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Rebecca Johnson
The Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) held in Geneva from April 28 concluded by midday on May 9, 2003 with the adoption of a procedural report, to which was attached the Chair's factual summary, reflecting - from the point of view of the PrepCom Chair, Ambassador Laszló Mólnár of Hungary - the breadth of issues discussed in the meeting (see Chair's Factual Summary). The PrepCom was unable to take decisions on who will chair the Third PrepCom and the next Review Conference, scheduled for New York in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Both of these future chairs are expected to be nominated by the nonaligned states parties to the treaty, and the appointments have been remitted to the next PrepCom.
After the report with the summary had been adopted, there were 19 statements (from China, United States, Russia, Greece on behalf of the European Union, France, the United Kingdom, New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, Ireland, Syria, Egypt, Germany, Brazil, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, Iran, Cuba, South Korea and Uzbekistan) putting on the record various different interpretations or emphases that they would have liked to see in the Chair's summary. Almost all made a point of appreciating the Chair's difficult task and commending him for a "sufficiently balanced" and creditable effort, while lamenting that "their" particular priorities had not been reflected with quite the balance that they wanted. Since the Chair had solicited much of the text and consulted with key delegations to ensure that they could live with the compromises his summary reflected, these caveats and reservations, detailed below, were mostly pro forma, and few came as a surprise.
Given its game-plan for this PrepCom, no-one was surprised when the US argued that there should have been more weight given to the concerns and accusations it had raised over Iran. It also complained that the issue of North Korea was not strong enough (though the US itself had given much less emphasis to DPRK than Iran during the PrepCom), while objecting to the mention of the ABM Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the "relative attention [given] by some states parties to nuclear disarmament". The US's major theme, reiterated throughout the PrepCom, was that the core of the NPT regime was preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation), relegating disarmament to a subsidiary position. Iran made a long statement objecting to the US "prejudgement" before the IAEA report on the Iranian nuclear programme (requested at the March 2003 IAEA Board of Governors' meeting and due to report in mid June). Iran wanted its nuclear programme to be "viewed on its own merit without political burden of US-Iran bilateral relations".
Despite the reams of paper expended on the so-called debates on nuclear disarmament, security assurances, safeguards, regional issues, and the merits and dangers associated with the non-military uses of nuclear energy, despite many anxious words about the DPRK's dangerous brinkmanship, and despite reportedly productive "interactions" on issues such as improving the organisational and structural aspects of the NPT and its review process, this PrepCom is likely to be remembered chiefly for the increasingly public conflict that the Bush administration appears determined to generate with Iran.
Unfortunately, I was unable to produce any further interim reports in the second week because NGO, Press and observer access to diplomats, statements and working papers during all but the first two days of general debate was restricted more than at any time in my previous nine years of working with the UN, CTBT, NPT, or CD. This PrepCom was symbolised by the widening gulf between the honeyed rhetoric that UN officials and governmental representatives utter about civil society, and the actual reality of life on the ground for the NGOs and Press representatives, who have had to deal with ever narrower, more stringent interpretations of "the rules", the unfortunate assignment to this PrepCom of what must surely be the Palais des Nations' most badly-trained security guard (who lets down his much more courteous and considerate colleagues in Geneva, New York and Vienna), to enforce unprecedentedly strict instructions forbidding non-delegates to pick up working papers or cluster debate statements or to liaise with the diplomats as they milled about the conference room waiting for the tightly closed cluster sessions to begin. Through personal contacts and friendships I was able to obtain some information, but it was not enough for me to have sufficient confidence in my ability to represent accurately or effectively the themes and tenor of developments during this PrepCom.
I apologise to all those who have been waiting for my reports and especially to those who have contacted me and my colleagues asking what had happened to them. I am aware that, for many delegations and experts all over the world the publicly available reporting on these deliberations are few and far between. Over the next few weeks I hope to get hold of the majority of statements and papers, and will try to fill in the gaps in my overall report of the PrepCom, which - if I am successful - we intend to publish on the Acronym website and in Disarmament Diplomacy 71.
(This section should be read in conjunction with the text of the Chair's summary. Unless otherwise specified, all quotes are from my notes of this final, open session of the PrepCom, as few statements were distributed.)
Unlike the first PrepCom in 2002, Mólnár's summary was, to some extent negotiated, at least with some of the key states, which ensured that no-one would seek to block its attachment to the PrepCom report. It ran to 10 pages and 42 paragraphs. Various delegations were solicited to put in text on issues that they had identified as priorities, which were then checked out with other key states that Mólnár felt might have an objection. As a consequence (and notwithstanding the obligatory caveats made at the end), many references were substantially amended and/or watered down. However, the reception was generally favourable.
