| Acronym Institute Home Page | Calendar | UN/CD | NPT/IAEA | UK | US | Space/BMD |
| CTBT | BWC | CWC | WMD Possessors | About Acronym | Links | Glossary |
Back to the main page on the NPT
Rebecca Johnson
This is an interim report after the first week of the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in Geneva (April 28 to May 9, 2003). It covers the issue of non-compliance, presented by the US delegation as one of the major themes of this PrepCom, and considers the principal statements so far on North Korea, Iraq and Iran.
Further updates were planned on other issues, focussing first on the debates and key presentations regarding nuclear disarmament, including security assurances and the Thirteen Steps agreed in May 2000, as raised in the General Debate and "Cluster 1" sessions. Unfortunately, in a mockery of the oft-heard commitment to partnership with civil society and respect for the work of nongovernmental organisations, as expressed in numerous United Nations and NPT documents and statements, the states parties to the NPT have decided that NGOs and Press should be completely excluded from the conference room during the debates devoted to disarmament, safeguards and the 'peaceful' uses of nuclear energy. As a consequence, obtaining reliable information is difficult and time-consuming. Though many individual delegations have made helpful and very welcome efforts to ensure that I receive copies or synopses of their statements and comments, the Acronym Institute's commitment to accuracy and range may be compromised by the restrictive working conditions, putting further updates in doubt. I must therefore appeal to states parties at the very least to apply to the cluster debates the procedural rule that applies to the Main Committees in review conferences, which are open until they get into drafting or sensitive exchanges, at which time a state party may request the Chair to close them (and the NGOs and press would then leave). Only the states parties can change the current restrictive ruling, and it is their responsibility to do so. In the meantime, it would be helpful if more delegations would recognise that we cannot note their comments if we cannot be in the room to hear them, so if they want to be included in the reports, it is up to them to ensure I receive their statements, working papers and remarks. Within the confines of these difficulties, I will aim to put a comprehensive report on the PrepCom on our website and in Disarmament Diplomacy at the earliest opportunity.
The status of the DPRK - a central question for the representatives of 187 parties at the meeting - was neatly set to one side so that it could not inconvenience the start of the meeting, when the Chair of the PrepCom, Ambassador László Molnár of Hungary, took custody of the DPRK's nameplate. This clever initiative avoided early arguments about whether the DPRK nameplate should be removed, signifying acceptance that it has withdrawn from the treaty, or placed in its usual alphabetical place in the Conference chamber, indicating that its withdrawal is still in doubt, despite its declared intention [Link to news review and documentation on DPRK's withdrawal and the UNSC's inconclusive deliberations]. While understandable from the perspective of a Chair keen to ensure that his meeting opens smoothly, the willingness of NPT parties to go along with this procedural fix to avoid having to deal with the challenge posed by North Korea's attempt to pull out of the NPT is profoundly disturbing. Since they no longer have to resolve the question in order to proceed with their PrepCom, the delegations now have little more than rhetoric to fall back on.
Almost all of the 30 statements made during the General Debate expressed varying degrees of concern and regret over North Korea's announced withdrawal. In an example of the stronger level of criticism, the European Union (EU) urged the "DPRK to reconsider its course of action... fulfil its commitments under the NPT, retract its announcement to withdraw from the NPT and readmit IAEA inspectors" In addition, "any clandestine nuclear weapons programme should be dismantled immediately in a verifiable manner." The EU emphasised its "firm resolve to contribute to the search for a peaceful solution, through negotiations..." The statement delivered by New Zealand's Minister of Disarmament, Marian Hobbs, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, emphasised the importance of "dialogue over confrontation" and called for a peaceful resolution "leading to the DPRK's return to full compliance with the Treaty's terms". By contrast, Myanmar (Burma) - another international "outcast", though not on nuclear issues, was representative of those who preferred to say as little as possible: "The one state party that has announced its withdrawal from the NPT should reconsider its decision, and should rejoin the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state". It was widely noted, however, that China's plenary statement conspicuously failed to mention DPRK, an omission remedied only by a short statement in the "Cluster 2" regional issues debate on Friday May 2.
The United States devoted a large part of its combative opening statement to accusing others of noncompliance, particularly DPRK and Iran, referring back also to Iraq. On North Korea, US Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf said that "its withdrawal action was both cynical, in light of its long-standing breach of the Treaty, and dangerous in its impact on security in Northeast Asia". Commenting that "If NPT withdrawal and threats to acquire nuclear weapons become the currency of international bargaining, our world will be in chaos", Wolf called on all NPT parties to send the same message to the DPRK: "abandon your nuclear weapons ambitions and return to compliance with the NPT." The US statement also contained a barely veiled threat. Though "determined to end North Korea's threat through peaceful, diplomatic means", Wolf emphasised that "all our options remain available".
During the final session of the first week, China issued a short statement on North Korea, saying that it "stands for maintaining the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean peninsula... and resolving the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully through negotiation." While emphasising that China was "not in favour" of the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT, the statement noted that "the DPRK nuclear issue is complex and sensitive" and also called for DPRK's security concerns to be addressed. After briefly commenting on the Beijing talks between China, the US and the DPRK, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi concluded with the mild hope that "the US and DPRK will exercise restraint and demonstrate sincerity and flexibility".
Russia's opening statement also emphasised the importance of the Korean peninsula remaining nuclear free, and was "of the opinion that the return of the DPRK to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is necessary and possible." Calling for a "political and diplomatic settlement of the crisis through negotiations", Russia argued that North Korea should be provided with "guarantees of security, sovereignty, as well as to restart humanitarian and economic programs which had been in place on the Korean peninsula".
