Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT PrepCom 2003: Acronym Special Coverage

Nuclear Disarmament (Cluster 1: Article VI)

Statement by Iran, May 1

'Statement by Mr. Amir H. Zamaninia, Director General for International Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 1 May 2003'; Iranian Mission to the UN in Geneva, http://missions.itu.int/~missiran/NPT2003.htm.

During the Cold War the threat of nuclear war and proliferation of nuclear weapons overwhelmed the international security environment as a result of increasing rivalries between the two superpowers. Aware of the great dangers of the proliferation of such horrible weapons, the international community could not but go along with a policy of two steps forward and one step back, and accept the creation of a small club of nuclear weapon states in order to curb the danger of further horizontal proliferation and prevent the increase in the number of nuclear powers. Clearly this was just a phase in the process of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT clearly foresaw undertakings "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

Article VI is a main pillar of the NPT and the key element in order to understand the nature and characteristics of mutual obligations under the Treaty. This Article clearly underlines that the NPT was not intended to grant a permanent and everlasting special status to nuclear weapon states. This Article is a directing principle of the NPT through which the way to achieve nuclear disarmament under effective and strict international control has been demonstrated. And this Article is an essential and integral part of the decision made by the international community to extend indefinitely the NPT in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

By adoption of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and the related paragraphs of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear and Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", including the "unequivocal undertaking of nuclear powers to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals", the 2000 Review Conference created fresh hopes that the collective efforts of the international community are moving forward in the right direction. However, a quick look at the overall implementation of the 13 steps over the past three years shows that there have only been setbacks and negative developments:

The President of the only nuclear weapon state rejecting the CTBT in its legislative branch is very explicit in announcing that he does not intend to resubmit it to the senate in his term (Fate of Step 1).
The same nuclear weapon state is vigorously following a program to drastically reduce the amount of time required to prepare for resumption of full-scale underground nuclear testing (Fate of Step 2).
The Conference on Disarmament has not yet succeeded in agreeing on a program of work, let alone including a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty in its agenda (Fate of Step 3) or establishing a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament (Fate of Step 4).
Manufacturing of nuclear weapon components and The New Posture Review prescribing the manufacturing of new types of nuclear weapons are vivid example of repudiation of the principle of irreversibility (Fate of Step 5).
Three years might be too short to expect the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. However, it is also too short to forget their unequivocal undertaking, or even in some cases, even the pronunciation of the word unequivocal (Fate of Step 6).
The ABM is abrogated through the unilateral withdrawal of the United States and Start II and Start III processes are practically terminated (Fate of Step 7).
The Trilateral Initiative is still to be completed and implemented. Regrettably, thus far less than 1 percent of the excess weapons-grade material is under IAEA control (Fate of Step 8).
Nuclear weapons are no longer relied on as a mere deterrent factor in superpower rivalries. As the US Nuclear Posture Review and its National Security Strategy prescribes, they are to be conveniently used against nuclear and non-nuclear states parties to the NPT alike and the threshold of using them is lowered to conventional conflicts (Fate of Step 9).
No excess fissile material has so far been put under IAEA or other relevant international verification and there does not seem to exist any such intention in nuclear weapons states (Fate of Step 10).
Step 11 seems to be the easiest one to claim success. Every nuclear weapon states may conveniently claim that the ultimate objective of its efforts in disarmament process is general and complete disarmament. However the concern is that there has not been any effort to evaluate its ultimate objective, under effective international control.

Bearing all that in mind one might have every right to wonder what remains to report upon. Non-nuclear states continue sincerely to aspire for a world free from nuclear weapons. Therefore, many have reported on their perseverance in seeking the fulfillment of the nuclear weapon states' obligation under Article VI. Nuclear Weapon States have special responsibilities to meet and to report on them. It is in fact the reports of nuclear weapon states which could help us all in this room to have a better idea of where we are standing in our path towards nuclear disarmament.

When the 13 steps were adopted in 2000 in New York, all members of international community but four were represented, very much similar to the situation we have here today. We believe the 13 steps have been too dire to us here to let it be so easily put aside and overlooked. The NPT Review Process should substantially deal with the implementation of the thirteen steps.

The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates the global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon states at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as the highest priority and as soon as possible of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

During the 2000 Review Conference, nuclear weapon states committed themselves to "the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process". Despite their commitments, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states. We fully support the initiative taken by Austria, Mexico and Sweden and consider the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons as part and parcel of the drive for nuclear disarmament.

The nuclear weapon states should engage immediately and in good faith in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of their obligations under the Treaty, in particular Article VI and the commitments under the 1995 decision on principles and objectives and the resolution on the Middle East. Any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.

The Nuclear Weapon States should comply with their commitments to the full implementation of Article I. They should refrain from nuclear sharing, under any kind of security arrangements among themselves with non-nuclear weapon states, and those not party to the Treaty.

We emphasize the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the Treaty without exception and in particular to Israel, whose unsafegaurded nuclear facilities pose a great threat to the security and stability in the Middle East.

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