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Rebecca Johnson
The first session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference of states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened on April 8, chaired by Henrik Salander, Sweden's ambassador to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The two-week meeting is the first since the 187 parties adopted far-reaching commitments on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in May 2000. It is also the first NPT meeting since the Bush Administration took over the US presidency in January 2001 and since the tragedies of September 11 and the subsequent inauguration of the "war against terrorism". This interim report provides an overview of the significant developments of the first week, followed by a brief summary of some of the substantive concerns and issues raised in debates and working papers.
There were few surprises in the opening debates, but the meeting nearly foundered in the first week when the United States, backed by France (and, rather reluctantly, the United Kingdom), refused to accept the Chair's work programme for the PrepCom. Their objection centred on the indicative timetable's mention of reports under sessions devoted to nuclear disarmament and regional issues. The final document of the 2000 NPT review conference had specified "regular reports" for both Article VI (disarmament) and implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. South Africa and Egypt took the lead in objecting to the US and its nuclear weapon allies' attempts to pick and choose which of the NPT obligations they would honour. In refusing to accede to the US demands, these two New Agenda countries were strongly backed by the non-aligned states (and, privately, many Western delegations as well). Though such disputes over language may seem arcane and trivial to people in the real world outside diplomacy, many at the PrepCom regarded the disagreement over "reports" as symbolic of the much wider problem of treaty commitments being reneged on and undermined.
Although discussion of substantive issues has been rather low key, many governments are deeply disturbed that the United States and some of the other nuclear weapon states are treating the consensus agreements of 1995 and 2000 as if they had been temporary and contingent. The very genuine worldwide horror and condemnation of the terrorist attacks of September 11 are now giving way to sullen anger as it appears that the Bush Administration has taken advantage of those tragedies to push through a hard-line, unilateralist foreign and military policy inconsistent with its international treaty obligations and threatening to the security interests of its allies and the rest of the world. Under the umbrella of post trauma bipartisanship in Washington, the Republican Party has moved swiftly to consolidate a partisan agenda devised long before September 2001. Desirous of helping the United States through the post 9/11 sense of shock and vulnerability, the allies have likewise kept quiet, hoping for an opportunity to voice their concerns without being perceived as hostile. Faced with a stark demarcation of "supporter or terrorist", underscored by President Bush's plangent declaration "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists", governments across the world have muted their criticism of US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, its trashing of the Kyoto Protocol to slow down climate change, declared opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and boycott of the November 2001 Special Conference on CTBT Entry into Force, its torpedoing of the Biological Weapons Convention verification protocol after more than six years of negotiations, and so on. The Bush Administration has taken the appalled silence for acquiescence. And indeed, such is its military, political and economic dominance, there is, in reality, little that non-Americans can do if Washington wants to pull away from the NPT commitments it freely agreed to a few years past, trash treaties it has signed, or even resume testing and modernise its nuclear arsenal or deploy space weapons in the future.
Reports and Accountability
One of the commitments undertaken in May 2000 (Article VI, paragraph 15 , subparagraph 12) was the provision of "Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process...on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) [1995]... and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 8 July, 1996". A similar commitment to reporting was made with regard to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East (paragraph 16, subparagraph 7). In including the reporting commitments in the relevant sections of his indicative timetable for the PrepCom, Salander did not anticipate problems, since the language had already been agreed in 2000 (and France had actually originated the suggestion for inclusion of reporting on the Middle East resolution). So when the United States, closely followed by France, suddenly refused to allow any mention of reports, other states perceived this as yet another example of rolling back the NPT commitments previously agreed to. Some felt that if they couldn't even hold onto a procedural decision taken in May 2000, they might as well close up the NPT shop.
After Salander threatened to adjourn the PrepCom indefinitely if the parties were unable to agree a timetable, a compromise was found whereby the discussions on Article VI were to be conducted in the context of the "agreements, conclusions and commitments" listed in the 2000 NPT final document, while discussions on regional issues were to include "commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions" in accordance with the relevant sections agreed in 1995 and 2000. Furthermore, the Chair made a statement on the record to the effect that none of this parsing of language could be construed as altering the status of the 1995 and 2000 documents and agreements. Honour was apparently satisfied, with both sides claiming moral and political victory, and so the PrepCom moves into its second week. Salander has increased his authority as Chair, viewed as having skilfully prevented the argument from holding up the meeting (he insisted that discussion should proceed until Friday unless any State specifically objected (which none did), while the main protagonists worked at getting agreement. If they failed by Friday, he said he would table his second "and final" proposal for a timetable, giving them until Monday to agree or come up with an acceptable alternative. Arguing that the PrepCom could not function effectively without an agreed timetable and work programme, Salander showed that he was prepared to take a risk by threatening to adjourn the PrepCom indefinitely if no agreement had been reached by Monday 10 am. If that had happened, it is not clear what the consequences would have been for the second and third PrepComs, scheduled for 2003 and 2004. Whether due to this threat or a realisation of the ultimate absurdity of their objections, the problem was resolved before the weekend.
