Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT PrepCom 2003: Acronym Special Coverage

Introduction to the Second NPT PrepCom Meeting

The states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will hold their second preparatory committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2005 Review Conference in Geneva, April 28 to May 9, 2003.

This important treaty, which was extended indefinitely in 1995, faces some very serious challenges that will need to be addressed. As the PrepCom opens, it will represent 187 states parties, including Cuba, which acceded in November 2002. This should have brought the membership to 188, but the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, is now shrouded in political uncertainty and legal dispute - an issue certain to loom large at the meeting. Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the treaty on January 10. Under Article X of the NPT, the move should have been confirmed - making it the first ever withdrawal from the accord - three months later, on April 10. However, the state's clear violation of its obligations under the treaty prior to this time (and in the build-up to its January 10 withdrawal announcement) clearly complicates an already serious and vexed problem.

The first PrepCom, held in New York last year, papered over some substantial cracks and ended smoothly, but not before being nearly derailed by the refusal of France and the United States to accept a work programme that included reporting requirements agreed to in May 2000. (For more information see Rebecca Johnson, The 2002 PrepCom: Papering Over the Cracks? Disarmament Diplomacy 64 (May/June 2002); and William C. Potter, Mary Beth Nikitin and Tariq Rauf, Ambassador Henrik Salander on the 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee, The Nonproliferation Review 9 (Summer 2002).) Depending on the level of heat surrounding issues such as the Middle East, Iraq and North Korea, Geneva diplomats anticipate that the 2003 PrepCom will severely test the diplomatic and management skills of its designated Chair, Hungary's ambassador to the UN in New York, László Molnár. On the other hand, many delegations will be keen to demonstrate that the NPT and nonproliferation regime remain strong and effective, so will seek a balance between addressing the hard issues of compliance and nuclear disarmament and reinforcing the credibility of the review process. In particular, several key delegations have argued in pre-PrepCom meetings that it will be important for the NPT States Parties to respond to North Korea's threat to leave the treaty and develop its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, there are growing calls for the IAEA's strengthened safeguards and inspection practices, developed as an Additional Protocol after the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme in 1991, to be made mandatory on all NPT parties, a decision that could be recommended by the PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference to take.

As things stand, the second PrepCom is expected to hear a large number of national statements, first in a general debate and then in more specific cluster debates on disarmament, the so-called peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and safeguards. The Chair, Ambassador Molnár, will then have the task of presenting the tenor of the concerns back to the states parties in his "factual summary". Last year's Chair, Swedish ambassador Henrik Salander, succeeded in preventing negotiations to water down his summary, but several states - mainly the nuclear powers and Iraq - lodged objections to how their actions or views had been represented. They may therefore make it more difficult for Molnár to follow the same process.

The importance of issues will be gauged by the number of times they are raised (and the strength of the diplomatic language employed): the CTBT; the Resolution on the Middle East; universality; security assurances; new and emerging nuclear doctrines; the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals; and the 13 Steps on nuclear disarmament. There are likely to be attempts to produce a consensus statement condemning North Korea's withdrawal from its NPT commitments, and it will be interesting to note which states make coordination of such a statement difficult. Taking their lead from demands made by the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) last year, it is likely that some states will push for the debates and discussions to be more "interactive", but what will that mean in practice? Will delegations depart from current practice to ask questions about other states' reports or statements, and if so, will the questioned delegations reply substantively or seek to avoid interaction? The real question facing governments as they gather for the NPT PrepCom is how to become more effective in countering the serious threats to multilateralism, arms control and nonproliferation.

Different Expectations

US diplomats expected that the "aftermath of the Iraq situation" was likely to have an influence on the mood and conduct of the PrepCom, though much would depend on what had happened by then. They anticipated that in addition to the "usual arguments" over nuclear disarmament, the major issues were likely to be North Korea's announced defection from the treaty and negative security assurances, which South Africa or others from the group of nonaligned states are expected to raise. The Bush administration's doctrine of pre-emption, contained in the 2002 National Security Strategy, together with statements by senior British and American officials about nuclear weapons use in response to biological and chemical weapon threats, appear to contradict the existing security assurances. Consequently, this issue is likely to take a higher profile at the second PrepCom than it did last year.

Expressing concern that some states appear to want to pull back from the agreements made by the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the New Agenda Coalition clearly stressed the importance of the PrepCom building on the success of 2000, especially with regard to the Thirteen Steps on nuclear disarmament. They are particularly concerned to avoid any renegotiation and watering down of these agreements. The Thirteen Steps are a comprehensive set of principles and measures for nuclear disarmament that were agreed through a process of negotiations with the nuclear weapon states in which the New Agenda delegations played a decisive role. Framed in the context of the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals", the 13 Steps covered the CTBT, maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests, negotiating a ban on fissile materials for nuclear weapons, the principles of irreversibility and transparency in nuclear arms control, development of verification capabilities, and commitments to reduce tactical nuclear weapons and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that they would ever be used. Also included were references to supporting the START process and "preserving and strengthening" the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, both of which have collapsed following the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in June 2002.

Also of importance for the PrepCom, Step 12 called for "regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process" on the implementation of the NPT's disarmament obligations. Though fudged language enabled a compromise to be reached last year, it is likely that the question of reporting will be raised again in 2003. Dressed in procedural clothes, the issue is at heart political. Canada, which has played a leading role in arguing that reporting has been made obligatory, regards them as fundamental to the principle of accountability under the treaty, and would like to see all states submit a report on the actions they have taken to comply with and implement the treaty's provisions, so that progress can be tracked and problems can be more effectively (and collectively) addressed.

Rebecca Johnson will be attending the PrepCom and will provide an analysis of the developments and implications of the meeting in the June issue of Disarmament Diplomacy. In view of the kind of meeting this is likely to be, no useful purpose would be served by our producing daily summaries of the proceedings, but we will post any particularly interesting debates or developments during the meeting.

Click here for Rebecca Johnson's in-depth look at the challenges facing the non-proliferation regime, entitled Incentives, Obligations And Enforcement: Does the NPT Meet its States Parties' Needs? to be published in Disarmament Diplomacy 70 (April/May 2003)

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