China, the first to respond, thanked the Chair for the factual summary "which we recognise is a difficult task" - (this acknowledgement was made in some form by almost all the speakers) - and said that the session had shown "that countries have different, even contradictory assessments" of the treaty's implementation. For China, balance had not been achieved on two main areas: DPRK and the urging in paragraph 17 to adhere to a moratorium on fissile materials production. Largely repeating its earlier statement on the DPRK, China said this was a "sensitive issue", reiterated its support for the Korean peninsula to be nuclear weapon free, and called for North Korea's "legitimate security concerns" to be addressed. China objected to calls for an "undefined and unverifiable moratorium" on fissile materials production, saying it preferred a "properly negotiated FMCT".
One might, therefore, have expected that the summary would contain a ringing call for the Conference on Disarmament to bypass its various blockages and commence negotiations on a fissban, but instead, paragraph 17 was very mealy mouthed, merely taking "note of a cross-group effort to develop a programme of work". Ambassador Mary Whelan of Ireland, current holder of the CD presidency, objected that this paragraph (a better version of which had reportedly suffered from French opposition) did not sufficiently acknowledge the initiative of the Five CD Ambassadors, "which many of us believe offers a way forward". Recognising, of course, that the Chair's summary was subjective and not consensual, Whelan emphasised that it did not reflect the weight given by states parties to various important issues.
The United States, which had been closely consulted on the text of much if not all the Chair's summary, also emphasised that the summary was "not an agreed or abiding text, but represented the Chair's view" and then reiterated many of the points that had been made in the US's first statement (and, reportedly, several other US statements, although these obtainable only to states parties during the PrepCom and so the reports of their contents cannot be substantiated). The US quoted paragraph 34, which dealt chiefly with Iran and the "importance of building confidence in the peaceful character of nuclear activities". The US said that the PrepCom had done more than call for Iran to sign the IAEA's Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540), arguing that it had "called on Iran to make full, truly transparent disclosure and compliance on all its NPT obligations".
Iran's careful response, a written version of which was also distributed, went beyond objecting to being named in the factual summary. Referring to Iran's own history in the past two decades of war and foreign pressure, the Director General for International Political Affairs, Mr Amir Zamaninia, commented on "the inability of the United States to view Iran's peaceful nuclear programme objectively, that is to say, separate from problems [in] our bilateral relations". Zamaninia compared the US approach to Israel -- "a proven and substantiated, established proliferator" and Iran, saying the US showed "double standards". Arguing that with seven separate interventions accusing Iran during this PrepCom, the US was attempting "to create a quasi-crisis", he wryly commented "frankly speaking, I could not bring myself to listening and reading more than the first three"! Iran objected that paragraph 34 of the Chair's summary was tantamount to a "prejudgement" and "namecalling" before the IAEA report on Iran (due in June) had come out. Reiterating some of the points made in Iran's General Debate statement and response to the first US broadside, Zamaninia referred to Iran's "desire and effort to become economically strong and be able to distribute prosperity, where we are not dependent only on the revenue from the sale of oil as a raw material". The Iranian delegation argued that it took questions about its nuclear programme seriously, and referred delegations to the statement by Reza Aghazadeh, Vice President, on "Iran's Nuclear Policy (Peaceful, Transparent, Independent)", delivered that the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on May 6, 2003 (which was also distributed).
The US also repeated its concern about Libya and stressed that the "Article IV benefits are not an entitlement". The UK followed the US lead in complaining that the language on Iran was weak , reiterating concern regarding the "scale, scope and lack of transparency" of Iran's programme, "as stressed by some 40 states parties", which is taken to include the EU and associated countries, as well as the US and Australia. The UK also applauded how the Chair had "handled DPRK", which was addressed in paragraph 28 with reference to "a wide range of concerns". The United States said that much more should have been said about the DPRK, for which there was only "one acceptable objective: the verifiable dismantlement of DPRK's nuclear programme [and] the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula." A few others, including Australia, UK and France emphasised this as well. South Korea fervently hoped that the attention paid to the DPRK-related nuclear issue would provide "favourable grounds for a peaceful resolution" of the crisis.