But what was it all about? Why did the United States get so upset about reporting? Some speculated that the timetable had gone to John Bolton, the State Department's principal opponent of multilateralism, who had decided that reporting and accountability were inconsistent with US sovereignty and prestige (or perhaps he just enjoyed flexing his superpower muscles). There is as yet no confirmation of who dug their heels in or why, but it all seems very peculiar when the United States had been the first to provide a report to the NPT PrepCom in 1998. By 1999, it had been joined by all but China; and by 2000 all the Nuclear-5 presented reports, though they different widely in content and coverage. Even as it blocked mention of reports, the United States provided an "information paper" on its approach to article VI to this PrepCom.
None of the Nuclear-5, however, want the reports to be linked with compliance, an issue they only want raised in relation to non-nuclear weapon states like Iraq, and none seems willing to be questioned or challenged on the content of their reports (though NGOs outside the closed sessions offer line-by-line critiques, made available to delegations). Was this the problem? Did the Nuclear-5 fear that including the obligation to report within the timetabled description of the subject matter to be addressed in particular sessions would result in their lists of proclaimed virtue becoming a topic for discussion? Russia and China, which kept very clear of the debate, were said to be equally unhappy that the adjective "regular" might set a precedent for annual, standardised reporting. Despite its own reported misgivings, Russia played the political tactic of pointedly providing a rather useful report under subparagraph 12 of its steps taken to fulfil Article VI, which even contained some new information on its intentions to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons. Britain, which had proudly reported on its disarmament-related steps in previous years, seemed at a loss to explain why - other than P-3 solidarity - it was backing the United States now, having raised no demur when it first saw the timetable. By Monday, it was clear that most delegations still did not understand the basis of the objections to reporting, and most felt that the United States and France had lost face. Certainly, their objections served to draw greater attention to the reporting commitment, providing further evidence of a desire to pick and choose which of the comprehensive agreements previously undertaken they now want to adhere to, which is no way to infuse credibility into an already shaken non-proliferation regime.
Two common themes ran through many of the opening statements: terrorism and compliance. Views differed sharply, however, about how these connected with the NPT's non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The United States surprised no-one by placing heavy emphasis on terrorism, especially keeping nuclear weapons and nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists, and on compliance, citing violations by Iraq and North Korea. Others also noted the increased awareness of terrorist threats but stressed the role of multilateral treaties and disarmament in defeating terrorism, and the need for full compliance with the treaty, including the disarmament commitments made in 1968 and spelled out in 1995 and 2000. While the vast majority of general debate statements stressed the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), many also referred explicitly or obliquely to concerns about the US nuclear posture review's consideration of new nuclear weapons and the possible resumption of nuclear testing. In the special disarmament debates, however, more emphasis was given by more delegations to reducing non-strategic (so-called "tactical") nuclear weapons than at any previous review conference.
Inevitably, particularly in light of the terrible events unfolding in the Middle East, Israel's continued possession of nuclear weapons was strongly condemned, mainly but not exclusively by Arab delegations. Less was said about India and Pakistan, which had shocked the world with nuclear tests in May 1998. Where the European Union (EU) remained "deeply concerned" about South Asia and called on India and Pakistan to meet the requirements of UN SC 1172 (June 1998), the United States seemed to set a tone of acquiescence, calling only for "restraint" in the nuclear programmes of the four non-NPT parties (Cuba, which has nothing significant, India, Israel and Pakistan) and calling on them to "protect against the proliferation of technology and materials to others seeking nuclear weapons".
US "generally agrees" NPT 2000 commitments
The United States raised the temperature of concern about the future of the nonproliferation regime by saying in its opening statement that it only "generally agrees" with the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In a further statement, CD ambassador Eric Javits pointed out that "we no longer support some of the Article VI conclusions in the Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review Conference"; he specifically cited the ABM Treaty and called the CTBT "another example of a treaty we no longer support". The CTBT was enshrined in the preamble of both the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the NPT when it was signed in 1968. Endorsement by all the NPT parties of the US Senate requirement to conclude a CTBT by 1996 was viewed as an indispensable part of the bargain that brought about the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and a further clear statement of support for the CTBT's early entry into force was included as the first of 13 steps identified in the May 2000 plan of action on nuclear disarmament. Javits sought to explain the new US nuclear posture and listed steps taken to reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons. He responded to criticism over security assurances by baldly stating "There is no change in US negative security assurances towards NPT non-nuclear weapon states". He also reiterated support for the US moratorium on nuclear testing and declared that "the United States has no plans for a resumption of nuclear testing". It is to be hoped that the difference between having plans and keeping options open is wider than the unclassified reading of the Nuclear Posture Review might suggest.
