective security. The Alliance is overcoming institutional inertia, out-dated business practices, and Cold War era understandings of its role, thereby erasing self-imposed limits that directly reduce the security of its members and partners, individually and collectively. At the same time, the Alliance is assessing the threats we face, understanding better their interaction, and developing new capabilities and partnerships to successfully address these threats.
NATO was founded in 1949 as an Alliance based on democratic values and collective defense. Although the threat environment and our operational capabilities have changed significantly over the last, nearly 60 years, the core values we represent and the need for cooperation and collective security have not changed. The NATO Alliance, its Partnerships and special relationships with other nations remain important to our own nation, now and into the future.
Source: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
© 2007 The Acronym Institute.