Although there were paragraphs covering reductions in nuclear weapons, the disposal of fissile materials, cooperative threat reduction, and the G-8 initiative, the United States said it would have liked to see a more positive report on such progress: "these achievements are truly remarkable and the factual summary should have reflected this better." The US took particular exception to paragraph 11, which emphasised commitment to the 13 steps, saying that the US had "made clear this year and last year that it does not support all the 13 steps". It also objected to the references to the ABM Treaty (para 15) and the CTBT (para 14), noting that it had exercised its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and was now "continuing our legal development of missile defences" and that contrary to the views of many, missile defences were "stabilising and enhanced deterrence". Furthermore, "the US does not support the CTBT and does not intend to proceed with ratification" but, reiterated, as stated at this PrepCom, that it is not pursuing further tests. As far as the US was concerned, there was no connection between slow progress on nuclear disarmament and the growth of proliferation threats, and "compliance with Articles II and III are at the NPT's heart".
Russia referred to Mólnár's "able and professional leadership", and said the summary sufficiently reflected the issues discussed. However, Russia objected to part of paragraph 26, which referred to remaining "unsolved questions regarding Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery". Russia considered that instead of merely taking note of the IAEA's readiness to resume its verification activities in Iraq (a phrasing that the US had reportedly insisted on) "a more accurate point would have reflected that some states parties welcomed the IAEA's readiness to resume its inspection activities in Iraq". Russia also insisted on reiterating points it has made at other times in the PrepCom about non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), disassociating itself with how this issue had been characterised in paragraph 16. Russia quoted from the 13 steps and underlined that the step on NSNW "should be implemented in a way that strengthens international stability and undiminished security" and that disassociating NSNW from other "weapons and security considerations does not reflect this step properly".
France was clearly well pleased when it referred to the "flawless flow" and "transparency" of Mólnár's chairing of the PrepCom. Saying "please don't interpret this as criticism", Ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle raised six points: that general and complete disarmament did "not have its due place as part of article VI"; that references to international stability and undiminished security had been omitted; that the references to negative security assurances (in paragraph 29) had not adequately reflected the reassertions of the 1995 assurances that had been made by four of the nuclear powers, including France; that the IAEA "deserved higher profile" (despite featuring positively in several paragraphs) and the full seriousness of the situation with regard to Iran had not been shown; that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were under-represented; and, finally, that most work was from English texts! Though the principal thrust of the EU intervention was to make supportive noises about the summary, commending Mólnár for his "outstanding efforts", Greece also referred to the "common goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament", only just avoiding a French-style assertion of a link that had been severed by the 2000 NPT Review Conference final document.
The UK argued that there was a lack of balance in some regards, especially in the "small mention" of the NWS' security assurances and, referring to paragraphs 17 and 18, the lack of mention that four of the 5 NWS had declared moratoria on fissile material production. Ambassador David Broucher also said that the UK disagreed with the thrust in paragraph 10, which had repeated assertions about transparency and accountability from the 2002 report.
By contrast, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, Ambassador Tim Caughley of New Zealand looked forward, saying that it was essential to give sufficient time to issues that states parties wanted to move forward and see accelerated progress on. The New Agenda would be redoubling its efforts at future meetings, especially with regard to the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, "a goal in itself, as well as being on the way towards complete and general disarmament". Egypt's Ambassador Naéla Gabr strongly endorsed New Zealand's points and went on to focus specifically on the references to the Middle East (paras 22, 24 and 25), saying that the importance of a nuclear weapon free zone and, also, a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, should not be underestimated or tied to specific kinds of regional or political developments. Germany endorsed the view that future meetings needed to develop "a more focussed approach". Brazil considered that the work had by and large been successful, but wanted to see more on the problems of nuclear disarmament and threats faced by the NPT regime.
Cuba made a strong call for nuclear disarmament, saying that the 13 steps are "obligatory" and should be honoured by all states parties. Cuba also argued that export controls, though an important element, should not be applied for political reasons. Uzbekistan felt that there should have been stronger reference to the welcoming of progress on a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, as noted in para 23. Malaysia, on behalf of the NAM, welcomed the accession of Timor Leste to the NPT, considered that progress should be continued in the future on both increased interaction and encouraging more states to report more fully. Japan specifically welcomed the participation of NGOs and appreciated Canada's work to enable better access for NGOs. Syria predictably ranted about Israel, objected to the reference to the roadmap in para 25, saying that "fulfilment of the NPT must not be conditional on anything else".
It was hard to escape the sense that NPT parties are now "going through the motions" of a review process rather than getting to grips with the real and serious proliferation challenges they face. Before making a more considered assessment, I will try to obtain more of the papers and documents, and so this will have to be delayed.
Rebecca Johnson, May 9, 2003
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.