New Agenda, Non-Aligned and EU
In its opening statement, supplemented by a more detailed working paper, Egypt, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of seven non-nuclear countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) gave a very negative and disappointed appraisal of the lack of progress in meeting the commitments made in the 2000 Review Conference. Reiterating that the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility should be applied to all disarmament measures, the New Agenda called for the nuclear weapon states to give legally binding security assurances and make no-first-use commitments. In reference to the mixed messages from the United States and Russia regarding the proposals put forward at the Crawford Summit, the New Agenda said they welcomed any reduction in the operational status of deployed nuclear weapons, but they underlined that such measures "cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts and the total elimination of nuclear weapons". Further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons were identified as a priority, and concerns were raised about missile defence developments and the "risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space".
The same concerns were reinforced by Indonesia, who represented the views of more than 100 non-aligned states party to the NPT. They stressed the urgency and importance of achieving universality and full compliance with the Treaty and underlined the importance of the 13 steps and principles, individually and collectively. The EU statement gave emphasis to implementation of those NPT steps that it had particularly advocated in 2000, such as non-strategic nuclear weapons and the principles of transparency and irreversibility. It gave one of the more resounding endorsements to the CTBT (which all EU members have ratified), urging "all states with nuclear capabilities to abide by a moratorium and refrain from any actions which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT". The EU also argued that the bilateral negotiations between Russia and the United States should be "swiftly embodied into a legally binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency". The EU also issued copies of the September 21, 2001 conclusions on concrete measures relating to terrorism and non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Separate statements and working papers from individual EU countries, including Britain, France and Germany, will be covered in later postings.
Russia
Russia agreed with the United States that terrorism and proliferation constituted real and great dangers: "That is why enhancement of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is the most important integral part of combating terrorism". New measures to counteract new challenges and threats should not compete with traditional disarmament and non-proliferation aspects of security, but make them more comprehensive. Later, the Russian delegation gave its report on Article VI in accordance with the recommendations disputed by the United States and France. Amongst its list of various measures to reduce its nuclear arsenal, Russia emphasised its ratification of the CTBT and hoped that the United States would reconsider its position to avoid a "crisis" not only of the CTBT but of the related regimes based around that treaty. Russia reiterated its objections to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty "guided by considerations of maintenance and enhancement of international law foundations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". Noting that it had ratified START II and agreed to reduce strategic weapons to 1,700-2,200 warheads, Russia declared itself "prepared to implement even more radical reductions". Russia devoted several paragraphs to opposing the further militarisation and placement of weapons in outer space. Far from being unavoidable, Russia feared that the weaponisation of space would be "fraught with unpredictable consequences for the process of arms control, strategic stability and international security as a whole". Russia supported initiatives from China and Canada aimed at negotiating further space treaties, and proposed that there should be a moratorium on putting "combat objects" into space, pending the elaboration and agreement on appropriate international arrangements. To the surprise of many, Russia also devoted considerable time to spelling out some initiatives it was undertaking further to reduce its arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons, promising "to complete implementation of the initiatives in the sphere of [non-strategic nuclear weapons] by 2004 on condition of adequate financing. In a familiar challenge to NATO, which still deploys some 200 US tactical nuclear weapons in seven European countries (six of which are designated non-nuclear weapon states), Russia proposed that "all the nuclear weapons should be brought back to the territories of the nuclear states to which they belong".
China
Like others, China agreed that the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terror had become even more important and urgent. In its statements, China reiterated its familiar positions on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, no first use and its "minimum level" nuclear arsenal. With regard to the NPT, China listed "new negative developments" and noted that some important provisions had been breached. Saying that the documents from the NPT review process, especially from 1995 and 2000, must be "faithfully implemented", China stated: "Nuclear weapon states should continue their moratoria on nuclear explosive tests, persevere with CTBT ratification and entry into force, refrain from the development of new types of nuclear weapons, and provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states unconditionally."
These excerpts are not intended to be comprehensive, but are chosen because they are useful, interesting or significant. Further excerpts or précis will be posted as soon as possible.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.