Japan stated that it could not accept "any development, transfer or possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea" and urged the DPRK "to refreeze its nuclear related facilites and to take prompt action to dismantle its whole nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner". Japan also argued that the talks between the US, China and DPRK in Beijing should include the "early participation of the concerned countries, including Japan and the Republic of Korea".
Comments on Iraq, in the wake of the war, were muted. Papering over the EU's internal divisions, the Greek Ambassador, Tassos Kriekoukis, speaking on behalf of the EU, very carefully noted that "In fulfilling its disarmament and verification task based on UNSC Resolution 687 and related resolutions, the IAEA, until December 1998, was able to obtain a coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme and dismantled what was known of that programme. So far, the IAEA has found no evidence that Iraq had relaunched a nuclear programme. Inspections need to be completed in order to resolve the remaining questions." Russia argued that "the process of the post-war settlement in the Middle East and Iraq, in particular, should be brought back into [an/the] international legal framework based on already available mechanisms accountable to the UN Security Council." Such an approach would "also facilitate the solution of the tasks connected with the strengthening of the WMD non-proliferation regime in the region."
The United States referred to the "objective message" conveyed by its experiences with Iraq, Iran and North Korea, that "an irresponsible NPT party may use its 'declared' peaceful nuclear program to mask its development or acquisition of nuclear weapon capabilities." In an observation that may come back to haunt Washington, the US stated: "What is presented as 'compliance' may in fact not be real. Only genuine commitment, true transparency, and rigorous verification can lead to genuine confidence."
The New Agenda Coalition alluded to a different message underlying the pre-war arguments about disarming Iraq: "We believe that the recent international debate in the United Nations Security Council, including statements made by its Permanent Members, on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, underlined international concerns about the legitimacy, possession and possible use of such weapons. These statements should provide further impetus to international efforts to delegitimise all nuclear weapons and to hasten international efforts towards nuclear disarmament. These statements, moreover, underline our basic belief that the only real guarantee against the use of any weapons of mass destruction anywhere, including nuclear weapons, is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again."
Pursuing this theme further, South Africa "took serious note of the debate in and around the UN Security Council that surrounded the situation in Iraq. One of the points that was of particular note in that debate was the focus on weapons of mass destruction, which include nuclear weapons. The strong statements that were repeatedly made about the threat that is posed by weapons of mass destruction, about the need to eliminate this threat, about the need to destroy these weapons by many of the members of the international community, and about the legitimacy of their possession, including by the Nuclear Weapon States, were statements that South Africa supported. It was of particular note that these statements focused on the horrendous consequences of the possession, proliferation and use of, or threat of use, of these weapons." The statement concluded by underlining that whatever the good or evil intentions of people, "It is our task, in accordance with the unequivocal undertaking that was agreed upon for nuclear disarmament, to work for the elimination of these weapons and not for us to rely on the fickleness of the nature of human kind."
Following directly after its warnings to North Korea, the United States fired a broadside at one of the treaty parties sitting across the conference chamber, accusing Iran of "conducting an alarming, clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program". Declaring that "Iran provides perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the NPT", Wolf posed and answered a series of questions: "How many other NPT non-nuclear weapon states built an enrichment plant before their first power reactor was finished? None. What responsible country would or could commit to building a production scale plant without extensive research and development? None. How many other NPT non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear programs based solely on light water reactors have also built large-scale heavy water plants? None. Why has Iran sought clandestinely to acquire laser enrichment technology?" The United States noted that "we have seen the pattern of cheat and retreat before - of begrudging compromises on process but obstinacy on real disclosure" and accused Iran of "going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq."
On the following day, adding to the end of Iran's national statement in the General Debate, G. Ali Khoshroo, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs responded, throwing a series of questions back to the United States: "How many nuclear weapon states other than the United States have prescribed the use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts and developed new types of nuclear weapons compatible with its combat scenarios? None. Which other nuclear weapon states have sought to utilize outer space for nuclear purposes more than the United States? None. How many nuclear weapon states other than the United States have legislatively rejected the CTBT and practically doomed its future? Why did the United States through its unilateral withdrawal from the ABM and its abrogation of step 7 of the 13 steps threaten the strategic stability of the world? Which NPT party other than the United States has left such a record of undermining so many international instruments, on disarmament and other issues alike? None. Are these not the relevant questions that should be dealt with at this PrepCom and other NPT meetings?" Iran's riposte to the United States, in which it also called for examples "by deeds, not words and polemic", irritated or amused, depending on the listeners' perspective. It was intended to deflect rather than address the genuine concerns underlying the US accusations, which are shared by many NPT parties, notwithstanding their comparative silence.
While they were hardly reassured by Iran's reiteration of its determination "to vigorously exploit its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" (as contained in the NPT's Article IV) or by its familiar repetition of NPT-related statements referring to the IAEA as the "competent authority" for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards, many delegations took note of Khoshroo's strongly-worded and apparently unequivocal condemnation of the development of nuclear weapons: "unlike some others, we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles." This statement does not allay fears that Iran may be hedging its bets and developing the technology and materials that underpin nuclear weapon capabilities as an insurance policy for the future (as several others are widely understood to have in part utilised Article IV for in the past, such as Japan, Germany and South Korea). It does, however, suggest that, unlike Iraq, Iran is not preparing to weaponise, and will aim to avoid any direct, verifiable violation of its NPT obligations. The point about insurance policies is that they may be kept up from year to year without being evoked, but they are ready and waiting to be activated in extreme circumstances. Unlike an insurance policy, activating nuclear weapons provides not compensation but widespread death and destruction, so if Iran pursues this path, it must expect to be haunted by its own words of abhorrence.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.